LABOUR MIGRATION FROM MOZAMBIQUE TO SOUTH AFRICA; with special reference to the Delagoa Bay hinterland, c. 1862 to 1897

Patrick Harries

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

February, 1983

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

ABSTRACT

Numerous studies have portrayed migrant labour in South Africa as a mechanism of super-exploitation whereby capital, in alliance with the state, had only to pay the worker a bachelor wage because of his subsistence base in the rural areas. Migrant labour was thus synonymous with underdevelopment.

This thesis postulates that the origins of migrant labour cannot be sought in these terms. Because of the highly competitive nature of the labour market during the 19th century, employers were concerned only with securing an adequate supply of labour. Much of this labour was drawn from geographically distant areas because the local population was able to market the product of its labour rather than the labour itself. Weak and impecunious colonial and republican states were hesitant to intervene directly in the labour market and did so only during times of economic expansion or when a non-interventionist policy threatened the stability of the state.

In the second part of the thesis, which deals with the Delagoa Bay hinterland of Mozambique, it is argued that a migrant form of labour arose out of the needs of the rural community rather than those of mining capital. Wages became the nutrient for survival in a harsh environment and compensated in some measure for the dissolution of old forms of livelihood such as hunting and trading. Migrant labour and rural production were intimately linked and the ability of migrants to determine their wage level and the incidence of migrancy was dependent on the viability of the rural economy. It was only after the colonial conquest of southern Mozambique in 1895-97 that workers were partially alienated from their means of production - a move that brought down the cost of Mozambican mine labour and that furnished the Portuguese with a highly marketable commodity.

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to a number of institutions without whose help this thesis would not have been completed. To my old high school for a Rondebosch Overseas Scholarship. To the University of Cape Town for a three year grant and a years leave in which to complete the final draft. My special thanks must go to the University's Centre for African Studies which has provided me with both financial assistance and a stimulating intellectual environment. I was also the recipient of a Human Sciences Research Council grant.

Numerous people have helped this thesis at various stages.David Killick collected oral evidence for me when I was refused entry into Gazankulu by the Department of Co-operation and Development. Richard Mendelsohn, Andrew Spiegel, Sheila Meintjies and Christopher Saunders kindly battled through draft chapters. Marcia Wright helped with advice and friendship. Patricia Davison made me aware of the importance of material culture and Susan Newton-King was always ready to offer advice and assistance. Mariette Ouwerhand and Pierre Cuenod of the Swiss Mission were particularly helpful.

David Birmingham supervised the thesis from its inception and provided me with guidance, encouragement and friendship. Shula Marks and her students at the School of Oriental and African Studies were a constant source of inspiration. Robin Hallett first made me, and many others, aware of Africa's history.He has become a father,friend and teacher to me and it is to him that this thesis is dedicated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF MAPS

ABBREVIATIONS

ABB	Albasini letterbook, Transvaal archives
ABM	American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
ACU	Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino
AHU	International Journal of African Historical Studies
BMB	Berliner Missionsberichte
BMSAS	Bulletin de la Mission Suisse en Afrique du Sud
BO	Boletim Oficial de Moçambique
Bol. Soc. Estudos Moç.	Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique
BPP	British Parliamentary Papers
BSGL	Boletim da Sociedade de Geógrafia de Lisboa
BSNG	Bulletin de la Société Neuchâteloise de Géographie
CA	Cape Archives
CCL	(Cape) Commissioner for Crown Lands
CCM	Chambre de Commerce, Marseilles
CG	Correspondência de Governadors
CGP	Consulate-General of Portugal, Pretoria
Ch	Chamber (of Mines)
CMAR	Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports
Col. Sec.	Colonial Secretary , Natal
CPC	Consulate-General of Portugal, Cape Town
CPWD	Cape Public Works department
CSO	Colonial Secretary's office, Natal
encl.	enclosure
EVR	(Eerste) Volksraad (Legislature), Transvaal
FO	Foreign Office
G	Governor
GH	Government House, Natal
GLM	Governor of Lourenço Marques
GGM	Governor-general of Mozambique
Gov.	Governor's office, Transvaal
HA	House of Assembly, Cape Town
HE	Herman Eckstein archives, Wernher-Beit Group
IAC	Immigration Agent, Cape Town
ICE	Industrial Commission of Enquiry, Transvaal 1897
II	Indian Immigration department, Natal
JAH	Journal of African History
JC	Junod Collection, University of South Africa

JICH	Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
JRGS	Journal Royal Geographical Society
JSA	James Stuart Archive, Killie Campbell Library
JSAS	Journal of Southern African Studies
KCL	Killie Campbell Library, Durban
LC	Legislative Council, Natal
MNE	Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Foreign Office), Lisbon
Moç	Mozambique
MSMU	Ministerio e Secretariado de Marinha e Ultramar (Colonial Office), Lisbon
NA	Natal Archives
NBB	Natal Blue Books
nc	Native commissioner
n.d.	no date
NGG	Natal Government Gazette
NPP	Natal Parliamentary Papers
NZASM	Netherlands South African Railway Co.
OHSA	Oxford History of South Africa (eds.) M. Wilson & L.M. Thompson
PI	Protector of Immigrants, Natal
PRO	Public Records Office
Pro	Proceedings (of the Royal Geographical Society)
RGS	Royal Geographical Society
Rep	Repartição
RM	Resident Magistrate
RSEA	Records of South-East Africa (9 vols.) (ed.) G.M. Theal
SAAR	South African Archival Records
SAAS	South African Association for the Advancement of Science
SAAYB	South African Archival Yearbook
SAJS	South African Journal of Science
SBA	Standard Bank Archives, Johannesburg
SGO	Surveyor-General's office, Natal
SMA	Swiss Mission Archive, Lausanne
SN	Secretary for Native Affairs, Transvaal
SNA	Secretary for Native Affairs, Natal
SP	State President, Transvaal
SS	State Secretary, Transvaal
SSa	State Secretary, Foreign Affairs, Transvaal
Supt	Superintendent
TLC	Transvaal Labour Commission, 1904
UNISA	University of South Africa
UR	Uitvoerende Raad (Executive Council), Transvaal

USPG	United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
USSCo	Union Steam Ship Company
WUL	Witwatersrand University Library
ZAR	South African Republic
ZGH	Government House, Zululand

MAP NO. 1. MAJOR LABOUR ROUTES FROM SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE TO SOUTH AFRICA



PART I

CAPITAL, THE STATE AND THE ORIGINS OF MIGRANT LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

The study of the genesis of a black working-class in South Africa has been strongly influenced by Marx's experience of a British labour force created by primitive accumulation and the separation of the worker from his means of production.[1] This has resulted in the belief that migrant labour emerged in South Africa as either an exotic anomaly to the "norm" of proletarianization or as an organic function of the super-exploitation that has characterized the historical development of capital in the country.[2] In this latter context it has been convincingly argued that following the 1913 Land Act a migrant labour system was purposefully implemented by the state in alliance with capital in order to secure a supply of cheap labour. This was achieved through the maintenance of labour reserves where rural production provided social security for workers and served as a supplement to below-subsistence industrial wages.[3] But a new orthodoxy has emerged as a number of researchers have sought the origins of migrant labour in capital's attempt to minimize labour costs. The central role of the state in this analysis has been recently succintly summarized by two economists who claimed that

> "South African capitalist development was predicated on a system of migrant labour, in which male workers were forced out to work on the farms and the mines by the systematic destruction of the rural base through conquest and expropriation and by taxation. The existence of rural "labour reserves" enabled the farmers and the mines in the critical early stages of their development to reap

---

1. K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, chapters 26-32.
2. On the historiography of migrant labour cf. Francis Wilson, Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969 (Cambridge, 1972), 120-139; David R. Massey, "Labour migration and rural development in Botswana" (PhD., Boston University, 1981), 5-35.
3. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid", Economy and Society, 1, 4, 1972; M. Legassick, "South Africa: Capital accumulation and violence", Economy and Society, 3, 3, 1974.

> a sort of super-profit through the payment of labour at a level below its reproduction cost - the rest of the cost being borne by the peasant economy."[4]

This interpretation of the origins of migrant labour has little historical basis and, largely dominated by sociologists and economists who have transformed contemporary function into historical cause, is challenged throughout this thesis. Part I disputes the view of the state as the historical handmaiden of capitalists conspiring to use its legislative and administrative powers, organized violence and revenues to increase and control the numbers of workers entering the market while concurrently effecting a reduction in their wages. Instead the picture is presented of a highly competitive form of capital, of employers who had no co-ordinated labour policy and of poorly developed colonial and republican states that were more concerned with paying for their own administration than in reducing capital's wage costs. Caught between Imperial, humanitarian, administrative and mercantile interests, a dynamic African peasantry and the labour needs of various sectors of the economy, these states were not the expression of any one dominant class interest. The result was a hesitant and highly ambiguous response to calls from capital for the state to intervene in the labour market.

---

4. Dudley Horner and Alide Kooy, "Conflict on South African mines, 1972-1979", SALDRU Working Paper 29 (University of Cape Town, 1980). For a similar view, cf. Norman Levy, The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System (London, 1982), 19-20, 22, 24-5, 29; E. Webster, "Background to the supply and control of labour in the gold mines", in E. Webster (ed.) Essays in South African Labour History (Johannesburg, 1978), 9-12; F. Molteno, "The historical significance of the Bantustan strategy", Social Dynamics, III, 2, 1977, 16-18; M. Morris, "The development of capitalism in South Africa", Journal of Development Studies, XII, 1976, 285, 288-9; N. Nbcasana, "The politics of migrant labour", S.A. Labour Bulletin, I, 8, 1978, 24. In Mozambique a similar analysis has been employed by Marvin Harris, "Labour emigration among the Mozambican Tonga: cultural and political factors", Africa, XXIX, 1, 1959 and A. Rita-Ferreira, O Movimento Migratorio de Trabalhadores entre Moçambique e a África do Sul (Lisbon, 1963), 73. Probably the leading exponent of this view is Claude Meillassoux, "From production to reproduction: a Marxist approach to economic anthropology", Economy and Society, 1, 1972, 103; "The social organization of the peasantry" in David Seddon (ed.) Relations of Production (London, 1978), 168; Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux (Paris, 1975), 148, 165-6. See also Samir Amin, Modern Migrations in West Africa (Oxford, 1974), 110.

Chapter 1

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE EMERGENCE OF A MIGRATORY LABOUR FORCE FROM MOZAMBIQUE: 1858 to 1875

In the three years following 1849, some 5 000 British colonists settled in the district of Natal and transformed the basis of the economy from hunting and trading to plantation production.[1] By 1857 the European population stood at 8 000 and a regular supply of labour, in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the coastal plantations, had become a vital factor in the development of an export economy and consequently, in the emergence of Natal as a settler colony. Natal planters blamed the failure of their experiment with cotton cultivation on the uncertain labour supply and they feared that a similar fate would befall the fledgling sugar industry.[2]

Sugar cultivation required the employment of a nucleus of experienced workers supplemented by less-skilled workers at particular times of the year. In preparing the soil, the ground had to be broken up and a good tilth achieved. Canes were then cut and ratoons were planted in the spring in order to take advantage of the summer rains. During the spring and summer months, much labour had to be expended on hoeing and weeding fields in order to protect the young stalks. During this period farmers needed a permanent supply of labour as local workers returned home to plant their maize crops. Before the cane was cut it had to be carefully stripped of its leaves, which had then to be removed from the foot of the plant, or gradually fired, in order to prevent the cane from being cut too high. If this happened the canes retained too much water relative to their more mature and sucrose-rich lower parts. An inexperienced worker could also damage the roots of the plant by cutting the cane too low. During the dry winter months of July-September the work force had to be augmented by 25-35% as

---

1. A.F. Hattersley, The British Settlement of Natal, 315.
2. H.D. Dennyssen, "Labour Policy of Natal, 1852-1874" (MA, UCT, 1926), 1.

the canes had to be cut when the water absorbed during the summer had sunk to the roots and the sucrose level was at its highest. Late cut cane was of little use for planting as it gave few ratoons. After cutting, the canes had to be transported within two days to the mills in order to prevent fermentation from setting in. Thus there was a concentration of labour demand in the winter in order to harvest and crush the cane. If this was not efficiently done, the capital goods in which the planters had invested large amounts of money, such as crushing mills, machinery, buildings and waterworks, stood idle.[3] This was forcefully brought home when in 1855 Natal's first steam mill had to close down due to an insufficient supply of labour.[4]

The root of the labour supply problem lay in the continued existence of the ties that bound Natal Africans to a means of subsistence independent of wage labour. One farmer compared Natal African labour to that of seasonal Irish labour employed during the harvesting period in England,

> "They do not like to be long engaged for now (October 1850) they will rarely stop more than a month or two at one place at a time, but when their engagements are concluded they will return up the country to their Kraals and perhaps remain there two or three months before they seek fresh engagement."[5]

This impression was confirmed by a Government official who in 1855 noted that

---

3. The problems of sugar farming were frequently referred to in letters and diaries. Cf. SNA 1/1/7 Shires o.a. memorialists to SNA, 10 Dec., 1857;SNA 1/1/8 Jeffels to SNA, 20 May 1858; SNA 1/1/9 Middleton to SNA 3 Sept., 1859; Jeffels to SNA, 28 Sept., 1859; KCL. Letters of J. Ecroyd, Emigrant to Natal, 1850-1853;KCL., E. Feildon diary, 1853-1856; KCL., Davidson diary 1867-1870.

4. B.J. Leverton, "Government Finance and Political Development in Natal, 1843 to 1893", PhD. UNISA, 1968, 47.

5. KCL., Letters of J. Ecroyd, 53.

> "a considerable proportion of (the Natal African population) are by no means disinclined to labour, or unwilling to render it to the planters, but upon their own terms and at their own times.... They are ready to work for two or three months at a time, but they then insist upon returning to their locations, and the planter can never count upon seeing them again at any definite time. Such irregular and unskilled labour does not suit the planter and jeopardizes the success of all his undertakings."[6]

In order to force labour onto the market the pro-settler Native Affairs Commission recommended in 1853 that the colonial government intervene in the labour supply by breaking up and reducing the size of the locations.[7]

African Dominance of the Cereals Market and the Genesis of the Natal Planters' Labour Problem

Settler calls for government intervention in the labour supply became more virulent when in 1856 Natal was finally separated from the Cape and was given a Legislative Council with a degree of representative government. But the control exercised by the settlers over African administration, and hence over the local labour marker, was restricted by the structure of the executive. This determined that the administration of European affairs by the colonial secretary was strictly segregated, both politically and financially, from African affairs, which were the concern of the secretary for Native Affairs. Ultimate control over the administration of Europeans and Africans was vested in the local representative of the Imperial government, the Lieutenant-governor.[8] Thus the department of the secretary for Native Affairs constituted an *imperium in imperio*, and for various reasons, was able to thwart settler attempts to gain a "regular" labour force drawn from Natal's African population.

In the early 1850s, direct African taxation contributed between a third and, if seen in terms of benefits received, in excess

---

6. Rawson W. Rawson to Sec. of Government of India, 17 Dec., 1855 quoted in D. Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, 180.
7. Natal Native Affairs Commission (NAC), 1852-53, 27.
8. Leverton, "Government Finance", 86.

of a half of all Natal's revenues.[9] During the first three months of 1850, when there was an acute shortage of cash in Natal, the state was able to extort from the African population, for the first time, £1,100 in hut tax.

By the end of the year, £5 241 in sterling had been collected together with a further £3 590 in kind.[10] This totalled almost as much as the entire revenue of the colony in 1848[11] and is a reflection of both the wealth of African peasants and of the extent of their involvement in the market. In 1856 African direct taxation provided the treasury with £10 403 and by 1864 hut tax returns totalled £19 902.[12] The importance of the contribution made by Africans to the Natal revenue was underlined when an increased import duty levied on beads and blankets supplied the government with the funds needed to import Indian labour.[13] African taxes allowed an expansion of the civil service, from 20 in 1846 to 75 a decade later and allowed the district to balance its budget and repay its loans to the Cape Colony.[14] Thus, ironically, it was largely revenue from the sale of the products of African labour that provided the settlers with the prerequisites for limited representative government in 1856. Because of the successful way in which Africans produced and marketed crops, the Natal government initially fostered the production of cash crops such as cotton and sugar by Africans in the locations.[15] These experiments achieved

---

9. BPP 1859 XLV, "Correspondence between the Governor and Colonial Office relating to the £5,000 Reserved for Disposal of the Crown and Correspondence regarding the Growth of Cotton by Natives, 1857-60", Lt.-governor Scott to Labouchere, 4 June 1857; L. Young, "The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal 1850-1855", SAAYB, 1951, II, 236; Leverton, "Government Finance", 60.

10. Young, "Native Policy", 234; Leverton, "Government Finance", 58, 96, 112.

11. Young, "Native Policy", 61, 64.

12. Ibid., 101.

13. L.M. Thompson, "Indian Immigration into Natal, 1860-1872", SAAYB, 1952, II, 14.

14. Young, "Native Policy", 61, 64.

15. BPP. 1850, "Correspondence relating to the Establishment of the Settlement of Natal", 133-4; D. Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 21, 186-87.

little success as Africans invested their energy in the production of marketable foodstuffs and came to dominate, from an early period, the domestic and export markets for cereals.[16]

Unlike the recently arrived English settlers, Africans were particularly familiar with the production of maize and sorghum and had access to the labour of their womenfolk, children and extended kin. They were also able to farm extensive areas of free, albeit infertile, land in the locations and were able to work white-owned land by entering into cash or labour tenancy relationships with absentee landlords and undercapitalized settlers. Large numbers of African farmers occupied unsurveyed, so-called Crown land while others settled on mission farms. Thus African farmers occupied large areas of land both in and outside of the locations and as early as 1849 exported "large quantities" of maize to the Cape and monopolized the Pietermaritzburg maize market.[17] Officials of the Native Affairs department expressed their admiration for African agriculture and the secretary for native affairs stated in 1862 that although Africans were willing to produce crops for the world market, they found the production of maize more profitable.[18] This is supported by official government statistics which show that, throughout the 19th century, the production of maize, millet and sorghum by African farmers far out-stripped their European contemporaries.[19] Conversely white farmers, through their access to capital and international markets were largely able to monopolize the export sector.[20]

---

16. For an alternative perspective, cf. ibid., 183, 187. See also E. Brookes and N. Hurwitz, The Native Reserves of Natal, 83; OHSA I, 387.

17. Campbell to Christopher, 16 May 1849 in J.S. Christopher Natal, Cape of Good Hope, 67; H. Slater, "The changing pattern of economic relationships in rural Natal, 1838-1914", in S. Marks & A. Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, 156; NAC, Report, 27; T. Phipson, Letters of a Natal Sheriff, ed. R.N. Currey, (Cape Town, 1968), 130-132.

18. H.F. Fynn in D. Moodie, The Natal Kafir Question, 80-81, 87; Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 186.

19. See figures 2 & 3 on pp 83, 84. These figures, taken from the "Agriculture" section of the Natal Blue Books, are probably highly inaccurate. They are however of impressionistic value.

20. Norman Etherington, "African economic experiments in Colonial Natal, 1845-1880", Africa Economic History, 6, 1978, 6; Peter Richardson, "The Natal sugar industry 1849-1905: an interpretative essay", Journal of African History, 23, 4, 1982, 519, 521.

The unwillingness of the Executive to break up the rural locations was based partly on a shortage of administrative personnel to replace chiefs in the reserves and partly on fears that the alienation of land reserved for Africans would undermine Shepstone's power and involve Imperial troops in an expensive rebellion.[21] Of perhaps greater importance was the fear that, by tampering with the locations, the government would disturb African production and thus disrupt the major source of revenue for the Natal treasury. Shepstone was adamant in his opinion that "reducing the size of the locations would be a dangerous experiment" and that "so crowding the Kaffirs as to compel them to leave their locations and seek work (is) objectionable".[22] It was also generally realized that the dismantling of the locations could not be achieved without a substantial increase in the British military presence and hence in the costs, to the Imperial government, of colonizing Natal. Discriminatory taxes passed by the Legislative Council in order to force Africans onto the market were often disallowed. Thus a 1s tax on all imported hoes was rejected by the Imperial government because it threatened to impede the development of African agriculture.[23] Similar attempts to raise the hut tax and transfer the Native Reserve Fund to the Legislative Council were blocked by the Executive as it was feared that they would give rise to political disturbances.[24] Although legislation was passed to prohibit "squatting" on Crown lands and to curb African rent tenancies, these measures were not enforced.

Absentee landlords and speculative land companies, who in the 1850s and 1860s leased to Africans five-sixths of all European-owned land, were protective of African peasant enterprise and supported the retention of Africans on the land as rent payments yielded the best return on their land investments.[25] Many

---

21. Leverton, "Government Finance", 121-122; Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 21-22, 27-28.

22. Moodie, Kafir Question, 86-87. See also similar conclusions in the evidence of magistrate Peppercorn, 88, 89, 128.

23. Leverton, "Government Finance", 100.

24. Ibid., 101, 112; Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 26.

25. H. Slater, "Land, labour and capital in Natal: the Natal Land and Colonization Company 1860-1948" in JAH, XVI, 2, 1975, 259-62, 272-73.

undercapitalized, up-country farmers, who had bought extensive tracts of land at low prices, found that their best means of procuring farm workers was to allow African tenants to occupy a part of the farm in exchange for a fixed amount of labour.[26] The terms of these labour tenancy relationships favoured African farmer-workers as the up-country farmers had to compete for labour with the coastal planters who were able to pay considerably higher wages. Missionary interests encouraged African christians to produce and market their crops.[27] Similarly, traders who dealt in African farm produce and planters who needed maize and millet to feed their growing labour force provided Africans with a market for their crops and in so doing neutralized any moves aimed at their proletarianization. Thus because of the viability of Natal's peasant economy and because of the benefits that this brought to the colony, African petty commodity producers were protected from having to sell their labour for extended periods. Forced labour for public works (isibalo) and taxation that discriminated in favour of Africans employed on white farms, did little to ease the settlers' "labour problem".[28] In 1856-57, of the 30 000 African workers needed by the colony of Natal, only 6 000 to 10 000 were drawn at any one time from the local population.[29]

Pressures on the Natal Colonial State to Abandon its Neutrality and Intervene Directly in the Labour Market

In order to resolve the "labour question", the Colonial government in Natal agreed to facilitate the introduction of foreign labour as a temporary measure until such time as population pressures

---

26. SNA 1/3/8 Resident Magistrate, Weenen to Shepstone, 4 Oct., 1849; Natal Native Commission, 1881-82, 10; Slater, "Land, labour and capital", 265, 272.

27. N. Etherington, Preachers, peasants and politics in South-east Africa, 1835-1880 (London, 1978).

28. Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 123-24; N. Etherington, "Labour supply and the genesis of South African confederation in the 1870s", JAH, 20, 2, 1979.

29. SNA 1/8/6 SNA to Resident Magistrates, 6 Dec., 1856; Natal Mercury, 30 April 1857.

in the reserves and new consumer desires would drive Natal Africans onto the labour market. Public appeals for the introduction of foreign labour were first made before the Native Affairs Commission of 1852-53 and were followed by letters to the press.[30] In order to avoid the political complications arising from the uncontrolled entry and movement into the colony of landless Zulu "refugees", many of whom were merely returning to their areas of origin, they were subjected to three year indentures and the introduction of labour without the permission of the Lt.-governor was strictly prohibited.[31] From 1854 to 1864, some 7 194 Zulus sought refuge south of the Tugela. These "refugees" included a number of "amatongas" who were probably Maputos as the colonists claimed that they were escaping Zulu oppression and that they often adopted the Zulu language and habits in order to avoid the aprobrium attached to the name Tonga. As "Zulu refugees" they were then indentured for three years.[32] However, this scheme of refugee apprenticeship proved unfeasible. Four thousand refugees entered Natal in 1856 when Cetewayo defeated his brother to become the undisputed heir to the Zulu throne. But of these, only 1 588 were indentured and of this number, more than two-thirds absconded when peace returned to Zululand.[33] This caused the planters to turn to the government to alleviate their labour problems by assisting in the importation of foreign workers.[34] But

---

30. NAC., Proceedings, pt. 1, p. 54, evidence Spies; pt. 2, p. 47, Archbell; pt. 5, p. 77, Fonn; pt. 6, p. 49 Cleghorn; Natal Mercury, 7 March 1856.

31. Ordinance 4, 12 March 1855. "To prevent Natives being brought into this District", W.J. Dunbar Moodie, Ordinances, Proclamations, etc., relating to the colony of Natal 1836 to 1855, vol. 1, 450.

32. Sessional Documents presented to the Legislative Council, no. 33, 1865; SAAR, Natal no. 4, May 1853, 110; SNA 1/3/4 Res. magis. Tugela to SNA, 14 Nov., 1855; SNA 1/3/8 Verulam magistrate to SNA, 29 Nov., 1859; SNA 1/3/8 Res. magis. Inanda to SNA, 29 Nov., 1859. See also Bleek, The Natal Diaries (ed.), Spohr, 28.

33. SNA 1/1/8 Draft letter entitled "Refugees", n.d.; SNA 1/3/8 Res. magis. Inanda to SNA, 29 Nov., 1859.

34. SNA 1/1/7 Jeffels to SNA, 7 Dec., 1857; 1/1/8 memorial from Sugar Planters, Victoria County to SNA, 3 Feb., 1858; Shires to SNA, 25 May 1858.

government-assisted labour immigration was to prove a source of contention between the up-country farmers and the coastal planters.

In 1857 the up-country members of the Legislative Council blocked the use of public money and stipulated that any importation of labour should be made at the expense of the coastal planters.[35] A simultaneous attempt to ease the restriction on the importation of workers by recognizing the validity of all labour contracts made outside Natal was disallowed by the Imperial government as it offered no safeguards against the enslavement of labourers.[36] In response to planters' requests, the Lt.-governor then gave permission for the private importation of "amatonga" labour and promised to persuade Mpande and Cetewayo to allow this labour to pass unhindered through Zululand.[37] Thus in 1858 recruiters acting on behalf of planters applied to the Lt.-governor for permission to import over 300 amatonga families.[38] By bearing the costs of importing families, the planters hoped to secure an experienced and constant labour force and recruiters, by contracting families for up to five years, intended to secure their labour at the same wage as Zulu apprentices and not at the open market rate, which rose by almost 40% from 6s3d in 1858 to 10s in 1860.[39] The inflow of this amatonga labour coincided with a change in a composition of the Legislative Council. In 1859 the coastal planters were able to overrule up-country objections to government assistance in the importation of labour by stipulating that the government's annual allocation of £5 000 towards the importation of Indian labour should be drawn

---

35. N.P.P. Select Committee Report, no. 8 of 1857. An amended version of this bill was rejected in 1858 by the legislative council as unfavourable to employers.

36. L.M. Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 12.

37. SNA 1/1/17 Shires o.a. memorialists to SNA, 10 Dec., 1857. On the ethnographic origins and use of the term "amatonga" see appendix I.

38. SNA 1/1/7 Jeffels, 7 Nov., 1857; 1/1/8 Foxon, 6 April 1858; Shires, 10 May 1858; Res. magis. Durban, 13 May 1858; Robinson, 20 May 1858; Res. magis. Durban, 20 May 1858; Foxon, 19 June 1858; Shires, 3 July 1858.

39. SNA 1/1/7 Jeffels, 7 Nov., 1857; Shires a.o. memorialists, 10 Dec., 1857; 1/1/8 Jeffels, 20 June 1858; 1/1/9 Middleton, 3 Sept., 1859; Jeffels, 28 Sept., 1859. The average annual wage plus provisions for African are in NBB, "Agriculture", 1858-60, see figure 1 , p. 78.

from indirect taxation on articles consumed by Africans (blankets and beads) and coastal planters (machinery).[40] Law 14 which was passed together with Law 15 in order to regulate Indian immigration, set a precedent for the involvement of the colonial government in the costs and organization of labour importation and a further law, No 13 of 1859, made provision for government encouragement, protection and assistance in the importation of amatonga workers and their families, both overland and by sea. Recruiters had to apply to the Protector of Immigrants for licenses to import labourers and, in order to control their movements, all immigrant workers had to be registered with the Protector of Immigrants. In order to prevent accusations of slavery, heavy fines were enforceable for the maltreatment of immigrant workers and contracts were limited to a maximum of three years. Employers were protected by the Masters and Servants Act.[41]

The increasing sugar production on the plantations was paralleled by increasing pressure from the planters for the government to intervene more directly in the recruitment of amatonga labour.[42] Recruiters were able to secure a capitation fee of 20s for each contracted worker but the passage through Zululand was hazardous and workers were loathe to enter into contracts which many regarded as akin to slavery.[43] The Colonial government was disinclined to take responsibility for the protection of labour passing through Zululand as this might have led to an unwanted involvement in Zulu politics. It was also fearful of the political repercussions that would emerge from being dragged into any labour importation scheme that could be connotated with slavery.[44] Nevertheless, a free flow

---

40. L.M. Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 14.

41. A.L. Hitchins and G.W. Sweeney, Statutes of Natal, 1845-99.

42. SNA 1/3/9 Res. magis. Durban, "Report of the state of the natives, 1859"; SNA 1/1/10 Philips, 29 Feb., 1860; Ayers, 27 Feb., 1860; Ralph, 6 March 1860; Knox, 15 March 1860; Ryder, 13 April 1860; Foxon, 18 May 1860; Natal Witness, 23 Oct., 1863.

43. 1/1/12 Planters memorial to Lt.-governor, 30 Oct., 1862; Adams to Col. Sec., 17 Dec., 1862; Planters memorial, Umgeni, 28 Nov., 1862; SNA 1/1/13 Acutt to SNA, 20 July 1863; Smith, 4 Aug., 1863; SNA 1/1/14 Cooley o.a. to SNA, 20 Jan., 1864; Campbell, 20 Jan., 1864.

44. SNA 1/1/12 Greig to SNA, 19 Dec., 1862; SNA to Greig, 8 Dec., 1862; Thompson, "Indian immigration", 12.

of labour was impossible without some form of protection being given to the workforce while in transit through Zululand and thus in late 1862 the Lt.-governor agreed to approach the Zulu authorities. He also attempted to ease the importation of labour by waiving the licence requirement for all recruiters bringing less than forty 'amatonga' families into Natal.[45]

In August 1863 a Select Committee on the labour needs of the colony recommended that 'amatonga' immigration should be placed on the same footing as government-sponsored Indian immigration. In anticipation of this report John Dunn, who had earlier applied for a government labour agency, was appointed in July 1863 to supervise the immigration of 'amatonga' labourers.[46] In this Dunn was unsuccessful and in October 1863 the Government Gazette announced that "the hope of a regular supply of labour/from Amatongaland must be abandoned".[47] Dunn attributed the failure of the feeding scheme to his insufficient administrative personnel and the refusal of amatonga workers to emigrate in batches larger than 10 people. They also objected to the stipulated three year contract periods and demanded that they be allocated to the employer of their choice.[48] Of perhaps equal importance in contributing to the failure of this early scheme was Mpande's reluctance to protect amatonga labour in transit through Zululand. Thus, although the Zulu king agreed to allow the labourers to pass through Zululand, he complained that earlier emigration had brought about a decline in the tribute extracted from the Maputo by the Zulu royal house. Significantly for later immigration schemes, it was reported that Cetewayo was of a more tractable disposition.[49] However, undoubtedly the most important reason for the failure of this first government attempt to import 'amatonga' workers was the drop in demand for labour following a 35% decline

---

45. SNA 1/1/12 SNA to Greig and Umgeni memorialists, 30 Oct., 1862; SNA 1/1/12 Lt.-governor to all Res. magistrates and other officials, n.d. approximately Nov., 1862.

46. SNA 1/1/12 Dunn to SNA, 1 Nov., 1861; SNA 1/1/13 SNA to Dunn, 3 July 1863.

47. Natal government gazette (NGG) notice 130, 6 Oct., 1863.

48. SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 27 Sept., 1863; 1/1/14 Dunn to SNA, 10 January 1864.

49. SNA 1/6/3 "Statement of the messengers sent by the government to Cetewayo and Panda", 23 March 1863; SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 8 July 1863.

in the sugar price from 1862 to 1863 and the onset of a general depression in Natal. The sugar price continued to drop for the next six years; from £34.10s in 1862 to £29.13s6d in 1865 to £18.19s in 1867. The accompanying sluggish demand for labour during this period is reflected in the fall in the average African wage from 10s to 9s0d to 7s6d.[50] These price fluntuations, as represented in figure 1 , made the Natal government even more cautious about any involvement in the importation of labour for, not only had the cost of importing Indian labour exceeded initial estimates but, as a result of the depression, recruiting overheads incurred by the government were lost and many farmers were unable to meet their commitments as regards the wages and importation costs of Indian labour. Others were left with unwanted, but indentured Indian workers.[51] This caused the Natal government to end all Indian immigration in 1866 and it was only eight years later, in 1874, that indentured workers from India were re-introduced into the colony.

It is impossible to quantify 'amatonga' immigration at this early period. However, there is evidence to show that 'amatonga' workers were spread throughout Natal and that, according to one of James Stuart's informants, under the Maputo chief Nozingile, who reigned from 1854 to 1873, "large numbers" of men went to various parts of South Africa.[53] Emigration was large enough to affect the ability of the Maputo to produce and market foodstuffs; like Mpande, the Portuguese complained that the "great numbers" of Maputo going to Natal each year had caused a decline in the amount of agricultural produce sold to the trading post at Lourenço Marques.[54] In 1866

---

50. NBB 1862 to 1867, "Agriculture". On the depression, see Leverton, "Government Finance", 135-139.

51. SNA 1/1/19 Lt.-governor, annotation on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June, 1869; Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 14; M. Palmer, The History of the Indians in Natal, 24, 26.; Leverton, "Government Finance", 137. See also footnote 93.

52. SNA 1/3/8 Res. magis. Inanda, 29 Nov., 1859; Lt.-governor, annotation on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869; A. MacKenzie, Mission Life among Zulu-Kaffirs: Letters of Henrietta Robertson, 228, 289.

53. KCL., JSA, file 25, p. 261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 1897.

54. Governor of Lourenço Marques, 15 April 1865, report in B.O. no. 21, 27 May 1865.

the circulation of currency in the town was stated by the governor to be dependent on the sterling wages earned in Natal with which Maputo immigrants bought trade goods at the settlement.[55] Thus the continued immigration of amatonga workers into Natal during the depression would seem to partly answer why, despite the absence of Indian immigration, sugar production rose by 51% over the period 1867-1873.[56]

As Natal recovered from the depression in the late 1860s and as Indian indentures expired, calls were once again made for government intervention in the labour market.[57] In order to gain more control over local African labour, various attempts were made by the settlers to place the department of Native Affairs under the Legislative Council.[58] But when this was prevented by the Colonial Office, the planters reiterated their demands for amatonga labour. In a memorial placed before the Lt.-governor in 1869 coastal planters asked for the reintroduction of indentured Indian labour and requested that foreign African labour be imported on twelve-month contracts. It was suggested that these immigrants pay the costs of their own recruitment, including a 10s tax to their chiefs.[59] But the Natal government was still unwilling to take on the responsibility of importing labour, especially as the vicissitudes of employment opportunities during the depression had persuaded numerous African workers to leave Natal and seek employment in the Cape colony.[60] The free flow of labour was further impaired by a shift in the balance of power in the Delagoa Bay hinterland when the Maputo moved

---

55. GLM to GGM, 11 April 1866 in B.O. no. 41, 22 Sept., 1866.

56. Natal Blue Books, 1867-1871, "Agriculture".

57. SNA 1/1/18 Kinsman to SNA, 11 Aug., 1868; Kinsman to SNA, 21 Aug., 1868; SNA 1/1/19 Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869; Goodliffe to Protector of Immigrants, 29 July 1869; Natal Mercury, 21 June 1870.

58. Charles Ballard, "The Transfrontiersman", 120; Leverton, "Government finance", 204. A similar recommendation was made in 1871, Ibid., 193.

59. Special Document, Natal Legislative Council no. 20, 1869.

60. Natal Government Gazette (NGG) XXI, no. 1180, 22 June 1869, Lt.-governor, 18 June 1869; NGG XXIII, no. 1267, 24 Jan., 1871. Keate-Granville, 30 Oct., 1869. See pp. 40 ff.

north of the Tembe river in August 1870 and in so doing alienated themselves from the Zulu and further jeopardized the position of their workers passing through Zululand. To forestall this worsening situation the Natal government agreed to provide approved recruiters with introductions to chiefs and in November 1870, Mpande and Cetewayo were asked to prevent the harassment of amatonga migrants travelling through Zululand.[61]

In the absence of a government labour importation scheme, planters engaged private recruiters to secure their labour. These men were generally hunter-traders who had a good knowledge of the size of the chiefdoms lying outside Natal and were known to foreign chiefs. They inevitably supplemented hunting and trading revenues with those accruing from labour recruitment and used immigrant workers as porters on their expeditions.[62] In the late 1860s one of these men claimed to be able to recruit several hundred workers in Maputoland on two year contracts at seven shillings per month for the first year and eight for the second.[63] Another reported that he could secure 450 amatonga and Swazi labourers in exchange for a capitation fee of £1 each.[64] Others asserted that the Maputo chief was prepared to supply labourers for a £1 capitation fee and that these men would be supplemented with workers drawn from the lower Nkomati.[65]

Following the settlement of the Zulu dispute with the Maputo, Mpande and Cetewayo gave permission in February 1871 for the movement of labour through Zululand to be resumed. This caused a large number of workers to enter Natal and prompted the Natal Mercury to state

---

61. SNA 1/6/2 no. 102, "Message fromthe Lt.-governor of Natal to Pande King of the Zulus and Cetewayo his son", 22 Nov., 1870. For the decline in relations between Zulu and Maputo at this time, see pp. 177ff.

62. SNA 1/1/8 Res. magis. Durban to SNA, 13 May 1858; SNA 1/1/12 Planters memorial to Lt.-governor, 30 Oct., 1862; CH 1050 Shires to SNA, 9 April 1875; GH 1050 Registrar Supreme Court to Lt.-governor, 14 May 1875.

63. SNA 1/1/18 Kinsman to SNA, 11 Aug., 1868, 21 Aug., 1868.

64. SNA 1/1/19 Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869.

65. CSO 381.714 Leslie to Col. Sec., 24 March 1871; SNA 1/1/19 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 8 July 1871.

that "the unexpected influx of large number of Amatonga labourers by land, has quite changed the aspect of the labour market."[66] But when Natal attempts to negotiate a labour supply with Umzila proved abortive,[67] the planters renewed their calls for government intervention in the labour market.[68]

Although the Imperial authorities refused to sanction any participation by the Natal government in the importation of African labour[69] it did allow the passage of law 15 in November 1871 which allowed them to control and regulate African immigration into Natal. This law confirmed that only approved recruiters were given free licences and that illicit recruiting was punishable by a £50 fine or 4 months in prison. Immigrants unaccompanied by a recruiter had to report to the nearest resident magistrate on entering the colony. Applications for labour were then to be made to the magistrate who would attest contracts of up to three years for a 10s fee. The worker was then accredited with a bonus, the payment of which was deferred and kept in trust by the magistrate until completion of the contract.[70]

It is commonly believed that the sugar industry in Natal was developed on the basis of Indian labour.[71] However, it would seem

---

66. Natal Mercury, 21 March 1871; CSO 379.535 Border Agent Zululand to Col. Sec., 28 Feb., 1871.

67. GH 1325 No. 26, Keate to GLM, 1 June 1871; SNA 1/1/96 no. 73, Col. Sec. to Lt.-governor, n.d. Oct., (?) 1873; BPP 1890-91 C6200 Erskine correspondence, especially Erskine to SNA 3 July 1871.

68. SNA 1/1/21 Blainey to SNA 6 Oct., 1871; Couper to SNA, 7 Oct., 1871; Natal Witness, 9 May 1891. On the Labour League and other planters' labour-recruiting organizations, see Sessional Papers, Natal Legislative Council, no. 5, 1872; "Petition from the Labour League", 7 Oct., 1872; Natal Mercury, 23 Sept., 1873; C.J. Beyers, "Die Indiër Vraagstuk in Natal, 1870-1910" SAAYB, 1971, II, 64-65.

69. GH 54 no. 123 Kimberley to Keate, 23 Nov., 1871; GH 56 no. 245 Kimberley to Keate, 9 Nov., 1872.

70. Hitchins and Sweeney, Statutes of Natal.

71. Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 68-69; Ballard, "The Trans-frontiersman", 180.

that, at least during the early phase, until the reintroduction of Indian labour in 1874, African immigrant labour from outside Natal played as important, if not a preponderant, role in establishing sugar cultivation in the colony. In 1869 it was reported that 5 000 Indians were employed in the colony and the number of local Africans entering the labour market had not increased over the previous thirteen years.[72] In 1872 about 6 000 foreign Africans were thought to be employed in the colony. They were particularly valued because they worked for 18 to 24 months before returning home for two to three years.[73] The secretary for native affairs saw this labour as a vital asset to the development of the colony and felt that,

> "if the influx of this class of (foreign Africans) goes on at the rate it promises to do, to satisfy the wants of planters, we shall soon have a body fluctuating as regards the individuals composing it, but permanent as regards its numbers, of from 15 000 to 20 000 men or even more."[74]

This foreign labour was drawn from Pondoland,[75] from various north Sotho-speaking chiefdoms such as those of Matlala,[76] Molepo,[77] Modjadji[78] and Sekhukhuni[79] and from Venda-speaking chiefdoms such as that of Magato[80] as well as Transvaal Ndebele chiefs like

---

72. SNA 1/8/6 SNA to Res. Magistrates, 6 Dec., 1856; Natal Mercury, July summary 1869. Both reports estimated the supply of local labour to be approximately 10 000.

73. Legislative Council Sessional Paper, no 12, 1872. "Report of the Select Committee on the Introduction of Native Labourers from beyond the border of the Colony", p. 6; L.C. no 4, 1874, "Report .. ... on the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874.

74. SNA 1/7/8 memorial signed by SNA, 18 Dec., 1871.

75. KCL, Davidson Diary. This refers to scattered individuals. Few Pondos were employed in Natal during this early period.

76. W. Moschütz, "Tagebuch der Station Mankopanspoort", BMB, 5, 1869, 83.

77. Natal Mercury, 13 May 1871.

78. SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 19 July 1871; PRO FO 63 /1047 Leslie statement in Keate to Kimberley, 15 Sept., 1871; Anon., Beimblatt zum Berliner Missions-freund, 12, 3/4, 1886, 35.

79. Letter of 1 March 1871 in Gold Fields Mercury, 7 July 1876; WUL A55 R.T.N. James, "Diary".

80. Natal Mercury, 5 Sept., 1871; F. Elton, "Journal of Exploration of the Limpopo River", J. Royal Geogr. Soc., vol 42, 1872, 31-32.

Mapela.[81] Despite the failure of the Natal government mission to Umzila in 1870-71, numbers of Gaza workers from the Bilene area on the lower Limpopo made their way to Natal in the early 1870s.

Amatonga labourers followed three major routes linking Natal with the area north of Zululand. The first route, used largely by Maputos, stretched from the lower Tugela northwards along the coast. Although this route had an abundance of water and good grazing for stock, it was a particularly dangerous path during the summer months when malaria and later sand fleas infested the area and when rivers overflowed their banks. The second route passed about 100 miles inland, through territory disputed by the Zulus and the Transvaal, before entering the lower Newcastle division. This mountain route was a good alternative to the coastal route in summer. The third and most important route led from the Upper Newcastle division, about 180 miles inland, to Lydenburg-Botsabelho in the Eastern Transvaal and then down the Olifants river to the north and the Sabi river to the east. Although many workers died of exposure on this route, because it passed through high and inhospitable country with little fuel or shelter, it gave access to Natal to people on hostile terms with the Swazi and Zulu.[82] Immigrant workers often travelled several hundred miles on foot and arrived in a half-starved condition. Consequently death from exposure or disease presented a constant threat on all the labour routes as did banditry and the fraudulent promises of unscrupulous recruiters who waylaid groups of workers entering Natal.[83] The dangers of travelling to and from Natal hindered the free flow of

---

81. Letter of 1 March 1871 in Gold Fields Mercury, 7 July 1876. Other sources refer merely to "Bechuanas" and "Basuthos", BMB, 1868, 334; SNA 1/1/21 Clarence to SNA, 24 April or "Swazies", SNA 1/1/12, Couper, 7 Oct., 1871.

82. Legislative Council no 12, 1872, "Report of the Select Committee on the introduction of Native labourers from beyond the border of the colony", SNA 1/1/27 memo by P.E. Ridley, n.d., 1872; SNA 1/3/21 R.M. Umvoti, 6 Nov., 1871 reported the death from exposure of six amatongas out of a party of thirty-one. See also Natal Mercury, 16 Nov., 1871 and ZA 27 Saunders to Res. Comm., 8 June 1895; BPP. 1890 L11, Saunders to SNA, Nov., 1887; Zambili to SNA, 1 March 1889.

83. BMB, 1868, 334; SNA 1/7/8 memo by SNA, 18 Dec., 1871; BPP. C 1137, "Report of the expedition to install Cetewayo", Aug., 1873. Over the years 1875, 1881-82, a total of 67% of the workers entering or leaving Natal travelled in winter and 33% in summer. II. 1/1 Various correspondence; NBB 1881, p. F115; 1882, p. F48.

labour, discouraged potential workers from emigrating and consequently caused the planters to call on the government to build shelters and assist the entry of migrant labourers. Requests for the government to protect these workers were also received from amatonga chiefs who played a vital role in the stimulation of labour emigration.[84]

African labour drawn from beyond the borders of Natal not only supplied the immediate needs of the labour market, but also depressed the entire wage structure of plantation labour by undercutting local African wage levels which in turn undercut the wages paid to indentured and free Indian workers.[85] The cost of introducing indentured African workers was far lower than that of indentured Indians, and, because employers felt that homestead production supplemented farm wages,[86] foreign African labour was thought to be 25 to 50% cheaper than Indian labour.[87] But the Lt.-governor, conscious of the costs that had accrued to the government from the first abortive Indian immigration project, and ever fearful of the political risks involved in introducing African proletarians, was opposed to the flooding of the market with workers, merely in order to supply the planters with cheap labour.[88] He succintly summarized the competing interests involved in the debate over the labour question in a reply to a Colonial Office query which asked why more than 200 000 Natal Africans could not supply the labour needs of the 17 000 colonists,

---

84. II. R53/76 SNA to PI, 24 Jan., 1876. See also p. 320, note 61.

85. Kimberley to Keate, 13 Aug., 1870, Keate to Kimberley, 21 Oct., 1870 in NGG XXIII no. 1269, 24 Jan., 1871.

86. KCL, Natal Land and Colonization Co. Trustees report on the state of insolvent estates of G.D. Koch and the Reunion sugar plantation; M. Palmer, Indians in Natal, 13.

87. The cost of introducing one Indian labourer was estimated at £17. Government involvement in the 1860-66 importation scheme amounted to well over two-fifths of importation costs, Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 13; Leverton, "Government Finance", 71, 98-99. African wages in 1871 stood at 8s to 12s and Indian at 15s to 19s. SNA 1/1/21 Clarence to SNA, 24 April 1871; Natal Mercury, 31 Aug., 1871, also July summary 1869 and 24 June 1875; MNE. caixa 697 , Portuguese vice-consul to MNE, 28 June 1872.

88. SNA 1/1/19 Annot. Lt.-governor on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869.

> "The Natives of Natal inhabiting the locations on which they have been settled are in fact land-holders, though under a peculiar tenure. As such they are producers, in which they compete with the colonists. The habits of industry they are gradually contracting make this competition year by year more serious. But they are not, nor will they ever be producers to such an extent as to prevent their supplying from among them to the colonists a very large body of labourers for wages. Of these labourers however, comparatively few are as yet absolutely dependent on wages for their livelihood for they have more or less share and interest in the location lands. The majority of them are apt in consequence to offer their labour on terms and conditions more and more suitable to themselves than to the colonists who employ them. The colonists want to secure long terms of service at small wages, (the Africans) prefer short periods of service, terminable almost at their own discretion, though still remarkably small as compared with the rate of wages in most other countries."[89]

The Lt.-governor stressed that the colonists preferred foreign to local African labourers because they were separated geographically from their means of production and consequently provided a cheaper and more constant source of labour, thus:

> "Natives coming from beyond the confines of the colony ... necessarily engage themselves to employers here for longer and more continuous terms of service than they would do if they had location lands or friends of their own race in the colony and they are obliged, in the absence of such alternative modes of supporting themselves, to accept such wages as may be offered."[90]

Musgrave, who succeeded Keate as Lt.-governor in July 1872, believed that the numbers of local Africans employed by European farmers was underestimated as the latter wished to draw in foreign Africans in order to flood the labour market and thereby reduce the wage level for unskilled workers.[91] Shepstone agreed with the Lt-governor in tracing the roots of the labour shortage to the independence of the Natal African peasantry,

---

89. Keate to Kimberley, 24 Oct., 1870 in NGG XXIII, no. 1269, 24 Jan., 1871.

90. Ibid., SNA 1/1/22 "Memorandum on the importation and control of native labourers from inland tribes", Shepstone, 5 Nov., 1872.

91. Leverton, "Government Finance", 227.

> "The natives in the colony do not and never will be able to supply ... the labour needs of the sugar and coffee planters of the coastal districts. They are themselves producers of much of the food which sustains the labourers on the plantations."[92]

Shepstone remained adamant that the political position and economic productivity of Natal's African population should not be undermined in order to provide the coastal planters with cheap labour.[93] In this respect he had an important ally in the up-country Pietermaritzburg newspaper, the Natal Witness, which advocated the maintenance of the reserves and frequently described the progressive aspects and expanding production of African peasant farming in Natal.[94] During the depression years of 1867 to 1871 the acreage of maize cultivated by European farmers had declined by 10% while sorghum production remained minimal. African farmers, on the other hand, had increased the acreage of maize and sorghum by 28% and 47% respectively. Thus African cereal farmers were in a prime position to benefit from the general economic recovery, following the diamond discoveries, when in 1872 the value of maize and sorghum almost trebled.[95]

Despite the inducement to stay on the land and the consequent shortage of local labour that this new prosperity engendered, the Colonial office and the Lt-governor remained unconvinced of the need to involve the government in the importation of African labour. They remained fearful of the "serious political complications" that could arise if workers, recruited at the expense of the government, were harmed while passing through Zululand.[96] The Colonial office was under strong pressure from humanitarian organizations to prevent

---

92. SNA 1/7/8 memorial by SNA, 18 Dec., 1871.

93. Natal Witness, 26 Aug., 1870.

94. Natal Witness, 14 Dec., 1866; 1 April 1870; 26 Aug., 1870; 21 March 1871; 30 April 1872.

95. Maize rose from 6s7d per muid (200lbs) and then averaged 15s for the next 5 years. Sorghum rose from 7s9d to 19s7d and then settled at 13s2d for the following 5 years. All statistics are drawn from NBB, 1867-1877, "Agriculture". See figures 2 and 3, pp. 83-84.

96. Keate to Granville, 19 May 1870 in NGG XXIII, no. 1269, 24 Jan., 1871; Natal Mercury, 21 Jan., 1871.

any form of immigration that could be associated with the slave trade. In July 1871 the Aborigines Protection Rights Society expressed itself "filled with the utmost alarm and anxiety" over proposals to import labour from the Portuguese settlements to the north of Natal.[97] The Quakers were especially concerned with the maritime importation of labour, over which they expressed "the gravest apprehensions".[98]

Settler opinion was divided on the proposed resumption of government-supported labour immigration. Up-country settlers, who farmed with cattle and sheep had suffered badly during the depression and many had deserted their farms for the Diamond Fields and the Orange Free State.[99] They felt that, for the area to recover, government revenue should be spent on the construction of railways that would connect up-country areas to coastal markets and to the new markets developing in the interior and they remained opposed to government expenditure on the importation of labour that would benefit only the coastal planters.[100] Even amongst the planters the desire for workers was not uniform as some coastal areas had a sufficient supply of labour.[101] These settler interests were unwilling for government money to be spent on the importation of labour for the benefit of certain coastal plantations and in November 1870 they were able to block moves in this direction in the Legislative Council.[102]

Imperial and local administration fears that labour immigration would give birth to a politically volatile landless proletariat, or conversely to a population of indigents for which the government would be responsible, constantly hampered the planters' desire for

---

97. GH 1139 Aborigines Protection Society to Lt-governor, 7 July 1871.

98. GH 55 no. 55 Friends Institute to Col. Office, 23 April 1872.

99. Natal Mercury, 28 Nov., 1871, 21 Dec., 1871; Leverton, "Government Finance", 178.

100. Natal Mercury, 11 July 1871; 21 Nov., 1871; Leverton, "Government Finance", 209.

101. Natal Mercury, Nov. summary 1870.

102. Ibid., Beyers, "Indiër Vraagstuk", 66-67, 71. See also footnote 51.

government assistance in the supply of labour.[103] Shepstone saw the importation of foreign African workers as the answer to the labour problem on condition that their immigration should be placed on the same footing as Indian labour. In order to prevent the permanent settlement of "foreign" Africans the immigration of workers' families should be prohibited for,

> "The colonial population are capable of being ruled by tribal arrangement and are so ruled,but upon these foreigners it is impossible to bring such responsibilities to bear - they exist amongst us not as communities but as individuals, therefore this difference must be recognized in devising means for their control."[104]

Elsewhere he stated that

> "The introduction of these African labourers, to the extent which appears necessary to carry on successfully the chief industries of the colony is in my opinion dangerous unless corresponding measures are taken to control them during their stay."

He stressed that they were drifters with no tribal control and, with no immediate families to support, they were a potential "criminal element."[105] Government assistance in the labour supply remained minimal until the early 1870s and planters were obliged to fall back on private recruitment for their labour. But the question of a safe passage through Zululand remained central to any attempt to import amatonga labour.[106]

---

103. GH. 54 no. 123 Kimberley to Keate, 23 Nov., 1871. See also footnote 87.

104. Sessional Papers of the Legislative Council, No. lw, 1872. "Report of the Select Committee into the Introduction of Native Labourers from beyond the borders of the Colony" a memorandum by SNA dated 5 Nov., 1872. See also Natal Witness, 26 Aug., 1870.

105. SNA 1/1/22 "Memorandum on the importation and control of native labourers from inland tribes, 5 Nov., 1872"; SNA 1/7/8 "Memo on the supervision and control of native labourers from inland tribes."

106. Frederick Elton in Natal Mercury, 5 Sept., 1871.

Natal Government-assisted Labour Immigration Schemes as a Means of Alleviating the Planters' Labour Problem

In November 1872 a select committee appointed by the Legislative Council recommended that the government aid the introduction of labour by employing a labour agent who would construct food depots and secure the safe passage of workers passing along the coastal route through Zululand.[107] The secretary for Native Affairs gave his guarded support to this scheme on condition that the movement of foreign Africans was regulated and controlled by both a 25% deferred wage payment and by the creation of a special rural police.[108] The shortage of plantation labour became critical between 1871-73 for, despite a 23% rise in African wages and despite a rise in the price of sugar from £23.10s to £24.10s a ton, the overall production of sugar declined marginally.[109] The crisis was only overcome when the executive allied itself with coastal planter interests in order to overrule up-country objections to the re-introduction of Indian immigration in 1874.[110]

In September 1873 the Natal government was able to take advantage of their official recognition of Cetewayo as sole heir to the Zulu throne, to negotiate various topics, the foremost being the establishment of a labour importation scheme through Zululand. Thus at the coronation Cetewayo, who complained of the way in which "large numbers of amaTongas were constantly passing through Zululand in all directions", agreed to the establishment of feeding stations along the coastal route and suggested Dunn as protector of immigrants in Zululand.[111] In February 1874, a month after Shepstone had been forced to order several magistrates to use forced isibalo labour to bring in the sugar crop,[112] Dunn was appointed labour agent in

---

107. Sessional Papers of the Legislative Council no 12, 1872 "Report of the Select Committee into the Introduction of Native labourers from beyond the borders of the Colony", 2.

108. Ibid., memorandum by SNA, 5 Nov., 1872.

109. Natal Blue Books, 1871-73, "Agriculture". Figure 1, p. 78.

110. Beyers, "Indiër Vraagstuk", 75-76; Leverton, "Government Finance", 184, 226. In an appeal to up.country labour needs, it was stipulated that after completing their five year indentures, Indian workers would not be eligible for a free return passage for a futher five years.

111. BPP. 1875 C.1137 Shepstone "Report of the expedition sent by the Natal government to install Cetewayo", August 1873, 20-21.

112. SNA 1/8/10 Shepstone to Res. magistrates, Durban, Inanda, Tugela and Alexandra, 12 Jan., 1874.

Zululand. His annual salary was fixed at £250 plus £30 for horses and £20 for his six employees. He was to build five stations between the Hluhluwe and Tugela rivers offering food and shelter to migrants along the coastal route to Delagoa Bay and he was to receive a grant of 6d for each meal provided. The Protector of Immigrants in Natal was to provide private recruiters with licences clearly stating the wages that they offered. The recruiter was then to have his licence endorsed by Dunn before contracting any workers. It was hoped that once the feeding scheme had generated its own momentum, the government would be able to dispense with recruiters.[113] In March 1874 an immigration agent was appointed at an annual salary of £150 at the Lower Tugela ferry on the southern end of the coastal route in order to register the names and tribes of all immigrants on their arrival and send a receipt to Dunn. He was to send the immigrants to the resident magistrate in their employer's district. The costs of importing each worker were then passed on to his employer. The cost of returning home was to be borne by the worker.[114]

During the first 23 months of the Dunn scheme some 5 837 amatonga workers were introduced into Natal at a cost to the government of £1 394 or an average of 4s10d per immigrant.[115] During the first 30 months an estimated 7 800 amatonga migrants entered Natal while 5 758 left the colony by way of the Lower Tugela ferry.[116] Although the Dunn feeding scheme offered protection

---

113. SNA 1/1/23 Dunn to SNA, 16 Sept., 1873 and 24 Oct., 1873.

114. SNA 1/1/24 Protector of Immigrants to W.P. Jackson, 20 March 1874; NGG 3 March 1874, notice 63 signed by Protector of Immigrants, 24 Feb., 1874; CSO 665. 4069/78 SNA to Dunn, 29 Oct., 1873 encl. in P.I. to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1874.

115. SNA 1/1/27 no. 15 P.I. memo, 18 Jan., 1876. The £1 394 was broken down into Dunn's salary of £600, transit fees £589, Jackson's salary £160 and ferry cost £45.

116. These figures are drawn from II. 1/1; CSO 665.4069/78 PI to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1874; Sessional Papers, Legislative Council no 4, "Reports of the Select Committee on the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874; CSO 556.2728 PI, 9 Oct., 1876. The figures given for Tongas leaving the colony are incomplete. The figure given here is an expression of the available figures for outgoing immigrants as a percentage against incoming immigrants.

to emigrant workers, it immediately ran into problems when employers lost money invested in the importation of workers, when the latter, having arrived safely in Natal, either deserted or were lured away by touts. Desertion not only incurred the loss of all recruiting overheads, it also ran counter to the Shepstonian system by giving birth to a landless proletariat. As the Protector of Immigrants stated,

> "although (through amatonga immigration) large additions are constantly being made to the male native population of the colony, no special supervision is exercised over a large and increasing body of strangers whose conduct is not checked by any of the local social or property considerations which so strongly influence the conduct of the resident native population."[117]

To prevent desertions, a Legislative Council commission recommended that labourers be made to bear the costs of their own importation unless they completed a six month contract. This proved impracticable and instead, amatonga immigrants were, in February 1876, strictly bound by six month contracts and an extension of the pass laws, the contravention of which would result in their being indentured as refugees for three years.[118]

As amatonga workers came from areas free of colonial control they were under no compulsion from the Portuguese to emigrate, nor did the latter have the manpower needed to guard the border in order to tax and regulate the emigration of labour.[119] Only at Lourenço Marques, where the Portuguese were cloistered within their trading settlement, had they the strength and administrative capacity to tax labour passing through the port by sea.[120] Here the Portuguese were offered an important source of revenue when in 1874 coastal members of the Natal legislature pushed through a resolution calling upon the government to defray expenses incurred in the importation of amatonga labourers by sea.[121]

---

117. SNA 1/1/22 Protector of Immigrants, minute paper, 6 Dec., 1875.

118. Sessional Papers, Legislative Council no 4, 1874. "Report of the Select Committee on the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874; Immigration Notice no 1, 1876, signed PI, 12 Feb., 1876.

119. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 31, GLM to GGM, 20 Feb., 1878 in GGM to MSMU, 15 March 1878.

120. Natal Mercury, 19 Aug., 1873.

121. Natal Legislative Council, Votes and Proceedings, 18, 1874, 124-5.

Maritime Migration

It is difficult to quantify or establish when the maritime migration of workers from Delagoa Bay began. This is because the coastal schooners operated along the coast by Natal hunter-traders avoided, often with the collusion of the Governor of Lourenço Marques, Portuguese customs controls. Consequently this form of migration was considered "illegal" and was not recorded. The first official mention of maritime migration was made in 1868 when workers were obliged, because of hostilities in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, to travel to Natal by sea.[122] In June 1870 it was reported in the press that numbers of amatonga workers were arriving in Natal by schooner and by the end of the year the Natal government recognized this form of migration as a possible means of solving the colony's labour shortage.[123] But the following year the governor of Lourenço Marques cracked down on the emigration of labour on coastal schooners that refused to pass through the customs post; the "Bibsy" was stopped with 52 immigrants on board, the "Roe" carrying about 30 men was threatened with seizure and the "William Shaw" which on a previous voyage had disembarked 50 workers on the beach outside Lourenço Marques and had picked up workers on Sheffin Island, was confiscated when it landed workers up the Maputo river.[124] The difficulties involved in importing labour into Natal by sea gave rise to settler calls for the Imperial government to annex Inyak Island, on the southern edge of Delagoa Bay as a means of circumventing Portuguese and Zulu interference in the flow of labour to Natal.[125] Frederic Elton, ostensibly sent to

---

122. MNE. caixa 697. J.B. Blandy to MNE, 21 Dec., 1868. See also BO 27, 9 July 1869. The Portuguese had ealier discouraged trade with Natal, see Natal Witness, 26 June 1846 and pp.170-1.

123. Natal Mercury, 24 June 1870; FO 63/1047 Keate to Kimberley, 8 Dec., 1870.

124. SNA 1/1/19 Leslie to SNA, 25 July 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Elton to SNA, 20 Sept., 1871; GH 845 GLM to Elton, 23 Oct., 1871; FO 63/1049 GLM to Elton in Keate to Kimberley, 7 Nov., 1871; AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 28, Ablett to GLM, 27 June 1872 in GLM to MSMU, 3 Dec., 1872. See also AHU, Moç., diversos, pasta 1.

125. FO 63/1047 Keate to Kimberley, 22 June 1871; BPP. 1890-91 LVII Erskine to SNA, 3 July 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; Elton to SNA, 20 Sept., 1871. See also Natal Mercury, summary 1870 and Sessional Paper, Legislative Council no 4, 1874.

Lourenço Marques to negotiate the release of the "William Shaw", was also ordered to report on the suitability of Inyak Island as an embarkation point for workers and to familiarize himself with the density of the population living on the Limpopo and hence on its capacity to provide Natal with labour.[126] But opposition from both the Zulu and the Portuguese prevented any British occupation of Inyak and, when in 1872 the question was submitted for international arbitration, negotiations over the regularization of labour migration were opened with the governor-general of Mozambique.

The Portuguese hoped to encourage maritime migration not only because of the rise in trade that an increase in coastal vessels would bring to their settlements but also because migrants were obliged to pay duty on the goods which they brought back from Natal and because the governor was able to levy a 15s "passport fee" on each emigrant.[127] In this way government officials at Lourenço Marques, as distinct from traders, were able for the first time to benefit financially from migrant labour. A 2s re-entry passport for each migrant had also to be paid to the Portuguese vice-consul at Port Natal by the owner of any coastal vessel carrying amatonga workers back to Lourenço Marques. As the governor of the settlement influenced chiefs to send or withhold shipments of emigrants, it is obvious that he too benefitted from, and consequently supported, maritime migration.[128] From May 1871 to May 1872, a total of 559 migrants returned from Natal by sea and a similar number probably left, although generally from the areas outside of Portuguese jurisdiction or without the knowledge of the governor-general.[129]

---

126. Frederic Elton, "Journal of an exploration of the Limpopo river", JRGS, vol. 42, 1872; N. Etherington, "Frederick Elton and the South African factor in the making of Britain's East African Empire", JICH, IX, 3, 1981.

127. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 29, GGM to Lt-gov., Natal, 7 March 1875 encl. in GG to MSMU, 17 March 1875; MNE caixa 663 Duprat to MNE 19 Jan., 1874; SNA 1/1/95 St. V. Erskine to SNA, 3 July 1871; FO 63/1026 Elton to Beaumont, 1 Aug., 1874 encl. in Pine to Carnarvon, 13 Aug., 1874.

128. MNE caixa 697 W. Peace to GGM, 19 June 1872; 20 Jan., 1873; FO 63/1049 Elton to SNA, 20 Sept., 1871 in Keate to Kimberley, 7 Nov., 1871.

129. B.O. 16, 19 April 1873; B.O. 28, 11 July 1878. See also FO 63/1047 Col. Sec. to Keate, 15 Sept., 1871 and note 133.

Many of these workers were bound by their recruiters for two year periods at wages of 13s4d per month, in exchange for capitation fees of £3.[130] The apparent success of this flow of labour by sea gave rise to calls for the Natal government to participate in its organization.[131]

In August 1872 the governor-general of Mozambique and the Lt-governor of Natal agreed to submit the question of organized maritime migration to their respective Imperial governments and in order to pressurize the British government, the governor-general of Mozambique suspended all maritime emigration.[132] However, a "large" maritime emigration continued "illegally" with the connivance of the governor of Lourenço Marques who was the chief recipient of the 15s "passport fee" and it was only after the latter's dismissal in June 1873 that emigration by sea was effectively prohibited.[133] The Portuguese vice-consul in Natal considered this to be one of the prime causes for the scarcity of labour in Natal in 1873.[134] But the Portuguese prohibition proved more formal than real when in August 1873 a "large number" of Delagoa Bay immigrants were landed in Durban. The following month negotiations undertaken by a special envoy sent by the Natal planters resulted in the removal of all restrictions and on 23rd September the Natal Mercury reported that Delagoa Bay "natives are flowing in, in considerable numbers". But the following month labour migration was again prohibited and it became evident that without a formalized agreement, Natal labour would become dependent upon

---

130. Natal Mercury, 2 May 1871; 1 July 1871; 4 July 1871; 30 Dec., 1871.

131. Natal Mercury, 2 May 1871; Sessional Papers, Legislative Council no 12, 1872 "Report of the Select Committee on the Introduction of Native Labourers from beyond the Borders of the Colony", 2.

132. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 28. Lt-governor Natal to GGM, 7 Aug., 1872.

133. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 28. GGM to MSMU, 30 Oct., 1871; GGM to MSMU, 3 Dec., 1872; GGM to MSMU, 27 May 1873; GGM to MSMU, 7 June 1873; GGM to Lt-governor, Natal, 3 June 1873; GH. 845. GGM to Lt-governor, Natal, 3 June 1873.

134. MNE. caixa 663. W. Peace to MNE, 29 Dec., 1873 in Duprat to MNE, 17 Feb., 1874.

the whims of the governor of Lourenço Marques.[135]

Because of the critical shortage of labour, the Natal planters were prepared to accept any Portuguese conditions. But the Foreign Office was more cautious because of the constant pressure from humanitarians who felt that maritime labour schemes were synonymous with the slave trade. In order to counteract this impression and to coax the Portuguese, the British envisaged that migrants would be conveyed by steamship.[136]

The Portuguese had first approached the Union Steam Ship Co. in 1864 to extend its services from Natal to the capital of Mozambique Island but the terms offered had been rejected as too expensive. But in 1873 the U.S.S. Co. extended its services to Zanzibar and offered to call at several Mozambican ports and at Madeira on the way from South Africa to Lisbon. This promised to link Mozambique with international shipping routes and ensure trade openings and regular contacts with Lisbon. However, the entire plan was contingent upon the Portuguese allowing the U.S.S. Co. to carry voluntary emigrants from Lourenço Marques to Natal at a passage fee of 20s each.[137] The British government enticed both parties by agreeing to liberate slaves, taken in the Mozambican channel, at Mozambique Island. A passage fee of £5 would be paid to the U.S.S. Co. for the delivery of these liberated slaves to Natal as well as a passport fee of 15s payable to the Portuguese authorities at Mozambique Island.[138]

In March 1874 the Portuguese Foreign Office agreedto allow a free flow of labour by sea if the British would appoint a Protector of Immigrants at Lourenço Marques to prevent the overloading of

---

135. Natal Mercury, 19 Aug., 1873; 23 Sept., 1873; 7 Oct., 1873.

136. MNE. caixa 663. Duprat to MNE, 11 Sept., 1873; Sessional Ppaer, Papers, Legislative Council no 4, 1874, Enfield to Colonial Office, 21 March 1873; GH 837 Elton to Brackenburg, 4 Aug., 1875.

137. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 24, Duprat to MSMU, 8 Sept., 1865; MNE caixa 663. Duprat to MNE, 11 Sept., 1873; Duprat to MNE, 19 Jan., 1874; M. Murray, Union Castle Chronicle 1853-1953, 67; see also John S. Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895, 41.

138. MNE. codice 264 Sec. State to Br. Ambassador, Lisbon, 30 March 1874.

vessels and to ensure the fair recruiting and safe embarkation of emigrant labourers. In an appeal to the humanitarian interests which had pressurized the Foreign Office into handing over responsibility for the maritime immigration scheme to the Natal government the committee stressed that the introduction of steamship communications with the Portuguese would increase legitimate trade, that the steamers would participate in anti-slavery activities and that labour migration to Natal presented Africans with an alternative source of income to the slave trade.[139]

In January 1875 Frederic Elton who had served the previous year in a temporary capacity as Natal's Protector of Immigrants, was sent to Mozambique Island to negotiate with the governor-general the terms of the special committee's report, which had been endorsed by the Legislative Council. Elton was an ardent imperialist and it was largely through his endeavours that control over the labour supply from Delagoa Bay came to parallel the Bay's strategic importance in Carnarvon's federation schemes.[140] The governor-general of Mozambique expressed his willingness to allow the resumption of maritime migration between Lourenço Marques and Port Natal but stressed that final confirmation of any organised scheme would have to come from Lisbon. Nevertheless in 1874 some 1 542 migrants returned to Lourenço Marques by sea.[141] In January 1875, U.S.S. Co. vessels started to call at Lourenço Marques each month and in July and August the governors of Natal and Mozambique issued decrees regulating the maritime movement of labour between Lourenço Marques and Natal. An 11s passport fee had to be paid to the Portuguese for each emigrant worker, passage by sea was to cost 15s with an extra 1s6d for the cost of "guarding and superintending" and preventing labour from "running away" while awaiting embarkation. On arrival the immigrants would be checked by the Natal Protector of Immigrants and only after 48 hours, would be assigned to their employers at a cost of between £3.10s and £4.[142] Contracts

---

139. Sessional Papers, Legislative Council no 4, 1874 "Report of the Select Committee on the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874.

140. Norman Etherington, "Labour Supply", 249-50; Etherington, "Frederic Elton", 257-8, 260, 262-3. On the strategic importance of Delagoa Bay to Carnarvon's federation plans, see Axelson, Portugal & the Scramble for Africa (Johannesburg, 1967), 12-15.

141. Monthly figures are to be found in the Boletim Oficial de Moçambique.

142. Portaria no 152 of 2 Aug., 1875 in BO 32, 7 Aug., 1875; Immigration Notice no 4 of 1875, NGG, 6 July 1875.

were to be for 2 to 3 years at monthly wages of 10s. Elton was immediately critical of these low wages and warned that immigrants would desert if they were not paid the current Natal rate of wages for Africans of 12s to 16s per month.[143] Humanitarians in Britain and France were critical of the scheme because of the encouragement that it would give to the slave trade.[144] But the Foreign Office agreed to sanction the scheme if properly supervised.

The Natal labour agent operating from Lourenço Marques proposed drawing labour through the settlement from numerous chiefdoms on both sides of the Limpopo, from Sekhukhune in the south to the Banyai in the north and Tonga in the east. He wanted to make Modjadji's capital the centre of his recruiting catchment but was convinced that

> "In no other part of South Africa is the country so densely populated by natives, as that portion lying between the Limpopo river and the amaSwazi tribe, and as they possess very few cattle, they are consequently more disposed to work."[145]

The total cost of importing each worker was estimated to be £4.2s6d. This compared favourably with the high cost of importing Indian labour, which in 1875 stood at £16. The Natal authorities were afraid however that whereas Indians were indentured for five years, foreign African labour would desert if contracted for periods longer than six months. Without a fixed and reliable core of workers, the farmers were unable to plan ahead.[146] Nevertheless, in July 1875 the Protector of Immigrants called for applications and bonds from

---

143. GH 837 Elton to Brackenburg, 4 Aug., 1875; FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 9 Aug., 1875.

144. Anti-Slavery Reporter, 1 April 1876; V. Schoelcher, Restauration de la Traite des Noirs á Natal (Paris, 1877). The French were particularly aggrieved as British complaints ended a similar French-run emigré scheme from northern Mozambique to Reunion and the Comores. For the latter, see P. Harries, "Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction: the nature of free and unfree labour in south-east Africa", JAH, 22, 1981, p. 317, note 33.

145. GH 1050. Shires to SNA, 7 April 1875. For a similar opinion, see MNE, caixa 664, R.T. Hall in Duprat to MNE, 28 Sept., 1877.

146. GH 1050. annotation on Shires to SNA, 13 April 1875. See also Natal Mercury, 22 Aug., 1871.

prospective employers of immigrant workers brought by sea from Lourenço Marques.[147] But the untimely death of the labour agent ended active recruiting schemes and the Natal government was obliged to make the terms of employment offered to migrants more attractive. Runners were sent to the chiefs in the Delagoa Bay hinterland announcing that immigrant workers would receive current Natal wages, that they could choose their own employers and that contracts were to be fixed at 2 to 3 years. The costs of introducing workers would be limited to between £2.10s and £3.2s.[148]

In November 1875 a Protector of Immigrants was appointed at Lourenço Marques by the Natal government at an annual salary of £300 plus £30 for a messenger-cum-translator. The Protector gained an extra income as local agent for the U.S.S. Co. and a fee of 1s6d for feeding, "guarding and superintending" and prohibiting the "running away" of migrants before embarkation.[149] Workers were sent to Natal on two to three year contracts at wages of 15s per month. On receipt of the worker the employer paid the Protector of Immigrants in Natal £2.10s and, if the worker completed his contract the employer was obliged to pay the worker's £1.4s return fare.[150] The return passage to Lourenço Marques was overcrowded and far from comfortable. One traveller recounted

> "the passage was very rough for nearly the whole of the journey and the stench from the natives was unbearable at times. Several of the natives died and were immediately consigned to the fishes below and the vessel reached Delagoa Bay after some miserable days and nights."[151]

---

147. Government Notice 208 of 1875; GH 846 GLM to Lt-governor, 3 July 1875.

148. FO 63/1026 Elton to emigration agent, 20 Oct., 1875; Elton to PI, 25 Oct., 1875.

149. Elton, 28 Jan., 1875 in NGG., 16 March 1875; GH 829 Elton to PI, 25 Oct., 1875.

150. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 30, PI., B.P. Lloyd to emigration agent, T. Thompson, 17 Dec., 1875 encl. in GG to MSMU, 17 Jan., 1876; Natal Immigration Notice no. 6 of 30 Nov., 1875; FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 30 March 1876.

151. Costello, 1874!, pp. 9-10. See also W. Joest, Um Afrika, 204-5.

Workers who generally formed "family parties" in which they returned home overland often sent their earnings with selected friends or relatives by sea to Lourenço Marques. Traders and labour recruiters, who travelled to Lourenço Marques by sea and returned home overland with their charges all took advantage of the maritime labour scheme.[152] Although a small number of emigrants paid their own passage and passport fees and consequently could choose their own employers, the vast majority of emigrant workers were discouraged from travelling to Natal by sea because of the difficulties involved in choosing a specific form of work and employer and by the long contracts that they were obliged to enter into. But numerous workers took advantage of the maritime scheme when, having saved sufficient money in Natal, they were able to afford to pay for the security of a return passage and the various duties on goods taken into Lourenço Marques. Thus in 1875-76 about 2 884 workers returned home to Lourenço Marques by sea.[153]

Mozambican Labour in the Western, Eastern and North-Western Cape

Natal's success in procuring labour through Delagoa Bay attracted the attention of other areas desirous of obtaining cheap labour. A large part of the western Cape's work force had long been drawn from the area today known as Mozambique. South-east Africa had provided the western Cape with a large number of slaves during the 17th and 18th centuries.[154] Following the prohibition on the

---

152. Legislative Council Sessional Paper no 12, 1872 "Report of the Select Committee on the Introduction of Native Labourers from beyond the Colony"; Ibid., no 4, 1874 "Report of the Select Committee to consider the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the colony, 20 Aug., 1874; I.I. R211/75 Jackson to PI., 12 May 1875.

153. The B.O. recorded the number of "black passengers" or "free blacks" embarking or disembarking at Lourenço Marques, see esp. B.O. 1, 2 Jan., 1875. See also I.I. 1/4.751/8 Bennet to Lt-governor, 16 Feb., 1878.

154. F. Bradlow and M. Cairns estimate 26.65% of all slaves brought to the Cape during the Dutch East India Company period, were of African origin, The Early Cape Muslims, 102. N. Worden has shown that as the supply of slaves from the East declined the percentage of Mozambican slaves living in the Stellenbosch district increased from 3.4% in 1722-39 to 16.2% in 1790-99, "Rural slavery in the western districts of the Cape Colony during the 18th century" (PhD., Cambridge, 1982),159.

importation of slaves in 1808, wheat and wine farmers in the western Cape became particularly dependent for their labour on slaves liberated at Cape Town by the anti-slavery squadron. During the Napoleonic wars a total of 2 032 "prize Negroes", captured from British and French slavers, were landed at the Cape and indentured for period of up to 14 years.[155] Over the next two decades a further 200 slaves were released and indentured for 14 years when the vessels in which they were carried ran aground at the Cape or were impounded for illegally importing slaves.[156] Together with 27 "free blacks", who were taken to the Cape when the British abandoned Mombassa in 1826, these men were not considered to be "prize negroes".[157]

In 1839 the British arrogated to themselves the right to search all Portuguese and stateless vessels and in 1844 a mixed British and Portuguese anti-slavery commission was established at Cape Town.[158] From 1839 to 1846, some 3 903 "prize negroes" were landed at the Cape but, as the slave trade came to be dominated by dhows operating between the African coast and the Indian Ocean islands and as the anti-slavery squadron increasingly released slaves taken from these vessels at Mauritius, the Seychelles, Zanzibar and elsewhere, this source of labour dried up.[159] However, although only 60 slaves

---

155. CA/CO 414/6 p. 321. "Vice-admiralty court sentences under the slave trade abolition act"; for annual breakdown by vessel, see CO 48/64 Cape Fiscal to governor, 23 March 1824, pp. 79-85, 87-115, 118-134.

156. CA/GH.28/1 enclosure to despatch 45, court of commissioners, 24 April 1808; CO 48/64 Cape Fiscal to Governor, 23 March 1824. One hundred and eleven slaves were released in 1808 and two other shipments, whose numbers were not declared, were landed in 1808 and 1819.

157. Adm. 1/70.Cmndr. Christian to Sir Lowry Cole, 23 Sept., 1826; Reginald Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, 270; C.C. Saunders, "Prize Negroes at the Cape of Good Hope", typescript, UCT, 1979.

158. P. Harries, "Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction", 316-317.

159. FO 84/515. no 13. Mixed Commission to Aberdeen, 7 March 1844; FO 84/566 Mixed Commission to Aberdeen, 1 Jan., 1845; FO 312/13 Mixed Commission to Aberdeen, various correspondence; FO 312/14 Mixed Commission to Aberdeen, 9 April 1846; CA/LCA 15 no 5. Napier minute, 30 Jan., 1844.

were freed at the Cape between 1846 and 1858, "prize negroes" remained an important potential source of labour and in 1862 the Cape parliament declared its willingness to contribute £5 000 in passage or bounty money towards their reintroduction.[160] This was refused by the Imperial government and, although one shipment of 181 was landed in 1864, prize negroes dried up as a source of labour for the western Cape and the mixed commission was dissolved in 1870.[161] These prize negroes constituted, with the descendents of the old Mozambican slaves, what became known locally as the Mozbieker community, several of whose members acted as guides and translators for scientific, trading and colonizing expeditions sent from the Cape to "open up" the Mozambican hinterland.[162]

Voluntary and uncontracted amatonga workers also made their way overland to the Cape where they were readily absorbed into the Mozbieker community. During the 1860s depression in Natal, a number of amatongas sought new markets on which to sell their labour.[163] Soon after the establishment of the Dunn feeding scheme in February 1874, the Natal Mercury complained that labour brought into Natal at the cost of the Colonial government was lured away by the high wages paid to construction workers on the Cape railways and to stevedores at Algoa Bay.[164]

In 1875 the emigration agent stationed at the Lower Tugela ferry reported that during one month, 7% of the 154 amatonga workers leaving Natal had worked in the Cape.[165] Shires, the ill-fated

---

160. CA/HA. 53 "Report of the committee ... on the subject of the introduction of Negro immigrants, 6 August 1862"; SA Advertizer and Mail, 6 Aug., 1862; FO 312/17 Mixed Commission to Russel, 18 Sept., 1862.

161. Reports of the Department of Native Affairs, 1863-71, vol. 1, Newcastle to Wodehouse, 10 Oct., 1862; FO 312/17 Mixed Commission to Russell, 20 Sept., 1864; FO 312/18 Mixed Commission to Clarendon, 30 June 1870.

162. G.S. Preller, Piet Retief, Lewensgeskiedenis van die grote Voortrekker, 321; A. Delagorgue, Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe, 463; W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar.

163. SNA 1/1/19 annot. Lt-governor on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869.

164. Natal Mercury, 3 Oct., 1874; 8 Oct., 1874.

165. II. 1/16. 819 Thompson to PI, 4 Feb., 1877.

labour recruiter for the Natal maritime immigration scheme complained that recruiters from the Diamond Fields and the Cape were able to offer as much as quadruple the wages stipulated by the Natal government and that chiefs like Modjadji were unwilling to allow their followers to work for less than the Cape rate. The Natal labour agent at Lourenço Marques complained in a similar way that his counterpart from the Cape was able to offer monthly wages of 30s, twice the existing Natal rate. It was generally recognized that competition for labour between the Cape, Natal and Diamond Field employers brought about a significant rise in the wages offered in the supply areas.[166] Other workers avoided recruiters and contracts by selling their labour directly on the market, such as a party of 70 amatonga workers which was reported in 1876 to have left Natal for the Cape along the coastal Pondoland route.[167]

---

166. SNA 1/1/27 PI memo, 18 Jan., 1876; SNA 1/1/27 R. du Bois to SNA, 25 March 1876; I.I. 1/3 R441 Natal emigration agent, Lourenço Marques to PI, 8 Oct., 1877.

167. SNA 1/1/27 no 47, Supt. Police to SNA, 2 March 1876. See also no. 60, du Bois to SNA, 3 April 1876.

Chapter 2

MOZAMBICAN MIGRANTS IN KIMBERLEY, THE CAPE AND NATAL

In the Cape, the economic upsurge of the 1870s that followed the diamond discoveries brought with it a vastly increased demand for labour. In August 1875 the Eastern District and Western Railways needed 1 000 Black workers to whom they were prepared to pay 2s per day if they agreed to sign a two year contract.[1] Two years later, between 8 400 and 9 300 Blacks were employed on railway construction in the Cape.[2] The high wages on the railways drew workers off the farms and led to renewed demands that the Cape government, because of this intervention in the labour market, should import labour for private and government employment.[3] The need for foreign labour was compounded by the successful way in which local African agriculturalists responded to new market opportunities for produce and consequently refused to sell their labour for extended periods.[4]

The first attempt by the Cape Prime Minister to deal directly with the governor-general of Mozambique in order to secure workers for the railways was rerouted through the Imperial government by Elton, who was by this stage British consul at Mozambique Island.[5] The Portuguese, ever hopeful of benefitting from the labour lying behind their coastal settlements, were quick to seize on this

---

1. TA. A180. CPWD. Merriman to Levy, 26 Aug., 1875.
2. A.J. Purkiss, "The Politics, Capital and Labour of Railway Building in the Cape Colony, 1870-85" (D.Phil., Oxford, 1978), 327-38 389.
3. Annexures to House of Assembly, G. 5-'76, "Report on Immigration and Labour Supply for 1875", Purkiss, "Railway Building", 330-31, 334.
4. Purkiss, "Railway Building", 371-77, 345, 346, 381-92; C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, 65-107, 110.
5. FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 29 Dec., 1875; FO 63/1039 FO to Elton, 30 March 1876; Elton to FO, 9 May 1875.

potential source of revenue and in July 1876 the decree governing emigration to Natal was extended to the Cape.[6]

Between September and October 1876, eighty-three migrants were introduced by private recruiters on U.S.S. Co. steamers. The recruiters were paid a capitation fee of £7 per immigrant and the workers were guaranteed a monthly wage of 30s in return for a one year contract.[7] These costs to employers compared favourably with the generally accepted local capitation fee and daily wage for Black labourers of £12 and 2s6d respectively and were considerably lower than the high daily wages of 7s paid to experienced white navvies whose introduction into the colony involved a further expenditure of £19.4s.[8] But when the Cape established a government labour agency at Lourenço Marques the private importation of labourers was halted and, from November 1876 to February 1877, 327 workers were imported by the Cape government to work on the railways. These men were engaged on one year contracts at 30s per month but because they were recruited before the implementation of the decree of 18 July 1876, they were not eligible for return passages.[9] From April to December 1877 a further 392 labourers left Lourenço Marques to work on the Cape railways but their contracts were extended to two years and their wages were effectively lowered to 25s per month as 3s was deferred towards their return passage and 2s was invested in a sick fund.[10] These labourers were especially valued by employers because of their long-term contracts and because their wages were considerably

---

6. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 30, Barkley, governor of the Cape to GGM, 2 March 1876 in GGM to MSMU 17 April 1876; MNE., caixa 434, Bonham to Corvo, 31 July 1876; MNE., ciaxa 679, MNE to Consul, Cape Town, 22 April 1877.

7. Archives of the Portuguese Consulate, Cape Town (CPC), "Mappa mostrando o numero de emigrantes, 1 Dec., 1879"; TA. A180. CPWD. Merriman to Erskine, 6 April 1876.

8. Annexures to Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, A.12-'90. "Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question", appendix E, p. v, Erskine to Commissioner of Crown Lands (CCL) 20 June 1890.

9. Cape Times, 22 March 1877; CPC. Portuguese Consul to Cape Railway Engineer, 5 July 1878; "Mappa mostrando o numero de emigrantes", 1 Dec., 1879; Consul to Head of the Maritime Health Station. Madeira, 26 June 1882.

10. CPC. "Mappa mostrando..."; Consul to GLM, May 1878; Purkiss, "Railway building", 378-79.

lower than the official open market rate of 2s6d per day. The burden of the £7 capitation fee paid to the Cape labour agent in Lourenço Marques was shared by the employers and the government in the same way as assisted immigration from England.[11] But following the death of the Cape government's labour agent in February 1878, immigration from Lourenço Marques was suspended.[12] This move was taken because of the improved labour situation following the importation of almost 4 000 Gaika and Galeka prisoners taken during the Frontier war of 1878. These people were largely employed on public works at extremely low wages that graduated from 5s per month after the first six weeks to 10s per month in the third year.[13] The expenses involved in the Frontier war, drought and the general commercial depression of 1876-78 all combined to dissuade the Cape government from continuing with the importation of relatively costly Delagoa Bay labour.[14] Furthermore, the Portuguese were unwilling to continue with the labour scheme in its existing form due to the reluctance of the Cape government to repatriate the 801 workers already imported or to control their movements once their contracts had expired.[15]

But by 1880 the upswing in the economy and the unwillingness of the Eastern Frontier prisoners of war to remain on Western Cape farms resulted in the appointment of a select committee to examine the Cape's labour problems.[16] Farmers complained that wages offered to workers engaged in the construction of railways and

---

11. II. 1/16. 744 Monteiro - Col. Sec., 24 Feb., 1877 encl. in 889/78 Hoffman to Macleod, 28 Feb., 1877; Annexures to Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly A26-'79. "Report of the Select Committee appointed to consider and report on the state of the labour market", evidence of Fuller, 60.

12. TA. 180. CPWD. Elliot to Oswald Hoffman, 12 Feb., 1878; to Portuguese consul, 14 Feb., 1878; to Secretary, Chamber of Commerce, Port Elizabeth, 16 Feb., 1878.

13. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877, GLM district report for 1876-77; BO. 11, 18 March 1878; BO. 52, 30 Dec., 1878, GLM district report for 1877-78; CA/IAC - 19; Purkiss, "Railway building", 407-408.

14. TA. 180. CPWD. Elliot to Portuguese consul, 14 Feb., 1878.

15. CPC. Portuguese consul to GGM, 18 Nov., 1879.

16. CA.HA 154 Stevens, contracting and pass officer to CCL, 5 April 1880; G.39-'93, "Cape of Good Hope Labour Commission", 1893, evidence of Stevens, p. 60.

dockyards could reach 4s6d per day and consequently both sapped the farms of their experienced workers and forced labour costs to spiral to 25-30% above English agricultural wage levels.[17] Farm wages were also not competitive with those paid on the Diamond Fields and this drew both local and immigrant labour away from the Western Cape. The labour shortage was worsened by the attraction of numerous workers to Zululand where the British army paid high wages.[18] Farmers wanted long-term immigrants who, because of their contracts, would form a core labour force of experienced workers who would be supplemented by piecemeal labourers during the labour-intensive pruning, wine-making, ploughing and reaping seasons.[19] It was estimated that farming districts like Paarl could take 1 000 immigrants.[20] Farmers reported favourably on Mozambican labour which, unlike labour drawn from the Eastern Frontier, did not return home and which undercut local wage levels.[21] The importation of Mozambicans also had the advantage of keeping the labouring classes black. English agricultural immigrants were not well thought of as they were expensive to introduce and, through contact with Black labourers "degenerated and practically turned black."[22]

---

17. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Committee appointed to consider and report on the supply of the labour market", evidence Van der Byl, p. 18, Vermaak, p. 14, Eksteen, p. 23-24, Van Aarde, p. 28, Seul, p. 28, 34, Moodie, p. 41; CPWD. Elliot to Mackay, 24 Jan., 1880.

18. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Committee", evidence of Seul, p. 34, Hockley, p. 44, Heathe, p. 50.

19. A.12-'90 "Report of the Select Committee on the labour question, 1890".

20. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Committee," evidence of Piton, p. 41, Heathe, p. 51.

21. Ibid., evidence of Herzog, pp. 4-5, Bensusan, p. 10, Vermaak, pp. 14-15, Lochner, p. 23.

22. Ibid., evidence of Seul, p. 34, Hockley, p. 45, Heathe, p. 52.

The select committee advised that "Mozambiques and Delagoa Bay natives" as well as "Mantatees" and "Berg Damaras" be imported.[23] In December 1879 the governor-general of Mozambique was asked to authorize the renewal of voluntary emigration from Delagoa Bay to Cape Town. The capitation fee of the Cape agent was lowered to £6 for each worker landed on a two to three year contract. This fee included passage money as well as passport and maintenance costs. While the costs borne by the state were lowered those borne by employers rose as they paid not only half the cost of introducing an immigrant, but also a further £1 for his clothing and a blanket. They were also obliged to provide the Delagoa Bay immigrant with his £2.17s return passage on the completion of his contract.[24]

This renewed immigration was aimed at alleviating the farmers' labour problems. But farmers were unwilling to pay the wage rates of 15s and 25s stipulated by the contracts of the first batch of 103 immigrants to arrive in November 1879. The immigration agent was then ordered to procure labour at 15s per month but was only able to obtain "youths" of under the age of twenty at this wage.[25] Young men were preferred by farmers as they were cheaper and could be more easily trained. They were also more likely to form social links in the work area and therefore renew expired contracts. From July 1880 "Delagoa Bay natives" were obliged to

---

23. "Mozambiques" was a synonym for Mosbiekers. "Mantatees" was a generic term applied to such diverse people as Venda-speaking followers of Magato and Pedi immigrants. Ibid., p. 59; Annexures to Votes and Proceedings, C2-'92 "Report of the Select Committee on the labour question", evidence of Frost, p. 49. Berg Damaras were cattle Damaras who had been divested of their cattle and forced into the mountains for protection. Some 400 Berg Damara were introduced between 1879-82 at a capitation fee of £12 per famly or £5 per man. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Committee", pp. 63-5; TA.180. CPWD. Elliot - Ohlsson, 27 Sept., 1879; B. Lau, "A Critique of the Historical Sources and Historiography relating to the "Damaras" in Pre-Colonial Namibia" (BA., Hons, 1979).

24. FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 2 Dec., 1879; CPC. Consul to MSMU, 7 May 1880; TA. A.180. CPWD. McNaughton to Chairman, De Beers, 18 March 1881, to Thompson, 5 July 1881.

25. IAC-21 "Lists of native labourers arrived from Lourenço Marques, November 1879 to May 1882". I have accepted the figures drawn from the original contracts rather than those in HA. 154, Contracting and Pass Officer to Commissioner for Crown Lands (CCL), 5 April 1880; TA. A180 CPWD. Elliot to De Coster, 15 Dec., 1879.

accept the 15s wage paid to "youths"[26] and, importantly, their contracts were extended to three years.[27] An examination of the contracts entered into with these labourers indicates that, although they were shipped from Lourenço Marques, most were drawn from the Inhambane interior.

Whereas many early immigrants introduced into the Cape from the Portuguese coastal settlement were described as locals or "Pecuanas" (Bechuanas), after July 1880 the vast majority of recruits were denoted as Tshanganes/Changanys/Gazas/Chobis or Inhambanes. Thus the reduction in the wage paid to "Delagoa Bay natives" can be attributed to the extension of the recruiting frontier north of the Limpopo; an area portrayed in 1875 as free of competition between labour recruiters.[28]

But not all immigrants were recruited. At least 14 paid their own passage fares to Cape Town and thus, by avoiding any contractual obligations, were able to sell their labour on the open market. Similarly, numbers of amatonga purposefully travelled overland from Natal in order to avoid entering into contracts which would restrict their access to the higher wages of over £4 paid to non-contracted labour in areas such as railway construction.[29] The great majority of immigrants were contracted to employers in wine-producing areas like Stellenbosch and Paarl and, as "general labourers", to employers in Cape Town. Large numbers were also sent to the wheat producing area of Malmesbury and were employed on the harbour works. Very few Delagoa Bay immigrants entered into contracts with Eastern Cape farmers although several hundred were employed on the Cape Midlands railway and on public works in Port Elizabeth and

---

26. Ibid., McNaughton to Chairman, De Beers, 18 March 1881; IAC-21 "Lists of native labourers...."

27. Annexures to V&P, G56-'81 Contracting Officer to Ass. CCL, 17 Feb., 1881. The contracting officer's rates are marginally higher than those on the contracts in IAC 21, "Lists of native labourers..."

28. II. 1/1.R496 Shires to SNA, 26 Aug., 1875; Annexures to V&P, C2-'92 "Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question, 1892", evidence of Stevens, p. 12.

29. IAC. 10 to 12, various shipments; SNA 1/3127 RM Tugela to SNA, 17 April 1876; CSO 2555.c32 RM Durban to SNA, 27 July 1881; JSA file 74, p. 66, evidence of Majuba.

East London. The Cape Copper Mining Company of Namaqualand employed almost 200 Delagoa Bay immigrants.[30]

By February 1881 the demand for "Delagoa Bay" labour slackened due to the arrival of more than 2 000 workers after October 1879.[31] Although the Cape was sliding into a depression and 11% of all imported African labour was unemployed, in March the labour importation experiment was still considered to be "attended with good success".[32] In June the U.S.S. Co. gave notice of its intention to discontinue its Delagoa Bay run and it was feared that this would "considerably increase" the costs of labour immigration.[33] By July it was felt that

> "the supply of Delagoa Bay labour is fitful and, what is more, extremely untrustworthy ... labourers from that part of Africa have little or no sense of the meaning of a contract, and give endless trouble by their habit of desertion ... It is more than doubtful whether they would continue to work at contract rate in the immediate vicinity of more highly priced labour."[34]

In October the last U.S.S. Co. steamer returned from Lourenço Marques with 150 workers and three weeks later the immigration scheme was suspended. The official reason was the high rate of desertion for, "very soon after their arrival (Delagoa Bay natives) discover that higher wages are to be earned than those for which

---

30. IAC 10 to 12 contains the contracts entered into by some 2 400 Delagoa Bay immigrant workers. These show area of origin, employer, period of contract and wage and give the ages of some 500 workers. See also Annexures to V&P, G64-'82 "Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants", 1882; TA. A.180 CPWD. McNaughton to Irvine, 17 Sept., 1881, to De Coster, 4 Oct., 1881, to King and Son, 21 Nov., 1881.

31. Annexures to V & P, G56-'81 Contracting officer to Ass. CCL, 17 Feb., 1881.

32. TA. A.180. CPWD. McNaughton to Chairman, De Beers, 18 March 1881.

33. Ibid., McNaughton to secretary, De Beers, 18 June 1881. When the Castle Packet Co. offered to carry immigrant workers from Delagoa Bay in 1884, the "normal" passage fee was given as £6.10s. The special fee for workers ranged from £4 to £4.10s. This compared unfavourably with the original fare of £2.17s. IAC 3 Messrs Anderson and Murrison to contracting officer, 10 Sept., 1884.

34. TA. A.180. CPWD. McNaughton to secretary, De Beers, 3 July 1881.

they have been engaged and many of them abscond in search of more remunerative employment."[35]

According to one report, by April 1881, some 6% of all Delagoa Bay workers introduced by the Cape government had deserted.[36] The financial losses to farmers caused by these desertions and the inability of the government to prevent them caused much bitterness. Some farmers attempted to discourage desertion by paying workers on a sliding scale, increasing from 15s in the first year to 25s in the third. For similar reasons, payment of a part of the worker's monthly wages was sometimes deferred until the expiration of his contract. This seems to have been an informal arrangement started in 1881 but was only included in contracts in May 1882 when 5s of the monthly wage of 15s was withheld until the worker had completed his 3 year contract.[37]

In January 1882 smallpox first broke out in Cape Town and in June a major outbreak was transmitted by Delagoa Bay workers employed on the dockyard. This gave rise to the fear that immigrant workers were spreading the disease and, with Lourenço Marques declared an infected port, all maritime immigration was halted and the Cape labour agent left Lourenço Marques for Natal.[38] But the smallpox epidemic of 1882 merely formalized the end of maritime labour immigration for the last major shipment of workers left Delagoa Bay in October 1881. The reasons for the decline in maritime emigration to the Cape should be seen in terms of the fall in state revenue and rise in unemployment that accompanied the drought and depression of the early 1880s[39] and the loss of recruiting

---

35. Ibid., McNaughton to De Coster, 4 Oct., 1881; McNaughton to De Coster, 24 Oct., 1881.

36. CA.HA.167 Contracting officer, "Return of numbers of foreign labourers", 11 April 1881.

37. CPC. Consul to contracting officer, 7 Sept., 1882; CPC. Consul to MSMU, 11 Sept., 1882; Annexures to V & P, C2-'92, "Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question", evidence of Stevens, p. 11; G64-'82 "Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants for 1881"; IAC.12 shipment 33.

38. CSO 862.2451 Health officer, Durban to Col. Sec., 28 May 1882; Annexures to V & P, G58-'84 "Report of the superintendent of Immigrants, 1882".

39. V. Bickford-Smith, "Dangerous Cape Town - middle class attitudes to poverty in Cape Town in the late nineteenth century", Cape Town History Workshop, 1981, p. 19-20; Purkiss, "Railway Building", 412.

overheads incurred by desertion. Simultaneously, new sources of local labour became available for, as Purkiss has shown, in the decade following 1875 the terms of employment "turned drastically" against peasants who supplemented rural production with wage labour. Thus two successive droughts, depressions and Frontier wars, together with increased taxation, coercive pass and vagrancy laws and the growing social stratification of the African peasantry all combined to swell the numbers of migrants and permanently proletarianized Black labourers in the Cape and increased the dependence of others on wage labour for their subsistence.[40]

Maritime immigration from Lourenço Marques to Cape Town ended in May 1883 with the landing of a final shipment of 27 workers. A total of 3 202 men had been officially imported since the initiation of the scheme. Of these, very few took advantage of the return passage guaranteed by their contracts. In September 1882 only 9% of those eligible for repatriation had returned home.[41] A year later this figure had increased to 10,5% and in 1885 it was stated that only 7% of the total number of immigrants had returned by sea.[42] As virtually all the immigrant workers were young men in their twenties, it may be assumed that many contracted local marriages which encouraged them to remain as monthly servants and day labourers or as farm workers held by the tied liquor and cottage systems. Evidence placed by farmers before the Cape Committee on the Labour Question in 1890 affirmed that Mozambican labour was preferred by their fathers because of its permanency. Although there were "only a few old ones left ... we are now working with the cross raised from them."[43] These men were easily absorbed into the community of Mozbiekers, Africans who spoke Low Dutch or Bantu languages that were unknown in the Cape. They recognized themselves and were classified by the Cape government as a distinct racial group.

---

40. Purkiss, "Railway Building", 409-411, 415-427, 430-431.

41. CPC Consul to MSMU, 11 Sept., 1882.

42. CPC Consul to MSMU, 11 Sept., 1883; Annexures to V & P, G21-'85 Immigration Agent to CCL.

43. Annexures to V & P, A12-'90 Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question, evidence of Eksteen, van Reenen, Visser and Stevens. See also CPP. A26. 1879 "Report of the Select Committee ... on the supply of the labour market", evidence of Herzog, van der Byl, Heathe, Seul.

Natal Government Labour Importation Schemes 1877-1879

Natal faced a renewed demand for labour with the building of the railway system in the late 1870s. In September 1877, some 3 000 men were needed for railway construction but, because planters complained that the railways were luring away their labour supply, the Legislature stipulated that 2 000 of these men had to be imported from outside the colony by the Natal government railway contractors.[44] As Indian labour was adjudged too expensive these labourers were either recruited directly by Natal Government Railways labour contractors or sub-contracted from the government.[45]

The Natal experiment with maritime labour drawn from Delagoa Bay proved as abortive as that of the Cape. The labour agent employed by the Natal government at an annual salary of £300 plus £30 costs was dismissed when, after 18 months of unsuccessful competition against Cape recruiters, he had sent only about 600 workers to Natal.[46] He was replaced in August 1877 by an official employed on a capitation basis of £4 per immigrant landed in Natal. This sum included the 26s6d "passport fee" paid to the Portuguese, a passage fare of 20s, shipping and landing changes of 5s, miscellaneous feeding, "Delagoa Bay expenses" of 18s6d and a capitation fee of 10s. A further fee of 13s3d accrued from immigration depot charges in Durban and consequently, the total cost of

---

44. II. 1/16 R238 Pollinghorne to Col. Sec., 16 April 1877; CSO 606.3060 Col. Sec. to Lt. Gov., 15 Aug., 1877; Resident Engineer to Col. Sec., 13 Sept., 1877; Sessional Papers of the Legislative Council no. 38, 1877.

45. C80 656 3122 Immigration Agent, Lower Tugela to PI, 15 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 839 Railway Contractors to Col. Sec., 2 March 1877; D.H. Heydenrych, "Natalse Spoorwegbeleid en -konstruksie tot 1895" (PhD., Stellenbosch, 1981), 84-91.

46. Natal officials claimed that the agent had been unable to recruit any workers and this view is supported by official Portugal statistics. II. 1/16 819 Thompson to PI, 4 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 38 Bennet to PI, 28 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 889 Col. Sec. annot., 1 June 1877; BO. 1882, p. 336, "Relação dos emigrantes que foram para o Cabo e Natal e dos que d'ali regressam", 30 Sept., 1882. However a careful reading of the manifests of vessels leaving Lourenço Marques shows that at least 563 "black passengers" or "free blacks" left the harbour between September 1876 and July 1877. The manifests are contained in the Boletim Oficial.

importing one Delagoa Bay worker was estimated at £4.13s3d.[47] On 14 December 1877 it was made public that employers would be expected to bear two-thirds of this sum, or £3.2s2d. Because disputes over earnings gave rise to work stoppages or desertion, wages were contractually fixed at the locally competitive level of 20s per month, and, if the worker agreed to a two year contract, the employer was obliged to deposit a 24s personal bond with the Protector of Immigrants in order to guarantee his return passage.[48]

The importation of labour by sea was disliked by the Immigration department because of its heavy expense. Between July 1877 and October 1878, costs of £218.18s.11d, which had not been budgeted for, accrued to the department. These included £103.14s.11d for board and lodging of immigrants in the depot as, due to the fluctuating demand for labour, they could not be placed immediately. Other charges included the £42 wages paid to an interpreter, doctor's fees of £50, advertizing costs of £1.4s and the loss of £12 when three immigrants deserted before they could be placed with employers. Labour costs were also driven up by the competition for workers between recruiters working for the Natal overland and maritime schemes as well as between freelance recruiters and those working for the Cape and Natal governments.[50]

The Natal government complained about the excessive fees charged by the Portuguese which, once negotiations over the terms of labour emigration were concluded, rose from 15s to 26s. This sum was divided between the metropolitan government, which received the official 11s. passport fee, and the Lourenço Marques authorities who received 15s for "clerical fees and stamp taxes."[51] After

---

47. II. 1/16 243 annot. by Col. Sec., 5 June 1877; annot. by acting PI, 24 April 1878.

48. Government notice no. 3, 1878, Natal government gazette (NGG), 1 Jan., 1878; II. 1/4 515 Railways contractors to PI., 30 April, 1878; C80 677.3811/78 Col. Engineer - Col. Sec., 12 Oct., 1878. See also SNA 1/3/27 R171/76 RM Durban - SNA, 9 March 1876.

49. II. 1/19 annot. acting PI., 9 April 1884.

50. SNA 1/1/27 Du Bois to SNA, 22 March 1876; II. 1/3 annot. PI to Col. Sec. n.d. on Bennet to PI., 28 Nov., 1877; AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 31, GLM to GGM, 24 Jan., 1878 in GGM to MSMU, 15 March 1878.

51. GH 837 Elton to Lt. Gov., 23 April 1877; II. 1/16.38 Bennet to PI., 28 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 Monteiro to Col. Sec., 16 May 1877; II. 1/3 509 Bennet to PI., 28 Nov., 1877; AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 32, British Ambassador, Lisbon to MNE, 10 July 1877 in MNE to MSMU 19 July 1877; MSMU to GGM, 4 Aug., 1877.

lengthy negotiations/[a] compromise was reached which enabled the Portuguese to retain the full labour tax in return for the promulgation of decree 251 of October 1877, which gave Natal and the Cape monopoly access to Delagoa Bay labour.[52]

A cheaper supply of labour was available at Inhambane where in August 1877 Reuben Benningfield was appointed labour agent. Benningfield had worked for several years as a hunter-trader in southern Mozambique, was thoroughly familiar with the area and had established good contacts with local chiefs and Portuguese officials. Over the next year he sent more than 500 workers to the immigration depot at Durban for a capitation fee of £3 which, because the governor of Inhambane waived the 15s clerical and stamp tax, was £1 less than the Lourenço Marques capitation fee.[53] Benningfield also introduced an undisclosed number of workers into the colony who, because he advanced them their passport fees and passenger fares, were considered to be free rather than contracted immigrants.[54] Most of the contracted labourers were employed by the Natal Government Railways which claimed that Inhambane labour was procurable at half the cost of that of Delagoa Bay.[55] That Inhambane labour was imported due to its cheapness was confirmed by the Protector of Immigrants, who did not want to allow Inhambane labour through the immigration depot "as by so doing I am afraid they will understand the cause of their being brought in, and it may tend to cause dissatisfaction among them."[56]

A third source of Mozambican labour that found its way to Natal by sea was that of slaves liberated by the British navy. As distinct from "amaTonga" migrants these so-called "Makuas" were mostly drawn from northern Mozambique and were not voluntary immigrants. Adults were contracted for three to five years and children

---

52. BO. 41, 8 Oct., 1877; AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 31, GGM to MSMU, 13 Oct., 1877.

53. CSO 608.3282 PI to Col. Sec., 31 Aug., 1877; II. 1/16.889 note headed col. sec., (n.d.). For a breakdown of the numbers per vessel see II. 1/4, various correspondence.

54. CSO 632 Benningfield to PI, 5 Dec., 1877; II. 1/16 889 Note headed Col. Sec., n.d.

55. CSO 608.3283 Natal government Railways (NGR) contractors to Col. Sec., 30 Aug., 1877.

56. CSO 632 acting PI to NGR contractors, 2Jan., 1878.

were indentured until they reached adulthood. They were paid graduated wages ranging from 1s per month for girls in their first year to 10s per month to adult males in their fifth year of service. Although their wages were extremely low the cost of their introduction was high as employers had to pay a £6 capitation fee. The government bore a further cost of £3, as well as other fees such a monthly wage of £4.10s paid to a Makua interpreter. Between 1873 and 1880 some 587 slaves were taken from Zanzibar or Mozambique Island and liberated at Durban. While a few dozen others were taken to Cape Town where they joined the Mozbieker community, these people formed the basis of Natal's "Zanzibari" population.[57]

Voluntary migration by sea was seen by many government officials as morally repugnant as it was easy to press-gang into emigrating men who were classified as libertos, or slaves obliged to undergo a two-year period of indenture before obtaining their freedom, as these men had no say in the matter of their emigration.[58] Following allegations that the government agent at Lourenço Marques had lured workers to Natal by giving false impressions as to the terms of their contract the Colonial Secretary informed the Protector of Immigrants that "Amatonga immigration by sea appears to me to be a very questionable mode of supplying the labour market."[59]

The advantage to employers of labourers introduced by sea was that they were prepared to enter into long-term contracts in exchange for the security of a free voyage to Natal and a guaranteed return passage. Maritime labour immigration also

---

57. GH 67 PI to Elton, 16 July 1875; II. 1/2. 125 "Return of Liberated Slaves in the Colony"; II. 1/4.880 Colonial Engineer to PI, 13 July 1878; II. 1/19 PI to Col. Sec., 4 Nov., 1880; Z. Seedat, "The Zanzibaris in Durban - a social anthropological study of the Muslim descendants of African freed slaves living in the Indian area of Chatsworth" (MA, University of Natal, Durban, 1973).

58. Until the status of liberto was abandoned in November 1878, it was possible to import libertos into Lourenço Marques from other Portuguese ports. MNE caixa 433, Lytton to Corvo, 7 Oct., 1875; MNE caixa 434, Morier to De Avila, 24 April 1877; BO. 26, 30 June 1877; AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 32, Curator-General to Corvo, 19 Aug., 1877; Report of the Curator-general, 27 Oct., 1880 in Curator-general to MSMU, 30 Oct., 1880. In 1862 Inhambane and Lourenço Marques still had slave populations of 3 116 and 276 respectively, BO 23, 7 June 1862; BO 44, 5 Dec., 1862.

59. GH 845 Col. Sec. annot., 11 Sept., 1878; GGM to Lt. Gov., 27 Aug., 1878; II. 1/16.889 Col. Sec., note n.d., 1878.

allowed Natal to tap new areas of labour and gave a safe passage to people like various Chopi-speakers who otherwise would not have been able to reach Natal due to Gaza and Zulu opposition to their southward passage through Zululand.[60] The major disadvantage was that each time one of these labourers deserted, the government lost its immigration subsidy of £1.11s.1d and the employer lost the £3.2s.2d capitation fee.[61] Probably not more than 1 000 amatonga workers entered Natal by sea between August 1877 and January 1879. Of far greater importance was the return passage; over 6 000 amatongas returned home by sea during the three years from 1877 to 1879.

Labourers who travelled overland via the Dunn feeding scheme along the coastal route were mainly Maputos who were regarded as Zulu subjects. They rarely engaged themselves for more than six months and avoided the maritime emigration scheme because of its low wages and long contracts.[62] Government officials complained that as amatonga workers cost the Natal government money to introduce, they should be obliged to spend a specific amount of time in Natal before moving on to the more lucrative labour markets in the Cape.[63]

Financial losses caused the Natal government to intervene in the labour market by using the pass laws to prevent desertion. In November 1878 the government attempted to restrict desertion when it decreed that all amatonga immigrants had to purchase a 5s pass if they wished to leave the colony without having completed a six month contract. This proved only partially successful as it was "fairly common practice" for lawyers and others to sell passes for 3s.[64] Because the pass law was never strictly implemented,

---

60. CSO 677.2882 Bennet to PI., 6 Aug., 1878; CSO 682.472 RM. Durban to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1878. See also II. 1/20 Meikle to PI., 20 Sept., 1884 and footnote 125.

61. II. 1/3.558 annot. to Col. Sec., 22 Dec., 1877, annot. Col. Sec., 21 Jan., 1878; CSO 787.3031 PI to Col. Sec., 26 Sept., 1878.

62. CSO 682.472 RM, Durban to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1878; PI to NGR contractors, Jan., 1879; CSO 820.3293 PI to Col. Sec., 14 Sept., 1881.

63. SNA 1/1/27 no. 15 PI memorandum, 18 Jan., 1876; SNA 1/3125 R233/76 RM Upper Tugela to SNA, 25 Feb., 1876 and 29 March 1876.

64. SNA 1/1/59.65 RM Lions River to Advocate, Pietermaritzburg, 19 Feb., 1883 and enclosures; Circular, Col. Sec. to RMs 13 Nov., 1878. See also SNA 1/1/59.77 SNA to RM Pietermaritzburg, 28 Feb., 1888.

when relations between Zululand and Natal declined in late 1878, it proved impossible to prevent large numbers of amatongas from returning home. Many deserted through fear of being called up by the British to fight the Zulus; others returned to protect their families while yet others returned home to serve in Maputo regiments alongside the Zulu.[65] In December 1878 the Governor of Lourenço Marques reported that:

> "The large scale emigration from this district and from the lands to the North has ceased completely. Enormous caravans are to-day returning home by land and sea, almost all were working (in Natal) and enjoying a comfortable living. In one month 1 300 have returned by sea and more than 5 000 by land."[66]

The return home of large numbers of amatonga workers caused heavy financial losses to employers who had invested capital in their importation. Thus the Natal Government Railways complained that it lost "a lot of money" when about 500 Delagoa Bay workers, imported by the government, deserted due to rumours of war. As about two-thirds of these men had been brought by sea, each desertion cost the Natal Government Railways £4.13s.6d.[67] Desertions represented large capital losses to other employers of labour, like planters and to the government because of its subsidization of labour immigration. Thus because of the heavy capital investment involved in importing labour by sea, the maritime scheme was halted in late October 1878 after the importation of only 840 workers.[68]

By February 1879 all overland immigration had ceased and the salaried posts held by Dunn and the immigration agent on the Lower Tugela were discontinued. In December the export of labour from Inhambane was prohibited as it was not covered by any law and because the Portuguese needed to withhold the emigration of their

---

65. ZGH 699.249 Shepstone minutes, 23 Aug., 1886; KCL. L. Von Wissel, "Reminiscences of trading days in northern Zululand, 1895-1919", 2.

66. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 32. GLM to Conselheiro Director general do Ultramar, 25 Dec., 1878. In his district report for 1877-78 the GLM wrote of the "numerous caravans" going overland to Natal and eastern Transvaal goldfields, BO. 52, 30 Dec., 1878.

67. C80 682.472 PI to NGR contractors, Jan., 1879.

68. II. 1/10.530 assistant PI to Col. Sec., 9 June 1882.

dependants due to "unrest" in the area.[69] Article two of the decree prohibiting the emigration of labour from Inhambane significantly stipulated that Blacks were not free to emigrate from the colony, for,

> "Although Portuguese subjects are completely free to emigrate to any country whatever, provided they conform to the local regulations, the law does not extend this provision to those who are unfit, due to their low degree of civilization, to claim their rights and privileges as free citizens."[70]

Article five stated that emigration from Inhambane had not been "spontaneous", that "secret agents" had operated in the area and that emigrants had no guarantees as to the terms of their contracts. In effect this confirmed the principle established in 1875 that all emigration had to be controlled and taxed by Portugal. It also underlined the growing awareness of the Portuguese that Black labour, in its "voluntary" form, was as marketable a commodity as slave labour had once been.

Between 1876 and 1878-79 the price of sugar in Natal rose by almost 30% but, over the same period of time and largely because of the Anglo-Zulu war, output dropped by 33%.[71] Planters threatened disaster if they were left with insufficient labour for the planting season. At its meeting in October 1879, the Victoria Planters' Association declared that,

> "planting and farming interests are suffering severely from the want of Kaffir labour principally attributable to the late war and the non-arrival of amatonga labourers."[71]

They called upon the Lt.-governor to inform chiefs that the war had ended and to resume the government immigration schemes.

Attempts to reduce the cost of labour immigration schemes proved difficult. The Lower Tugela labour agency, which had fallen

---

69. GH 837 Br. Cons. to Lt. Gov., 12 Jan., 1880; FO 84/1539 Br. Cons. to FO, 10 Dec., 1879; FO 84/1616 Azvedo to Nunes (n.d.) in Br. cons. to FO, 14 Feb., 1882.

70. BO. 50, 15 Dec., 1879. In 1877 there were no restrictions on the emigration of free Blacks, AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 32, GGM to MSMU, 13 Oct., 1877.

71. Natal Blue Books 1876-1879, "Agriculture". See p. 78 , figure 1.

under the Protector of Immigrants, was not renewed and considerable confusion arose over departmental responsibility when the agent's duties were transferred to the Border Agent who was reponsible to the Secretary for Native Affairs. In December 1879 Dunn was reappointed to his position as Protector of Immigrants in Zululand but at a capitation fee of 5s per worker rather than on a salaried basis which amounted to an effective increase in his income of 2d per immigrant.[73] Five stations were used, two in Dunn's territory at Manyeti and Ungoye, another at Inbabe under Mlandela and a further station under Somkeli on the Umfolozi. The northernmost station was built on the Hluhluwe river. Migrants were given a pint of maize at each shelter, and two shelters were equipped with grinding mills. They reported any harassment to the station heads who then reported to Dunn or to Mlandela or Somkeli to whom Dunn paid a stipend.[74] Although Dunn was able to bring 2 539 men through Zululand in 1880 his position as a supplier of labour was no longer unchallenged.[75] In 1880-81 some 2 000 amatongas entered and about 1 500 left Natal by sea. Dunn also faced continuing competition from Cape agents operating in the Delagoa Bay hinterland but with the defeat of the Zulu royal house an alternative source of labour emerged when Zulu workers began to enter Natal.

Labour from Areas under Zulu Control and the End of the Dunn Feeding Scheme

As early as 1873 labourers whom the colonists referred to interchangeably as Zulu or amatonga, were drawn into Natal from chiefdoms situated north of the Hluhluwe which konza-ed to the Zulu chiefs Somkeli and Zibhebhu.[76] The Natal public was informed that these immigrant labourers were forced to work in Natal by Cetewayo and that three to four hundred men had been "sold" in this fashion

---

73. CSO 2554.C137 Campbell to RM Stanger, 11 July 1880; CSO 726. 4993 Dunn to PI., 1 Nov., 1879; CSO 820.3293 Cronje to Col. Sec., 29 Aug., 1881.

74. In 1878 Dunn supplied 2 557 men x 2s6d = 6 395s6d + 6 000s salary = 4s10d. SNA 1/1/68.936 PI to Col. Sec., 9 Jan. and 15 Jan., 1884.

75. CSO 2555.C32 Dunn to acting SNA, 8 Sept., encl. in RM Lower Tugela to Col. Sec., 13 July 1881.

76. CSO 817,809 PI to Col. Sec., 17 March 1883. To konza is to pay homage or serve.

for six month periods at the low wage of 8s per month. These workers proved not only cheap but extremely reliable for, as almost their entire wage was handed over to Cetewayo, they dared not desert their employers.[77] The mechanisms of this labour system emerged in 1878, when in a civil law suit it was alleged that the Natal Government Railways contractors had received from Cetewayo 800 workers from a "tribe which is subject to the Zulu king and is situated between the Zulus proper and the amatonga". It was claimed that these men were forced to work in Natal and that their entire wages were paid via John Dunn to Cetewayo. In evidence before the court, the Natal Government Railways claimed that Cetewayo received a capitation fee of 20s for each worker as well as a total of 6s4d from the workers' monthly wage of £1. The men had no recourse to desertion as a means of resistance for they feared that they would be killed if they returned home without Cetewayo's permission.[78] Following the adverse publicity of the trial, the Natal Government Railways dispensed with this forced labour and turned to Benningfield, from whom they were able to procure Inhambane labourers at a capitation fee of £3. Shield-bearing Zulu men were prevented by Cetewayo from selling their labour in Natal. This was because, as bachelors without families to support, almost all the product of their labour was funnelled through the ibutho system into the royal lineage.[79] As Shepstone stated before the Anglo-Zulu war, the Zulus were "too strongly attached to their military organisation for the planters of Natal to hope for a direct supply of labour from the unemployed population of Zululand."[80]

---

77. D. Leslie, Natal Colonist, 4 March 1873 in Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amatongas, 288. The men were drawn from chiefdoms under Manaba, Umangaliso, Endongene and Umhlomala. See map no. 2, p. 72 for the Maputo-Zulu frontier in c. 1885.

78. BPP. South Africa Correspondence 1878-79, C.2220 no. 66. In this document it was "believed" that the sending chiefdom was that of the "Bonambi". This is highly unlikely as the Bonambi was an ibutho of the Zulu army living on the Upper Pongola near its junction with the Bivane, see F. Fynney, The Zulu Army and Zulu Headmen (Pietermaritzburg, 1879). See also CSO 656 NGR to PI, 5 March 1877; II. 1/5 NGR contractors to PI, 1 Aug., 1878.

79. J.J. Guy, "Production and exchange in the Zulu Kingdom", Mohlomi, II, 1978; J. Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, 10-12, 21-30.

80. Cited in Ibid., 3, 17-18.

In order to gain access to Zulu labour the British included a clause in the Deed of Submission, signed by the defeated chiefs at the end of the Anglo-Zulu war, guaranteeing the freedom of Zulus to work in Natal. In the months following the end of the war, the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs was inundated with applications from planters wishing to import Zulu labour.[81] In November 1880 Melmoth Osborne, the British Resident in Zululand, stated that although before the Anglo-Zulu war "no shield-bearing Zulu had been permitted to leave the country, now these young men hastened to places where they could earn money to acquire herds."[82] The Deed of Submission abolished the Zulu military system, which obliged the chiefs to seek alternative forms of surplus appropriation. Foremost amongst these was the sale of Zulu male labour formerly appropriated by the King. But immediately following the defeat of 1879 Zulu males had little concept of their freedom as individuals to sell their labour power. As Osborne expressed it,

> "The Zulu chiefs have been so long accustomed to look for and abide by the direction of their chiefs in all matters of a public nature, that they are not as yet enough advanced in appreciation of the personal freedom they now have of going to labour of their own discretion, as to take advantage of their liberty. Going to work - especially in large numbers - outside the chief's territory is looked upon as a public act."

Osborne then made the crucial point that unless the chiefs benefitted financially from the loss of labour power that was entailed by the emigration of their dependants and followers, they would actively dissuade their people from seeking work in Natal.[83] Thus, despite the fear of Imperial reprobation, local British officials encouraged the chiefs to force labour onto the market.[84] This system of

---

81. See numerous despatches in SNA 1/1/37; 1/1/38; 1/1/41; 1/1/42; 1/1/46; 1/1/48; 1/1/49; 1/1/51; 1/1/52; 1/1/54; 1/1/55 to 59; 1/1/65.

82. NA. Despatch book of Melmoth Osborne, Osborne to Colley, 10 Nov., 1880 cited in C.S. Shields, "The Life of John Dunn", (MA, UNISA, 1939), 60.

83. CSO 787.3373 British Resident to High Commissioner, 10 Nov., 1880; Jeff Guy, "The destruction & reconstruction of Zulu society" in Industrial and Social Change in South Africa, eds. Shula Marks & Richard Rathbone (London, 1982).

84. CSO 787 acting SNA to Lt. Gov., 21 Sept., 1880; SNA 1/413 Report of acting SNA in Border Agent Lower Tugela to SNA 31 March 1880. See also GH. 857 and SNA 14 Feb., 1880 report on Dunn to Lt Gov., 2 Feb., 1880.

compulsory labour had the added advantage of undercutting the wage level of more traditional sources of labour for, in contrast to the 20s-25s monthly wage earned by amatongas, inexperienced Zulu labourers earned 10s-15s per month.[85] In 1881 more than 3 500 Zulus entered Natal in search of work.[86]

It is difficult to state with any certainty from which areas of Zululand these men originated. It is however certain that large numbers of "Zulus" entering Natal came from groups like the important Ngwayo clan, that had close relations with the Zulu state[87] but whose members were excluded from serving in the Zulu army. Various aspects of the material culture of these chiefdoms, all of which were situated north of the Hluhluwe, differentiated them from the Zulu; they tekeza-ed[88] and several practised circumcision and amputated the last joint of the little finger.[89] Within the Zulu economy they performed a specialized occupation; that of carriers, either in the Zulu trade with Delagoa Bay or of tribute from Maputoland.[90]

Under Cetewayo, Zibhebhu had partially colonized and subjugated this area and had forced numerous people to move north of the Mkuzi.[91] But under the 1879 settlement, Zibhebhu and Somkeli were excluded

---

85. See extensive correspondence in SNA 1/1/41; 1/1/46; 1/1/48; 1/1/52; 1/1/53; 1/1/54.

86. SNA 1/1/25.54 "Return of Natives entering and leaving the colony", 1881.

87. Guy, Destruction, 22, 31, 85, 200; A.T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, 335-346.

88. To speak Zulu with an accent like that of the Swazi or coastal Natal Nguni , groups like the Baca or Lala, C.M. Doke and B.W. Vilikazi, Zulu-English Dictionary. See also Bleek, The Natal Diaries, ed. Spohr, 76.

89. Ingwavuma magistrate. District Record Book, sections 7 to 19. History of Crown Land, Ingwavuma District, 8 June 1959. When this report was written the Ngwayo and Mtshelekwana had already abandoned these customs and were indistinguishable from the Zulu.

90. BPP. South Africa. Correspondence 1878-79. C.2220 no. 66. Bulwer to Hicks-Beach, 28 Aug., 1878.

91. ZGH 786. Report of the Zululand Boundary Commission of 1879. June 1880.

from the area north of the Hluhluwe, which was to be "given back to the Tongas."[92] The change in Zulu politics following Cetewayo's exile and the installation of the thirteen chiefs, gave new expression to old antagonisms in the trans-Hluhluwe area as chiefs aligned themselves behind either the Usutu royal house or Zibhebhu's Mandlakazi.[93] As Zibhebhu's district lay to the west of the trans-Hluhluwe, the British assigned him, as an appointed chief, the task of retrieving cattle and arms which the Zulu royal house had deposited for safe keeping with the "amatonga" chiefdoms to the north of Zululand. Under this pretext, Zibhebhu was able to make constant depradations into the area where he demanded cattle from the pro-Usutu chiefdoms.[94] He also forced them to provide his European agent, Johan Colenbrander, with labourers for Natal. These men were then contracted to planters for six months in exchange for a £2 capitation fee. Half of the capitation fee and half of the workers' wages accrued to Zibhebhu.[95] After the restoration of Cetewayo in January 1883, the settlement of 1879 was scrapped and Zibhebhu was given the area between the Mkuzi and Pongola rivers as compensation for territory lost elsewhere. But his attempt to occupy this area triggered the Zulu civil war. Following the crushing of the Usuto in mid-1883 at least one recruiter was able to acquire 500 pro-Usuto Ngwayo through Zibhebhu and as late as the beginning of 1884 Colenbrander was given a licence to import 2 000 "Zulus".[96]

---

92. BPP 1892 C-6684 Correspondence respecting boundary questions in Zululand. See especially "Sketch map of the Ndwandwe district of Zululand showing boundaries variously assigned to Usebebu between 1879 and 1880;" Guy, Destruction, 72.

93. SNA 1/4/3 Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 31 March 1880; ZA 26.636 Saunders to Osborn, 26 Aug., 1887; Saunders to Osborn, 10 Sept., 1884; KCL. von Wissel, "Reminiscences", 2-3.

94. Zibhebhu also attempted, unsuccessfully, to raid the pro-Usutu Maputo chiefdom. Von Wissel, "Reminiscences", 3; FO 84/1564 British consul to FO, 1 Jan., 1880.

95. SNA 1/4/3 Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 26 March 1880. See also SNA 1/1/25, J. Colenbrander to SNA, 27 March 1880.

96. II. 1/17.534 Annot. Col. Sec., 9 Feb., 1884 on Morris and Co. to PI., 5 Feb., 1884; SNA 1/1/72.245 Veer to SNA 17 April 1884 and annotations.

Map No. 2

The Maputo-Zulu Frontier ca. 1885



Dunn complained that this alternative source of labour for Natal interfered with his amatonga agency.[97] But a greater threat to Dunn's monopoly arose from planters and officials who complained that, following the British conquest of Zululand, amatonga workers no longer needed protection on their way south, that immigrants did not receive sufficient food from Dunn, that the scheme was too expensive and that it merely extended Dunn's political power.[98]

---

97. GH.857 Dunn to Lt. Gov., 7 Feb., 1880. Dunn had himself tried unsuccessfully to levy tribute from the Maputo. FO 84/1564 O'neill to FO, 1 Jan., 1880.

98. CSO 2554.C137 Campbell to RM Stanger, 11 July 1881; CSO 2555,C32 Minute RM Lower tugela to Col. Sec., 13 July 1881; Administrator of Native Land and Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 10 Aug., 1881.

The Border Agent also claimed that Dunn had issued passes to numerous amatongas who did not report to the Immigration agent or Resident Magistrate of the Lower Tugela. These illegal immigrants, who sold their labour on the open market, traded or practised as diviners, were an added source of revenue for Dunn.[99] In November 1881 at the beginning of the planting season when the demand for labour was highest and when it was dangerous for immigrants to enter Natal because of the unhealthy state of the coastal route, Dunn declared his willingness to drop his rates to 4s on condition that the two northern stations were abandoned.[100] The Natal government was obliged to accede to these demands as the feeding scheme not only assisted the importation of labour, it also cheapened the general price of wage labour in Natal. The former Natal government immigration agent at Lourenço Marques wrote, following the Anglo-Zulu war, that

> "For the last two years there has been and continues to be a great demand for labourers and that demand is far in excess of the supply, caused by the large numbers (of amatongas) who have completed their terms of service returning home, the consequence is that wages have risen very considerably throughout the colony, which must continue unless labour is imported."[101]

Over the period 1881-82, some 4 341 amatongas entered while 7 063 left Natal by way of Dunn's agency.[102] But in February 1883, a month after Cetewayo's return to Zululand, Dunn ended his participation in the feeding scheme "owing to the present changes in

---

99. SNA 1/1/68 Border Agent to Col. Sec., 11 Jan., 1884.

100. SNA 1/1/25 Dunn to Col. Sec., 19 Nov. and 17 Dec., 1881; Border Agent to PI., 30 Nov., 1881.

101. CSO 840.289 Bennet to Gov., 23 Dec., 1881.

102. CSO 897.809 PI to Col. Sec., 17 March 1883; SNA 1/1/68.936 PI to Col. Sec., 9 Jan., 1884.

Zululand."[103] This move was no doubt as much due to his opposition to Cetewayo's restoration as it was to the difficulties that would emerge when amatonga migrants attempted to pass through the territory of Somkeli, a staunch Usutho supporter.[104] With the ending of the flow of amatonga labour to Natal, competition for labour between planters and the railways became more acute. In August 1883 the Victoria Planters' Association complained that 4 000 Indians had been requisitioned for the building of the railway, that a further 2 000 to 3 000 were to be requisitioned over the next two months and that there was little solution to the problem as the railway would not be finished before 1885.[105] By December 1883 labour was so scarce on the plantations that contractors were able to make as much as 3s a day from hiring out Indian labourers.[106]

In January 1884, during a temporary halt in the Zulu civil war, Dunn was asked to rejuvenate the feeding scheme. This he agreed to do but, no doubt because of the dangers involved, he demanded a capitation fee of 25s.[107] This the Natal authorities found unacceptable and on 21 January 1884 the Secretary for Native Affairs informed the Lt.-governor that the feeding scheme had ended due to the Zulu civil war and the inability of the authorities to control amatonga labour once in Natal.[108] Private recruiters were also

---

103. CSO 897.809 Dunn to Col. Sec., 18 Feb., 1883.

104. Guy, Destruction, 200, 251.

105. CSO 921.3289 Victoria Planters Assoc. to Col. Sec., 27 Aug., 1883.

106. SNA 1/1/68.922 Wilkinson to SNA, 20 Dec., 1883.

107. II. 1/17.17 CSO to PI., 4 Jan., 1884; SNA 1/1/68.936 Col. Sec., 9 Jan, 1884. The Usuthu, who had been crushed in July 1883 were to combine forces with a group of Boers to defeat the Mandlakazi in June 1884. During the lull in the civil war, workers had to pass through the anti-Usuthu district of Sokwetshata who had succeeded Mlandela, and then had to enter the pro-Usuthu area of Somkeli before reaching Zibhebhu's territory.
II. 1/17.17 CSO to PI., 4 Jan., 1884.

108. SNA 1/1/68.936 SNA to Bulwer, 21 Jan., 1884. The defeat of Zibhebhu in June 1884 was a severe blow to Dunn. He did however re-emerge in the late 1880s as a private recruiter of Zulu labour, drawn from the area under his control. SNA 1/1/112.3 Dunn to SNA, 31 Dec., 1888; SNA 1/1/24 Ritchie, 26 April 1890.

restricted from introducing labour because of the unrest that plagued the area north of the Hlatuze river which, according to the post restoration partition of Zululand, marked the northern border of the reserve.[109]

The shortage of African labour brought about by the Zulu civil war led the Natal government to respond to appeals for labour from the Natal Government Railways and the Harbour Board[110] by briefly resuscitating the maritime labour importation scheme. Following the Portuguese prohibition of maritime emigration from Inhambane in 1879, Reuben Benningfield was able to initiate a scheme whereby labour was taken "illegally" by sea from Inhambane to Durban and then overland to Kimberley.[111] Officially-recognized labour immigration from Inhambane was only resumed in December 1883, on the same basis as the old scheme, with the former Cape agent acting for the Natal government.[112] But with Natal in the depths of an economic depression employers were unwilling to pay the £3.2s.2d capitation fee for this labour and consequently in the first two months following the publicization of the scheme they only applied for 110 workers.[113] The pre-war Natal wages offered at Delagoa Bay could not compete with those of the diamond and eastern Transvaal gold fields and in the first eight months only 136 workers were imported, most of whom came from the Shangane and Chopi chiefdoms well to the north of Lourenço Marques.[114] During the Zulu civil

---

109. SNA 1/1/70.27 Bennett to Col. Sec., 12 Jan., 1884 and 22 Jan., 1884; 1/1/70.77 annot. Zululand Resident, 7 March 1884 on Farrel to SNA, 4 Feb., 1884.

110. CSO 918.2921 NGR Contractors to Col. Sec., 26 July 1883.

111. This scheme is discussed on page 91, notes 165-168.

112. CSO 862.2494 PI to Col. Sec., 4 July 1882; II. 1/16.1139 Natal Harbour Board, "Meeting with Just de Coster," 8 Dec., 1883. The Portuguese also attempted unsuccessfully to initiate and control the export of Gaza labour from Chiloane, see J.C. Paiva de Andrade, Relatória de uma viagem ás Terras dos Landins, 24.

113. II. 1/17.89 Col. Sec. to PI., 8 Feb., 1884; II. 1/17.136 Newspaper cutting marked Jan., 1884.

114. II. 1/19.382 De Coster to PI., 10 April 1884; minute PI, 5 April 1884; CSO 978.3561 RM Durban to Col. Sec., 11 Sept., 1884; II. 1/19.477 PI to Col. Sec., 7 April 1884; II. 1/19.506 De Coster to PI, 14 April 1884; II. 1/19.1087 De Coster to PI, 3 Aug., 1884.

war private recruiters also offered to take labour overland from the untroubled Inhambane interior and in September 1883, three months after the ending of the first phase of the civil war, about 200 men entered Natal after a two month journey overland from the Inhambane area. This route soon became the most important means of securing labour immigrants from Inhambane and, during the following year large numbers of migrants, accompanied by recruiters, made their way overland to Natal.[115]

In March 1884 the governor-general of Mozambique expressed his dissatisfaction that the "great flow of emigrant workers who go from the district of Inhambane to the English colony of Natal" were not allowed to go by sea and hence, because they were not contracted, they provided no source of revenue to the Inhambane treasury. For the first time, he significantly referred to this uncontracted labour as "clandestine".[116] The governor of Inhambane reported that it was prejudicial to the interests of the town that several thousand Africans had been recruited in the area and taken to the Diamond and Gold Fields and to Natal without passing through any Inhambane controls.[117] In an attempt to control and tax this labour emigration the Portuguese dropped the prohibition on the export of labour from Inhambane in January 1885 and placed emigration from the port on the same footing as that from Ibo to Mayotte and Nossi Bé and from Lourenço Marques to Durban.[118] But when the Castle Packet Co. offered to take migrants from Inhambane to Durban for a 30s passage fee, the Natal government was unwilling to

---

115. II. 1/21.1139 Col. Sec. to PI, 4 Sept., 1884; II. 1/22,1398 De Coster to PI, 8 Oct., 1884; RM Durban to PI, 27 Oct., 1884. See also II. 1/17.534 Morris and Co. to PI, 5 Feb., 1884.

116. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 1, GGM to MSMU, 28 March 1884 also enclosed unsigned memo 17 Nov., 1884, In 1886 Gungunyana claimed that he should be the recipient of the 30s emigration fee taken from his subjects at Lourenço Marques and Inhambane. But this was impossible to enforce as these ports were controlled by the Portuguese; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 3, GGM to MSMU 22 March 1886; GGM to MNE 27 Dec., 1886.

117. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 1, G Inhambane to GGM 13 June 1884 in GGM to MSMU 28 June 1884.

118. BO. 2, 10 Jan., 1885; BO. 18, 17 Jan., 1885; FO 84/1709 Br. consul to FO, 12 Jan., 1885. Following French criticisms of their exclusion from the 1876 Lourenço Marques emigration scheme, they were given permission in June 1881 to contract Inhambane labour for the plantations of the Indian Ocean Islands, AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 1, memo, 20 Aug., 1884; FO 84/1616 for consul to FO, 5 July 1882; FO 84/1640 Br. Consul to FO, 15 Feb., 1883.

initiate another project involving capitation overheads that could be lost through desertion.

Economic Depression and the End of Natal's Dependence on Amatonga Labour

The Protector of Immigrants was of the opinion that amatonga immigrants did not desert "because of a wish to return to their homes but in the hope of obtaining better wages as free men, which labourers from Inhambane might equally do."[119] Desertion was only one of a number of strategies used by amatongas to improve their conditions of service.[120] Because of the planters' need for a core of skilled workers, amatongas were encouraged to renew contracts and to return to their old employers after a period of "home leave". This could only be achieved if the workers considered the conditions on a plantation to be good. Amatonga workers also influenced the flow and direction of workers by propagating in their home areas the trustworthiness of various recruiters and the conditions existing on various plantations.[121] Thus according to one planter, "Some of these (amatonga) people like ourselves have strong preferences for certain kinds of work as well as certain employers."[122]

The capitation losses that desertion caused employers constituted a major reason for the cessation of the amatonga labour immigration scheme.[123] As figure 1 shows, wages on the plantations

---

119. II. 1/24.163 D.C. Andrews to PI, 8 Jan., 1885 and annotation PI to Col. Sec., 9 Jan., 1885.

120. Desertion was not always used as a strategy to improve conditions. It was equally used by employers as a means of reducing overheads when wage arrears were abandoned. Cf. SNA 1/3/9 Res. Mag., Durban, "Report of the State of the Natives", 1859.

121. SNA 1/7/8 Memorandum by SNA, 5 Nov., 1872; Ibid., 18 Dec., 1871; L.C. no. 12, 1872, "Report ... on the introduction of native labourers from beyond the border of the colony." SNA 1/1/24 PI to Jackson, 20 March 1874; GH 837 Elton to Brackenberg, 4 Aug., 1875.

122. II. 1/1 R815/76 C. Parson to Col. Sec., 18 March 1876.

123. II. 1/21.1139 Reynolds of Umzinto Estates to PI, 26 Aug., 1884; II. 11/22.1536 Reynolds to PI, 12 Nov., 1884. In a letter to the Transvaal State Secretary the Natal Colonial Secretary saw the state's inability to control desertion as the only reason for the ending of amatonga immigration. TA SSa 330 Ra 4047 in Ra607 Col. Sec. to SS, 27 July 1897.

were closely tied to both output and the market price for sugar. Thus the depression of the sugar industry in 1881-86 was accompanied by a fall in wages which further encouraged desertion and acted as a strong disincentive for labourers to seek work in Natal.

Figure 1

Fluctuations in the Production and Price of Sugar and in African Wages in Natal, 1863-1897



Another important reason was the smallpox epidemic of 1882-83 which gave the up-country farmers an important weapon with which to attack the labour importation schemes of the coastal planters. In September 1884 the Colonial Secretary, the Protector of Immigrants and the Quarantine Board agreed that amatonga immigration should be halted due to the fear that smallpox would be imported and due to "the

generally unsatisfactory nature of the hold we have on these men as regards contract of service and their tendency to desert."[124] A final batch of 60 men, consisting largely of "Chopis", whom the labour agent at Lourenço Marques feared would be killed if they returned home, arrived at Durban in October 1884.[125]

The colonists' fear that smallpox would be introduced by amatongas acted as a catalyst in the promulgation in 1884 of new regulations aimed at controlling labour immigration. All immigrant workers were then obliged to report to a government official on entering Natal and permission to enter the colony would only be granted after a 21 day quarantine period.[126] Although magistrates could refuse Africans passes to leave the colony for the Diamond Fields or Cape, law 48 of 1884 aimed "To provide for the better regulation of the passing and re-passing of Natives between Natal and the neighbouring States and Territories." This law obliged amatongas to take out passes on entering Natal and threatened any person employing an immigrant without the requisite pass with a £10 fine or a three month jail sentence. Three years later a charge of 1s was introduced for each pass.[127]

The earlier establishment of a minimum wage for contracted workers introduced by sea proved difficult to maintain and in 1884 the government merely advised that "It is not expected that migrants can be induced to come to Natal for less than 20s or 25s, per month." Instead of a fixed minimum wage of 20s, applicants were merely to state the highest wage that they were prepared to pay.[128] Because of a lack of manpower, these laws proved difficult to enforce and

---

124. II. 1/20 Minute Col. Sec. to PI, 28 Aug., 1884; Col. Sec. to Gov., 2 Sept., 1884; PI to De Coster, 10 Sept., 1884.

125. II. 1/20 De Coster to Col. Sec., 2 Oct., 1884; II. 1/22.1398 De Coster to PI, 8 Oct., 1884. Although maritime immigration officially ended in October 1884, at least 350 Inhambane workers were landed at Durban where they were employed by the Harbour Board in 1886. See CSO 1082.2223 Port Capt. to Sec., Harbour Board, 18 March 1886.

126. SNA 1/1/78.812 SNA to Attorney Gen., 21 Nov., 1884; Att. gen. enclosure 21 Nov., 1884; Government notice 323, 1884; SNA 1/1/78.832 Tatham and Edmonstone to SNA, 19 Nov., 1884.

127. CSO 2555 c 32. RM Durban to ANA, 27 July 1881; SNA 1/1/53.1144 Fynney to SNA, 31 March 1882; Law 52 of November 1886. William Broome, The Laws of Natal, vol. III, 1879-1889, pp. 1592-94, 1867-68.

128. Government notice 14, 1884 in NGG., 8 Jan., 1884.

when, with the sugar industry in dire straits and contributing little to the colony's economy, up-country farmers renewed their demands for the withdrawal of all labour immigration subsidies, the Natal government was obliged to withdraw its amatonga subsidy which in some years amounted to as much as £3 000; almost one-third that of Indian immigration.[129]

When Natal emerged from the depression of the early-mid 1880s, the government no longer felt obliged to subsidize the introduction of amatonga labour. Large numbers of applications were made to the Secretary for Native Affairs to import Zulu, amatonga and Pondo labour. Government notice 255 of 1888 reminded employers that they had to bear the cost and burden of introducing foreign labour and that workers could only be introduced with the permission of the Secretary for Native Affairs. Labour was being drawn from the plantations by the railways, labour tenancy and especially by the Gold and Diamond fields.[130] The planters received little sympathy from the Secretary for Native Affairs who considered that the drawing of labour away from the plantations was only natural as the latter paid monthly wages of 15s while the Diamond Fields paid 30s per week. It was "a question of wages, the labourer will always go where his labour will be best paid." Consequently it was "not practicable" for the government to embroil itself in expensive labour importation schemes.[131] Others saw the solution to the "labour problem" as a tightening of government control over foreign labourers once they had arrived in Natal by restricting the movement of labour from Natal to the Transvaal and Cape.

This was forcefully put by one memorialist who stated, at the beginning of the 1888 planting season, that

---

129. SNA 1/1/86.653 Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 20 Oct., 1885 and 23 Dec., 1885; SNA 1/1/88.834 RM Durban to SNA, 2 Dec., 1885; Debates, Natal Legislative Council, vol. VII, 1884, 278-283, 322-333. For African immigration subsidies, see II. 1/1R600 annotation on PI to Col. Sec., 24 Sept., 1875; Bo. 3, 20 Jan., 1878, GLM district report for 1877-78; II. 1/16.1211 Annot., PI., 22 March 1884.

130. SNA 1/1/106.335 Asby a.o. to SNA, 25 April 1888; SNA 1/1/108.607 Wood and 48 others to SNA July(?) 1888; Various correspondence in SNA 1/1/108 to SNA 1/1/110.

131. SNA 1/1/106.416 SNA to Governor, 21 June 1888.

> "the present extraordinary demand (for labour) by foreign states ... requires dealing with otherwise our labour supply is curtailed, colonial industry crippled and the cost of production greatly increased."[132]

But the planters, many of whom had interests in the Gold Fields, opposed any governmental restrictions being placed on the emigration of African labour from Natal. In the event, the only new restriction placed on the mobility of African labour was that of a special permit, introduced in 1889, that had to be granted by the Secretary for Native Affairs in order to take labour through Natal to the Gold Fields.[133]

Planters' fears that amatonga labourers would no longer be drawn to Natal due to uncompetitive plantation wages were compounded by misgivings over recruiting overheads lost when labour immigrants deserted. They believed that the solution to their labour problem lay in the increased proletarianization of local labour together with a tighter control of the labour force which, however, was only fully possible with Indian indentures.[134] The transition to employing local rather than immigrant labour was also determined by a structural transformation of the Natal economy which pushed local labour onto the market and consequently decreased the colony's dependence on foreign labour.

By the 1880s, the locations were becoming increasingly overcrowded. They had been centred around rugged, broken and infertile country where people had retreated for security during the Mfecane.[135] Yet although the population of the locations had trebled by the 1880s, the extent of the rural locations had been reduced and very little capital had been spent on their development.[136] The early 1880s were marked by a sharp downward turn in the terms of trade for many African peasants.

---

132. SNA 1/1/108.661 Hawksworth to SNA, 30 Aug., 1888.

133. SNA 1/1/114.438 Levy to SNA, 11 May 1889; 1/1/118 J.G. Colenbrander to SNA, 11 Sept., 1889.

134. S.F. Benningfield in Natal Coast Industrial Planters conference (Durban 1888), 9; SNA 1/1/108.661 Hawksworth to SNA 8 Aug., 1888.

135. NAC Proceedings I, 69, evidence of Shepstone; Young, "Native Policy", 225-6, Welsh, Roots, 177.

136. Welsh, Roots, 179, 220; E.H. Brooks and N. Hurwitz, The Native Reserves of Natal, 11. The £5 000 annual Reserve Fund for Natives had hardly been touched, Leverton , "Government Finance", 392-3.

The contribution of Africans to the Colonial revenue rose from £33 000 in 1872 to £63 000 in 1880. This included direct hut taxation and indirect duties on all goods thought to be used by Africans, including a tax of 6d on each hoe and pick.[137] The Anglo-Zulu war had provided an enormous market for maize and sorghum, the price per muid of which rose from an average of 15s and 13s2d respectively in 1873-77 to 28s4d and 25s2d in 1880. While many white farmers were unable to take advantage of these high prices due to their involvement in the war, the African response to this sudden demand for foodstuffs was to increase the production of maize and sorghum from one season to the next by 87% and 105% respectively, and profits were invested in ploughs, harrows and wagons. But in 1881 the market price for maize and sorghum fell to 16s5d and 17s11d. Two years later, as recession trailed into depression, prices dropped to 8s4d and 11s2d and by the end of the depression in 1886 prices had slumped to 7s and 9s10d.[138] Due to the increasing involvement of free Indians in the cereals market [139] and the general overproduction of maize and sorghum, prices remained constantly low into the 1890s.[140] As African peasants were largely dependent for their cash income on the marketing of maize and sorghum,[141] the depression in prices

---

137. "Mr Greenstock's notes of travel", Mission Field, 1 Jan., 1876, 137; C. Axelson, "A history of taxation in Natal prior to Union", (M.A., University of Natal), 106.

138. Natal Blue Books, 1880-81, "Agriculture". The production of maize by Europeans fell by 31% from 1880 to 1881 when Africans produced 80% of Natal's maize. See figure 2 . The number of ploughs used by Africans rose from 4 810 in 1878 to 8 591 in 1883 and 13 898 in 1888. The number of harrows rose from 195 to 275 to 876; wagons from 375 to 955 to 1 165, Natal Blue Books, "Agriculture".

139. Natal Blue Books, Native Affairs, 1887, RM Inanda, 20; RM Alexandria; Ibid., 1888 RM Lower Tugela, 78; Ibid., 1889 RM Inanda; Norman Etherington, "African Economic Experiments in Natal, 1845-1880", Afr. Econ. Hist., 6, 1978, 8. It was claimed in 1884 that free Indians grew 100 000 muids of maize annually, Binns in Debates of Natal Legislative Council, VII, 1884, 322. This seems highly unlikely as in 1897 the Blue Books recorded the harvesting by Indians of 69 086 muids of maize.

140. Natal Blue Book Native Affairs, 1886, RM Lower Tugela; Ibid., 1887 RM Inanda, 20.

141. Ibid., 1881, 140, 151, 156, 161, 176, 185; Ibid., 1882, 117, 120, 124.

Figure 2

African and European maize production in Natal 1867-1897



illustrated in figures 2 and 3, obliged them to seek cash incomes by selling their labour for longer periods on the market. Many moved away from cereals production altogether such that in a bad harvest year, like 1889 in Umsinga district, the magistrate reported that, "many of the natives... are now dependent on their earnings and wages of boys out at service and there are few men to be found at their homes."[142]

142. NBB., NA 1889 RM Umsinga, 52; NBB., NA 1886 RMInanda, 34; NBB., NA 188 RM Ixopo, 22.

Figure 3

African and Settler Millet and Sorghum Production in Natal, 1867-1897



During the boom years of 1876-1880 a great deal of capital was invested in land and, as the price of land rose, rents were increased.[143] This pushed many Africans off the land or obliged them to seek less-advantageous tenancies; in some cases children of tenants then found it more profitable to move permanently onto the labour market or to work for extended periods on the railways or gold fields.[144] In some areas rents were demanded in money rather than labour because of the scarcity of cash and low prices paid for farm produce.[145]

In 1880 the Crown Lands were first offered for sale, four years later an annual rent of £1 was charged of all "squatters" living on these lands and by the end of the decade most of the formerly unsurveyed land in the colony had been sold. This meant that Africans living on unsurveyed land either lost their farms or had to find the capital to buy them from the state.[146]

---

143. Welsh, Roots, 196; Leverton, "Government Finance", 301. See also Mission Field, 1 Jan., 1876, 21.

144. Natal Blue Book Native Affiars, 1886, 83; 1887 RM Umsinga, 33, 68; Ibid., 1888, 17, 31, 67; 1889, 74, 78.

145. Ibid., 1887 RM Umsinga, 33; Ibid., 1888 RM Umsinga, 31.

146. Natal Legislative Council, SP 1884 no. 12, "The collection of rent for squatters on Crown Lands"; NBB., NA 1886 RM Newcastle, 49; NBB., NA 1887 RM Ixopo, 24, 28; RM Klip River, 75; RM Weenen, 67; Law 41, 1884.

It is impossible here to examine in any depth the various other factors which drove Natal Africans onto the labour market. These include the growing use of labour-saving implements; the need for cash in order to procure goods which, although once luxuries, had become necessities and the ability to circumvent the power of the elders that was given to young men through access to wage labour.[147]

By the late 1880s, Natal drew the majority of its labour force from within the colony. Many workers were also drawn from Zululand where recruiters worked through magistrates and chiefs who received capitation fees of 5s to 20s in exchange for forcing their followers to accept work on the Natal government railways for wages of 20s per month.[148] The use of Zulu labour was supported by the government which, in a notice issued in May 1888 on the laws governing the introduction of labour declared "that every facility will be given consistent with the requirements of the laws of Natal and Zululand to persons desirous of introducing labour from Zululand." The question of amatonga labour was significantly excluded and their importation was discouraged by the Secretary for Native Affairs.[149]

In 1889 recruiters applied for licences to introduce overland more than 2 250 Zulu workers, 1 000 unidentified "native labourers" and 800 amatongas, most of whom were drawn from the Gaza state in the Inhambane interior. The following year the number of Zulus applied for rose to 4 700, "native labourers" remained constant, amatongas dropped to 200 and several hundred workers from "the Cape" and Basutoland were applied for, mostly on six month contracts at 25s per month.[150]

By the late 1880s, despite the ending of the smallpox scare and the emergence of the colony from the depression of 1882-86,

---

147. H. Slater, "The Changing Pattern", 161; Welsh, Roots, 222-24.

148. ZGH 725 Res. Comm., to Gov., 28 Oct., 1889; Times of Natal, 23 Oct., 1889.

149. Government notice 255, 1888, NGG., 22 May 1888; SNA 1/1/129.909 Crompton to SNA, 30 Oct., 1890. Guy dates large-scale labour migration from Zululand to 1888 following the crushing of the last of the royalists. "Destruction and reconstruction", 176ff.

150. Figures drawn from various correspondence in SNA 1/1/112 to SNA 1/1/135.

Natal was no longer reliant on amatonga labour. The drawing of workers from within the colony and from a Zululand severely dislocated by the civil wars of 1883-86, entailed no government expense. It also provided Natal with a source of labour over which it had some control at a time when employers were faced with growing competition for foreign labour from the Diamond Fields and especially from the newly-discovered Witwatersrand goldfields.

Mozambican Labour and the Kimberley Diamond Fields[151]

In much the same way as Natal and the Cape, Africans living around the Kimberley and Dutoitspan diggings were able to respond to the new market opportunities offered by diamond mining, by selling the produce of their labour rather than their labour power itself.[152] Following the Natal and Cape patterns, a geographical division of labour emerged in which the southern Tswana chiefdoms supplied the diggings with food and fuel while labour was drawn from outside of the area. Although it is impossible to calculate the numbers of amatongas, or "Shangaans", as they became known at Kimberley, employed on the Diamond Fields, the manner in which "new hands"[153] were registered shows that during the early 1870s they were of relatively little importance. In 1873 Shangaans entered into 2 285 new labour contracts or 11.8% of the 19 338 registered on the Kimberley and De Beers mines. Three years later, Shangaans signed some 1 098 new labour contracts out of a total of 12 274. Of far greater importance to the diamond diggings was the number of

---

151. Labour on the Diamond Fields has been thoroughly examined in several recent works: R.F. Sieborger, "The Recruitment and Organisation of African Labour for the Kimberley Diamond Mines, 1871-1888" (MA., Rhodes University, 1976); R.V. Turrell, "Capital, Class and Monopoly: The Kimberley Diamond Fields 1871-1889" (PhD., University of London, 1982); K. Shillington, "Land Loss, Labour and Dependency, The Impact of Colonialism on the Southern Tswana, 1870-1900" (PhD., Univ. of London, 1981).

152. K. Shillington, "The Impact of the diamond discoveries on the Kimberley hinterland" in S. Marks & R. Rathbone, eds., Industrialization and Social Change; Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 45-47.

153. A "new hand" could in theory annually enter into six two month contract with different employers. An "old hand" re-registered with the same employer. Many workers rested between contracts in the location around Kimberley. The origins of the term "Shangaan" meaning "followers of Shoshangane (Manukosi)" are dealt with in appendix 1 . The following statistics are drawn from Turrell, " Kimberley Diamond Fields," 397-399.

men drawn from the Pedi and South Sotho polities.[154] But in 1876 the first Sekukuni war co-incided with an attempt by employers to reduce their workers' wages following a fall in the price of diamonds. This caused large numbers of South Sothos to move to the Eastern Cape which both obviated the harassment suffered in crossing the Orange Free State and providing them with remunerative labour on the railways. This exodus of labour was accompanied by the return home of thousands of Pedi workers to defend their families. Thus between May and July 1876, some 6 000 African workers left the Diamond Fields.[155]

Influenced by the Natal immigration feeding scheme, the Griqualand West Labour Commission of 1876 recommended that the government construct rest stations along the labour routes in order to protect immigrants and supply them with food. It further advised the construction of a central depot from where immigrant labourers would be contracted for a minimum of three months. If unable to find labour within five days, the immigrant should be assigned to an employer. But the government was not prepared to bear the costs involved in implementing policies that would merely cheapen the cost of labour and concurred with the Labour Commission's finding that "the surest means of encouraging the introduction of labour is the payment of high wages." Thus despite the recommendations of the Labour Commission, government intervention in the labour market was limited to a half-hearted and abortive attempt to procure "Shangaan" labour through Albasini and to the construction of a central depot at Kimberley.[156] Consequently amatonga migrants, passing from tropical areas to the cold winter highveld suffered terribly from exposure, banditry and the labour exactions of

---

154. "Pedi" here refers largely to Sekukuni's people but also includes numbers of Transvaal Ndebele under chiefs Mapoch, Zebedelia, Matiega and Makapan and Venda speakers from Magato's chiefdom. South Sotho refers largely to the Basotho followers of Moshesh. De Vaal, "Joao Albasini", 141; Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organisation", 66-67, 71-72.

155. Purkiss, "Railway Building", 390-393; Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 166-168.

156. BPP 1879. C2220, Labour Commission of Griqualand West, 165; Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 165-166.

Transvaal farmers and state officials.[157]

In February and March 1876 the Resident Magistrate of Natal's Upper Tugela district, which bordered on the Orange Free State, remarked on the "unusual number of amatongas passing this way to the Diamond Fields". He described a migration by stages in which "many of (the migrants) were lately from their homes, had passed through Zululand, remained a short time at Durban or its neighbourhood until they could earn sufficient to purchase food and clothing and then started for the 'Fields'". The magistrate then outlined some of the routes taken by workers returning from the Diamond Fields. Because Africans were not allowed to carry guns through Natal and the trekker republics, they would send "the half of their number home with the arms by a circuitous route north of the Transvaal republic ... other natives return via Natal and proceed to Delagoa Bay from Durban by sea." In depositions enclosed in the magistrate's report, "Jonas" declared that he had left the Delagoa Bay area two months previously with nine other immigrants, had entered Natal via the government feeding scheme and had worked for six months in Verulam and Durban before saving sufficient money and clothing to complete the journey to the Diamond Fields. "Maroonga" stated that he intended to return home by sea to Delagoa Bay from where he and five others had set out about three years previously. Having taken advantage of the feeding scheme, he had worked for six months in Durban before acquiring the capital needed to travel to Kimberley. There his companions had purchased guns which they sent home with carriers who, passing north of the Transvaal, took more than two months to arrive at Delagoa Bay.[158] As early as January 1876 the Natal Protector of Immigrants complained that the movement of amatonga labour to the Diamond Fields was a

---

157. TA.SN 5 Merensky to Osborne, 25 July 1877; TA.SN 1 Acting Native Commissioner(NC) Waterberg to SNA, 8 May 1879; SN 2. H. Shepstone, minute no. N309/1879 of 13 Dec., 1879; Ibid., NC Zoutpansberg to M. Barlow, 21 Oct., 1879; Ibid., Barlow to SNA, 3 Sept., 1879; SN. 4A NC Spelonken to SNA 2 July 1881; SS 490 Lddst. Lydenburg to Col. Sec., 25 Nov., 1880; SN 173 R179/83 NC Spelonken to NC Zoutpansberg, 9 Oct., 1883. See also p 100, note 28.

158. SNA 1/3/26 R233/76 RM Upper Tugela to SNA, 25 Feb., 1876 and 29 March 1876 and enclosed depositions of "Jonas", 2 Jan., 1876 and "Maronga", 23 Feb., 1876. See also Junod, The Life of a South African Tribe, II, 401 for Kimberley as a source of guns. Breach loaders costing £25 were more than four times the price of tower muskets at Kimberley. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 100.

drain on Natal's finances as many of the migrants entered the colony via the government's feeding scheme.[159] These men either sold their labour to the highest bidder on the Kimberley market or were taken up by labour touts who protected and fed them and who were then paid as much as a £1 capitation fee for each worker willing to contract himself for a three month period.[160]

As increasing numbers of amatonga labourers entered Natal through government-assisted immigration schemes and as the numbers of Pedi and South Sotho labourers on the Diamond Fields dropped, amatonga/Shangaan workers were increasingly recruited in Natal for the Diamond diggings. They were offered wages which, at £2 per month, were lower than the Kimberley average but which were almost quadruple those offered in Natal. The six month contracts thought 'normal' in Natal were especially valued by Kimberley employers as they were considerably longer than the two to three months average contract on the Diamond Fields.[161] The annexation of the Transvaal by the British removed a major obstacle to the movement of Shangaan workers across the Highveld.[162] By 1878 Shangaan labour constituted 26% of all new contracts registered on the Kimberley and De Beers mines and 29% of those entered into on the poorer Dutoitspan and Bultfontein mines. This marked a rise from 1 594 contracts signed by Shangaan "new hands" in 1877 to 9 369 in 1878. After dropping to 7 588 new contracts in 1879 when the Anglo-Zulu war restricted transit through Zululand, some 8 776 new contracts were signed in 1880. This period was marked by the movement of Shangaan workers onto the Bultfontein and Dutoitspan diggings where, although wages were slightly lower than on the Kimberley and De Beers mines, new opportunities existed for wage-earners. Thus the number of new

---

159. SNA 1/1/27 no. 15, PI, Memorandum, 18 Jan., 1876.

160. Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organization", 58-60.

161. Helps to Gov. sec. Griqualand West, 25 Aug., 1877 in Smalburger collection, University of Cape Town, BC 635. B12.6.

162. AHU. Moç., pasta 32, R.B. Morier, British Ambassador to MNE, 10 July 1877. Morier stated that the Transvaal which had formerly "rendered itself disagreeable to its neighbours ... (by) ... preventing the free emigration of the tribes from the North desirous of obtaining employment in the Cape colonies" would therefore compete with the Portuguese areas as a supplier of labour.

contracts entered into by Shangaans employed on the Bultfontein and Dutoitspan mines increased from 637 in 1877 to 6 198 in 1879; an increase from 7% to 47% of the work force employed on those mines. These statistics underline the flaws inherent in attributing, in an over-generalized way, the origins of migrant labour to the "pull" of the Griqualand West market for guns; for the sharp rise in the number of Shangaans employed at Kimberley was preceded by the prohibition of the gun trade in 1877.

When the Cape government annexed Griqualand West in October 1880, it attempted to assist the labour needs of employers on the Diamond Fields by extending the terms of the Cape-Delagoa Bay maritime immigration scheme to Kimberley. In March 1881 the Cape official in charge of labour immigration wrote an encouraging letter to the chairman of De Beers stating that the Cape government was willing to subsidize half the cost of £6 involved in taking Delagoa Bay workers to the Diamond Fields via Cape Town. Although they would have to pay more to mine labourers than the 15s per month paid to Delagoa Bay workers employed on Cape farms, he felt they could still be employed at relatively "moderate wages" and possibly on two year contracts.[163] But the importation of Delagoa Bay labour became too expensive for the Cape when the U.S.S. Co. ended its run to Lourenço Marques and, due to the large number of desertions and the onset of the depression, De Beers was unwilling to pay an increased capitation fee of £4, especially as the government could not prevent labourers from deserting, and hence the loss of this money. The Cape immigration official stated frankly that importation overheads were unlikely to be covered by low wages and long contracts as it was "more than doubtful whether (Delagoa Bay labourers) would continue to work at contract-rate in the immediate vicinity of more highly priced labour."[164]

---

163. TA. A 180. CPWD. McNaughton to Chairman De Beers, 18 March 1881.

164. TA. A 180. CPWD. McNaughton to secretary De Beers, 18 June 1881; BO 13 July 1881

A more successful scheme was that entered into by J. Benningfield, a director of the Kimberley Central Diamond Mining Company with his brother Reuben, who had worked as the Natal government labour agent in Inhambane until the Portuguese prohibited labour emigration from that port in November 1879. Despite the terms of the Portuguese prohibition, Reuben Benningfield was able to bring his first shipment of labour for Kimberley into Durban bay in October 1881 and, over the next five months, at least 500 workers were introduced in this way.[165]

Benningfield paid the passport and passage costs of these men who consequently entered Natal as free labourers, able to choose their own employers, and not as contracted workers.[166] As a means of importing labour, this immigration scheme manifested many of the trappings of slavery. The British consul at Mozambique Island was informed that Benningfield's agent in Inhambane, José Teixeira, the man who in 1888 became the Natal government labour agent, sent envoys into the interior to get labour by "all sorts of pretences". Once inInhambane, the labourers were chained and in chains or stocks were embarked for Natal. For his services Teixeira received a 20s capitation fee from Benningfield who also paid an undisclosed amount to the governor of Inhambane who, in order to circumvent the decree prohibiting the export of labour form the town, made out exile passports with false names for 5s (1$200 reis).[167] The superintendent of police in Durban complained about the conditions under which the labourers were imported; as many as 200 men were packed into the Benningfield's coastal schooner on each trip, they were not examined by a medical officer on landing at Durban and had no latrines attached to their sleeping quarters.[168] The workers were taken in groups under guard to Kimberley where they were employed on one year contracts at 40s per month for the first six months and 60s for the following six months. For supplying the Kimberley Central with labour that was, by Kimberley standards, inordinately

---

165. CSO 841 Benningfield to Port Captain, 20 Jan., 1882; Port Captain to PI, 20 Jan., 1882; Henderson and Grice to PI, 6 March 1882; I I. 1/10. 79 Supt. Police to Mayor and Council, Durban, 6 Jan., 1882.

166. CSO 841.341 Henderson and Grice to PI, 24 Feb., 1882 and Benningfield to PI, 1 Feb., 1882.

167. FO 84/1616 Br. consul, O'Neill to FO, 14 Feb., 1882.

168. II. 1/10.79 Supt. Police to Mayor and Council, Durban, 6 Jan., 1882.

cheap and bound by long contracts, Reuben Benningfield was paid a capitation fee of £6. The scheme seems to have contributed to the mine-owners' attempted wage reductions of late 1881 but ended when the Benningfields' schooner was wrecked on the coast of Madagascar in 1883.[169] Benningfield re-emerged as a recruiter of labour for Kimberley when, in the late 1880s, he brough several hundred immigrants from Inhambane into Natal from where they were taken to Kimberley and employed by De Beers.[170]

During the early 1880s non-contract amatonga labour immigrants continued to make their way across Natal to the Diamond Fields. Natal officials complained that amatongas merely "made a convenience" of the government immigration scheme in order to enter Natal legally and then, after earning the 5s pass which was required by legislation of November 1878 for all immigrants who had not worked in the colony for six months, they continued to the Diamond Fields.[171] Many were recruited in Natal on six to twelve month contracts for wages which, estimated to be £4 to £5 in 1884, were over six times greater than those offered in Natal.[172] On their way home amatongas would often work on plantations and railway works in order to earn sufficient money to pay their passage fee to Lourenço Marques or to cover the costs incurred in returning overland.[173] Large numbers of labourers walked in small parties overland from Inhambane, an extremely dangerous journey of up to five months, while others from the same area sought the protection of recruiters who contracted them to employers on arrival at the Diamond Fields.[174] Other Shangaans reached Kimberley via the route to Natal which ran along the Olifants and Sabi rivers to Lydenburg and Botsabelho, but then branched off to Middleburg, Pretoria,

---

169. CSO 841 RM Durban to PI, 2 Feb., 1882.

170. The Portuguese consul in Cape Town mentioned a figure of 600 in 1890. CPC Packet "various documents", 1890.

171. SNA 1/1/25 PI to Border Agent, 24 Nov., 1881; PI to Col. Sec., 14 Dec., 1881; CSO 2555 C32. RM Durban to SNA, 27 July 1881; SNA 1/1/53.144 Fynney to SNA, 31 March 1882.

172. SNA 1/1/78.840 SNA to gov., 29 Nov., 1884; Bulwer to SNA, 8 Dec., 1884; SNA to gov., 12 Dec., 1884; Maxwell to SNA, 9 Dec., 1884.

173. SNA 1/1/66.755 RM Umsinga to Col. Sec., 14 Sept., 1883.

174. ABM: ABC 15.4 vol. 12, Richards to Mean, 24 Aug., 1884; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 1, Governor of Inhambane to GGM, 13 June 1884 in GGM to MSMU, 28 June 1884; E. Creux, "Une Tournée Missionaire", BMSAS, 40, 1881, 231, 234.

Potchefstroom, Bloemhof and Christiana.[175] The number of contracts registered by Shangaan "new hands" declined sharply from 10 311 in 1882 to 1 680 in 1883 and 997 in 1884. This was caused partly by the Zulu civil war which disrupted the labour route through Zululand and partly by the war against Mapoch, through whose territory Shangane workers had to pass on their way from Lydenburg to Middelburg in the Transvaal.[176] But the decline was largely due to the effects of the depression at Kimberley. This co-incided with a high mortality rate caused by smallpox in 1883-84 and the closing of the Natal borders to all labour immigrants going to or returning from the Diamond Fields, in order to prevent the spread of the disease.[177]

The last ethnic breakdown of workers employed on the Diamond Fields was taken in 1884 when 2 144 Shangaan "new hands" were registered. But by 1885 workers who re-registered as "old hands", for whom we have no ethnic breakdown, constituted by far the majority of the work force. Thus whereas 50% of the contracts entered into in 1878 were signed by old hands, by 1885 this percentage had risen to 83%. The compound system was established between 1885 and 1888 in order to "maintain and discipline a migrant labour force."[178] Compounds reduced desertions, pressured workers to re-register and, in conjunction with convict labour and financial amalgamations, effectively drove down the wage level for African workers from an average monthly wage of £5.14s8d in 1885 to £2.8s in 1894. During the 1890s, mechanization on the mines, the partial stabilization of the labour force and competition with the Witwatersrand for migrant workers reduced the numbers of Shangaans to about 700 domiciled at the Fields and a probably similar annual number of immigrant labourers.[179]

---

175. Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organization", 39. A graphic description of the problems faced by migrants on this route to the labour markets is C. Richter, "Wanderende Basuto", BMB, 1882, 46-59.

176. Cape Blue Books. G3.-'84 Division of Kimberley. Native Registrar to Civil Commissioner, 18 June 1884, 28.

177. C80 927.3812/83 annot., Col. Sec., 27 Sept., 1883; C80 936. 5730 Memorial of Farmers in the county of Weenen; (sic 1884?) RM Ladismith to Col. Sec., 18 Aug., 1884; CSO 974.3915 Col. Sec. to Cmdt. Natal Mounted Police, 27 Sept., 1883.

178. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 172, 275-6, 289-298.

179. CA G7-'92 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1892, p. 16; C6-'92 Cape of Good Hope Census, 1891. pp. 90-91; see also G19-'05 Cape of Good Hope Census, p. 93.

Chapter 3

THE EFFECT OF THE WITWATERSRAND MINES ON THE PATTERN OF MIGRANT LABOUR FROM MOZAMBIQUE

The Decline in the Number of Mozambicans working on Natal Plantations

During the late 1880s and 1890s a constant demand existed in Natal for experienced labour, held by long-term contracts, to work as stevedores, in railway construction and on the plantations. Indian labour was expensive, and local Zulu labourers were not sufficiently divorced from their means of production to work long contracts at low wages.[1] Delagoa Bay labour was drawn by the high wages paid on the Transvaal goldfields and by local railway construction. Thus recruiters for the Natal plantations were obliged to look further north for their labour.[2] Consequently, when Reuben Benningfield, by this time a director of the Natal Government Railways, offered in August 1888 to introduce 500 labourers from Inhambane at a capitation fee of 30s, the government agreed to re-establish maritime labour immigration.[3] In September 1888 José de Sousa Teixeira was appointed the Natal government labour agent at Inhambane and Paulino Fornazini at Lourenço Marques.[4] Teixeira had worked for Benningfield in the early 1880s when he was responsible for shipping labour, illegally and under dubious circumstances, to Kimberley via Durban. Fornazini was to play an important role in the recruitment of labour for the Witwatersrand in the 1890s.

In order to prevent what the Portuguese referred to as the "great clandestine emigration" from the Inhambane interior, maritime labour migration was resumed in December 1888 but on the basis of

---

1. CSO 1202.504 Chairman, Harbour Board to Col. Sec., 13 Nov., 1888.
2. FO 84/1901 Br. cons., Lourenço Marques to FO, 23 Sept., 1888.
3. CSO 1194.3552 Benningfield to Col. Sec., 10 Aug., 1888; CSO 1203. 5201 Benningfield to Col. Sec., 24 Nov., 1888; CSO 2566.C42 Engineering Chief, NGR to Col. Sec., 17 July 1890.
4. BO. 49, 8 Dec., 1888.

the emigration scheme to Reunion.[5] From November 1888 until April 1890, well over 1 200 workers were introduced into Natal by Castle Packet steamer from Inhambane and many more returned home by sea.[6] In contrast to earlier labour immigration schemes and in line with the government's desire that colonists should employ Zulus rather than amatongas, it was declared in January 1889 that the government was to lift its subsidy and that the £4.13s3d cost of introducing a worker by sea from Lourenço Marques had to be borne by the employer alone. In order to discourage desertion, the government advised the payment of a minimum wage of 17s for agricultural labour and 20s for railway labour.[7] Contracts were for one or two years, at the discretion of the immigrant worker. But this ruling did not apply to Benningfield's railway labourers who were not brought in as immigrants but as passengers who paid their own fare to and from Natal in monthly instalments to Benningfield.[8] However, with the re-emergence of a smallpox threat on the East coast in 1890 the Natal government discouraged the introduction of Inhambane labour. But the general manager of the Natal Government Railways opposed any attempts to halt this source of labour and in response to the requests of the Colonial Secretary, reported that,

> "I am sorry to say it is desireable to continue the immigration from the East coast. Indeed for some years past, and at present, it has been the only reliable source of labour from which (the Natal Government Railways) draws bodies of men."[9]

---

5. Ibid., decree 596. Reunion emigration was controlled by decree 327 of 1888 (BO. 24, 16 June 1888). Within six months of the promulgation of this decree, some 1 215 labourers left Inhambane for Reunion, almost 600 carried on the Castle Packet Co's SS. "Florence". A further 300 were employed on the Tanganyika coast in German military operations. In 1889, another 800 men were sent to Reunion where they earned wages of 10s per month. CSO 1198.3482 Br. cons. to Gov., Natal, 22 July 1888; BPP 1890. Br. Cons. report no. 742 for 1889; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 7, GGM to MSMU, 9 Aug., 1890.
6. See various correspondence in II. 1/46; 1/50; 1/51; 1/54.
7. Government notice 25, 1889, NGG, 8 Jan., 1889; SNA 1/1/106.335 Ashby a.o. to SNA, 25 April 1888; Government notice 25, 5 Jan., 1889; SSa 264 Ra 3309 Col. Sec., Natal to State Secretary (SS), ZAR, 10 Dec., 1893.
8. I.I. 1/54.272 PI-Col. Sec., 28 April 1890. See also I.I. 1/51.1175 Benningfield - PI., 13 Dec., 1884.
9. I.I. 1/57.816 Gen. manager, NGR - Col. Sec., 13 Aug., 1890 enclosed in PI - Col. Sec., 19 Aug., 1890.

The Portuguese made further attempts to restrict "clandestine" emigration from Inhambane and Lourenço Marques when in April 1889 unauthorized recruiters were threatened with prison sentences of two years or heavy fines.[10] But although "illegal" Natal recruiters were arrested in Portuguese territory, "clandestine" migration was very difficult to prevent as the Natal government refused to recognize its illegality.[11] In order to discourage overland migration, the legal number of migrants shipped to Durban from Lourenço Marques and Inhambane was doubled from two to four per five tons in January 1891 and the provision that shipments of over 50 men be accompanied by a doctor was lifted.[12]

Apart from the 1 200 workers shipped by Benningfield from Inhambane to Durban between November 1888 and April 1890, he was able to land a further 1 217 in the 23 months between May 1890 and April 1892. These men were contracted for a year to either Benningfield, who presumably represented the Natal Government Railways, or the Harbour Board at a monthly wage of 20s. Many amatongas were also employed as "togt" labourers in Durban.[14] From 1893 to 1897 a further 430 men were introduced, largely as colliery labourers and, no doubt because of the nature of this work and the competition for labour at Inhambane, at an increased salary of 25s per month.[15]

During the 1890s, more legislation was passed in Natal in order to both ease the introduction of immigrant labourers in to the colony and to discourage their desertion and movement to more profitable labour markets outside Natal. Thus it was stated in 1894 that an

---

10. Decree 209 in B.O. 15., 13 April 1889. Fines extended from 100$000 to 400$000 and as much as 1 000$000 if violence had been used to procure labour.

11. FO 84/1969 Br. Cons. Lourenço Marques to FO, 3 Oct., 1889; MNE caixa 698 Portug. Cons., Durban to MNE, 12 July 1892 and enclosures; CSO 1330.2276 PI - RM UMlazi, 6 April 1892 and enclosures.

12. Decree 8, BO 1, 3 Jan., 1891; Government notice 61 in NGG XLII, 27 Jan., 1891.

13. See various correspondence in I.I. 1/55 - 1/64. It is highly unlikely that these figures are complete.

14. SNA 1/4/3 J.J. Milne to SNA, 16 July 1889.

15. Various correspondence I.I. 1/68; 1/74-76; 1/80; SNA 1/1/294 .2349 Curator, Durban to PI, 10 Oct., 1901.

immigrant worker would only receive a pass to leave Natal after showing proof that he had completed his contract and a contracted immigrant worker was thenceforth only required to purchase and carry a pass if he wished to seek work outside the colony. Four years later the duration of recruiting licences was restricted to two months and they were only issued if the labourers were to be employed in Natal.[16]

Following the defeat of Gungunyana, the Portuguese in Mozambique were in a better position to benefit financially from labour emigration and a decree issued in May 1896 first increased enormously the cost of recruiting labour and then in November 1897, following a profitable agreement with the Transvaal excluded Natal, Mozambique's "most energetic and persistent rival" for the trade of the Witwatersrand, from access to Mozambican labour.[17] A symbolic change in Natal's labour supply occurred in the same year when Indian immigration was prohibited and when Zululand, together with the southern part of the Maputo chiefdom, was formally brought under the control of the newly "responsible" settler government in Natal. Drought, locusts and a rinderpest epidemic in the mid and late 1890s helped separate African producers from their means of production and by the end of the century the Natal labour market was dependent on African labour drawn almost entirely from within the colony.[18]

The Emergence of a "Labour Problem" in the Transvaal

The nature of the early Trekker economy in the Transvaal, based largely on hunting and pastoralism, precluded the need for large amounts of labour. Seasonal labour was obtainable with the co-operation of local chiefs, whose followers were obliged by Transvaal law to work for fourteen days, as long as they fell under the "protection" of a Boer community. A more important and experienced

---

16. Government notice 489 of 1894, NGG, 25 Dec., 1894; Government notice 174 of 1897, NGG, 30 March 1897.

17. MNE caixa 698, Cons., Durban to MNE, 19 July 1897; GH 830 GLM - Br. Cons., Lourenço Marques, 9 Aug., 1898 in Br. Cons., Lourenço Marques to Gov., Natal, 6 June 1898. The November 1897 labour agreement is examined on pages 134 ff.

18. Welsh, Roots, 193-94; Slater, "Land, labour and capital", 274-76; Guy, Destruction, 239; Charles Ballard, "Pestilence and the Peasantry: The Holocaust in Natal and Zululand 1895-1907", Economic History Conference, University of Natal, Durban, July 1982.

form of labour was supplied by inboekselings. These were indentured workers who were often purchased or demanded as tribute from peoples like the Swazi and Gaza or who were captured in raids on frontier chiefdoms.[19] But inboekselings were expensive. In 1863 Manuel da Gama, an Indo-Portuguese trader, sold 17 slaves in the Zoutpansberg; male children fetched £10 to £30 and adolescent males as much as £60.[20] Furthermore once the inboekseling had completed his period of service he was under little obligation to stay with his master. The supply of slaves that fed the inboekseling system had largely dried up by the late 1860s and was prohibited by the London Convention of 1884. Thus although individual slaves were still obtainable in the 1880s and 1890s, the trekkers were obliged to look to the state for their labour. Legislation passed in 1870 introduced a graduated form of taxation that favoured Africans employed on white farms. It also made Africans liable to statutory labour as vagrants if convicted of travelling outside their home areas without passes. By introducing and charging high fees for passports and internal passes the Transvaal government attempted to restrict the entry of "rootless", foreign Africans into the country and to limit the ability of local workers to sell their labour to the highest bidder.[21]

The Transvaal state was, unlike the Cape and Natal, fully representative of settler opinion and, until the British annexation of 1877, intervened actively in the labour market by passing legislation on taxation and vagrancy that was aimed at forcing Africans to seek employment on farms.[22]

---

19. R. Wagner, "Zoutpansberg: the dynamics of a hunting frontier, 1848-67", in S. Marks and A. Atmore, eds., Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, 332-35; Harries, "Free and unfree labour", 316, 326; P. Delius and S. Trapido, "Inboekselings and Oorlams: The Creation and Transformation of a Servile Class", JSAS, 8, 2, 1982; J. Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the Voortrekkers; W. Kirstner, "The Anti-Slavery agitation against the Transvaal Republic, 1852-1868", SAAYB (1952), II.

20. Account book of Manuel da Gama (private manuscript).

21. Law 9 of 1870 in Locale Wetten der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, 1849-1885 (ed) F. Jeppe and J.G. Kotze.

22. For laws related to taxation, vagrancy and passes, cf. Law 3 of 1872, Law 4 of 1873, Law 3 of 1876 in Ibid. A good overview of the relationship between land, labour and legislation in the early Transvaal is P. Delius, "The Pedi polity under Sekwate and Sekhukhune" (PhD., London, 1980), 171-216.

Thus the elements of a labour supply problem already existed when in 1873 the New Caledonian alluvial goldfields were discovered in the eastern Transvaal. Two years later it was estimated that at least 1 000 men were employed on these goldfields.[23] The majority of the Africans were "Shangaans" who arrived in gangs varying in numbers from 4 to 5 or from 40 to 50. Many also crossed the border and settled as tenants on company farms surrounding the goldfields.[24] They earned salaries which, at 20 to 25s per month, compared favourably with Natal and, probably because the goldfields lay just across the Lebombo mountains, workers seldom spent more than three months on the mines.[25] In 1883, the first year of their operation, the southern De Kaap Goldfields drew about 2 000 workers alone and the Sheba reef at Barberton employed some 1 500 men in 1886. Shangaans were drawn to the eastern Transvaal fields from as far north as Inhambane and the high wages lured away much of Natal's "amatonga" labour force.[26] Most of the labour force at Barberton, as well as the small mining camps in northern Swaziland consisted of Shangaans.[27]

The growth of mining settlements exacerbated the labour supply problem for with the expansion of the urban consumer market, increasing numbers of workers were needed for both agriculture and mining. This accounts for the Transvaal's unwillingness to allow Africans to seek work outside the Republic at Kimberley or on the Cape railways and explains why African workers travelling across the Transvaal without the protection of white recruiters, were so

---

23. MNE caixa 663, Forsman - MNE, 22 March 1875 in Duprat to MNE, 4 May 1875; Fernando da Costa Leal, Uma Viagem na África Austral, 74.

24. T. Baines, Goldfields of South Africa, 134, 137; TA. W 179 H.T. Glynn, "Game and Gold"; D.M. D(unbar), The Transvaal in 1876, 10. For a description of these Shangaan workers, see Percy Fitzpatrick, Jock of the Bushveld, 212, 216.

25. Dunbar, The Transvaal in 1876, 10, 14; Costello, 1874; 57; MNE caixa 663, Duprat to MNE, 19 Jan., 1874, Forsman to MNE, 22 March 1875 in Duprat to MNE, 4 May 1875.

26. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 1, GInhambane to GGM 13 June 1884 in GGM to MSMJ, 28 June 1884; NA/II. 1/47.91, Jose Teixeira to PI, 12 Jan., 1889; D.M. Wilson, Behind the Scenes in the Transvaal, 29. See also R.G. Herring, The Pilgrim Diggers of the 70s, 31.

27. W.H.C. Longden, Red Buffalo, 45; Goldfield Times, 31 Aug., 1888; SPG., L. Marvis, "The Usuto Mission Station in Swaziland".

often forced to undertake statutory labour for Boer farmers.[28] This problem was appreciated by Owen Lanyon who in 1877, as the newly-appointed administrator of the Transvaal, wrote to his successor in Griqualand West that, although the Transvaal had benefitted from the Diamond Fields, "...at the same time the fact that it has suffered considerably from the consequent loss of its labour cannot be ignored. The amount of land under cultivation has certainly become less from this cause for the native prefers to go to Kimberley for work..."[29]

During the 1880s the state intervened in the labour market in various ways. The defeated followers of chiefs such as Njabel of the Mapoch and his ally, the Pedi dissident chief Mampoer, were indentured to farmers for five years in 1883. Two years later a similar fate befell the followers of a small Koranna chief in the south-western Transvaal, David Massouw.[30] Although the republican government was obliged by the London Convention of 1884 to implement a policy of rural locations for Africans, which had first been mooted in 1853 and then legislated for in 1876, it was envisaged that the locations would not be large enough to provide the African population with a means of production entirely independent of wage labour.[31] Closely tied to the surveying of reserves was the squatter law of 1887, which sought to prevent the concentration of Africans on company land and unsurveyed, "government" land by limiting the number of tenants to five families per farm. It also sought to prevent a rise in farmers' overheads by restricting competition for labour through the equitable division of workers, living outside the locations, amongst the Boer farming community.[32]

---

28. TA. A180 CPWD Elliot to Tew and Co., 6 Nov., 1875; McNaughton to Few and Co., 30 March 1876; TA. SS 185. R54 Colonial Secretary, Cape Town to SS, 27 Feb., 1875 R529; SS 186. R652; SS 188. R1103; SS 192. R1810; SS 1193. R1822; NA. SNA 1/1/27 F.B. Fynney to SNA, 19 Jan., 1876; Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organization", 47-51, 66-67.

29. Cited in Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields," 167.

30. War Office, The Native Tribes of the Transvaal, 87, 111; J.A. Mouton, "Generaal Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis", SAAYB, (1857), I, 74, 146.

31. B.J. Kruger, Die Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk in die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 1885-1889, 9-10; W.A. Stals, "Die Kwessie van Naturelle-eiendomsreg op grond in Transvaal, 1838-1884" SAAYB, (1972), II, 67, footnote 122.

32. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 12-15.1.

During the first British occupation of the Transvaal, the pass laws were relaxed partly in order to facilitate the entry and transit of foreign African labour. But although differential African taxation, favouring men in European employ, was scrapped in favour of one overall tax, local Africans could only obtain passes once their hut taxes were paid. An 1885 amendment to the pass laws proclaimed that an African could not be hired without a pass, that a passless African was eligible to a fine of 15s and the costs of his capture and transportation. The frequent levying of this fine in statutory labour and the bounties offered for passless Africans left migrant workers at the mercy of the Boer population and thus, although the pass law provided and tied workers to the farmers, it restricted the flow of labour into and through the Transvaal.[33]

The state lacked the unity of purpose, administrative capacity and military strength needed to enforce comprehensively its intervention in the labour market. The landdrost at Christiana on the labour route to Kimberley warned that if any attempts were made to extract a 1s pass fee from migrant workers the prison would soon be full. The squatter law was similarly unenforceable and African resistance to proletarianization extended the size of the rural locations.[34] But the pressures on the state to supply labour to farmers and miners were multiplied after the Witwatersrand gold discoveries of 1886.

Labour on the Witwatersrand Goldfields

The demand for labour on the mines attracted both workers and recruiters away from the established labour markets. As early as 1888 an experienced Natal recruiter like J.W. Colenbrander applied to the Transvaal superintendent of Natives for at least 3 500 passes to introduce workers from Amatongaland.[35] Other workers migrated in stages, by, for example, working on the Nkomati railway for 12s per week before moving to the New Caledonian and De Kaap goldfields because wages there were 18s per week. Workers commonly

---

33. Law 6 of 1880, Law 22 of 1885 in Jeppe and Kotze, Locale Wetten der ZAR.

34. SN.2 acting landdrost Christiana to SNA, 22 April 1880. See also p. 116 ff.

35. SS 1603 R3370 Kleijn to Supt. Natives, 13 April 1888 encl. in R3501 Kaptyn to SS, 23 April 1888.

used the eastern Transvaal goldfields as a halfway house where money could be earned to complete the journey to the Rand. In many cases, mines were reliant on freelance labour recruiters who often engaged men on the goldfields and then contracted them out to employers for as much as 13s per week. The mines had little control over the terms of employment offered by these labour touts; in many cases these were falsely inflated and, when they were not met, induced the worker to desert his employer. In some cases it was felt that freelance recruiters encouraged this desertion as they were then able to re-sell the worker for a further capitation fee.[36] By 1890 about 58% of all African labour employed on the Rand mines was of Shangaan origin and the following year it was estimated that there were more than 7 000 Shangaans on the mines attached to the Chamber of Mines.[37]

By world standards mining on the Witwatersrand was particularly expensive. The low-grade ore deposits required extensive mining of the reef outcrops and the use of expensive machinery and skilled labour. Fluctuating and inconsistent levels of investment, a fixed gold price that took no account of rising costs and the sheer extent of the gold fields all placed heavy cost constraints on mining operations.[38] Consequently the mining industry was prone to seek the assistance of the state, especially in times of depression, in an attempt to lower working costs. Mining costs were dominated by wage payments which, largely because of the winter seasonal shortage of workers, were highly competitive. At an early stage labour overheads in combination with the speculative gold share crisis of 1889-1890, threatened several mines with closure.[39] By September 1890, the

---

36. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 12 March 1890; Chamber of Mines Annual Reports (CMAR), 1893, 182; HE 146 L. Philips to Wernher, Beit and Co., June 1890; HE 146 L. Philips to Eckstein and Co., 20 Feb., 1891.

37. HE 149. L. Philips to Wernher, Beit and Co., 13 Sept., 1890; CMAR 1891, 49, 50, 76.

38. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", History Workshop, 8, 1979, 60; P. Richardson & J.J. van Helten, "Labour in the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1886-1914" in Marks and Rathbone, op. cit., 79-82; N. Levy, The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System, 8-19, 44. See also notes 79 and 112.

39. SN 17. SR 378 C. Jordan a.o. mine managers to Minister of Mines, 12 May 1888; CMAR 1899, 10; G. Schumann, Structural Changes and Business Cycles in South Africa, 1806-1936, 87-90; J.A. Henry, The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank, 96-99.

average African monthly wage on the Rand stood at £3.3s4d, with larger and more competitive companies paying up to £3.19s.[40] To the many employers who believed implicitly in a backward-sloping labour supply curve and the economic irrationality of African labour, these wages were untenable. This was clearly put by Lionel Philips when he stated that: "Kaffirs work for a given sum and not a given time. The less we pay the longer they will stay each time and the more efficient they will become."[41] But an attempt by 66 companies in October 1890 to institute a maximum average wage of £2.1s per month failed when workers responded to the wage-cut by deserting and returning home.[42]

The mines then put greater pressure on the state to intervene in the supply of labour. Initial fears that the existing pass system might dissuade Africans from travelling to the Rand were overruled by mine-managers who called for a tighter implementation of the existing travel pass system. They also recommended the introduction of a special pass system on the goldfields in order to monitor and control the movement of workers and consequently cut wages by restricting competition between the mines for labour.[43] In 1889 only about half of the 10 000 Africans employed on the mines had passes while in 1892 only about one-third of the 25 800 strong workforce possessed passes.[44] The Chamber of Mines felt that the existing pass law of 1885 was applicable only to farming interests as the statutory labour which it provided to the farmers simultaneously discouraged the movement of African labour to the mines. It was suggested that travel passes be exchanged on the Rand for

---

40. SS 2273 R5596 Sec. Ch. Mines to Supt. Natives, 22 Sept., 1890 encl. in R3213; HE 149 L. Philips to Wernher, Beit and Co., 27 Sept., 1890; CMAR, 1890, 65.

41. HE 149 L. Philips to Wernher, Beit and Co., 9 Aug., 1890. See also Ibid., 1 Aug., 1890; CMAR, 1889, 9-10; CMAR, 1893, 44; Industrial Commission of Enquiry (ICE), 1897, evidence of Ed. Way, 43, H. Jennings, 219.

42. CMAR, 1890, 69-70; S. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, 92-3, 165-6; F. Wilson, Labour in the South African Goldmines, 5 106-7.

43. CMAR, 1889, 9-10; SS 2273 R1078 Sec. Chamber of Mines to SS, 25 Jan., 1890 encl. in R3213/90; SS 2273 RMD1452 Mining Comm., Klerksdorp to Minister of Mines, 4 March 1890.

44. D. Etheredge, "The Early History of the Chamber of Mines, 1887-1897" (University of the Witwatersrand, MA, 1949), 72; CMAR, 1892, 45, 106. See also CMAR, 1890, 52, 73, 189.

work passes and that a strictly controlled special pass system for the goldfields would "effectually prevent or reduce to a minimum the malpractices of touts and the wholesale desertion of natives, which so frequently and seriously embarrasses employers at present."[45]

As in Natal and Griqualand West, employers on the Rand wished to extend workers' contracts for as long as possible. The constant turnover of workers caused by the migrant labour system involved recurrent recruiting costs and made it difficult to train new employees.[46] The Native Labour Commissioner of the Chamber of Mines warned that any official attempt at "the fixing of service at six months will very much decrease the value of Kafir labour, because experienced workers are more valuable than raw Kafirs."[47] The Secretary and the Chairman of the Chamber of Mines at various times called for the building of urban locations to house a stabilized African work force, but were told by the Superintendent of Natives that this was unacceptable to the government as it would drain labour from the farms and would encourage detribalization.[48] The government supported "in principle" the Chamber of Mines' measures to introduce foreign labour, but stipulated that all costs should be borne by the industry and that all workers should return home on completion of their contracts.[49]

The government was also asked to construct stations that would offer food and shelter to migrants on their way to the mines. Migrant workers needed protection from farmers who captured them and made them pay fines or undertake statutory labour for crossing their lands. The police were accused of arresting migrants and of forcing them to work on the Rand-Delagoa railway. Workers were defrauded by bogus policemen , were liable to attack and robbery and were the prey of unscrupulous labour touts who offered them false terms of employment and then sold them for a capitation fee. Wild animals, banditry and harsh environmental conditions on the

---

45. SS 3924 Ballot to Grant in Ballot to Supt. Natives, 2 Nov., 1893.

46. CMAR, 1893, 44: TLC., evidence of Perry, 40, 49.

47. SS 3924 R16105 W. Grant to SS, 19 Dec., 1893.

48. SN 23 R2470 sec. Ch. Mines to Supt. Natives, Dec., 1893; CMAR, 1897, 24. See also J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its Changes and Effects, 237.

49. LA 455 Leyds to ZAR Cons., Lourenço Marques, 3 Nov., 1893.

Highveld in winter caused workers to arrive on the goldfields and diamond fields in a poor physical condition and resulted in winter labour shortfalls.[50] Furthermore, by spreading stories of misadventure in the labour supply areas, returning migrants dissuaded their peers from emigrating. Thus a guaranteed safe passage to and from the mines for Shangaans, who constituted over half the labour force, was vital if a cheap and plentiful supply of labour was to be achieved.[51]

Several mine-owners saw an answer to their labour problems in a raising of the hut tax, and its payment in specie, while others called for the institution of a government Commission to determine how best to push Africans living within the Republic onto the labour market.[52] A further solution to the labour problem on the mines was sought in the contracting of Mozambican labour, along Natal lines, on long contracts of up to two years and at low wages of 20-25s per month. This early scheme proved abortive as the Transvaal government was only prepared to supply the Chamber of Mines' Labour Commissioner with letters of introduction while the Portuguese were not prepared to assist any labour emigration schemes without the establishment of a Portuguese curator of natives in Johannesburg who would tax and monitor the arrival of "Portuguese " Africans on the Witwatersrand. The Portuguese also demanded the appointment of a Transvaal government labour agent in Mozambique who would be

---

50. LA 462 Portuguese consul to SS, 7 May 1888; TA. W 179 Glynn, "Game and Gold", 205; R. Berthoud-Junod, Du Transvaal à Lourenço Marques, 81, 92-99; E. Smithers, March Hare, 55; MNE 697 Portuguese Consul to MNE, 28 Sept., 1891; P. Bonner, "The Rise, Consolidation and Disintegration of Dlamini power in Swaziland", (PhD, London, 1977), 477. The official and semi-official harassment of immigrants in the rural areas remained a constant grievance for those attempting to supply the mines with labour.

51. HE 149 L. Philips to Wernher, Beit and Co., 8 Nov., 1890; CMAR, 1890, 76-77; 1891, 41, 49, 50; 1892, 44, 52-53; SS 2651 R119 telegram, Ch. Mines to SS, 5 Jan., 1891; Ibid., 6 Jan., 1891; enclosures.

52. SS 2273 R3213, "De Kaffer Arbeids Kwestie"; SS 3924 R6151 sec. Barberton Mining and Commercial Chamber to SS, 18 May 1893; Etheredge, "The Early History", 75.

responsible for all recruiting in the colony.[53]

The Chamber of Mines, having failed to get the government to intervene in the labour market on its behalf, then attempted to involve the government in the establishment of a labour recruiting organization. An employers' combination aimed at regulating wages had been mooted when the Chamber of Mines was formed in 1889 and companies had combined in 1890 to replace weekly with monthly wage payments and to introduce the wage-cut of October. But after the setbacks of that year, plans for a recruiting organization were not rejuvenated until 1892 when the Chamber of Mines suggested the establishment of a labour recruiting combination that would cost £2 000 annually. Capital would be drawn from a payment of 3d for each African worker employed and the object of the organization would be to over-supply the market with labour in order to cut wages.[54] In 1893 it was estimated, probably exaggeratedly, that recruiting agents earned £132 000, or 10s each month for every migrant brought to the mines and that if this amount, plus a wage reduction of 24s per worker, could be saved it would cut working costs by £500 000 annually. But this required the establishment of an expensive, centralized recruiting structure; a commissioner and his personnel should get £5 500 annually and a further £3 000 should be spent on the construction of compounds.[55] In February 1893 the State Secretary was asked by the Chamber of Mines to appoint a native labour commissioner who would head the proposed recruiting organization. When this was rejected,[56] it was explained to the Superintendent of Natives that the lack of labour on the mines resulted in a restricted output and raised the price of labour. There was a need for a government official to liaise with the mine companies, to find and procure labour and to keep in touch with the chiefs; to make out passes and approve contracts, to arrange the lodging and protection

---

53. HE 190 Taylor to Edward Cohen, 10 June 1891; SS 3045 R12419 SS to Portuguese Consul, 7 Oct., 1891; Ibid., Portuguese Consul to SS, 8 Oct., 1891; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, SS to Governor of Inhambane, n.d. Oct.,? 1891 encl. in GGM to MSMU, 11 Nov., 1891; LA 462 Cons., Lourenço Marques to SS, 18 Oct., 1891.

54. CMAR, 1892, 40-41.

55. SS 3924 R6443 Artwell to Supt. Natives, 1 Feb., in Ballot to Supt. Natives, 2 Nov., 1893.

56. SS 3654 R2870 Lippert to SS, 8 Feb., 1893.

of African migrants and to hear their complaints. It was hoped that this official would also organize the importation of African labour. The mining companies would supply the capital needed to establish and run a Native Labour Department. The Superintendent of Natives was asked to use his position to get native commissioners, veldkornets, landdrosts and chiefs to send labour to the mines. It was argued that cheaper mine labour would bring down the cost of farm labour.[57] The government hesitated for five months before finally deciding not to embroil itself in labour recruiting but gave its support to the creation by the Chamber of Mines of a Native Labour Department headed by a commissioner.[58] The Native Labour Department was established in August 1893 and, according to the report of the Chamber for that year marked

> "the first determined step on the part of the local mining industry to tackle the native labour problem, and to endeavour, while lowering the rate of native wages, to secure an ample supply of labour."[59]

It was envisaged, perhaps more realistically, that the NLD would save the mines some £150 000 annually in recruiting costs.[60]

In October 1893 the government agreed to support the Native Labour Department's plans to negotiate with the Portuguese over the supply of labour from Mozambique and the following month the State Secretary asked the Governor General of Mozambique to accept the Native Labour Department's proposals for the regulation of labour migration.[61]

In Mozambique, a considerable debate was generated by the issue of migrant labour in the early 1890s. A traditional fear was that migrant labour anglicized Mozambique Africans and consequently undermined Portuguese authority and encouraged British imperial designs on Delagoa Bay.[62] The emigration of labour to the Transvaal

---

57. SS 3924 sec. Ch. Mines to Supt. Natives, 28 March 1893; Ibid., 16 May 1893.

58. SS 3924 R6440 sec. Ch. Mines to SS, 13 July 1893 encl. in R6443 Ballot to Supt. Natives, 2 Nov., 1893.

59. CMAR 1893, 43. This sentiment was repeated in CMAR 1899, 57.

60. CMAR 1893, 36.

61. SSa263 Ra3309/95 Supt. Natives to SS, 26 Oct., 1893; SSa264 SS to GGM, 3 Nov., 1893.

62. AHU. Moç., pasta 31, Curadoria geral to GGM 8 Feb., 1878 in GGM to MSMU, 15 March 1878; CPC. Portuguese Consul to MSMU, 30 Nov., 1880; FO 84/1846 O'Neill to FO, 26 Feb., 1887; MNE 697 Portuguese

and Natal was bad for commerce as it reduced the number of consumers in Mozambique, it stripped the southern part of the colony of its labour and consequently increased wages at Lourenço Marques, which was itself employing increasing amounts of labour. This situation was worsened as Africans were not allowed to move between districts within Mozambique without passes which made it difficult to bring labour from the north to Lourenço Marques. But more importantly, most of the revenues from migrant labour, amounting to 6$000 or 27s6d per migrant, went to the governor of Lourenço Marques and his secretaries who then sent these emoluments to Portugal rather than spending the money locally in Mozambique.[63] In January 1891 a proclamation was passed calling on all returning migrants to present themselves to the government secretary who had issued their passports. Failure to comply with this ruling would result in a criminal prosecution and a fine of 12$000.[64] In an attempt to bolster colonial administration by spreading the profits of labour migration, it was decreed in October 1891 that state income from this source would be deposited in the Mozambican treasury and divided amongst the district governors and their secretaries.[65] Despite the plethora of legislation regulating migrant labour, the Portuguese were largely unable to pressurize or tax labour leaving Mozambique and the large numbers of recruiters who invaded southern Mozambique each winter generally operated free of Portuguese control.[66]

In order to gain some return from the egress of this labour, and, more immediately, to try to tax labour passing by sea to Natal and then overland to the Transvaal, the Portuguese government

---

Consul Natal to MNE, 13 Aug., 1889; SMA 484 Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 29 June 1892; L. Fuller, Light on the Lebombos, 9.

63. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 7, GGM to MSMU, 24 Aug., 1890; GLM to Director Geral to Ultramar, 18 June 1891 in Commisão Organizadora, Mouzinho, Governador de Lourenço Marques, 193-4. See also Joest, "Reise in Afrika im Jahre 1883", Zeitschr. fur Ethnologie, 17, 1885, 204-5, 211.

64. Portaria 7 B.O. 1, 3 Jan., 1891; Eduardo de Noronho, O Districto de Lourenço Marques e a África do Sul, 81.

65. Portaria 500, B.O. 41, 10 Oct., 1891; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 7, GGM to MSMU, 24 Aug., 1890.

66. SMA 483 Grandjean to Leresche, 7 Oct., 1891; SMA 513/A Grandjean to Leresche, 21 Aug., 1893; SMA 81/I Grandjean "Report on Antioka", 1893.

in December 1893 agreed to regulate the emigration of labourers to the Transvaal on the basis of the decree which governed labour migration to Natal.[67] Once the Transvaal government was assured by the Natal Colonial Secretary that it would be placed under no financial obligation, it complied with Portuguese wishes and established labour agents at Lourenço Marques and Inhambane.[68] These men acted as co-witnesses, with Portuguese officials, to the signing of contracts by emigrant labourers who then had to be vaccinated. The Chamber of Mines guaranteed to pay a 15s fee to the Portuguese for passports and emoluments as well as all costs involved in transporting workers to and from the mines. It also undertook to transport all migrants on the Portuguese-built railway from Lourenço Marques to Ressano Garcia.[69] The Portuguese stressed that these conditions were provisional and that they would be reconsidered after six months; permanency could only ensue from direct negotiations between the Transvaal and metropolitan Portuguese governments.[70] Despite the lack of Portuguese control over the flow of labour from Mozambique, the ad hoc agreement of 1893 laid the basis for co-operation in the field of labour recruitment between the Chamber of Mines and the Portuguese and initiated the prospect of monopsonistic recruiting.

Several schemes for the recruitment of labour in Mozambique were considered by the Native Labour Department. Reuben Benningfield offered to introduce "East Coast Natives upon a large scale" on annual contracts and at monthly wages of £2.12s6d for adults and £2 for adolescents, costs which he later reduced to £1.15s and £1.5s respectively. The total cost to the Chamber for importing each labourer under Benningfield's scheme was estimated at £5.10s, broken down into passport and contracting fees of £2, travel costs of 15s from Inhambane to Durban, embarkation costs, food and depot expenses of 7s, Transvaal consular fees of 5s for confirming contracts, railway costs to Waterval of 12s plus depot expenses at Lourenço Marques, the cost of food to Waterval and vaccination fees which

---

67. MNE 698 Portuguese Consul, ZAR to MNE 10 Nov., 1893.

68. SSa 264 Ra330 Natal Col. Sec. to SS, 10 Dec., 1893; SS 3924.15520 ZAR Cons, Lourenço Marques to SS, 15 Nov., 1893.

69. LA 455 sec. Ch. Mines to SS, 18 Oct., 1893; LA 463 Cons. Lourenço Marques to GGM, 14 Nov., 1893; SS 3924.15520 telegram ZAR cons., LM to SS, 6 Dec., 1893.

70. LA 455 GGM to ZAR Cons. LM, 22 Dec., 1893; SS 3924 R2002/94 GGM to SS, 10 Feb., 1894 and encl., R3233 16 Dec., 1893; SSa263 Ra3309 Supt. Natives to SS, 12 April 1894.

totalled 8s. The remaining 23s constituted Benningfield's profit.[71] Other recruiters offered Mozambican labour on similar terms. But in contrast to Benningfield, who stressed that his workers would emigrate with the full knowledge of the Portuguese, others offered to introduce labourers, for amounts varying from less than £1 to £4 each, as long as they came "from tribes not acknowledging Portuguese authority."[72] It is clear that in 1893 the vast majority of Mozambican workers were drawn from areas outside Portuguese jurisdiction. By 1894, some 20 000 men, two-thirds to three-quarters of the Rand African labour force, were drawn from the East Coast.[73] They were particularly valued because they spent up to three years on the mines, which was considerably longer than the 3 to 6 months African average, and often returned to enter into new contracts. They were highly sought after, not only because of their long experience on the mines but as underground workers; an occupation shunned wherever possible by other African workers but which, during the 1890s became almost an ethnic specialization for Shangaans.[74]

Shangaans travelled to and from the mines in groups ranging from two to three members to over two hundred. They carried blankets, clothing, pots, knobkieries, a sleeping mat and rolls of tobacco for exchange purposes. Food consisted of a pouch of cassava or maize flour, a calabash of water and xigugo, a nutritious mixture of roasted groundnuts, maize and salt which needed no preparation and did not ferment. Shangaan workers tended to gather and work together, out of choice and because of the manner of

---

71. CMAR, 1893, 37; CMAR, 1894, 26, 29.

72. CMAR, 1893, 29, 31, 34-36; SS 3925 R10295 R. Wilhelm to Supt. Natives, 26 Jan., 1894.

73. SSa155 Ra 1358 ZAR Cons., Lourenço Marques, Report for 1894.

74. CMAR, 1893, 38; CMAR, 1894, 34; CMAR, 1895, 33, 37, 43, 44, 55. See also SSa329 R1959 see Robinson group to SS, 7 Feb., 1896 encl. in Ra607; Annual Report of Assoc. Mines 1896, 18, 61; ICE evidence of J.H. Johns, 261; CMAR, 1898, 459; Ibid., 1899, 39; TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 99, 100; Ibid., Ferraz, 246; Ibid., Perry, 47; Ibid., Report, 37; J. Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag, 66. See also A. Longle, "De Inhambane a Lourenço Marques", BSGL, 6, 1, 1886, 33-34; A.M. Cardoso, "Expedição ás Terras do Muzilla", BSGL, 7, 3, 1887.

their recruitment, on specific mines to which they gave special names. In the early days they attached themselves to hunter-traders, travellers and recruiters for protection but as the migrant system developed many recruiters constructed compounds at strategic points such as canteens, drifts and alongside chiefs' villages. African sub-recruiters gathered scores of workers, who sometimes received a £1 advance, in these compounds before they were taken to the goldfields by the white recruiter. Clandestine workers were "run" across the border and sold to the highest bidder for up to 15s or were taken to compounds at Komati Poort and Hectorspruit by African sub-recruiters who, apart from their basic wages, earned capitation fees of 5s to 7s6d. A more profitable but also more precarious alternative was for workers to emigrate and enter the labour market as non-contracted individuals.[75]

Two major obstacles prevented the mines from investing large amounts of capital in the Native Labour Department and hence restricted the organized importation of foreign labour. The first was the competition in the supply areas between recruiters accredited to the Native Labour Department, individual mines, freelancers, sub-contractors and runners. This competition resulted in the luring away of contracted labourers en route to the mines and high wages and often fraudulent terms being offered to the prospective worker. This saddled the mines with high labour overheads and induced workers to desert if their expectations were not met.[76] Wealthy companies paid thousands of pounds annually to freelance recruiters or "touts" who received 10s to 20s for each worker, and it was generally recognized that the cheapest recruiting was to be

---

75. SMA 438/A Liengme to Leresche, 18 Feb., 1895; Richardson, The Crowded Hours, 137-46, 160, 317; Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag, 47-48, 67; Junod, Les Chants et les Contes Baronga, 37; South African Mining Journal, 14 Sept., 1895; CMAR 1895, 37, 40; Ibid., 1898, 4; TLC., evidence of Perry, 43, 48-49; Wirth, 111, 115; Breyner, 100, 102; Dyer, 281, 283-284; Cabral, 535-36; Coelho, 538; E. Krige and W. Felgate, "An ecological survey of the Temba-Tonga", 99. The most popular Shangaan mines were the Simmer and Jack and New Primrose. For a breakdown of the Shangaan mine population, see SPG, Report of the Bishop of Lebombo on the State of the East Coast Labourers at the Johannesburg Goldfields, Jan., 1899.

76. SS 3925 R10295 Grant - P.J. Joubert, 6 Dec., 1893; SS 3924 SR 1383 R. Wilhelm to SS, 23 Aug., 1895; CMAR, 1894, 35; TLC., Perry, 49.

done on the Rand itself.[77] Because of the high labour costs arising out of untramelled competition, when a representative of the Association of Mine Managers and of the Chamber of Mines visited southern Mozambique in September 1894 he reported that, "nothing can be done to procure Kaffir labour without the aid of the Portuguese government and its agents..." But Duncombe envisaged the cost of importing each labourer from Inhambane as £4.12s6d, which was 5s6d higher than Benningfield's estimate. Thus the major restriction on the organized importation of Mozambican labour was the high capital cost of introducing labour and the fear that this money would be lost if the worker were lured away by touts or if he deserted.[78] The labour situation worsened considerably in 1895. In January of that year it was estimated that 40 000 Africans were employed on the Rand. But within the next six months, a number of deep level mines, first started two years previously, entered the development stage and at least one mine reached the operating stage. This resulted in a vastly increased demand for labour and, accompanied by a general increase in stamping power, it was estimated that by the end of 1895

> "in consequence of the very general increase of stamping power and the working of deep level mines, not many less than 60 000 men will be required to fully satisfy demand."[79]

The Luso-Gaza war of 1894-5 aggravated the labour shortage. According to the report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895 the war had a "disastrous effect on the mines by cutting off supplies of the most acceptable and best class of natives for underground work."[80] By mid April 1895 the approaching annual winter egress of labour was foreshadowed by Mozambicans returning home on foot and via Durban to fight in the Gaza alliance and protect their families. When the

---

77. CMAR, 1894, 19.

78. CMAR, 1894, 19, 42-44; CMAR, 1895, 28; Etheredge, "Early History", 76.

79. L. DeLaunay, Les Mines d'or du Transvaal, 532; CMAR, 1895, 36, 37; TLC Minority Report, 47. See also Richard Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed", JSAS, 6, 2, 1980 and notes 38 and 112.

80. CMAR, 1895, 37.

war intensified, it was estimated that more than 150 Shangaans left the Rand each day.[81] Although in August missionaries in Khosen reported that "masses of young people are leaving in a great hurry for the mines so as not to be called to fight", in September the Native Labour Department declared that "the eastern border of the Transvaal was guarded by armed bodies of natives belonging to Gungunyana, who were instructed to prevent all natives from leaving the country, and thus entirely preventing any men coming forward for service."[82] By September the supply of Mozambican labour had dried up entirely and the mines were suffering from an acute shortage of experienced underground workers. The deteriorating political situation, which culminated in the Jameson raid of December 1895 led to a further flight of labour and the ballasting of the Delagoa Bay railway , completing of the Barberton line and the expansion of the Eastern Transvaal and Klerksdorp goldfields exacerbated the labour shortage on the Rand.[83] The shortage of cheap labour was partly responsible for the collapse of the share market in late September 1895, which followed the over-speculation of the boom years 1894-5. The ensuing drying-up of capital placed an added pressure on the mining industry, especially on the undercapitalized companies, to cut back on overheads such as wage costs.[84]

The perceived high cost and shortage of labour caused many mines to either cut back on output or face closure.[85] As Mendelsohn has pointed out, even where mining companies successfully weathered the drying-up of foreign capital in late 1895, these were generally

---

81. Ibid., 41-42. The Luso-Gaza war is dealt with on pp.206 ff.

82. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 13 Aug., 1895; CMAR, 1895, 54.

83. CGP (Portuguese Consular archive, Pretoria) 2nd Register of Correspondence,no 54, Portuguese consul to GLM, 2 Sept., 1894; CMAR, 1895, 36, 37, 55.

84. ICE. evidence of C.S. Goldman, 130; Schumann, Business Cycles, 91; Henry, Standard Bank , 101-102.

85. Staatscourant, 27 Jan., 1896; CMAR, 1896, 140, 151.

deep level companies in need of large amounts of cheap labour.[86]

Competing Labour Markets: Agriculture in the Transvaal

The Transvaal government, which was representative of farming rather than industrial interests, did little to alleviate the labour problems of the mines. This was largely because the soaring consumer demand for agricultural produce, which accompanied the expansion of the mining industry, called for a commensurate rise in the supply of labour for the farms. Transvaal burghers made repeated applications for the government to assist in the supply of rural labour and warnings from the mining industry, that gold production was closely tied to the supply of cheap labour, were paralleled by warnings from farmers that food production was similarly dependent on cheap labour.[87] The rural labour problem was exacerbated by the accumulation of land into the hands of speculative companies and Boer notables and by the emergence of a class of landless burghers. Speculation in the shares of land and prospecting companies was as intense as speculation in gold mining shares. In 1889 the market value of nine land companies with a nominal capital of £5 283 000 had reached over £30 000 000; a similar rise in land values was noticeable before the stock market crash of September 1895.[88] By the mid 1890s, large tracts of the Transvaal had been purchased by these companies and, in order to get an immediate return on their long-term speculations, they rented out land to Africans.[89] Large numbers of Africans were also able to lead an existence independent of the labour market on unsurveyed or "government" land, mission farms, freehold "trust" land and in rural locations.

The differences between rich and poor burghers were exacerbated as the price of land rose with the speculative investments of the land companies and as bank credit became available to those burghers

---

86. Richard Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: the Debate Renewed," JSAS, 6, 2, 1980.

87. B.J. Kruger, Die Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk in die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 1885-1899, 45.

88. Schumann, Business Cycles, 88, 91.

89. S. Trapido, "Reflections on land, office and wealth in the South African Republic, 1850-1900" in Marks and Atmore (eds) Economy & Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, 354-5; Trapido, "Landlords & Tenants in a Colonial Economy: the Transvaal, 1880-1910", JSAS, V, 1, 1978. One group of companies claimed to own more than 8 million acres, J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 1961), 5.

able to mortgage their freehold farms.[90] With this money the wealthier farmers purchased the capital goods needed to develop, and the fencing with which to protect, their lands. This placed them in a pre-eminent position from which to respond to the soaring urban market for agricultural produce. In 1894 maize, sorghum, and millet worth £107 000 was imported; by 1896 some 800 000 bags of maize was consumed on the Rand and grain valued at over £1 000 000 was imported into the Republic. The government's strategy of encouraging farmers to grow maize by placing high tariffs on imported maize was opposed by the mining industry as, together with drought and locusts, it pushed the cost of maize, the major nutrient of the industrial workforce, up from 10s per bag in 1893 to 14s -15s and as high as 22s in 1897-98.[91] But many Boer farmers, especially those without freehold rights, were unable to take advantage of these high maize prices. They tended to be conservative, partly because the government failed to modernize farming through the creation of a ministry of agriculture, partly because the farmers failed to create an organization representative of their interests and partly because the majority of them were hunters or cattle keepers with little capital and little experience of crop cultivation for the market.[92] These factors, when combined with labour losses through

---

90. P. Naudé, "Boerdery in die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 1858-1899" (PhD., UNISA, 1954), 142-3. 279, 281-86, 290, 301. This was especially true in 1896 when following the Jameson Raid, the cessation of speculative activity left banks like the Standard with idle capital, £500 000 of which was then extended to those farmers able to use mortgage bonds as collateral, see Henry, The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank (London, 1963), 132; J.J. Fourie notes that rural poverty rose out of "the structural change in the economic framework after 1886", Afrikaaners in die Goudstad, 1886-1924 (Cape Town, 1978), 30, 33.

91. W. Bleloch, The New South Africa (London, 1902), 394-5; ICE., evidence of L. Hamilton, 74; TLC., 218, evidence of Menne and Nicholson; Naudé, "Boerdery", 146, 273; D. Denoon A Grand Illusion (London, 1973), 71-72; SS 349. R14179 Sec., Chamber of Mines to SS, 2 Dec., 1892 and various other despatches in R8309/92. J.F.W. Grosskopf, Rural Impoverishment and Rural Exodus (Carnegie Commission on the Poor White Problem in South Africa, vol. I), 54.

92. TLC., Report, 15, 17, 31, 63; Naudé, "Boerdery", 104, 229, 235, 346-7, 499, 501; Trapido, "Landlords and Tenants", 48-9, 51. The first congress of the Transvaal Agricultural Union, the farmers' equivalent of the Chamber and Association of Mines, was only held in November 1897 and was accompanied by calls for the establishment of a department of agriculture, De Pers, 24 Nov., 1897.

compulsory commando duty, determined the slow response of many Boer farmers to the booming market for agricultural produce.

African farmers were thoroughly familiar with the production of maize and sorghum and were able to cultivate land far more intensively than bywoners or Occupation farmers. This was partly because of their widespread social and political networks, which gave them access to large amounts of labour, and partly because of their willingness to use the labour of women and children.[93] Because of what they perceived as a scarcity of labour in the rural areas, farmers vied with one another to attract tenants who, because they owned their own cattle and often draught animals, ploughs and harrows as well, were not tied to one employer. Thus as long as labour remained a scarce factor of production relative to land, tenants were able to use the threat of desertion to ensure that the terms of their tenancies remained in their favour. Consequently in the late 19th century, not all the members of the tenant's family needed to work for the farmer and tenants had access to generous amounts of land for cultivation and grazing. Conditions varied from farm to farm, but it was possible, despite the anti-squatter law, to find 40 tenant families and their 400 cattle squatting on a Boer farm in exchange for the full-time labour of three adolescents aided by 20 adults who worked for the farmer for two consecutive months each year, and were free to work their lands or go to the mines for the remaining 10 months; on another farm more than 100 squatters provided the owner of their land with only seven workers.[94] This meant that, at a time when farmers needed increasing amounts of labour, there were severe restrictions on the extent to which they could exploit their workers; in economic terms, "squatting" was a highly wasteful and inefficient form of labour utilization.

The widespread establishment of rural locations in the 1890s was also seen by farmers as a major cause of the rural labour problem. After 1886 several attempts had been made to settle landless burghers on the small occupation farms that acted as buffers against the independent chiefdoms of the northern Transvaal. Because the "government land" on which these burghers settled was

---

93. Trapido, S., "Landlords and tenants", 36-38.

94. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 10-12. See also Naudé, "Boerdery", 221-2.

in effect unsurveyed land occupied by Africans, they were often harassed and forced to flee their farms.[95] The state only intervened actively on the side of the Occupation farmers when the struggle between landless burghers and Boer notables found expression in treks out of the Republic[96] and when gold revenues provided the state with the capital needed to mount costly military campaigns.

In 1894 chiefs Malaboch and Magoeba were defeated and thousands of their followers were distributed amongst the farmers of the victorious commando. But demands by commandos that other defeated chiefdoms be broken up, or their people indentured in the traditional manner as prisoners-of-war for five years, were refused by the government as the state did not possess the administrative or military capacity to control a large rural proletariat and needed to win the co-operation of chiefs in order to entrench its rule.[97] Thus the establishment of rural locations in the 1890s was partly pragmatic in that it preserved, in a circumscribed form, the material basis of chiefly power.

Boer farmers were constantly opposed to the establishment of these locations because they engendered and protected a source of agricultural production against which they had to compete and especially because the locations deprived them of their "natural" source of labour.[98] When location dwellers did sell their labour, it was on a seasonal basis and generally to the mines as they paid far higher wages than farms. Consequently farmers continually called for the break-up of the rural locations or for their

---

95. H.W. Grimsehl, "Onluste in Madjadjiland, 1890-1894", SAAYB, 1955, II, 207-9, 211, 221-27. 231-2; Mouton, "Genl. Piet Joubert in die Geskiedenis van Transvaal", SAAYB, 1957, I, 149; Naudé, "Boerdery", 78.

96. J. Hattingh sees the shortage of rural labour as one of the reasons for the impoverishment of many burghers, the consequence of which was social disharmony and treks out of the Republic, "Die trekke uit die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek en die Oranje-Vrystaat, 1875-1895" (PhD., Pretoria University, 1975), 467-8. By the end of the century many burghers were without land and it was largely these disaffected men who collaborated with the invading British forces during the Anglo-Boer war, see A.M. Grundlingh, Die Hendsoppers en Joiners (Cape Town, 1979), 232ff.

97. War Office, Native Tribes (London, 1905), 112-3; Grimsehl, "Onluste in Modjadjiland", 236, 246-7; Mouton, "Genl. Piet Joubert", 153; J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 184. According to G.G. Munnik, many of Modjadji's people were indentured after the 1894 war, Memoirs (Cape Town, 1933), 143.

98. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 9, 22, 29, 33.

occupants to be forcibly obliged to work on white farms.

The government had always been sympathetic to these demands and had initially pegged the size of locations to between 4 and 6 acres per household. But when it came to surveying the locations, the maximum was officially raised to 12 acres and, due to the unwillingness of the chiefs to retreat into areas which were only a fraction the size of their old domains, locations often exceeded the stipulated 12 acres per family.[99] Popular pressure from Boer farming interests attempted to limit the establishment of reserves and eventually culminated in the passing of law 21 in September 1895, the plakkerswet, which transferred the right to delineate new reserves from the government-appointed Location Commission to the Volksraad and stipulated that locations would not be of such a size as to provide their inhabitants with a means of production entirely independent of wage labour. The same law modified the 1887 Squatters law by prohibiting Africans from squatting without the permission of the farmer while at the same time apportioning a white farmer with five African families for each adult family member, bywoner or part owner of his farm. Although a farmer was legally permitted a maximum of 25 families, the size of the family was never stipulated.[100] The plakkerswet also sought to tie workers more strictly to the farms by stipulating that an employer was only obliged to supply a labourer or tenant with a trekpass three months after receiving notice of his intention to quit.

This aspect of the plakkerswet was tightened in October 1895 by a new pass law which threatened with long terms of forced labour any African caught moving without "good reason" or in a direction not stipulated in the pass. In the same month new legislation introduced a personal tax of £2 to be levied on all African males

---

99. Ibid., 28, 35; W.H. Stals, "Die Kwessie van Naturelle-eiendomsreg op Grond in Transvaal, 1838-1884", SAAYB, II, 1972, 67; Grimsehl, "Onluste in Modjadjiland", 228. The surface area of a location was not always a good indication of its ability to support a large population. Thus the "Knobnose location", surveyed in 1892, was unhealthy and lacked sufficient water and because of this, most people preferred to squat as tenants on surrounding farms, see Transvaal Native Affairs Department, Report for 1905, 60; War Office, Native Tribes, 67, 98; E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa (Cape Town, 1924), 342.

100. Resolutions of the first Volksraad, 6 Sept., 1893; 3 Sept., 1894 in BPP., Laws of the Transvaal up to 1899; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 35-38.

not employed by Europeans. This law was aimed at forcing Africans living on mission stations, rural locations, government land or paying rents in cash or kind, onto the labour market.[101]

But the attempt by the government to influence the supply of labour in the rural areas, through the passing of legislation, proved abortive. Much of the pressure on the state to intervene in the labour supply came from bywoners and under-capitalized individuals, working occupation plots and loan farms, who could not afford to compete for labour with the larger Boer farmers and notables. The latter, who generally comprised the landdrosts and veldkornets whose duty was to enforce the plakkerswet, saw little advantage in forcing labourers from their farms, or in undertaking dangerous and costly expeditions against the large numbers of Africans on Company lands, merely in order to supply their poorer compatriots with cheap labour.[102] Where attempts were made to enforce the plakkerswet and the other "labour laws" of 1895, largely in the outlying districts where the power of the central government was weak, the rural labour problem was compounded rather than solved as squatters tended to flee, with or without their trek passes, from white occupied land. They then settled on government, company and mission lands as well as rural locations or fled the Republic, while others responded to the threat posed by the plakkerswet by moving to the mines or by purchasing freehold land under the trust system.[103] Three years after the passing of the 1895 plakkerswet, the Volksraad concluded that it was unenforceable and refused to consider the numerous calls for its modification. Nevertheless, it was conceded that farming interests were unable to compete with the wages paid by the mining industry and, towards the end of the decade, moves

---

101. According to article 7 of Law 22 of 1895, an African caught without a pass had to pay a fine of up to 15s, a fee of 1s for his travel pass and any costs involved in his transportation. He was allowed to earn this money by hiring himself out to an employer, Locale Wetten, 228-231; Kruger Landelike Arbeids-vraagstuk, 37-38, 42; Naudé, "Boerdery", 211, 218.

102. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 30; Trapido, "Landlords and tenants", 41.

103. BMSAS no 124, 1895, 423; TLC., evidence of B.H. Dicke, 326-7; S.A. Native Affairs Commission, 1903-05, evidence of Hogge, 457-8, and Munnik, 488; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 43-45. Bundy states that by 1899 Africans owned just under 250 000 acres in the Transvaal, South African Peasantry, 205.

were made to force young men living in the Reserves to spend two years in the employ of farmers before working in the mines.[104]

Labour and the Transvaal State

The Transvaal state served as the mediator between the competing needs for labour of farming and mining interests, while attempting at the same time to regulate the competition for labour within those two sectors of the economy. The ambiguity of the state's position becomes more real when it is realized than in 1895, a year in which 60 000 Africans were employed on the Rand, the African male population of the Transvaal was estimated at about 131 500. Two years later the African population was thought to total 400 000 to 500 000. Yet 100 000 labourers were needed for agriculture and 120 000 for mining.[105] Although farming interests were represented in the Volksraad by enfranchised burghers, the vast majority of Transvaal export revenues came from gold sales. In order to overcome this contradiction between farming and mining interests, the government sought to control and cheapen labour on the mines by legislating a separate pass law for the De Kaap and Rand goldfields. The object of this law, which was drafted by the mining industry and was passed together with the "labour legislation" of September and October 1895, was

> "to prevent the hitherto indiscriminate desertion of natives which has involved so many companies in heavy money losses, and to give legal security to any company prepared to incur the necessary expense of importing natives from a distance."[106]

Law number 23 of 1895 helped depress African wages by severely restricting the freedom with which African workers moved from mine to mine in search of higher wages. This law decreed that when a migrant entered the proclaimed Goldfields of the Rand or De Kaap he had to procure a pass and metal badge which were specially coloured

---

104. This legislation, tabled in February 1899, was bitterly opposed by the mines and was never put into effect due to the outbreak of war that year. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 52; Naudé, "Boerdery", 223.

105. Ibid., 44; CMAR, 1895, 181; Star, 4 Nov., 1897.

106. CMAR, 1895, 39.

and initialled for each district. This pass entitled him to spend three days looking for work within the specified district and was renewable for 3 days at a fee of 2s. An employer was prohibited from engaging a worker without a district pass. After finding work the migrant's district pass was exchanged for an employer's pass and only on completion of his contract would the district pass be returned to him. In order to leave the proclaimed Goldfield the district pass and badge had to be destroyed and a travel pass issued for a 1s fee. The punishment for failing to produce a district or travel pass was respectively, 10s or one week's imprisonment and £3 or 1 month's imprisonment.[107]

Because of the rural labour shortage in the Transvaal, calls by mining companies for native commissioners to help supply the mines with labour went largely unheeded. Government tardiness over the construction of shelters along the labour routes within the Transvaal may also be attributed to the fear of criticism from burghers over the costs to the public treasury of such shelters and the facility they would afford rural labour to move to the mines.[108] But the refusal of the government to build shelters or bear any of the costs of introducing labour drained the financial resources of the Chamber of Mines' Native Labour Department. By the middle of 1895 the Native Labour Department had established stations at Komati Poort and three other points intersecting the paths leading from Gazaland to the Rand. The costs involved in the construction and maintenance of these shelters and the evident inability of the Native Labour Department to end high wages and competition for labour through the importation of large numbers of workers or the establishment of a fixed scale of wages on the Rand undermined the effectiveness of the recruiting organization. By the end of 1895 the Native Labour Department was faced with collapse and in desperation it attempted to supplement its inadequate funding by doubling the 3d per African employee charged of its member companies.[109]

---

107. Ibid., 51-59; SS 264 Ra 3309 "Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, Regulations in terms of Act 88, Gold Law, n.d."

108. When in 1897 the State Secretary advised the Volksraad to allow the construction of labour depots on the Rand, he was quick to point out that "the waiting houses were not intended to be on a magnificent scale, but only to prevent the natives deserting." Star, 6 Nov., 1897.

109. CMAR, 1895, 31-2, 53.

The year 1896 marks a watershed in the government's approach to the mining industry's labour supply. In that year, gold constituted 97% of the Transvaal's export revenue[110] yet the development of the mines was held back by a governmental system of monopolies, concessions and general bureaucratic inefficiency.[111] Foremost amongst the fetters which the mining capitalists condemned as responsible for holding back the expansion of the mining industry was the inadequate supply of cheap labour; in 1896 wages paid to African labourers constituted about 25% of total working costs on the Rand. The following year the state mining engineer estimated the price of African labour as some £2 million, or 18.6% of total work costs.[112]

The Jameson Raid in December 1895 attempted to removed these impediments by establishing a government supportive of the needs of mining capital. Although a failure in its political objectives, the Raid did succeed in pushing the Transvaal government to intervene more actively in the procuring of labour for the mines.

The Jameson Raid and State Intervention in the Labour Market

The ad hoc labour agreement of December 1893, which theoretically regulated labour recruiting in Mozambique, lasted until the defeat of Gungunyana in September 1895. The defeat of the Gaza allowed the Portuguese to extend their control over the vast majority of the population of Southern Mozambique and this gave them the power, for the first time, to control labour emigration and to make effective demands of the Transvaal.[113] In September 1895 it was reported

---

110. C.W. de Kiewiet, History of South Africa: Social & Economic (Oxford, 1941), 119.

111. Marais, Kruger Republic, 23-46; C.T. Gordon, The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger (Cape Town, 1970), 28-111.

112. The total wage cost, including white wages, came to over 50% as against an average wage cost on English mines of 31.7%. I.C.E., evidence of Seymour, 149; Albu, 14; Way, 38; H. Jennings, 200; Shanks, 366; Annual Report of the Assoc. Mines, 1896, 19; TLC., evidence of Jennings, 44.

113. The ad hoc agreement of December 1893 had officially lapsed on 6 June 1894 but as no action had been taken by the Portuguese, the Transvaal regarded the regulations governing the recruitment of labour as "uncertain". SS 241 Ra 2716/95, p. 30, "Arbeid in de goud-mynen deur kleurlingen komende van Mozambique", 23 Sept., 1895.

that Paulino Fornazini had been granted a concession to authorize and control the emigration of African labourers from Mozambique and that all recruiting had been halted.[114] In February 1896 a Barberton newspaper stated that recruiters were "frantic" because of the comprehensive enforcement by the Portuguese of an 18s6d emigration tax.[115] Labour agents operating in Mozambique were either arrested or left the country and this led to high capitation fees of 27s6d being paid for labourers at Komati Poort.[116] The scarcity of Mozambican workers brought about a severe shortage of underground labour, restricted stamping power, and threatened several mines, when combined with the withdrawal of capital caused by the Jameson raid, with closure in early 1896.[117]

The political and economic crisis brought about by the Jameson Raid drove the Transvaal government to intervene directly in the labour market on the side of the mining industry. On 27 January 1896, just over three weeks after Jameson's surrender outside Klerksdorp, a proclamation was issued in the government gazette which declared the government,

> "ready to provide all the help and assistance within its ability to facilitate the supply of native labour on the public diggings of this Republic."[118]

A week later, on 4 February, a circular was sent to native commissioners, calling on them to assist in supplying the mines with labour.[119] Because the government recognised the inability of the

---

114. S.A. Mining Journal, 14 Sept., 1895, 1064-65; FO 63/1316 Cons. to FO, 6 March 1896; CMAR, 1895, 35. On Fornazini, a leading Lourenço Marques entrepreneur, see Std. Bank 1/1/102, LM 1895-1900, Lourenço Marques Branch Inspector, 26 July 1897.

115. Gold Fields News, 20 Feb., 1896. This figure seems exaggerated as the official emigration fee remained 15s until May 1896, LA 464 Cons., Lourenço Marques to SS, 27 Aug., 1895.

116. CMAR, 1896, 141, 169-70.

117. HE. 171 Eckstein and Co. to Beit and Co., 17 Feb., 1896; Ibid., 22 Feb., 1896; SSa 329 R 1728 Secretary, Robinson Gold Mining Co. to SS, 17 Feb., 1896; Ibid., 13 Feb., 1896; Ibid., R1377 manager, East Rand Prop. to SS, 2 Feb., 1896.

118. Staatscourant, 27 Jan., 1896; SSA 330 "Resume", p. 120.

119. SS 329 BB. 139/66. SS to Supt. Natives, 30 Jan., 1896 and circular of 4 Feb., 1896 encl. in R607. See also CMAR, 1896, 141, 143-44; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 187.

Transvaal's African population to satisfy its own labour needs as well as those of both farmers and mine companies, it was obliged to turn to foreign sources of supply.[120] The reversal of government labour policy was underscored when on 2 February, negotiations were opened with the Portuguese on the basis of the 1893 ad hoc labour agreement.[121]

The Transvaal government was pressured by the mining industry to seek a formal arrangement with the Mozambique authorities. The secretary of the Robinson group wrote that

> "as far as our needs are from outside, preference is given by us to East Coast boys on account of the distance they are away from home, and therefore they would stay longer, and also they are willing to work underground...."

He distinguished between "Maputasland" (sic) and "Gazaland", which had adult male populations estimated at 12 000 to 15 000 and 100 000 respectively. Gaza labourers were preferable because they could evade "vexatious and expensive" Portuguese taxation by being brought to Komati Poort for 10s each. "Maputa" labour cost 3s6d to take to the railway at Lourenço Marques and Inhambane labourers were expensive because of Fornazini's local concession and the 27s6d shipping fee. The railway fee of 28s6d from Lourenço Marques and 19s6d from Komati Poort was thought to be "enormous considering that the niggers are conveyed in open trucks and packed like herrings." Only government intervention could reduce these costs.[122]

The inability of the Chamber of Mines' Native Labour Department to procure labour resulted in a falling off of subscription rates and threats of secession in early 1896.[123] The organization sought its salvation in an agreement with the Portuguese and with this end in view the Native Labour Department manager sought Transvaal government support for his negotiations in Lourenço Marques.[124]

The Portuguese consul was first approached unofficially by the Transvaal government in January 1896 when he was told that it would be "materially advantageous" for him if he were able to influence

---

120. SSa 330 Resumé, 8 June 1897, p. 120. See also Fourie, Afrikaners in die Goudstad, 20; Trapido, "Land, Office and Wealth", 362.

121. SS 329. R243 SS to Lourenço Marques cons., 8 Feb., 1896; LA 464 Cons. Lourenço Marques to GGM, 10 Feb., 1896; SSa 330 "Resumé", pp. 120-23.

122. SSa 329 R1959 Sec. Robinson Group to Assistant SS, 7 Feb., 1896.

123. HE. 171 Rouliot to Beit, 6 April 1896; Ibid., 26 April 1896;

the governor-general in Mozambique to lift the restriction on labour emigration. In late February the consul met with President Kruger who informed him that the need for a labour agreement with the Portuguese arose from his desire to rectify one of the major causes of the dissent that had culminated in the Jameson Raid.[125] The Portuguese negotiators were well aware that because of the Transvaal government's need for labour in order to settle its political problems, "we may later be able to turn this unsettled situation to our advantage" and that the labour supply question should be made "a weapon that could be very useful for us."[126] In March the Transvaal government agreed to abide by existing Portuguese legislation, which controlled emigration of labour from Mozambique to Reunion and Natal and in particular agreed to appoint an official in Johannesburg who would fulfil the role played by the Protector of Immigrants in Natal. On 21 April the various clauses of the agreement were verbally agreed to and, although no reference to costs was made, decree 129-A of 27 April was published in the Mozambican government gazette.[127] The strength of the Portuguese position became evident when on 13 May, decree 158 was published which fixed the price of labourer engagements at 5$000 (22s6d). This marked an increase of 7s2d over the 1893 price, but was 3s6d less than the 26s charge initiated in 1877 when the Portuguese began to tax maritime emigration to Natal. On top of this increased cost, each recruiter had to purchase a 500$000 (£111.2s) licence, valid for one year only, from the Portuguese.[128]

CMAR, 1896, 154.

124. SSa 329 Ra852/96 Grant to Sheppard, 20 Feb., 1896 in Ra607.

125. MNE 709 Cons to MNE, 23 Feb., 1896. This desire was repeated on several occasions, see MNE 709 Cons. to MNE, 16 May 1896; Cons. to GLM, 2 Dec., 1896 encl. in Cons. to MSMU, 9 Jan., 1897; Portuguese Consulate Pretoria (CGP) cons. to MNE, 23 Feb., 1896; Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Moçambique 1896-98, 148.

126. MNE 709 Cons. to MNE, 23 Feb., 1896; Cons. to MNE, 16 May 1896.

127. SSa 330 "Resumé", 123-8; SS 329.975/96 SS to Min. Mines, 7 May 1896 in Ra607.

128. BO. 20, 16 May 1896. For Natal costs see pp.61-62.

This legislation caused much consternation in mining circles and, on the same day that decree 158 was promulgated, the Association of Mine Managers put forward its own recommendations. These included a contract period of 24 months and minimum wages of 40s to qualified workers and 20s to "youths". They further agreed that the mine companies should reimburse the government all costs incurred in supplying the goldfields with Mozambican labour. Following these objections to the Portuguese plan, the Transvaal government expressed its unwillingness to accept responsibility for the fulfilment of workers' contracts. Probably because of the financial costs that would have been incurred and because it would have dragged the British government into the "native labour question" on the Rand, the Transvaal revised its earlier negotiating position and insisted that responsibility for contracts was a matter for the courts.[129] The responsibility clause was vital for the Portuguese as through it they sought to limit clandestine migration by monitoring Mozambican labour at the receiving, employment end. Only in this way could they effectively end clandestine emigration and control and tax "Portuguese" labour.[130] Clandestine emigration also involved a loss of Portuguese railway revenue amounting annually to about £2 000 as, after the Luso-Gaza war, recruiters looked increasingly to the Gazaland area north of Ressano Garcia.[131] Although negotiations broke down over the issue of responsibility in late August 1896, the Transvaal government was nevertheless given permission by the Portuguese to issue recruiting licences to labour recruiters recommended by the Superintendent of Natives.

By mid 1896 the Native Labour Department of the Chamber of Mines, which had been unable to come to an agreement with the Portuguese, was in the process of dissolution and a new labour agency had been proposed which would consist of members of both the Chamber and Association of Mines. In dissolving the Native Labour Department the Chamber was abandoning its attempt to form a monopsonistic labour

---

129. SSa 330 "Resumé", 130-35; SS 329 Ra2389 Sec. Mine Managers Assoc. to Min. Mines, 13 May 1896 and R1873 SS to Portuguese cons., 29 Aug., 1896 in Ra607/96.

130. MNE 709 Cons. to MNE, 16 May 1896; CGP cons. to MNE, 14 May 1896.

131. MNE 709 Cons. to MNE, 2 Sept., 1896.

recruiting organization that would exclude its competitors. Foremost amongst these was the Association of Mines which commented auspiciously that

> "The proposed Association for the Native labour supply originated from the generally acknowledged necessity of having one uniform and united organization for the introduction of Native labour at the least possible expense to the companies, and above all to do away with the competition which has arisen through individual groups of companies providing their own native supply."[132]

A leading member of the Chamber of Mines commented that the value of a new labour association was that

> "it would constitute practically a monopoly for the introduction of labour and we sincerely hope to obtain gradually a reduction of wages. Our code is to centralize the introduction of Natives (and to) get a uniform system of pay and management of the compounds so as to get a better control over the native population."[133]

The Chamber of Mines and the Drive towards Monopsonistic Recruiting in Mozambique

Following the breakdown in negotiations with the Transvaal government in August 1896, the Portuguese entered into direct consultations with the Chamber of Mines.[134] In September an agreement was entered into with the Native Labour Department which gave the organization the right to erect shelters and recruit labour anywhere in Mozambique. More importantly it prohibited any recruiter from operating without the permission of the Chamber of Mines or the Governor of Lourenço Marques.[135] This effective monopsony invested the Native Labour Department of the Chamber with renewed political

---

132. Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 19, 55.

133. HE. 171 Rouliot to Beit, 6 June 1896.

134. The Portuguese consul in Pretoria feared that the government was blocking a labour agreement and that the Chamber was the only serious party, MNE 709, Cons., to GLM, 2 Dec., 1896; Cons. to MNE, 9 Jan., 1897.

135. CMAR, 1896, 164. See also Ibid., 157-61; HE 172 Rouliot to Beit, 12 Sept., 1896.

strength for, as the Portuguese started to arrest labour recruiters not tied to the Chamber of Mines, the labour monopsony threatened mining companies not attached to the Chamber.[136] The secretary of the Robinson group which belonged to the Association of Mines, in asking for government assistance to secure a similar labour concession, complained that

> "For some time past our labour supply has come entirely from (Mozambique) and now through this concession our supply has been cut off and we are helpless to acquire natives from that direction."[137]

The acquisition of a Mozambican recruiting monopsony by the Native Labour Department turned negotiations over a new labour association in favour of the Chamber of Mines as it was agreed that the proposed recruiting "organization should be established ... embracing and utilizing the privileges conceded by the Portuguese government."[138] Adequate funding was assured by a 3s contribution and a further liability of 3s per worker employed by each member company. This capital would allow the Labour Association to construct a labour depot and five recruiting stations between Ressano Garcia and the Limpopo. It was hoped that these shelters would attract 2 500 to 3 000 workers each month.[139]

The manager of the Wernher-Beit group, which was attached to the Chamber, saw the formation of such a labour association, which would

---

136. HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 26 April 1896; Ibid., 10 Oct., 1896; FO 63/1317 Cons. to FO, 2 Sept., 1896; Ibid., 5 Sept., 1896. See also CMAR, 1896, 169-170.

137. SS 329 Ra5025 see Robinson group to SS, 16 Oct., 1896 encl. in Ra 607; SS 329 Ra5026 Portug. cons. to SS, 21 Oct., 1896.

138. Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 56-57.

139. An earlier attempt in June-July 1895 to build shelters in Mozambique had been abandoned. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 7 July 1895; Idem., 7 Sept., 1895.

be heavily dominated by the Chamber of Mines, as "a step towards the fusion of the two chambers."[140] The secretary of the Robinson group was more explicit in his outline of the Chamber's political motivation in acquiring the Mozambican labour concession.

> "It is well known that the Chamber of Mines has an object in view in securing the concession - it is namely to prevent the companies belonging to the Association of Mines from getting any labour whatsoever and so force them to break up the Association and join the Chamber on their terms."[141]

Because of these political motives, the Association withdrew its support for the new Rand Native Labour Department in October but allowed its individual members to join the organization.

Despite the inability of mining capitalists to form one umbrella recruiting organization, they were sufficiently sanguine over the expected flow of labour that would emerge from the labour concession in Mozambique, as to cut the wages of African mine-workers in October 1896.[142] But the Chamber of Mines had been obliged to pay a high cost for its labour monopsony.

A recruiting licence cost 1,014$000 (£225,6s7d) which consisted of a guarantee fee of 800$000 (£177.15s6d), a stamp fee of 200$000 and a registration fee of 14$000.[143] The Portuguese charged the Rand Native Labour Department 7$650 (27s6d) for every emigrant; this was broken down into a basic passport fee and various contracting and registering charges. Apart from these revenues claimed by the Portuguese, a further cost of 11$815 (42s6d) was incurred in recruiting, feeding and transporting the workers to the Rand. Thus the high cost of £3.10s involved in recruiting and transporting Mozambican labour to the Rand limited any successful wage reduction as mine managers feared that wage reductions would

---

140. HE 172 Rouliot to Beit, 7 Nov., 1896.

141. SS 329 Ra5025 see Robinson group to SS, 16 Oct., 1896 encl. in Ra607/96.

142. HE 172 Rouliot to Beit, 5 Sept., 1896; Ibid., 10 Oct., 17 Oct., 1896.

143. LA 465 ZAR cons., Lourenço Marques to SS, 17 Nov., 1896. These figures are computed at the official exchange rate of $225=1s. See also SS 329 Ra5537 and Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 61.

lead to an increased rate of desertion and the consequent loss of recruiting overheads. The desertion of labour caused by wage reductions was worsened by drought, locusts and rinderpest which in many cases drew men back to their families and prevented them from seeking service on the mines.[144]

By the end of December 1896 the wage-reductions of October had "utterly and hopelessly collapsed" and, due to the shortage of labour, several mines were once again faced with closure.[145] The inability of the mining industry to hold down the rate of wages was largely attributable to the failure of the mines to form a solid labour association. However mining capitalists saw their immediate labour problems in terms of the government's lax implementation of the pass laws and the "extravagant and unjust" taxes extorted by the Portuguese on all workers leaving Mozambique.[146] These taxes substantially increased recruiting overheads and necessitated a more efficient pass system to prevent desertion. Thus the importation of foreign labourers, whose introduction was necessary in order to oversupply the labour market and reduce wages, was dependent upon the successful implementation of the pass laws. A month before the wage reductions of October 1896, Wernher-Beit had stated that "if the new 'pass law' is being properly administered it should be possible to enforce the fulfilment of contracts, and in that case it will pay to import labour from long distances at considerable cost and at lower wages."[147] But the mining capitalists complained that the existing pass law on the goldfields was "a grievance instead of the relief it was designed to be."[148]

A major inducement for Mozambicans to desert was that they had to repay the cost of their transport to the Witwatersrand. As this

---

144. Ibid., 18, 64-5; HE 140 Fitzpatrick to Beit, 26 Dec., 1896.

145. HE 140 Fitzpatrick to Beit, 26 Dec., 1896; HE 162 Phillips to Eckstein, 23 Jan., 1897; to Rouliot, 9 Jan., 1897.

146. SS 329 R1756 Sec. Assoc. Mines to SP, 11 Dec., 1896. The 27s6d fee was more than that levied on labour going to Natal in 1877, see SSa 330 "Kaffirarbeiders aan die Witwatersrandsche goudvelden", 170.

147. HE 62 Wernher-Beit to Eckstein, 12 Sept., 1896, p. 198.

148. HE 140 Rouliot to Beit, 26 Dec., 1896.

was variously estimated at 45s to 60s, many workers deserted once on the Rand and willingly paid pass fines of 10s.[149] Even when, in December 1895, under pressure from the mining companies the pass fine was raised to 60s, Africans could still desert and reappear in another pass district, like Boksburg, where officials asked no questions and where the pass fine was only 20s.[151] Labour touting was closely linked to desertion as touts often encouraged workers to desert and then shared their capitation fee with the worker. Large profits were made by touts, who operated on the Rand, and by freelance recruiters who brought labour from Mozambique. With private enterprise in the recruiting sphere largely untrammelled, competition for workers drove monthly wages up to £3.10s and resulted in the payment of high capitation fees of up to 60s and 70s.[151] One recruiter claimed that he was paid £5 per recruit by Consolidated Goldfields and a further 5s for each month, over and above six months, that the recruit spent on one mine.[152] These capitation fees hampered the work of the Rand Native Labour Department as they encouraged company recruiters to sell their workers to freelancers. But more importantly, high capitation fees, when combined with desertion, involved the mines in losses of up to 75% of the capital invested in recruiting.[153] Despite the promulgation of the "Pass Laws" (no. 23 of 1895 and 31 of 1896), the amount of money lost by individual companies through desertion increased annually. The execution of the pass law was described as a "farce" and "merely an extra tax-collecting agency" and it was averred that Mozambican labour could not be imported on a large scale until contracts of

---

149. Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 19, 75-79.

150. HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 8 March 1896, 15 March 1896: CMAR, 1897, 130-37; ICE. evidence of C.S. Goldman, 104; Ibid., J.H. Johns, 261; UR.12 "Pasambtenaar Johannesburg, Rapport 1897".

151. SS 329 R1959 sec Robinson group to SS, 7 Feb., 1896 in Ra607; HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 29 March 1896; ICE., evidence of T.H. Leggett, J.H. Johns; D.M. Wilson, Behind the Scenes in Transvaal, (London, 1901), 196-7.

152. Richardson, Crowded Hours, 317.

153. ICE., evidence of C.S. Goldman, 104, 109-110; Ibid., evidence of J.B. Robinson, 268; T.H. Leggett, 256.

at least two years could be guaranteed by a strictly enforced pass law.[154]

Calls from the mining industry for the government to tighten the pass laws were accompanied by cries for the government to allow the introduction of foreign labour drawn from various sources[155] and to compel the Netherlands South African Railway (NZASM) to lower the costs of transporting Shangaans or improve the conditions of their journey. Although rail transport reduced the molestation of immigrant workers, allowed their transport in winter months and landed them on the Rand in a better physical condition, workers were discouraged from travelling by train as they were often herded into overcrowded and insanitary sheep trucks and luggage vans and were brutally treated. It was claimed that NZASM charges for transporting Shangaans were twelve times the rates charged by the Cape railways.[156] The mining industry also called on the government to persuade the Portuguese to lower the tax on emigrant labourers. From September 1895, which marked the end of the Luso-Gaza war, to March 1897 the cost incurred by the Rand Native Labour Department in recruiting and transporting labour from Mozambique to the Rand doubled to 70s. The Association of Mines felt it could afford to pay the Portuguese no more than 5s, and that only if recruits were prevented from deserting by an enforced pass law.[157]

By 1897 the problem faced by the mines with respect to Mozambican labour was less one of supply than one of cost, although the two were still intricately linked. Thus an oversupply of African labour in April allowed the mines to reduce African wages by 30%

---

154. SSa 329 R1959 sec. Robinson Group to SS, 7 Feb., 1896; SSa 330 R5792 sec. Assoc. Mines to SP., 14 Paril 1897; SSa 330 R661/97 Trew and de Savingy to ZAR govt., 15 June 1897; D.M. Wilson, Behind the Scenes, 185-86.

155. Proposals that labour be drawn from Abyssinia, Italy, Syria, Madagascar, China, Zanzibar and Nyasaland were all quashed by the Transvaal government, SSa 330 "Kaffirarbeid aan de Witwatersrandsche Goudvelden", p. 114.

156. CGP 2° no 76. Cons. to GLM, 4 Oct., 1893; South African Mining Journal, 14 Sept., 1895, 1063-64; Star, 11 Dec., 1897.

157. SSa 330 R5792 sec. Assoc. Mines to SP., 14 April 1897 in Ra607/96; CMAR, 1896, 119-120.

from 1 June 1897.[158] This wage-cut, when combined with the seasonal egress and the second Luso-Gaza war of 1897, resulted in a "considerable exodus" of African workers from the mines. For the wage reduction to be maintained the labour market had to be over-supplied and this necessitated the importation of large numbers of Mozambicans. But for Mozambican labour to be imported, its price had to be lowered and this re-emphasized the need for government intercession with the Portuguese in Mozambique.[159]

The high tax levied by the Portuguese on emigrant labour was strongly supported by colonial interests in Mozambique opposed to the loss of labour and high wages induced by labour migration to the Rand.[160] But the heavy tax on labour emigration merely encouraged clandestine migration, which resulted in a loss of government revenue estimated at 450, 000$000 (£10 000) in 1896.[161] According to the governor of Lourenço Marques it was this clandestine emigration that forced the Portuguese into an agreement with the Transvaal; it was never the government's intention to deplete the colony's work force by encouraging labour migration, for,

> "In view of the extent of the frontier between the Portuguese territory and the South African Republic it was found impossible to prevent the illegal emigration of Portuguese natives without having a bureau at the place where these natives were accustomed to go to and this was the reason for the publication of the regulation (governing the movement of labour from Mozambique to the Transvaal), and never to encourage emigration to the Transvaal which, by causing a scarcity of labour, is continually harmful to the interests of trade and to the development of this province."[162]

But although labour migration was harmful to the development of Mozambique, it provided metropolitan Portugal and the local

---

158. HE 62 Beit to Eckstein, 10 April 1897, 30 April 1897; HE 172 Eckstein to Beit, 30 April 1897; CMAR, 1897, 107.

159. Ibid., 114, 116, 118-19; SSa 330 "Kafferarbeid aan de Witwatersrandsche Goudvelden", 117; R. Monster, "Die Industriële Kommissie van Ondersoek in 1897 en sy Politieke Betekenis" (MA., Potchefstroom University, 1966), 77, 109.

160. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Moçambique, 146; MNE 709 Cons. to SS, 23 April 1896 encl. in Cons. to MNE, 16 May 1896; CMAR 1898, 461.

161. MNE 709 Cons. to MNE 14 May 1896.

162. NA. GH 830 GLM to Br. Cons. LM, 9 Aug., 1898 in Cons. to Governor of Natal 6 June 1898. See also Mouzinho, Moçambique, 149. For colonial opposition to migrant labour, see pp. 251-254.

administration with an important source of revenue. As early as 1884 it was estimated that migrants brought more than 36 000$000 (£8 000) into the Delagoa Bay area each year. By the mid-1890s the Royal Commissioner, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, estimated that most of the approximately 25 000 migrants, who annually returned from the mines, repatriated savings, after two years of work, of about £20-30 or a total for the colony of £500 000 to £750 000. This money was used to purchase goods on which import duties had to be paid and it provided the colonial authorties with valuable foreign exchange as the hut tax was levied in gold specie. Perhaps most importantly Mozambican labour, by contributing to the development of the Rand, brought about the development of the Lourenço Marques harbour and railway system. Mouzinho was of the opinion that, apart from its labour, Mozambique had little else to export[163] and a later governor of Lourenço Marques believed that the town's future was based on its role as a service port for the Witwatersrand. This he stated clearly,

> "It is only by aiding and enabling the Johannesburg mines to work and by developing the Transvaal trade in general that Lourenço Marques itself can be developed and it was partly with this end in view that the regulation legalizing emigration to the Transvaal was entered into."[164]

This subordination of both indigenous and colonial Mozambican interests to those of the metropole dominated negotiations with the Transvaal and were entrenched in legislation.[165] On 1 Nov. 1897 the Portugese agreed in principle to control and regulate the emigration of labour to the Transvaal. This was made legal by the promulgation on 25 November of decree 109 and on 11 December the regulations governing the recruitment of Mozambican workers were

---

163. Adolpho de Castro Neto de Vasconcellos, "Dos Mappas Estatisticos com Relação ao Movimento Commercial no Districto de Lourenço Marques, Durante o Anno de 1884", Bol. de Soc. de Geog. Commercial do Porto, 1886; Mouzinho, Moçambique, 146-48, 150.

164. NA. GH 830 GLM to Br. Cons., Lourenço Marques, 9 Aug., 1898 in Cons. to Gov., Natal, 6 June 1898. For a similar view cf. GLM report for 1881 in BO. 1882, p. 142.

165. See extensive correspondence in SSa 594, especially Ra 5540 "Kaffirarbeiders uit Portugeesch gebied" and in Ra 6501/95.

published. These regulations were simultaneously published in the Staatscourant.[166]

Decree 109 attempted to minimize competitive recruiting by cutting out freelance recruiting and by demanding that only recruiters representing "firms or bodies which are bona fide employers of natives" would be given a certificate of recommendation, costing 10s, by the Transvaal's Superintendent of Natives. The cost of an annual recruiting licence was increased from 214$000 (£47.10s) to 450$000 (£100) but the guarantee fee was reduced from 800$000 (£177.15s6d) to 450$000 (£100). A fee of 4$500 (£1) was charged for witnessing labour contracts, which could include 100 workers on one contract. Once the contracts were drawn up the worker was taken to Ressano Garcia where he was issued with a passport costing 7s6d, a reduction of £1 on the old fee. In order for the passport to be valid for travel in the Transvaal, it had to contain a 1s Transvaal revenue stamp. The recruiter was made responsible for all desertions between the signing of the worker's contract and the purchase of his passport at Ressano Garcia. A fine of £2 was deducted from the recruiter's guarantee for each emigrant worker not presented at Ressano Garcia.[167] The deserting recruit or "runaway" was made liable to a fine of 60 to 90 days labour.

The recruit had to report, with his Portuguese passport, to the

---

166. J. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Providencias publicados pelo Commissario Regio na Provincia de Moçambique desde 1 Dezembro 1896 até 18 Novembro 1897, 694-703; BO 50, 11 Dec., 1897, "Regulamento para engajamento dos indigenas da Provincia de Moçambique para o trabalho na Republica Sul Africana"; SSa 594 "Regulations drawn up by the government of the South African Republic in connection with the supply of natives from the Portuguese Province of Moçambique", pp. 8-11, 177-81; Staatscourant, 8 Dec., 1897; Ibid., no. 957, 30 March 1898, government notice 149. For a further decree governing recruiting in the territory of the Moçambique Company, see Boletim da Companhia de Moçambique, no. 100, 16 Oct., 1897.

167. This clause was removed in 1899, CMAR, 1899, 67.

"Curator of Natives" on the Rand who was an official nominated by the Mozambican authorities. The Curator of Natives performed much the same function as Natal's Protector of Immigrants in that he ensured the fulfilment of contracts, received complaints from Mozambican workers and, in theory, sent home workers' savings through the district governors.[168] His major task was to register and keep track of "Portuguese" labour on the Witwatersrand. The funding for the Curator's office came from a registration fee of 2s6d levied on each African worker passing through his office. After leaving the Curator, the recruit was taken to the pass officer with whom he deposited his passport and from whom he received a district pass. In order to prevent a worker from discarding his Mozambican identity the district pass had imprinted upon it in red ink, the number of the worker's Portuguese passport and the name of his employer. Africans paid 1s per day for board and lodging in the compound attached to the pass office building in which the curator's rooms were situated.

On the expiration of his contract, the worker exchanged his district pass for his passport, which was validated for travel with a 1s Transvaal revenue stamp, and then reported to the Curator. The latter then endorsed, for a 10s fee, that the worker's contract had expired. In this way an attempt was made to curb clandestine migration and, if a worker returned home without an endorsed passport he was liable to 60 to 90 days forced labour. But in many cases the levying of the 10s endorsement fee was counter-productive as it caused Mozambicans to return home early and illegally.[169] If the worker wished to re-engage he had to pay 10s for the endorsement of his old passport and 10s for a new passport. On his return home, the migrant had to present his endorsed pass to officials in the district where he had been engaged. This measure ensured the payment of hut taxes.[170]

Although the 10s re-engagement costs were often borne by the recruiter, the migrant was made liable for the costs incurred in his transport to the Rand as well as for all pass and registration

---

168. In practice, this was seldom done. NA/SNA 1/46 confid. papers C22/1899, Marwick to SNA, 28 June 1899.

169. TLC., evidence of I. Ferraz, 248.

170. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 99.

fees. In this way a major part of the cost of labour recruitment was legally transferred from the mining companies to the workers. Mozambican workers, by paying passport, registrations, endorsement and pass fees, also bore the costs of reproducing the system of control, which prevented their "clandestine" migration and desertion and which thus restricted them from selling their labour to the highest bidder. Similarly the reduction in the cost of a Portuguese passport from 27s6d to 7s6d was only acceptable to the Portuguese because the worker was obliged to pay a registration fee of 2s6d and an endorsement fee of 10s to the Curator on the Rand. In 1898, the first year in which fees were hesitantly gathered, the income of the Curator's office totalled £30 000.[171]

Because of its benefit to the mining industry, the 1897 labour legislation was celebrated by newspapers like the Natal Witness as, "the only reform so far granted the mining industry".[172] The Association of Mines and the anti-capitalist press on the Rand also greeted the legislation as a major government reform.[173] But the Chamber lost its prospective monopoly through this legislation and an editorial in the Star, which was supportive of the Chamber, decried the labour agreement as a "sprat" in comparison with "whales", such as the railway and dynamite monopolies. The legislation was a

> "cleverly arranged scheme (according to which) the Republic is not called upon to sacrifice a solitary halfpenny ... the whole or nearly the whole penniary (sic) burden of the new labour scheme falls upon the hapless native himself."

The editorial expressed the fear that the taxation and bureaucracy in the new legislation would discourage immigrant labour and encourage desertion and commented, "We have settled with the respective governments. We have now to settle with the natives."[174]

Despite the complaints of the Chamber of Mines, the 1897 labour legislation marked a decisive intervention by the state in the labour

---

171. NA/SNA 1/46 confid. papers, C22/1899 Marwick to SNA, 28 June 1899.

172. Natal Witness, 8 Nov., 1897.

173. Standard and Diggers News, 22 Nov., 1897; De Pers, 10 Nov., 1897.

174. Star, 24 Nov., 1897. See also Star, 22 Nov., 1897 and 23 Nov., 1897.

market on the side of the mining industry. Many burghers who were already angered by the use of native commissioners to secure labour for the mines,[175] were opposed to the potential expenditure of state revenue on the importation of mine labour and felt that labour immigration would merely compound and not solve, the Transvaal's "native problem".[176] But in reality the 1897 labour legislation was achieved by sacrificing the interests of the African worker, and hence the grass-root development of the Mozambican economy, to those of mining capitalism and metropolitan Portugal. The 1897 labour agreement allowed the RNLA to oversupply the mines with workers and reduce wages. Thus while the number of workers on the mines attached to the Chamber increased by 21% from 1897 to 1898, the wage reduction of 29% effected in 1897 was successfully held into the following year.[177] This meant that, in exchange for supplying the Rand with cheap labour, the colonial government in Mozambique was assured of a steady source of foreign exchange. By the end of the century the first Portuguese curator of natives was able to state that

> "the native revenue (from migrant labour) is very large, the province lives upon the natives."[178]

The Chamber of Mines in its report for 1897 remarked that although the labour supply had "fluctuated considerably ... the supply must on the whole be regarded as very satisfactory. More especially as concurrently with the greater labour requirements of the industry a large reduction in the scale of native wages has been successfully carried through."[179] This sentiment was repeated in the following

---

175. ICE., evidence of Albu, 14; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 54.

176. The attorney-general had initially opposed the creation of a separate pass law for the goldfields as he feared it would encourage the growth of the mining industry as a state within a state, SS 3925. R10295/93 att. gen. to SS, 25 April 1895 encl. in R3116/94; others opposed the exportation of Transvaal capital by foreign workers, which the pass officer in Johannesburg estimated at £3 million in 1897, U.R. 12, "Pasamptenaar, Johannesburg, Rapport 1897", p. 27; see also Volkstem, 6 Jan., 1894; Star, 6 Nov., 1897. Others feared the political implications of importing African labour, HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 8 March 1896.

177. CMAR, 1897, 129.

178. TLC., evidence of Ivens Ferraz, 248.

179. CMAR, 1897, 129.

year, when the Chamber reported that,

> "The rapid growth of the industry has only been made possible by a corresponding increase in the supply of native labour."

It then noted that the rise in the number of workers employed on the goldfields, from 14 000 in 1890 to almost 90 000 in 1898 "has been obtained without any appreciable rise in the rate of wages ... (and that) ... good work has been done, both in meeting as far as possible labour demands and especially in keeping down the scale of wages."[180] Wages fell from an average of 63s4d in September 1890 to 49s9d in 1898.[181]

From March 1897 to the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War in October 1899, some 42 000 Mozambican workers were brought to the Rand by the RNLA.[182] At least another 6 400 were brought by freelancers and an undisclosed number of "clandestine" immigrants, who often passed themselves off as residents of the Republic, found work on the Rand.[183] In 1898, 53 223 Mozambicans, earning an average of £2.9s9d constituted 60% of the labour force on those mines attached to the Chamber of Mines.[184] The following year the number of Mozambican workers was estimated at over 70 000 or some 67% of the total labour force on the Rand.[185] It was thought that 10 000 of these men came from Lourenço Marques district and 30 000 from each of the Gaza and Inhambane districts.[186] Large numbers of

---

180. CMAR, 1897, 129.

181. CMAR, 1890, 12, 62-5; CMAR, 1898, 407, 458.

182. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 28, 101. See also CMAR, 1898, 445.

183. W. Holterhoff felt the figure 6 400 to be "ridiculously low", TLC, 160. See also F. Wirth, 111.

184. CMAR, 1898, 458.

185. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 27; Oxford History of South Africa, II, 15 gives a figure of 119 000. The CMAR (1899, p. 68) gives a figure of 94 550 workers employed on mines associated with the chamber in 1899. In June 1899 "a careful investigation conducted along the entire main reef by Rev. C. Baumgarten "revealed that Mozambicans constituted 56 830 of the total workforce of 92 168" i.e. 64%, Hobson, The War in South Africa, 232.

186. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 101.

Mozambicans, up to 26 000 according to one source, were also employed outside the mining industry in such occupations as domestic service and railway work.[187]

The Chamber of Mines sang the praises of Mozambican labour

> "The East Coast native pays us better in every respect than any native of South Africa, or, indeed, any class of coloured labourers we can get as far as we are now aware. He certainly comes farther and takes more trouble to collect but when we get him he stays longer, and after he has once learnt his business, he almost invariably comes back again after he has gone to his kraal. The greatest advantage of employing the East Coast native is that you have no difficulty with him underground, as compared with natives from other sources."[188]

This was a frequently expressed sentiment, put plainly by Percy Fitzpatrick when he declared in 1904 that the "Portuguese East Coast has been the salvation of the Rand."[189]

Although freelance recruiting, touting and desertion remained a problem for the mining capitalists,[190] the Transvaal-Mozambique agreement of 1897 was accompanied by a tightening of the pass law. The Natal native labour agent on the Rand wrote in 1898 that, "... the treatment of natives found without passes is nothing less than barbarous ... thousands of innocent natives are at the present time fined, imprisoned and lashed under the provisions of the Pass Law."[191] Decree 109 ended free enterprise recruiting and gave the workers less room for manoeuvre in determining the conditions of their employment. This caused a rise in clandestine emigration, which was encouraged by non-RNLA recruiters,[192] and consequently

---

187. TLC., Report, 30; Ibid., evidence of Wirth, 112, Baldwin.

188. CMAR, 1898, 459.

189. TLC., evidence of Fitzpatrick, 119.

190. CMAR, 1898, 66, 76, 83-86, 460; CMAR, 1899, 68.

191. NA/SNA 1/46 Confid. papers. C22/1899 Marwick to SNA, 28 June 1899; CMAR, 1898, 463.

192. TLC., evidence of Holterhoff, 160-161.

caused the Portuguese to pass decree 466 in September 1899 on the eve of the Anglo-Boer war which gave to the Chamber of Mines an unrestricted labour recruiting monopsony.[193]

193. BO 39, 30 Sept., 1899. The implementation of the monopsony was prevented by the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war in 1899.

CONCLUSION

Employers benefitted from a migratory form of labour in numerous ways. Men who were geographically divided from their means of production were more dependent on wage labour for their subsistence and consequently worked longer periods and performed tasks avoided by local workers. By seeking workers from areas where production patterns were unaffected by the new centres of consumer demand in southern Africa and by constantly pushing the labour frontier northwards, employers succeeded in flooding the labour market with migrants who tended to undercut their more experienced peers by accepting longer contracts and lower wages. Perhaps most importantly migrant labourers, who were employed extensively during times of economic expansion, could be expelled with equal vigour during periods of economic depression.

A system of migrant labour also entailed a number of disadvantages for employers. Workers were often discouraged from seeking employment by the long and dangerous journey to the labour market and many arrived in an exhausted condition which precluded their immediate employment. Temporary workers did not acquire high levels of skill and, by returning to areas outside British or Transvaal jurisdiction, were able to sell diamonds or gold amalgam stolen on the mines.[1] The greatest obstacle to the introduction of a migrant labour system was the cost of recurrent recruitment, capitation fees and travel expenses. This resulted in untrammelled competition between employers for workers, the loss of labour overheads through desertion and a consequent inflation of the wage level.

Before the installation of colonial rule throughout the region and the creation of an effective recruiting monopsony, numerous contemporary observers remarked that, even by the standards of industrialized western Europe, the wages paid to workers on the mines

---

1. ICE., evidence of C.S. Goldman, 115; Johns, 263. According to oral tradition collected by Martha Binford the theft of diamonds and gold amalgam was an important "pull" factor drawing workers to the mines, "Stalemate: a study in cultural dynamics" (PhD., Michigan State University, 1971), 86-87.

were high.[2] Basic African wages at Kimberley and on the Rand compared favourably with the wages paid to workers in Britain and Germany and were far higher than those paid to workers in countries like Ireland and Poland which were on the periphery of industrial Europe.[3] Mozambican workers were able to accumulate relatively large amounts of money before returning home. For a migrant employed in Kimberley in the 1880s these generally amounted to about £8 to £10[4] although larger cash savings were also reported, such as £27 after three years of employment in the Western Cape.[5] Wages repatriated from the Witwatersrand in the 1890s varied from £10 to over £20.[6] The Mozambican migrant's cash wage was augmented by theft and informal activities such as brewing, male prostitution and the investment of wages in goods which were then sold for a profit

---

2. W. Nelson, Masbro Advertizer 19 May 1877 in Africana Notes and News, XX, 5, 1973, p. 179; Milner to Chamberlain, 6 Dec., 1901 in the Milner Papers, ed., C. Headlam, II, 313. This point was forcefully made by the S.A. Mining Journal (24 Oct., 1891; 28 Jan., 1893) which complained that because of the black migrant workers productive base in the rural areas he, unlike his proletarianized European peer, only required a bachelor wage.

3. Pamela Horn, Labouring Life in the Victorian Countryside (London, 1976), 30, 119-23, 126; see especially Appendix G; John Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain 1887-1914 (Cambridge, 1963) 97-99; Ronald Blythe, Akenfield (London, 1969), 40-41; L.M. Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland (London, 1972), 137, 151-2, 160. Irish wages were as low as 1s to 1s6d per day in 1870 and wages of 10s for a working week of over 72 hours were not uncommon in areas like Oxfordshire and Suffolk in the 1890s. According to K. Hvidt, Flight to America (New York, 1975), 126, Danish farmhands in 1870 earned wages of approximately £1 per month. Compare this with peak wages of over £4 at Kimberley and £3.10s on the Rand. See also note 9 , p. 145.

4. SS 490 Lddrst. Lydenburg to Col. Sec., 25 Nov., 1880; SN 173 R179/83 native commissioner Spelonken to n.c. Zoutpansberg, 9 Oct., 1883. See also a report on the robbery of £102 from two Mozambicans after working in the Transvaal, Fernandes das Neves to GLM, 13 June 1882 in Moçambique 69, 1952, p. 90. These figures, as well as those in notes 5 and 6, refer to amounts stolen in robberies and, as the complainants may have carried money for friends, they can only be treated as very rough estimates.

5. CA: IAC - 1 Swellendam magistrate to contracting officer, 15 Feb., 1884.

6. CMAR, 1895, 69-70; Daniel da Cruz, Em terras de Gaza (Oporto, 1910), 308 ; Mouzinho, Moçambique, 147.

in his home area. By the 1890s wages paid in gold in the Transvaal were worth up to 30% more in Mozambique when exchanged against the inflated real. By international standards, migrant labour from areas independent of European control proved expensive to employers in various other ways. The existence of a migrant male labour force drew large numbers of men away from the mines and into domestic and other non-contracted forms of service and precluded the direct exploitation of the worker's family in ways similar to the 19th century west European model.[7]

The co-operation of the state was frequently sought by capital in its attempt to increase the numbers of African workers on the market without increasing the wage level. But the state only intervened in the labour market and then in a half-hearted and ephemeral way, during times of economic expansion, as in the Cape and Natal, or following the Jameson raid when capitalist grievances threatened the very structure of the Transvaal state. Pass laws aimed at restricting the movement of labour were poorly implemented and schemes involving state expenditure on the introduction of labour were either rejected or short-lived. On the Witwatersrand the Republican state did little, apart from its pass laws, to restrict the fratricidal tendencies of competitive capital.[8] At no stage in the 19th century did capital or the state, let alone in combination, attempt to control the African wage level through the implementation of a migratory form of labour movement.

Although workers were "pulled" to the market by competitive wages and "pushed" home by harsh industrial conditions and the iron discipline of the labour market, it was the viability of production in the rural areas that determined the degree to which men worked on their lands, engaged in petty commodity production, or accepted wage labour. As a result of the restriction on the labour supply caused by rural production, men who sought work in southern Africa offered their services on a "seller's market", which allowed them to command

---

7. Charles van Onselen notes that competitive wages paid to domestic servants inflated not only African mine wages but also the wage demands of white workers who employed domestics. Hence the attempts after the Anglo-Boer war to introduce European women who would release the large number of African domestic servants for mine labour, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, 2: New Nineveh, 6-22.

8. Marks and Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", 64.

correspondingly high wages and shape the timing and condition of their labour.[9] In order to understand why rural producers sought wage labour in southern Africa and why their movement onto the labour market took a migratory form, it is necessary to examine the changing structure of the social formation in the labour-sending areas. The second part of this thesis deals with the political, economic and social causes of labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland which was the earliest and most consistent supplier of Mozambican labour to South Africa.

9. For a comparative example of the high wages paid to migrant labourers because of their access to a viable rural means of production, see Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia: from the ninth to the nineteenth century (Princeton, 1961), 322, 401.

PART II

THE DELAGOA BAY HINTERLAND

MAP NO. 3. THE DELAGOA BAY HINTERLAND



SECTION ONE

Political Disruptions and Population Movements

INTRODUCTION

The Delagoa Bay hinterland, for the purposes of this thesis, covers approximately the former Portuguese administrative district of Lourenço Marques. It comprises an area of about 16 000 square kilometres which in the nineteenth century supported a population of roughly 80 000 to 120 000[1]. It is bordered in the west by the Lebombo mountains, which reach a plateau summit of about 1 500 feet and the Upper Pongola river, in the south by the Nkuzi river and St Lucia Bay and in the north by the Limpopo[2] and its tributary, the Olifants river. Together with the more southerly Nkomati[3] and its tributaries the Vanetzi and Massintonto, the Limpopo and Olifants rivers rise in the inland Highveld plateau, cut through the Lebombo mountains and meander through the wide alluvial valleys, reaching the sea to the north of Delagoa Bay. The central and southern area is drained by the lesser rivers, the Matolla, Umbeluzi and Tembe[4] and by the more important Maputo-Pongola.

During the nineteenth century the Delagoa Bay hinterland was occupied by a number of chiefdoms of varying size[5]. Each chiefdom was dominated by one specific clan whose members believed themselves to be consanguinially related. Various symbols reified the clan. Foremost of these was the institution of chieftaincy, for the chief as the direct descendant of the founding ancestors and as the senior member of the kin group, was the embodiment of

---

1. Anon. "Caminho de Ferro..." BSGL., 2, 1, 1880, p. 82; H.-A. Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 5; TA. SNA 168 NA 200/02 G.GM to Br. Consgen., 20 Aug. 1903.
2. Also known as the Crocidile, Bembe, Ouro, Uri, Meri and Inhampura river.
3. Umkomokazi, St Georges, Meti and Manice river.
4. The Matolla was also known as the Lourenço Marques river, the Umbeluzi as the Dundas river and the Tembe as the Espirito Santo or English river.
5. See appendix 2 for a list of the major chiefdoms and their military strength in 1894.

clan unity and the centre of its corporate identity. As one missionary expressed it, "take away the chief, break the tribe and the individual becomes more conscious of himself".[6] The chief administered justice, protected the army with his war medicines, interceded with the clan ancestors and generally regulated production strategies. He gave to his followers a sense of belonging by organizing various rites that were limited to clan members such as first fruit ceremonies and entry to the age regiments. Membership of the clan was expressed through the use of a common clan patronymic or shibongo by which an individual identified himself as a member of his chief's house. The cohesion of the clan was reinforced by marriage patterns which stressed clan endogomy and by milk taboos which excluded non-kin.[7] The differences between clans were accentuated by myths which accredited to each clan a separate area of origin and migration.

In a society with few labour-saving tools and marked by seasonal peaks in labour demand and in the absence of an ideology that regarded labour as a marketable commodity, land and capital goods were generally less important as factors of production than labour. Consequently a chief's productive capacity was largely dependent on his ability to attract followers who would cultivate his soil, look after his cattle, increase his military strength and make certain payments to him in labour and in kind.[8] By attracting manpower from outside his clan the chief was able to increase the amount of food produced under his supervision. But because of limited storage facilities, food had to be consumed quickly and it was the chief's capacity to distribute food and thereby to act as a hedge against the vagaries of nature, that discouraged segmentation and attracted further dependants. The power of a chief was measured not in terms of his accumulation of material goods but rather by his redistributive powers and his consequent ability to attract followers.[9] Thus the social formation

---

6. SMA513/b. A. Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Sept., 1894.
7. Junod, Life of a South African Tribe I, 253.
8. Ibid., II, 7.
9. Ibid., II, 6-7.

of the Delagoa Bay hinterland was marked by a high degree of geographical mobility. Because of extensive in-migration and out-migration no clan was of "pure" descent or occupied one contiguous territory and its material culture was constantly changing through cultural adaptation, borrowing and innovation.[10]

The most institutionalized form of dependence was for an in-migrating outsider to khondza or subjugate himself to a chief, through the payment of taxes, in return for access to a means of production.[11] However, while military and production strategies demanded that the political unit consist of more than the members of one clan, the clan remained the central focus of the chiefdom and, while it discriminated against outsiders, it provided for their gradual social incorporation through the ideology of agnatic descent.[12] Thus in the pre-colonial period the "nation" or tiko included all those people who professed fealty to the chief irrespective of their divergent kin backgrounds. The tiko or chiefdom was the "true national unit"[13] in which political identity was rooted and clan members who shared a common patronymic were often scattered amongst several chiefdoms. This "national" consciousness could be strong for, as one missionary lamented,

> "The sense of national spirit is much developed amongst the maKhossa (on the Inkomati river bend) and no-one conceives of the possibility of detaching himself from the rest of the people and thus abandoning all the national customs in order to become a Christian." [14]

People identified themselves as being from "the land of" the clan dominating a specific chiefdom. Thus a person from the area dominated by the Maputo clan might refer to himself in Tsonga and

---

10. Ibid, I, 358-59.

11. Ibid., I, 405, 433; II, 388.

12. Ibid., I, 356-440, see also 358-9; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 1891.

13. Grandjean, La Mission Suisse á la Baie de Delagao, 434; Idem, La Race Thonga, 34; Junod, Life I, 356; Junod, Cinquante ans aprés, 14-15.

14. SMA1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur l'oeuvre missionaire".

Zulu as va ka Tembe and aba kwa Tembe - of the land of Tembe, the founding ancestor of the Maputo clan. These terms of identification were also sometimes used by a particular corporate group whose members defined their political allegiance within the clan in terms of their real or putative descent from a junior branch of the line started by the founding ancestor. These "lineages" provided the political ideology for large-scale group segmentation from the clan and chiefdom. Thus a Maputo could also refer to himself as va ka Maputo (aba kwa Mabudu in Zulu), of the land of Maputo (Mabudu), the chief (1764-1782) who broke away from the senior house of the Tembe clan or as va ka Makasana (aba kwa Makasana), the grandson of Maputo, who ruled as chief of the clan from 1800 to 1854. In a similar way, people living in the lower Nkomati area occupied by the Mazwaya clan might refer to themselves in Tsonga as wa ka Makaneta or wa ka Maketshe, who was the grandfather of Makaneta.[15] The existence of these modes of identification explains why the Portuguese used terms such as "Catembe" or "Camfumo" to refer to specific geographical areas.

Neither the chiefdom, clan, lineage, homestead or household was organically unified by ties of kinship; they were highly fluid and processual institutions which provided for the incorporation of many refugees, immigrants and other peoples displaced by warfare, famine, soil exhaustion and contamination with death, disease and witchcraft.[16] "In-migration" was a rational means of exploiting the environment by moving from areas of low productivity and high mortality to more productive and safer areas. The number of rootless in-migrants, disadvantaged by their status as dependents, increased markedly during the second quarter of the nineteenth century as the effects of the mfecane broke onto the Delagoa Bay hinterland.

---

15. These terms were also used as polite forms of address by foreigners. JSA file 25, 260; file 74, 66; A. Delagorgue, Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe (Paris 1847), 462-3; KCL., Erskine Papers (4) misc. notes, n.d. approx. 1870-75; Junod, Life, II, 360-61. Doke and Vilakazi, Zulu dictionary ("kwa"); Sá Nogueira, Dicionário Ronga, ("ka").

16. SMA 497/D Paul Berthoud to Leresche 4 Feb., 1888; Idem., 497/E 11 Oct., 1888; Junod, Life I, 319; Idem., BaRonga, 121; Grandjean, Mission Romande, 34.

The severe dislocation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland caused by the Nguni incursions of the 1820s has been stressed as probably the single most important cause of early labour migration.[17] Yet a careful historical examination reveals that the Nguni disruption of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and the Gaza civil war of 1858-62 left Maputoland, the earliest and largest supplier of labour to Natal, almost unscathed. This indicates that political upheavals were less important in mobilizing workers than factors such as proximity to labour markets. However any study of the origins of migrant labour from the Delagoa Bay hinterland must start with the mfecane for this left the area sandwiched between the Zulu, Swazi and Gaza and resulted in an endemic instability which changed the demographic structure of much of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and loosened the ties of kinship and fealty that had restricted people's freedom of action; it also expanded people's horizons and swelled the number of rootless in-migrants and out-migrants. But most importantly for this study the forced migrations of the period were a prelude to labour migration.

---

17. Eduardo Noronho, Lourenço Marques e a África do Sul (Lisbon, 1895), 80; Antonio Rita-Ferreira, O Movimento Migratório de Trabalhadores entre Moçambique e a África do Sul (Lisbon, 1963), 13, 16, 38-42; D. Webster, "Migrant Labour, Social Formations and the Proletarianization of the Chopi of southern Mozambique", African Perspectives 1978/1, p161-163; S. Young, "Fertility and Famine: Women's Agriculture History in Southern Mozambique" in R. Palmer and N.Parsons (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty, p72.

Chapter 4

IMMIGRANTS AND EMIGRANTS:
The Delagoa Bay Hinterland to c. 1875

The Nguni Incursions to 1838

According to oral tradition, the first wave of displaced Nguni, the Maseko, under Ngwane passed peacefully through the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1818 and then travelled to the Zoutpansberg along watercourses linking the Highveld with the coast.[1] Portuguese sources however, recall the destruction of a whaling station outside Lourenço Marques and the killing of its manager in that year.[2] In 1821-22 Manukosi and Zwangendaba invaded the southern and central chiefdoms of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, extracted tribute from Lourenço Marques and took many cattle and women before pushing northwards to defeat Manyisa and settle in the fertile Bilene area on the lower Limpopo.[3] During this troubled period an attempt by the Portuguese and their Mafumo allies to prevent local chiefdoms from dealing directly with foreign ships resulted in the killing by Matolla of the governor, 45 of his soldiers, and the ravaging of Mafumo in February 1823.[4] The Portuguese at that time paid an annual sagwati to Matollo, the chiefdom straddling the northern and western trade routes out of Lourenço Marques, and to the Tembe who controlled the southern outlet for goods.[5] The Tembe established their supremacy in the area when they attacked and defeated a weakened Matolla and then killed the newly-installed governor of Lourenço Marques, subsequently replacing him with an administrator

---

1. A. Grandjean "L'Invasion des Zoulou dan le sud-est Africain", BSNG., XI, 1899, 71. But cf. G. Leisegang who believes Ngwana was the son of Ngoqwen and did not pass through the Delagoa Bay hinterland, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im Sudlichen Mozambique 1820-1895" (Ph.D., Cologne, 1967), 48, 52.

2. G. Theal (ed) RSEA, IX, 112-113; Gomes da Costa, Gaza 1897-1898 (Lisbon, 1899), 63; F. Toscano and J. Quintinha, A Derrocada do Imperio Vatua, p57. But cf. Naval Officer (W. Owen?) "Remarks on Delagoa Bay" South African Quarterly Journal, No11, 1830, 136 where it seems more likely to be Tembe.

3. Francisco Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs de Lourenço Marques: Repostas aos quesitos feitos pelo secretario dos negocios indigenas (Lourenço Marques, 1909), 52-3; Grandjean "L'Invasion". These two compilations of oral tradition do not tally. See also ADM 1/2269 Owen "Report on the Portuguese Settlements" 15 April 1823; Ibid.; Osborne "Description of the Peoples of Delagoa Bay, 28 September 1822". See also note 7, p. 154.

4. CO 48/62 no 76 W.H. Lijs to P. Brink 12 April 1824 encl. in Somerset to Bathurst, 22 April, 1824; ADM 1/69 Threlfall to Nourse 29

more amenable to Tembe wishes. But in order to prevent a Tembe monopoly the Maputo chief gave refuge to his brother-in-law, the Matolla chief, while mobilizing his army.[6]

The political instability of the period was worsened by the arrival of another Nguni group under Nxaba which was forced northwards by Manukosi. In 1825 Zwangendaba also moved northwards and Manukosi crossed the Nkomati to settle in the Ntimane areas for about a year. He then defeated the allied forces of Khosen and Rikotsho and settled next to the Masimichope River. These migrations caused a great upheaval throughout the Delagoa Bay hinterland, apart from Maputoland.[7]

Zulu expansion into the Delagoa Bay hinterland has been explained by Alan Smith and David Hedges in terms of the collapse of the Ndwandwe in 1819 and the subsequent success of the Zulu in capturing the trade route to Lourenço Marques.[8] By June 1824 British naval officers reported that all the chiefs on the northern side of the bay and southward to Zululand had recognized Shaka's overlordship; by September of 1825 Zulu rule stretched as far as the Limpopo.[9] Yet the extent and nature of Zulu suzerainty

---

April 1824; ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm., 19 June 1824.

5. ADM 1/69 Nourse to Adm. 5 Jan., 1823. FO 97/303 no 36. encl. Owen to Adm., 11 Oct., 1823.

6. ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm., 19 June 1824. H. Fynn, Diary 46, 47. Fynn's account of warfare is probably exaggerated. This section of his "diary" was written in the 1860s.

7. Threlfall Cape Monitor 9 July and 2 Aug., 1853; T. Boteler, Narrative of a voyage of discovery, I, 78-9, 86, 100, 104, 128. Vol II, 301-2; FO 97/303 Owen to GGM 10 May 1825, E. Noronho, O Distrito de Lourenço Marques 53. For oral tradition, see Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs 52-3, 85, 109; SMA 1760 Grandjean 16 Aug., 1890; Grandjean, La Mission 54-59; D. Fernandes das Neves, "Exploracao de Rio Bembe", BSGL 3, 6, 1882; H.A. Junod, Life I, 449, Gomes de Costa Gaza 1897-1898, 62. It has been impossible to verify these oral traditions. Their value lies in their impression of great geographical mobility and corresponding political upheaval.

8. A.K. Smith, "The Struggle for Control of southern Mozambique, 1720-1835" (Ph.D. UCLA., 1970). D.W. Hedges, "Trade and Politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries" (Ph. D., London, 1978).

9. ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm., 19 June 1824; FO 97/303 Report of Lt. Badgly 2 Sept., 1825; FO 97/303 Owen to Adm., 11 Oct., 1826.

during this period remains perplexing. This is partly because of the confused orthography and nomenclature used by coastal observers to describe the complicated movements of Zulu and refugee Ndwandwe groups in the interior.[10] What is still more confusing is the lack of any reference to a Zulu army of occupation before 1828 or to any extensive Zulu trading. Sagwati presentations made during this period entailed a good deal of reciprocity and did not necessarily imply a tributary relationship. Lourenço Marques for example, in exchange for tribute given to the Zulu, received both cattle to feed visiting whalers and ivory for trade purposes.[11] To view Zulu involvement in the Delagoa Bay hinterland in the early 1820s in terms of purposeful territorial expansion begs the question as to why the Ndwandwe did not move northwards and why the Zulu took five years to decide to move into the Delagoa Bay hinterland (1819-1824) at a time when new mercantile outlets were being developed on the Natal coast. Furthermore, if the Zulu moved northwards in order to guard Maputoland from the devastation of wandering refugee Nguni groups, why was the same policy not applied to Tembe, the northern-most point of the trade route to Lourenco Marques?[12] While the

---

10. Little distinction was made between the various Nguni speakers who were termed "Vatuas", a Portuguese term derived from the word ba-tua or ba-tsua, used by coastal peoples to refer to the San and Nguni whose languages contained clicks, Bryant Olden Times, 286; Junod, Life I, 18; C. Montez, "As Raças indigenas de Moçambique", Moçambique, 23, 1940, 65. Other generic terms were "Mapsitis", "MuNgoni" and "Olontontes". The word "Nyamboses" seems to have been synonymous with the term "Gazas", Webb and Wright, Stuart Archieve, II, 69.

11. ADM 1/2269 W. Owen "Report on the Portuguese Settlements", 15 April 1823; Antonio Jose Nobre, "A Guerra das Reis Vatuas" in F. Santana (ed.) Documentação avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, I, 225 (henceforth Documentação); Fynn, "History" in Bird, Annals, I, 63. Hedges' comment that Maputoland was "the great supplying country for Zululand" is an extrapolation of evidence presented by James Stuart's informant Bikwayo, which should only refer to Mpanda's reign, i.e. 1840-1860s. Evidence of "Ronga tribute bearers" in Zululand in 1824 and 1826 is similarly misleading as Isaac's reference could as easily be interpreted to mean ivory hunters or traders. Hedges, "Trade and Politics", 226, 233; N. Isaacs Travels and adventures in Eastern Africa, 59. For problems with the "Trade hypothesis" see pp 259-60, note 7.

12. But cf. evidence that Maputoland was stripped of cattle in the early 1820s, Fynn, Diary, 46; NA/ZGH. 708 Z288/87, Saunders, "Supplementary Report", 17 Nov., 1887.

trade hypothesis remains the most convincing reason for Zulu expansion into the Delagoa Bay area, it fails to explain why they moved north of the Bay.

It seems possible that Zwangendaba and Manukosi, like Mzilikazi, were sent northwards by Shaka, but subsequently decided to sever their ties with the Zulu king. This would account for the so-called "Zulu" presence in the northern Delagoa Bay hinterland during the early 1820s.[13] South of the Bay, the Maputo area was ecologically unsuited to Zulu colonization as it was disease and fever-stricken. Poor soils, a lack of ground water and extensive tsetse infestation moreover, prohibited the keeping of cattle on a large scale, and cattle were essential to the Zulu diet and bride-wealth system.[14]

Secondly, contemporary political intrigues played an important role in drawing the Zulu unwillingly into Maputoland. What initiated the direct intervention of the Zulu in Maputo affairs was the toppling of the Tembe chief Mayette, by the Maputo chief Makasana in late 1823 or early 1824. This would have placed the entire southern trade route between Zululand and Lourenço Marques in the hands of the Maputo and was no doubt an important reason for the Zulu King's decision to attack Makasana and reinstate Mayette as ruler of Tembe.[15] The first major Zulu invasion of the Delagoa Bay hinterland took place in 1828 due to Zulu opposition to the establishment of a Nguni state near enough to attract Zulu

---

13. G. Leisegang is of the opinion that Zulu power in the early 1820s was restricted to Mabudu and Tembe, "Dingane's Attack on Lourenco Marques in 1883" JAH 10, 4, 1969, 569-70. This could be the case if, when the visiting British naval officers referred to "Zulus", they included Zwangendaba and Manukosi, who lived north of Delagoa Bay. For evidence suggesting that when the two Ndwandwe leaders entered the Delagoa Bay hinterland they were in the service of the Zulu, cf. FO 97/303 Owen to Adm., 26 Oct., 1826; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 71; Nunes to GGM, 4 Oct., 1830 in Documentação, II, 221, 222. Cabral, Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indigenos do Districto de Inhambane (Lourenço Marques, 1910), 23. Yet elsewhere (Narrative I, 255) Owen was well aware as early as 1823 of the distinction between followers of Shaka and Zwangendaba.

14. A.T. Bryant, Olden Times, 336. NA. SGO III 1/2 Cowie to Moodie 26 July 1848, see also chapter 6.

15. Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive, 143, 152 evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza; Fynn, Diary, 46-7; Threlfall, Cape Monitor, 20 Aug., 1853.

secessionist groups. In order to entrench and perpetuate their political power and means of surplus extraction by expanding their Nguni following, the Gaza pursued a policy of enticing northwards Zulu, Swazi and Natal Nguni male and female immigrants by means of economic and political incentives; Zulu immigrants were given military commands and were presented with enough ivory or cattle to procure up to four wives.[16] Shortly after the Zulu defeat of the Ndwandwe in 1819, one of Shaka's generals, Ndengezi-mashumi, emigrated northwards to join Manukosi. The Zulu invasion was probably caused by the segmentation of another Shakan military chief in 1828, Hlangabeza ka Mabedhla, with his ama-Ntshali clan.[17] Before the Ntshali were able to reach Manukosi's headquarters, they were cut down by a pursuing Zulu army, whose mission included the subjugation of the area south of the Limpopo.[18] The results of the Zulu expedition were inconclusive[19] but on its return through the unhealthy Maputo lowlands the impi was decimated by the effects of malaria and famine before reaching Zululand in about September 1828.[20] Together with the coup d'etat that placed Dingane on the Zulu throne, this setback precluded further Zulu invasions of the area and limited Zulu power to the southern side of the Tembe River

---

16. D. Kruger and H. Pretorius (eds) Voortrekker Argiefstukke (Pretoria, 1937), 329; Gomes da Costa Gaza 1897-1898 p. 26; Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive II, 251; Harries, "Free and unfree labour", 319, n40; Montanha estimated that only 200 Nguni speakers accompanied Manukosi, "Viagem de ida, estada e volta dos Hollandezes da Republica Hollandeza Africana", ACU 1857, 331.

17. Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive I, 445, evidence of Bikwayo. p. 95 evidence of Dinya ka Zokozwayo. See also Ibid., III evidence of Mbovu, 45.

18. W. Bleek, The Natal Diaries ed. O.H. Spohr, 76; J. Gibson, The Story of the Zulus, 38. See also Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive, II, 61, 67n82, 163n24, 249-50

19. Ferrão, (Circumscripçoes, 85)gives victory to the Zulus. Toscana and Quintinha A Derrocada give victory to the Gaza. Grandjean, La Mission, 54, merely mentions that the Khosa paid tribute to the Shakan army.

20. Webb and Wright, James Stuart, I, 187, evidence of Jantshi. Gibson, The Story, 38. Fynn, Diary, 161; Grandjean "L'Invasion des Zoulou", 78.

for the next five years. The removal of the Zulu threat allowed Manukosi to settle in Bilene on the lower Limpopo and was followed by an expansion of Gaza power in alliance with local Portuguese mercantile interests.

In 1825 a Commercial Company was established at Lourenço Marques largely in order to thwart British imperial designs on the Bay. In return for bearing the costs of a Portuguese civilian presence, in effect that of a penal colony, the Company was given monopoly rights to the purchase of ivory and slaves.[21] This, however, removed the rights of the badly and irregularly paid garrison to its only source of steady income and led to a rapid deterioration in relations between state officials and Company traders.[22] Competition between the two interest groups following the appointment of governor Dinisio Ribeiro in September 1829 came to a head. Ribeiro used his position as the representative of the Portuguese colonial state to expand the territories held by Portugal around the Bay. In effect this amounted to the use of state violence, at Ribeiro's disposal, to extort slaves and ivory from the people with whom the Commercial Company traded.[23] In this Ribeiro's greatest advantage was his alliance with Manukosi, which was cemented by his access to government powder, troops and visiting ships.[24]

---

21. The monopoly of slave exports was constantly disputed. On the Commercial Company, see Lobato, Quatro Estudos para a história de Lourenço Marques, 123-8. On degredados, see Documentação, III, 317. Carvalho to GGM, 27 April 1830 20-1. "Relação dos presos..." 29 April 1830, 104-5. Carvalho to GLM, 30 April, 1830, 313. Cadaval to Paulo Miguel de Brito 20 Oct., 1830; Lobato, "Lourenço Marques em 1830", Studia, 1966, 27ff.

22. Documentação, III "Nove documentos relativos a irregularidades que seram cometidas em Lourenço Marques em Detrimento da Companhia Commercial, 1831". Doc., I. GLM-GGM 24 July 1832, p. 180. Boteler noted that in 1823 Lourenço Marques trade was entirely in the hands of the garrison, soldiers receiving 8 yards of cloth and 80 lbs of rice per month as wages, Narrative of a Voyage, 31.

23. A. Lobato, Quatro Estudos, 121, 123, 126.

24. Ibid., 122, 138.

In 1829 the governor of Lourenço Marques paid tribute to the Maputo and Manukosi and, more or less continuously, to the Zulu.[25] However, in that year an alliance of Portuguese, Mafumo and Gaza forces defeated Matolla and Mabota and initiated a trade blockade against Maputo. In the following year tribute was extorted from the Mazwaya, Xerinda and Matolla, payments made to the Zulu were cut drastically and in April 1833 tribute was extracted from the Nwamba.[26] It was probably this growth of Gaza power, in alliance with the garrison, and its threat to the Commercial Company and to Zulu trade with Lourenço Marques, that unleashed the Zulu invasion of 1833, by which time Dingane had consolidated his position at home and was able to continue Shaka's expansion northwards.

After an initial foray in July 1833, a Zulu-led army of about 6 000 soldiers appeared before Lourenço Marques, in October of that year.[27] Seven days after the sacking of the town and execution of the governor a Gaza attack on the Matolla allies of the Zulu was repulsed and it was probably due to this defeat, when combined with the crushing of the Portuguese garrison and their

---

25. Witworth to Nourse 29 April 1824 in RSEA, IX; Lt. E. Rogier "Notes on Owen Expedition" ms. in RGS; Documentação, 932, GLM-GGM., 1 April 1829; Fynn, Diary, 198.

26. Documentação, I, Nobre "A Guerra" pp. 223-4. Documentação, II, p. 439 Ribeiro to GGM., 30 Oct., 1830, p. 938. GGM to Duque de Cadaval, 1 June 1831; Documentação, III, p. 275. GLM to GGM, 5 May 1831, p. 276, GLM to GGM (May?) 1831; p. 218 GLM to GGM, 15 May 1831; p. 443 GLM to GGM, 29 July 1831; Ferrao, Circumscripçoẽs 53. Anon. to Cmdr., HMS Pelican 16 Jan., 1836, East Sussex Record Office, Lewes, see also UNISA/JC. H.A. Junod, "Les Causes de la Rebellion..." JSA. file 25 p. 259, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza. Documentação, I, 212, "Termo dos interragatórios...." April 1833. G. Liesegang, ("Dingane's Attack", pp. 571-72) interprets the above reference to a "King of the Vatuas" who aided Ribeiro against Moamba as Dingane. I interpret this as a reference to the continuing support of Ribeiro of Manukosi.

27. The army was composed of men from Maputo, Tembe, Matolla, Magaia, Shirinja and Moamba. AHU. Moçambique. Diversos caixa 2. Jose Maria dos Santos to GLM, 9 Dec., 1834. The Matolla later claimed to have killed Ribeiro. FO 63/1050 Delagoa Bay Statements of David Leslie enc. in Dean to Hammond 14 July 1873.

Mafumo allies that persuaded Manukosi to move north.[28] In May 1834 he straddled the route between Inhambane and Lourenço Marques and, after sacking Inhambane in October 1834, crossed the Save river to settle in Mosapa.[29] The removal of Ribeiro and Manukosi allowed the company to dominate trade at Lourenço Marques and ensured Zulu hegemony over the Bay. More than a decade of insecurity and turmoil dislodged many people from the Delagoa Bay hinterland and initiated/the emigration of coastal peoples into the interior. The Voortrekker leader, Louis Trigardt, met his first "Knobnose chief" near the upper reaches of the Groot Letaba in July 1836. A contemporary trekker report referred to these "knobnoses" as "defenceless and unwarlike people, always flying before their assailants... (and of whom) ...many perish from want."[30]

The years 1834/5 mark the apogee of Zulu power in the Delagoa Bay hinterland when Lourenço Marques and most of the chiefdoms south of the Nkomati paid tribute to Dingane. The following years saw the growing menace of the Trekker invasion culminate in the crushing defeat of Dingane at Bloodriver in 1838. This caused a sudden contraction of Zulu power with a resultant political vacuum

---

28. Nobre "A Guerra" p. 224; Lobato, Quatro Estudos p. 136 gives this date incorrectly as 20 November 1833.

29. AHU. Moçambique. Diversos caixa 2. GGM to MSMU, 18 Febr., 1835; AHU. Moç., Maço 1286. GLM to MSMU 30 Jan., 1840; Nobre "A Guerra" 225; Liesegang ("Beitrage" p54) gives the date of Manukosi's departure from the Delagoa Bay hinterland as 1834. In "Nguni immigrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi 1821-1839" Afr. Hist. Studs. 3, 3, 1970, 324, he gives the date as 1836. The former date is more probably due to the attack on Inhambane in Oct., 1834.

30. The term "Knobnose" derives from the prominent nasal cicatrisation practiced by many people living in the Delagoa Bay hinterland in the early 19th century. T.H. le Roux (ed), Die Dagboek van Louis Trigardt (Pretoria, 1964), 1, 189; J.G.S. Bronkhorst, in The Chase Papers, (ed), J.C. Chase, 72; B.H. Dicke, "The first Voortrekkers to the northern Transvaal", SAJS XXIII, 1926, 1012-1020. See also Jose Antonio Texèira, "Descripcao dos Rios da Bahia de Lourenco Marques" (Sept., 1838) in ACU, II, 1918, 64; Nobre, "A Guerra, 226. See also Webb and Wright, Stuart II. p143 Mahungane and Nkonuza.

in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[31] The way was open for Manukosi to return to the fertile Bilene area and, propelled by a smallpox epidemic in Mosapa and the need to punish dissidents, he did so in late 1838 or early 1839, with a following much reinforced by people speaking the Tsonga dialects from north of the Limpopo, as well as Shona speakers from Mosapa.[32]

Large Scale Emigration from the Central and Northern Delagoa Bay Hinterland

The return of Manukosi to the Limpopo-Shengane area, and his later move to Bilene, is remembered as a time of great devastation marked by much fighting and the flight of individuals and chiefdoms. Refugees tended to flee along existing trade routes flanking the two major eastward-flowing rivers in this area, the Olifants and the Limpopo-Levubu. As the land between these rivers was dry and inhospitable, coastal migrants entered the Transvaal in two major streams. The Nkuna, Mavundja and Tsungu chiefdoms were pushed southwards from the Limpopo-Shengane area, parts of the Nkuna following the Olifants river to settle under the Kaha who were at that time tributary to the Pedi.[33] The Mavundja with part of the Tsungu initially settled under the Swazi before moving to the Spelonken via the Buluberi area, between the Groot and Klein

---

31. To the south of Zululand, the decline in Zulu power after Blood river allowed the Pondo under Faku to move east of the Mzimvubu. Beinart, "Production and the material basis of chieftainship", in Marks and Atmore, op. cit., 131.

32. Grandjean, La Mission, 55-56; Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs, 53; A. Merensky, Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben, 82. The Massuits (Mapsitis) whom Liesegang mentions ("Ngoni Migration" p 322) threatening Inhambane in 1836 are probably the group mentioned by M. Reio (Indigenas de Moçambique, 22) as that of Mucisse who rebelled against Manukosi in Bilene while the latter was in Mosapa.

33. H.-A. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal" SAAS 3, 1905, 229-231, 237; Junod, Life I 17, 28. II 169, 584-586; Grandjean, La Mission, 59, 77; J. Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low-veld (London, 1929), 1170. J.D. Krige, "Traditional origins and tribal relationships of the Sotho of the northern Transvaal", Bantu Studies, XI, 1937, 347.

MAP NO. 4. AREAS WEST OF THE LEBOMBO MOUNTAINS SETTLED BY EAST COAST IMMIGRANTS



Letaba rivers which was under Modjadji.[34] Many people who lived in eastern Khosen-Bilene were displaced by an immigrant Mosapa group and fled to the area between the Sabie and Masinthonto rivers before moving to the Olifants-Limpopo region.[35] The Khosas were pushed into infertile areas in the west and later came to act as a buffer between the Gaza and the Swazi by their occupation of part of the chiefdom of Mabila. In the north, the Maluleke living on the Shengane-Soungoutane rivers, with some of the Boloyi chiefdoms, settled on the Nuanetsi-Nkomati river. Northern Hlengwe clans such as the Tshauke and Sono also migrated up the Limpopo. The Maluleke and some Hlengwe refugees settled on the Middle and Lower Levubu.[36] While some Baloyi returned to the northern Olifants-Limpopo area, others continued further south to settle under Modjadji in the Buluberi area and under Podile's Letswalo Narene in the Haernertsberg area, while still others filtered through to the Spelonken where they later settled under Albasini.[37] In the south, people from the Hlanganou area were pushed westwards over the Lebombos to settle on the northern fringe of the Drakensberg under various north-Sotho chiefs as well as other immigrant African and Boer communities.[38]

To Junod, the return of Manukosi to Bilene initiated a "general exodus" of the people who had lived between the Nkomati and Limpopo rivers.[39] To another missionary historian it unleashed

---

34. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 230-231.

35. Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 77-8; Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs, 82.

36. Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs, 110. TA. A.18. B.H. Dicke, "The Development of the Northern Transvaal"; Idem., "The Northern Transvaal Voortrekkers", SAAYB 1, 1941, 138-141. Cuenod ms. Henri Berthoud, "Voyage chez Gungunyane, 1891".

37. Grandjean, La Mission Romande, 60; J.D. Krige, "The Sotho of the northern Transvaal", 355.

38. UNISA. A. Nachtigal, "Beitrage zur Geschichter der Knopneuse" in Tagebuch, band 2, vol. I, 281; H. Raddatz, "Das Kaffernland des Untern Olifant", Petrm. Geogr. Mitteilungen, 1886, 53.

39. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", pp 229-231, 237. Grandjean, La Mission Romande, 59.

a "massive emigration" along the trade routes to the west. These people joined earlier emigrant groups pushed out by the Dlaminis and Khumalos or settled in malarial and tsetse infested valleys under chiefs like Ramapulane, Pafuri, Tshivase, Modjadji, Maale, Podile and Sekwati.[40] Although they often shifted their political allegiances, the coastal refugees were welcomed by these chiefs as dependants who paid them tribute in labour and in goods. Coming from a different ecological area, East Coast immigrants brought with them new sources of food such as fowls, crops like cassava, certain kinds of ground-nuts, various grain and potato strains and especially maize.[41] Immigrants were attached to homesteads as individuals or, as small groups under their own headmen, were scattered throughout the veld, colonizing those areas where human and animal diseases, poor soils and lack of water had previously restricted settlement.[42]

Manukosi's return south brought little peace to Lourenço Marques and in 1841 the Portuguese settlement came under attack.[43] It seems likely that this was part of Manukosi's strategy aimed at extracting tribute from a wider area, for the following year he raided for cattle as far west as the 29th degree, expelled the Nkuna from their shelter with the Pedi and threatened to attack Sekwati.[44] Manukosi went on to raid cattle from Boer settlers in the Lydenburg Republic but was obliged to negotiate an unfavourable peace with them in 1848.[45] As the victors of Dingane

---

40. UNISA. A. Nachtigal, "Beitrage zur Geschichter der Knopneuse", in Tagebuch, band 2, vol. I, 277-284, 237; Anon. "Altes und Neues..." BMB, 1863, 7; J.D. Krige, "The Sotho of the Northern Transvaal", 342-344, 47, 55-56; War Office, Native Tribes, 66.

41. E. Krige, The Realm of a Rainqueen, (Oxford, 1943), 45; Evidence of Edmund Mabyalane (Kurulen, 30 March 1979). See also p 282.

42. N.J. van Warmelo, A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa (Pretoria, 1935), 90; J. Krige, "Sotho of the northern Transvaal", 355; Paul Berthoud, Les Negres, 20; Nachtigal, "Geschichter der Knopneuse", 282.

43. Quintinha and Toscano A Derrocada, 57; E. Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 61.

44. SAAR, Transvaal I, pp 45, 88 to 91; Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 237; Junod, Life, II, 585.

45. H. Ward, The Cape and the Kaffirs, 177; Kruger and Pretorius (eds), Voortrekker Argiefstukke, 329.

and Mzilikatze and the friends of Mpande and Mswati, the Trekkers were a powerful new force in the Delagoa Bay area.

The attempt by various governors of Lourenço Marques to attract Boer settlers was frustrated at every turn by a protectionist Metropolitan government fearful that the Voortrekkers were the unwitting vanguard of British economic and political imperialism.[46] Without settlers, Lourenço Marques remained "little more than a fortified trading post" sandwiched between the Gaza, Swazi and Zulu empires.[47] The town, visited by five or six ships every year, lay at the mercy, as the Governor General mournfully stated, "of the blacks, who are already acquainted with our weaknesses and have hemmed us within the confines of the fort".[48] Portuguese power was dependent on the Lourenço Marques traders and their ability to attract allies from among the chiefs of the interior. Traders like João Albasini and Boda Cassimo in fact supplied the slave hunters and boats needed for the Portuguese to defeat the Mazwaya in 1843.[49] However, the threat of the firepower at the disposal of the traders was no surety against attack, for when Makasana intervened in a Tembe succession dispute in order to ensure the installation of his grandson, he laid siege to Lourenço Marques in June 1844, as did Manukosi four years later.[50]

---

46. TA. A344. GGM to GLM, 2 Nov., 1838; 18 May 1839, 16 June 1843, 20 Sept., 1843, 30 Oct., 1843, 16 April, 1844, 30 May 1844; SAAR, Transvaal no 3, p 350 GLM to Governo da Republica Africana, 1 May 1855, p 271; Ibid., 24 July 1854, pp 98-101, C. Potgieter to GLM, 6 Nov., 1854. B. van Tonder, "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere in die Transvaal en die Portuguese van Mosambiek tussen 1836-1839" (M.A. Pretoria, 1952); Ida Belo Carmona, "Relaçoẽs entre os Portugueses de Moçambique e os Boers", Moçambique, no. 85, 1950, p. 54, no 86, pp. 53-57, 61.

47. Roberto Theodorico da Costa e Silva, March 1857, cited in Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 71; Liesegang, "Dingane's attack", 567.

48. TA/A. 334. GLM to GGM, 20 Sept., 1843; GGM to MSMU 16 April 1844.

49. E. Noronho, Lourenço Marques, p 55.

50. Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs, 147; Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 58, 61; J.B. de Vaal, "Die Rol van João Albasini in die Geskiedenis van die Transvaal". SAAYB, I, 1953, 11; B. van Tonder, "Die Verhouding", 49. Gomes da Costa, Gaza 1897-1898, 63.

The Swazi raided the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1852, 1855 and 1858, mainly for children whom they exchanged with the Boers for cattle and horses and for their help in sheltering Swazi cattle from a Zulu attack in 1854.[51] A further reason for the Swazi incursions was the wish to take advantage of civil unrest in Zululand to assert their control over the Lebombos, neutralize Matolla as a refuge for Mswati's enemies and consequently secure Swazi trade links with Lourenço Marques. The Swazi invasion of 1855 had succeeded in upsetting the balance of power in the Delagoa Bay hinterland for, following the incorporation of two Matolla sub-chiefdoms into Swaziland,[52] the Zulu, who claimed the Matolla as tribute-paying subjects, were drawn into the area. The area south of Delagoa Bay was relatively free of Zulu control during Makasana's lifetime when the Maputo were able to extract tribute as far south as the Mkuzi river, the northern border of Zululand.[53] However, following Makasana's death in 1853 or 1854, Zulu control over Maputoland was entrenched when his grandson Nozingili was presented with a wife and placed on the throne by Mpande.[54] Following the Zulu civil war of 1856, groups paying tribute to Cetewayo settled north of the Pongola and the Tsonga-speaking

---

51. FO 312/14 encl. 3 in mixed commission to Clarendon, 3 Dec., 1858; "The hunting journal of Robert B. Struthers, 3 Feb., 1856"; A. Merensky, BMB, 1860, 267-68; Idem., "Tagebuch der Reise", BMB, 1861, 172; Webb and Wright, James Stuart I, 150, evidence of Giba; III, evidence of Mnkonkoni; Bryant, Olden Times, 329-330; P. Bonner, "The Rise, Consolidation and Disintegration of Dlamini power in Swaziland between 1820 and 1889" (PhD., London, 1978), 88-90.

52. P. Bonner, "Dlamini power", 90-92.

53. P. Kirby (ed) Andrew Smith and Natal, 76; BPP. 1890. C. 6200 Zambili to Natal SNA 1 March 1889. Natal SNA to Zambili 1 March 1889. See also Bryant Olden Times, 284; A. Delegorgue, Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe, 462; E. Krige and W. Felgate, "An ecological survey of the TembeThonga", p 10; Junod, "Tembe", BSNG, 1895, 123; JSA file 25 p 255 Mahungane and Nkonuza. Ferrao, Circumscripçoẽs, 149-150.

54. NA.SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA 28 July 1871; JSA file 25, p 255, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 1897; Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs, 148. Nozingili was a son of Makasana's deceased son Hluma, by a junior wife. His adversary, Makasanyana, was the son of Hluma's great wife by a leviratical marriage.

chiefdoms south of Lake Kosi became increasingly independent of the Maputo.[55] A further extension of Zulu power into the Delagoa Bay hinterland occurred in 1854 when Mpande sent an emissary to Lourenço Marques to secure the succession to the Matolla chieftaincy of his favourite. When the Portuguese, who also claimed tribute from the Matolla, attempted to intervene in this dispute, Mpande threatened both to aid an attack on Lourenço Marques and to invade Matollaland. These plans were only defused by the intervention of Sir George Grey on behalf of the Portuguese and by the eventual installation of the Zulu favourite.[56]

Despite this direct involvement by the Zulu in the politics of the Matolla, sovereignty over the chiefdom remained disputed. James Stuart's informants, when referring to the 1850s and 1860s, remembered Matolla as a Portuguese dependency, while others remembered the northern chiefdoms as tributary to Manukosi.[57] Thus it would seem that Zulu influence in the 1840s and 1850s was largely restricted to the Maputo and Tembe chiefdoms which occupied the trade route from Zululand to Lourenço Marques.[58]

To the north of the Bay, the Shimoy war of 1855 was initiated by Manukosi's attack on the Rikotsho, Khosen and Baloyi chiefdoms which had allied themselves with the Boers. Ohrigstad had been established when A.H. Potgieter was given permission by the Governor of Lourenço Marques in 1845 to found a settlement five days from Delagoa Bay.[59] The Boers had then extended eastwards looking

---

55. NA.CSO 682.472/79 R. Magis. Durban to Col. Sec. 27 Nov., 1878 JSA file 25 p. 255. Manhungane and Nkonuza. On the relationship between the Mkuzi River-Kosi Bay people and the Maputo, see BPP 1890 c.-6200 Saunders to Osborn 21 Sept., 1889; Leslie, Amongst the Amatongas, 257; Bryant, Olden Times, 286; NA/ZGH 736.3233/91 Minute 13 March 1891. Res. Comm. Zululand; Delegorgue Voyage, 440; Krige and Felgate, "Ecological Survey", 11-12, 16, 25.

56. CA.GH 28 no. 29 Co to Lt. Gov. 6 March 1856 and enclosures; "Hunting journal of Robert Struthers", 6 July 1855; FO 63/1049 Keate to Barkly, 17 Dec., 1871; Noronha Lourenço Marques, 46.

57. JSA file 25 p. 259. Mahungane and Nkonuza; Ferrão Circumscripçoẽs, 83, 85.

58. AHU. Sa da Bandeira papers. maco 2 "Mappa Nominal dos Naçoẽs vizinhas do districto de Lourenço Marques" quoted in Liesegang, "Beiträge", 66; Thomas Baines, The Gold Regions, 10; "Hunting journal of Robert Struthers", 11 July 1855; Delagorque, Voyage, 462-3; JSA file 25 p 255, file 72 p 137, Mahungane and Nkonuza.

59. TA. ABB. Albasini to GLM, 24 July 1859; Luis Martins, "João Albasini e a Colônia de St Luis", in Pelo Império, no 126, 1957, 64.

for game and raiding for tribute and slaves. Maswati had recognized the threat posed by the Boers and had proposed an alliance with Manukosi in 1849.[60] This had been rejected and by the late 1850s, largely due to metropolitan Portugal's unwillingness to delimit its claims to the interior, the Boers were able to kidnap children as slaves and extort payments from the Nwamba who lived 25 miles from Lourenço Marques.[61] In order to prevent this encroachment Manukosi attacked a number of chiefdoms which had allied themselves with the Boers and, fearing that Lourenço Marques had also allied itself with the Boers, the Gaza king pillaged the town's merchants' supplies of ivory and trade goods and attacked the fort in 1856.[62] The war ended in 1857 when Manukosi signed a peace treaty with the Governor of Lourenço Marques and agreed to pay a heavy reparation to the Trekkers who had routed his forces in a battle near the confluence of the Singwedzi and Limpopo rivers. But the Boer menace continued and Manukosi threatened to invade the Transvaal in 1858 in order to recover stolen cattle and to free Nwamba from the Boers.[63]

When the Gaza king died in 1858, Lourenço Marques and its allies expanded their area of tribute collection. This process had first started in 1850 when chief Assane of Mafumo refused to attack the Nwamba and instead killed his pro-Portuguese leading general. The Portuguese had then succeeded in deporting Assane to Mozambique

---

60. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 232; SAAR Transvaal I 103, 110.

61. MNE. Direcção dos Consulados. maço 23 GGM to MNE 4 May 1860; TA/ABB. Albasini to GGM 24 July 1859; Webb and Wright, Stuart Archive. I, p 150. A treaty entered into in 1848 by the GLM marking the border between the Portuguese and Boer settlements was repudiated by the metropolitan government, TA. A.334. GGM to GLM, 16 Oct., 1848.

62. Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 61-62; "Hunting journal of Robert Struthers", 30 June 1855; Liesegang, "Beitrage", 65; Gomes da Costa, Gaza 1897-1898, 63; Augusto Cabral, Raças, Usos, 27.

63. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 232; Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 62; St. V. Erskine, "Route map of the Gaza country" published by Conseil de la Mission Romande (n.d.). TA/SS.21 R2230/50 Du Toit to State Pres. 9 Aug., 1858; De Vaal, "João Albasini", 48.

Island, and had installed Machaquene, the chief of a minor house, as the Mafumo regent.[64] In 1859 Machaquene led a combined Portuguese, Mafumo and Shirindja force against the Mazwaya, many of whom sought refuge in the north and whose chief, Kobete, was deposed in favour of his brother Mapunga.[65] But Machaquene was to achieve his major distinction during the Gaza civil war.[66]

Following Manukosi's death in 1858 Mawewe, the eldest son of his principal wife, was installed as king and several of his brothers were obliged to flee north of the Zambezi with their followers. Umzila, an elder son by a minor wife, fled westwards and settled alongside a trading depot on one of the major routes to Delagoa Bay, where he fell under the protection of João Albasini.[67] The latter was a hunter-trader who in 1857 had moved out of Schoemansdal in order to consolidate his hold over both those followers who had accompanied him from the Delagoa Bay hinterland and an increasing number of refugees, all of whom lived on his farm on the upper Levubu river. Although many of those who sought Albasini's protection were Venda-speaking refugees from the chiefdoms living in the mountains north of the Levubu river, the great majority were Tsonga-speakers displaced from their home areas east of the Lebombos.[68] Umzila was thus one of several chiefs who were to seek refuge with Albasini and whose followers swelled his power and prestige.

Mawewe was prepared to pay handsomely for Umzila's repatriation, but this was precluded by the weak and divided nature of the Boer society in the Zoutpansberg. Instead of securing the surrender of

---

64. Junod, "BaRonga", 10, 135; UNISA/JC., H.A. Junod, "Les causes de la rebellion dans le district de Lourenço Marques", 21 Oct., 1896. Junod's oral evidence confuses Assane with his son Amule who was a minor at the time of his father's expatriation.

65. Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 55; E. Torre de Valle, Diccionário Shironga-Portuguez, (Lourenço Marques, 1906), 46; UNISA/JC H.A. Junod, "Les Causes...."

66. The political history of the Gaza civil war has been examined in some detail by G. Liesegang, "Beitrage", 74-84; De Vaal, "João Albasini", 57-63; P. Bonner, "Dlamini power", 195-204.

67. Dicke, "First Voortrekkers", 1016.

68. OT., Edmund Mabyalane, Kurulen, 17 Feb., 1881

Umzila, through his dealings with various Boer and Portuguese groups claiming to represent the Transvaal government, Mawewe was subjected to numerous fraudulent extortions.[69] This caused him to close Gazaland to Transvaal hunters in January 1861, a move that made Umzila's position in the Zoutpansberg untenable. Threatened by hostile factions in the Transvaal and with growing signs of support for his cause in Gazaland, he recrossed the Lebombos in October 1861.

In Gazaland, Mawewe's marriage to a Swazi princess in 1861 led him to raid several tributary chiefdoms for brideprice cattle, and due to a severe famine and cattle epizootic he was obliged to extort ever-increasing amounts of food from people in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[70] Mawewe's exactions increased the precariousness of a life already made difficult by ecological upsets. His marauding sullied his popularity and caused many refugees to flee across the Lebombos, including a large part of the Khosa population which moved westwards into Mabila and displaced part of the local population which sought refuge in the pro-Mawewe chieftaincy of Nwamba.[71] For these reasons the Khosa were quick to support Umzila, as were the Lourenço Marques residents and their Mafumo allies under Machaquene who were severely hindered by the restrictions that Mawewe had placed on hunting and trading.[72] The Portuguese were influenced in their support for Umzila by Albasini's plans for a common front with the Zoutpansberg Boers against Mawewe[73] and perhaps even more so by the commercial overtures that Mawewe had made to the British in Natal.[74] These overtures had

---

69. NA.SNA. 1.6.2 "Statement of Unkunhlana..." 5 Oct., 1859; NA. SNA. 1/1/10 "Statement of Mabulawa, 12 January 1860".

70. Fernandes das Neves, A hunting expedition to the Transvaal, (London, 1879), 116, 122, 254.

71. Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 83.

72. AHU. Moc.,CG., pasta 18, João Tavares Almeida to MSMU, 2 Sept., 1861.

73. TA.SS.R4322/61 Albasini to State President 29 March 1861; R4325/61 Albasini to State President 30 March 1861; TA.ABB Albasini to GLM 23 May 1861. Albasini to Paiva de Raposo 21 March 1862; Albasini to GLM 7 April 1862.

74. NA.SNA 1/6/2 "Statement of Umkunhlana", 5 Oct., 1859; SNA 1/1/10 Statement of Mabulawa, 12 Jan., 1860; 1/1/12 Sanderson to SNA 8 Sept., 1862; 1/6/2 Statement of Ukundhleni and Uhayi, 21 Oct., 1862. See also p. 178.

brought a number of schooners up the coast which threatened the monopolistic position of the Lourenço Marques traders and caused the British to annex Inyak and Elephant Islands, on the southern side of Delagoa Bay in November 1861.[75] Umzila's other ally was Matolla which, because of its geographical position, had close trading links with Lourenço Marques and whose sovereignty was threatened by the marriage alliance between Mswati and Mawewe.

On 27 November 1861 an army sent by Mawewe to prevent Umzila from reaching Lourenço Marques was beaten at Bolouanine in Matolla. On reaching the settlement, Umzila was provided with more than 2 000 guns and 50 000 cartridges by the Lourenço Marques traders and the support of their hunters and several thousand auxiliaries drawn from the Mazwaya, Mabota, Matolla and Tembe chiefdoms under the Mafumo army chief Machaquene.[76] In return Umzila agreed to make tributary to Lourenço Marques, various chiefdoms situated between the settlement and the Nkomati river and to remove all restrictions on Lourenço Marques hunters and traders.[77] With this support Umzila was able to defeat Mawewe for a second time on 16 December at a battle in which the latter's allies, Nwamba and Mabila, were decimated. But after being reinforced by a Swazi army, Mawewe returned in February 1862 to defeat and dislodge Umzila from Bilene, scatter the Khosa throughout the dry Baloyi area to the north and raid the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[78] Umzila fled northwards, harried by Mawewe and hunger, to the Chiguaraguara area, north-east of the Limpopo bend, where he regrouped his shattered forces before pushing on to Mosapa. Here Mawewe's pursuing army, much depleted by the effects of famine

---

75. KCL. Alexander Anderson Papers "Gun Running at Port Natal"; FO 63/1046 Portuguese legation, London to FO, 22 May 1863. See also TA. ABB Albasini to GGM, 9 Dec., 1861.

76. Onofre Lourenço de Andrade, O Presídio de Lourenço Marques no periodo....1859 a 1865 (Lisbon, 1867), 19, 26-28; TA.SS 45 9/62 Albasini to Schoeman, 8 Jan., 1862.

77. BO. 12. 22 March 1862; BO. 23. 21 June 1872. "Condiçoẽs impostas pelo governador do districts de Lourenço Marques...as regulo Muzilla, 2 Dec., 1861", a translation of this treaty is in FO 84/2142 Marques de Soveral to FO, 4 Jan., 1891, encl. no 1; TA.ABB Albasini to GLM, 22 Dec., 1862.

78. Neves, A Hunting Expedition, 243; Bonner, "Dlamini Power", 200-201.

and smallpox, was routed in mid-1862 and, fleeing south, was finally crushed in Nwambaland in August 1862. With Umzila hunting down his defeated enemies, people fled from Nwambaland to Swaziland and the Transvaal[79] while another of Manukosi's sons, Sihono, fled north to the Shire with his followers.[80]

The civil war, when combined with the famine, cattle epizootic and the smallpox epidemic raging through the area, shattered the economy of the northern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland. Hunting and trading were suspended, enormous numbers of cattle died or were lost to the Swazi and crops either failed to materialize, were burnt or left unharvested.[81] However the war did not end with Mawewe's flight to Swaziland, for in 1863, and almost each following winter, armies swept out of northern Swaziland to devastate the central and northern Delagoa Bay hinterland.[82] Umzila, threatened by the Swazi and divided from his southern marshes by the Mbethe famine, vacated Khosen and the chiefdoms to the south of the Nkomati and moved the administrative centre of his kingdom north of the Save river to Mosapa. Bogota who had been chief of the Gaza provinces south of the Limpopo before Umzila's accession to power was reduced to a small sub-chief living about 260 miles north-west of Inhambane while Manjobo was entrusted with the populous Bilene area on the lower Limpopo which became the southern border of the Gaza empire and the buffer against the Swazi.[83]

The retreat of the Gaza to the area north of the Limpopo and Olifants rivers left the central and northern Delagoa Bay hinterland open to the Swazi who were able both to secure their access to

---

79. AHU Moç. CG past 19. GLM to GG., 13 Aug., 1862 in GG to MSMU 14 Oct., 1862; ABB. Albasini to GLM 2 April 1862; H. Merensky Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben, 90.

80. Cuenod papers. Henri Berthoud, notebook 4.

81. See pp 223-224.

82. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga", 234-235; Idem., Life I, 472; Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low-veld, 170; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 1899.

83. ABM:ABC.15 4 col. 12 Richards to Mann, 4 Jan., 1882.

Lourenço Marques through Matolla and to extort tribute from the settlement.[84] The Swazi raids, and the civil war that had preceded them, caused large numbers of people to flee westwards into the Transvaal.[85] The Hlanganou moved into the mountains of the Lydenburg district while those remaining were forced to lead a hunter-gatherer existence.[86] Many Khosa sought refuge with Albasini, while others moved into the thinly-populated northern plains where they were still to be found in 1881.[87]

Albasini competed with the surrounding chiefs in his attempt to attract displaced people, many of whom were refugees from the civil war and other political disturbances to the east of the Zoutpansberg. This he did by offering them access to both land and, in contrast to many other chiefs who incorporated refugees, by allowing them to retain their clan-names, material culture and chiefs and by offering them the possibility of rapid advancement in his service as hunters, traders and tax-collecting "soldiers".[88] Like several Venda-speaking petty chiefs, his followers were mainly Tsonga-speaking; but they were a conglomeration of various clans, had no links with other coastal refugees and did not refrain from attacking immigrant Nkuna and Maluleke chiefdoms as well as chiefs

---

84. Fernandes das Neves, "Exploração do Rio Bembe", BSGL., 3, 6, 1882, 343. In 1863 a Swazi army laid seige to Lourenço Marques and five years later another army camped "within pistol shot" of the settlement. BO. 47, 1870, 196; BO. 12, 1871, 52; Bonner, "Dlamini power", 251.

85. ACU. 1866, Report of governor of Inhambane for 1864; BO. 21, 27 May 1865; Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 63; BO. 41, 14 Oct., 1866; AHU Moç., CG., pasta 25, GLM to CG, 9 Feb., 1867; Idem., 22 Feb. and 25 Feb., 1867; Bonner, "Dlamini power", 251; War office, Native Tribes, 65-66;Nachtigal, Tagebuch, 280. Grandjean thought the Swazi raids of 1861-78 responsible for "the dispersion of the Tonga clans", SMA 514/A Grandjean to Leresche, 27 May 1895; OT., Edmund Mabyalane, Kurulen, 30 March, 1979.

86. Van Warmelo, Preliminary Survey, 91; Nachtigal, Tagebuch; Stevenson-Hamilton, 172.

87. SMA 467 Grandjean; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 80-86.

88. Grandjean, La Mission, 60; Stayt, The BaVenda, 136; OT., Chief Chevane (14 April 1979, Ribola); Nqcapu and Lucas Siweya (16 April 1979); Headman Maswanganyi (8 April 1979).

like Magato and Modjadji, who had given asylum to many Tsonga-speakers.[89] Albasini presided over a shifting population, the size of which depended upon his fluctuating fortunes. Thus at the height of his power, when after the fall of Schoemansdal he came to represent the Boer presence in the Zoutpansberg, he drew Tsonga-speaking followers both from the coast and from refugees settled under local chiefs. As his power declined in the 1870s, many of these people deserted him for wealthier masters.[90] Albasini was merely one of many chiefs living in the north and eastern Transvaal who was willing and able to offer a home to large numbers of Tsonga-speaking followers.[91]

Within the wide and constantly shifting diaspora of coastal immigrants and their descendants, four semi-independent clusterings, generally under their own chiefs, had begun to crystallize by the 1860s. Those on the middle and lower Levubu, mainly of the Maluleke clan, frequently paid tribute to Umzila.[92] Those living in the Spelonken and on the left bank of the upper Levubu accepted the overlordship of Albasini and his chiefs who were responsible for the maintenance of the north-eastern frontier. The other major Tsonga-speaking groups, largely composed of

---

89. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 235, 238; B.H. Dicke, The Bush Speaks, 24-26; Evidence of Edmund Mabyalane (Kurulen, 17 Feb., 1981); De Vaal, "João Albasini", 71, 83-84, 98; H.W. Grimsel, "Onluste in Modjadjiland 1890-94", SAAYB, 1955, II; Van Warmelo, Preliminary Survey, 91; War Office, Native Tribes, 66.

90. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 235; TA. SN.1.A Oscar Dahl, "Estimate of Able-bodied men in Zoutpansberg"; Grandjean, La Mission, 60; OT., O.I. Miyen, (Elim, 18 Feb., 1981).

91. TA. SN.1 Oscar Dahl, "Estimate of able bodied armed men" and SN. 2 "Report of (sic) the chiefs and population in the northern part of the District of Zoutpansberg". On whereabouts of dispersed settlements of Tsonga-speakers, cf. SN.1a. Lydenburg, ass.N. Comm. to Clarke, 31 May 1879. P. Berthoud, Lettres Missionaries, 426, 447; R. Wessman, The BaVenda of the Spelonken, 54; Transvaal Native Affairs Dept. Report, 1905, 60; T.S. van Rooyen, "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Oos Transvaal tot 1882", SAAYB, (1951), II, 190.

92. St. V. Erskine, "To the Limpopo mouth and back", 1868, ms. in RGS, p. 27; SS 1240.R3129/86 encl. in native commissioner Spelonken to Supt. natives, 24 Aug, 1886; SSa 5, RA 71/94 Portuguese Consul to SS, 10 June, 1891; SSa 6, Native Commissioner Spelonken to Supt. Natives, 22 July 1891; also declarations of Klopper, Mashilahushe in Schiel to Supt. Natives, 9 Aug., 1891; SS 365, R6802/92, Cmdt. General and Supt. of Natives to delegation from Gungunyana, August 1892; H.A. Junod, "Les Baronga", BSNG (1897), 94; G. Liengme, "Le Suicide", BSNG, (1895), 178.

members of the Baloyi and Nkuna clans, congregated under the Lovedu and Kaha chiefs Modjadji and Maale, and lived on the edge of the Highveld.[93] Smaller settlements, many of whose members claimed Hlangaan origin, developed to the south of the Olifants river around the Pedi and immigrant Boers in the Ohrigstand river valley.[94] These communities constantly drew people from east of the Lebombos.

Thus by the 1860s the widespread social dislocation suffered by the peoples of the northern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland had resulted in large-scale in-migration and the emergence of a strong tradition of westerly emigration.

The Southern Delagoa Bay Hinterland: African Politics and Imperial Rivalries

The Swazi raids which were so influential in pushing people westwards from the Delagoa Bay hinterland only ceased in the late 1870s following dynastic disputes in Swaziland and the re-emergence of Zulu power in the south. The resurgence of Zulu power in the area followed the stabilization of Zulu politics once Cetewayo had secured his hold over the Zulu royal house. Of equal importance was the securing by the Maputo of a marriage alliance with the Swazi, which allowed them to pursue an aggressive policy of territorial aggrandizement. This drew the Zulu northwards as it threatened their control of the trade route running through the southern Delagoa Bay hinterland.[95]

The Portuguese presence in the area remained weak and divided. Inhambane, which had supported Mawewe during the civil war and had sheltered some of his chiefs after their defeat by Umzila, remained in a beleaguered position for almost the next thirty years.[96] With Umzila's retreat north of the Limpopo, Lourenço Marques was deprived of its most powerful ally and its power stretched little further than the range of its cannon.

---

93. Anon. "Altes und Neues..." BMB, 1863, p. 7; SN.1A. Oscar Dahl, "Estimate of able bodied armed men."

94. H. Ward, The Cape and the Kaffirs, 177; H. Raddatz, "Das Kaffernland", p. 53 and especially map entitled "Das Untere Olifantbecken".

95. See Chapter 5, p.190, notes 32, 33.

96. AHU. CG. Pasta 21. GG-MSMU 8 Aug., 1863; GG to District gov., 11 June 1863 in BO., 19 Sept., 1863; ACU, 1866, Rep. of GInh for 1863, pp 39-40; Cabral, Raças, Usos, 27-29. See also Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 63; GH 837 Br. Cons. to Sec. State for foreign affairs, 4 July 1886.

The settlement thus lay at the mercy of the Swazi and its population was considered ungovernable;[97] the soldiers who constituted the garrison were generally illiterate and poorly trained and armed. Most were degredados or Angolans who had been unwillingly pressed into the army and at best they were paid sporadically and then often in trade goods. The civilian population was made up of slaves, degredados and a handful of rapacious and impermanent traders drawn largely from Portuguese and British India.[98] Portuguese officials certainly had no power either to encourage or to control the flow of labour from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, a flow that began as a trickle in the late 1850s.

The Portuguese were only able to extend their political influence over the Delagoa Bay hinterland by involving themselves in dynastic politics and by taking sides in local disputes, in which their strategy was to supply their allies with arms and impose trade blockades on their enemies.[99] Portugal's position at Lourenço Marques remained precarious and her policy of backing one chief against another threatened at times to backfire.

In 1867, Assane, the exiled chief of Mafumo, was brought back to his country where he died later that year. The Portuguese then installed his son Amule as chief of Mafumo. But when Amule

---

97. Noronho, Augusto Castilho, 8-9.

98. João de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provinciais Ultramarinos (Lisbon, 1884), II 265-66, 276 . In 1857 the population of Lourenço Marques stood at 844 of whom 370 were slaves, 328 free Africans (of whom 86% were women and children under 10 years old), 44 Asiatics (mainly Catholics, Banians and Moslems) and 82 Europeans of whom 55 were soldiers. (BO. 46, 1857, 197). In 1861 the population of 936 was composed of, inter alia, 276 slaves, 92 soldiers, 55 merchants, 5 hawkers, 3 civil servants, 6 fishermen and 180 without fixed employment. By 1864 the population stood at 1 094, including 260 slaves, 751 Asiatics and free Africans and 83 Europeans, see Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 72, 192

99. David Leslie wrote in 1871 that "It appears that the governor of Lourenço Marques' way of making war is to pay one tribe to attack another and sometimes one tribe he agrees with takes his goods and then refuses to come out." SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA 9 Aug., 1871; Ibid., 24 Aug., 1871.

refused to supply the Portuguese with a contingent of men for military service in Angola, or elsewhere in Mozambique, he was attacked by a detachment of Portuguese troops and their African allies.[100] He then laid siege to Lourenço Marques and his forces were only driven off after hand-to-hand fighting. Amule then ravaged the country surrounding the settlement before taking his people and settling with the Nwamba. Hostilities continued until November 1869 when Amule was seized and exiled to Mozambique Island.[101]

To the south of Lourenço Marques Maputo emerged as a major power when, following the death of Mawewe's father-in-law, Mswati, in August 1865, the focus of Swazi military operations began to shift from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to the northern and eastern Transvaal.[102] Having secured a marriage alliance with the Swazi and, having been furnished with arms by the Portuguese intent on chastising the Tembe for their refusal to supply Lourenço Marques with labourers, the Maputo chief Nozingile (Missongue/Msongi) moved north of the Maputo river in August 1870.

After sustaining heavy losses the Tembe clan, of which Maputo was a junior house, was forced north of the Tembe river and in May 1871 sought refuge with the Portuguese.[103] In January 1872 the Maputo army stood before Lourenço Marques and, in order to stave

---

100. Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 56; FO.84/2224 British consul Delacour to FO., 4 April 1892. But cf. Junod whose information on Mfumo history during this period seems confused. Life, I 458 and UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes de la Rebellion...", letter to V. Rossel, 21 Oct., 1896.

101. BO., 18, 9 May 1868; BO. 49, 16 Oct., 1869; BO. 12, 25 March 1871; Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 9-12.

102. In 1866 the Swazi launched expeditions into the eastern Transvaal which embroiled them in a series of wars with, amongst others, the Pedi. A major expeditionary force was sent in alliance with Albasini to fight Magato and the campaigns against the Pedi continued until November 1879 when Sekhukhuni was overwhelmed by an Anglo-Swazi force. Bonner, "Dlamini power", 242 ff.; BO. 9, 1871, p 37; BO. 10, 1871, p 41.

103. FO 63/1050 Delagoa Bay statements of D. Leslie encl. in Dean to Hammond, 14 July 1873; Straker to Lt Gov., 21 Feb., 1872 encl. in Lt. Gov. to Kimberley, 18 March 1873; FO 84/2224 Delacour to FO. 4 April 1892; SMA 542/B Loze to Grandjean 3 Dec., 1897.

off an attack on the settlement, several merchants provided Nozingile with five headloads of goods in exchange for their cattle which had been pastured in Tembe. But at the same time the Portuguese armed their ally, chief Mapunga of the Mazwaya, whom Nozingile accused of stealing some of his ivory.[104] After invading Matolla, Nozingile attacked and inflicted heavy losses on the Mazwaya army near Lake Malangotibo.[105] These wars in the southern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland restricted the flow of labour emigrants as they required male labour power for military purposes and increased the dangers of the journey to Natal. According to Junod, writing twenty years later, they were also responsible for the "deep hostility (that) existed from then on amongst these different clans."[106]

The extension of Maputo power proved extremely embarrassing for Portugal as an imperial power. Moreover, an Anglo-Portuguese anti-slavery treaty of 1817 which recognized Portugal's suzerainty from Cape Delgado to Delagoa Bay, was imprecise as to which European nation had rights to the area south of the Bay. Britain's claims, first made in the 1820s,[107] were rejuvenated when, encouraged by Mawewe's hostility towards the Portuguese in Lourenço Marques and his desire to trade with Natal, a British naval vessel took possession of Inyak and Elephant Islands in November 1861.[108]

---

104. SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871, Ibid., 3 Sept., 1871; FO 63/1047 Erskine to Keate encl. in Keate to Kimberley, 12 Sept., 1971.

105. FO 63/1050 Leslie "Delagoa Bay Statements"; UNISA/JC, "Les Causes..."; Junod, "Tembe", BSNG, 1895, 124; Ferrão, Circumscripçoẽs, 150-151. But for Mazwaya victory cf. Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 66; Junod, Life, I, 475. The governor of Lourenço Marques merely stated that both sides had suffered heavy casualties and that the Maputo were obliged to retire, BO. 23, 8 June, 1872. Stuart's informants Mahungane and Nkonuza stressed that Matolo was only hlasela'd (invaded) and not cita'd (ravaged). This was possibly because the Matolo and Maputo were linked by marriage, see JSA, file 25, p 259.

106. UNISA/JC, Junod,"Les Causes...."

107. M. Jackson-Haight, European Powers and south-east Africa, 187-217, 223-4; RSEA, IX, 131-183; BPP 1875 c.-1361, Correspondence respecting claims of H.M. government to Delagoa Bay.

108. FO 97/318 Capt. Bickford to GLM, 5 Nov., 1861. The annexation of the two islands by Natal was gazetted in 1862, GH 1049 Straker to GLM, 25 Feb., 1870 encl. in Straker to Lt. Gov., 21 Feb., 1873. Vide n. 75.

The Portuguese replied to the formal annexation of the two islands in the following year by seizing a Natal coastal schooner.[109] Similar tactics, and the politics of attrition which followed, had proved successful in the 1820s but by the early 1870s the importance of the southern shore of Delagoa Bay had increased dramatically. Inyak Island was viewed as a good embarkation point for the maritime movement of migrant labour to Natal and by the mid-1870s Delagoa Bay was considered an important element in Carnarvon's federation scheme as its annexation would encircle Zululand and give Britain control over every port used by the Boer Republics.[110]

Natal's claims to Inyak reemerged when in March 1870 the Maputo chief Nozingile refused to sell the island to the Portuguese and instead allowed a party of Englishmen to settle there. Natal's position was further strengthened by Portugal's inability to occupy Inyak.[111] The only weapon that the Portuguese were able to employ against Maputo was that of a trade embargo, since their African allies were weak and vacillating in their support of the settlement. Thus it was from weakness that the Governor of Lourenço Marques turned to the Zulu for support.

Although Mpande had placed Nozingile on his throne and although the Maputo paid tribute to the Zulu,[112] relations between the two states had reached a low ebb during the late 1860s. The Zulu were opposed to Nozingile's marriage to the daughter of the Swazi king Mswati[113] and regarded any expansion of Maputo power over their tributary chiefdom of Tembe with suspicion as it weakened Zulu control over the trade route to Lourenço Marques. It was, furthermore, in the interest of the Zulu that the southern shore of Delagoa Bay be repopulated as the Tembe had traditionally provided Zulu porters

---

109. FO 97/318 Peel to Hammond, 13 March, 1862.

110. FO 63/1026 Elton to FO., 2 Oct., 1875; C.J. Uys, In the era of Shepstone, 141-149.

111. FO 63/1047 Ablett to Col. Sec., 3 Dec., 1870; Keate to Kimberley, 22 June, 1871; BO. 12, 25 March 1871; F. Da Costa Leal, Uma Viagem na África Austral, 42.

112. FO 63/1050 Leslie, "Delagoa Bay Statements"; F. Elton, Natal Mercury, 10 Oct., 1871; KCL. Mpande file, Lt. gov. Keate to High Commissioner, 17 Dec., 1871.

113. SNA 1/1/18 Kinsman to SNA, 21 Aug., 1868; A. Preston(ed) South African Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley 1879-1880, 47.

with food and shelter en route to Lourenço Marques.[114]

Another cause or symptom of hostility between Maputo and Zulu was the execution by Nozingile of Cetewayo's official messenger and his 16 companions, whom he had accused of fraud and deception.[115] Zululand's antipathy towards the Maputo was paralleled by a growing dependence on Lourenço Marques for the arms and ammunition needed to modernize the Zulu army. Thus as in the 1820s, it was the need to control the northern trade route that drew the Zulu into the Delagoa Bay hinterland and by the early 1870s both Portuguese and British observers agreed that the Portuguese presence at Lourenço Marques was contingent upon their alliance with the Zulu.[116]

Cetewayo ordered that Nozingile prohibit any permanent British settlement of Inyak and, with Zulu support, a Portuguese garrison temporarily occupied the island until 1872 when the question of suzerainty over southern Delagoa Bay, Inyak and Elephant Islands was submitted for arbitration to the French President.[117] Cetewayo also demanded that Nozingile pay him 408 headloads of goods as reparations for his unauthorized attack against the Tembe and called a halt to the Maputo advance against the Mazwaya.[118] In order to influence the outcome of the MacMahon award, Portugal felt compelled to occupy the southern shore of the Bay and in order to achieve this appealed to Cetewayo to intercede with Nozingile to bring about the resettlement of the area by the Tembe. A Zulu ambassador was then sent to Lourenço Marques to oversee the peaceful reoccupation of the area south of the Tembe river. This took place in May 1875 and in June the Tembe chief, although tributory to the Zulu, swore allegiance to Portugal.[119] In July the MacMahon award granted to Portugal the area south of

---

114. AHU. Moc., CG pasta 29. GLM to MSMU, 30 May, 1874.

115. Webb and Wright (eds) James Stuart Archive, I, 66, evidence of Bikwayo.

116. SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; idem., 14 Sept., 1871; BO 11, 1871, 46. See also page 185 , note 4.

117. GH 1049 Straker to Lt. gov., 21 Feb., 1873.

118. SNA 1/1/21 Lieslie to SNA, 3 Sept., 1871.

119. AHU. Moç., CG pasta 29. GLM to GG, 11 May 1875 encl. no 2 in GG to MSMU, 24 Jan, 1875; BO. 23, 5 June, 1875; BO. 25, 19 June 1875.

Delagoa Bay to 26°30', which included half the Maputo chiefdom. But Portugal's position in the Delagoa Bay hinterland remained dependent on the Zulu alliance, which in turn was secured by the unhindered flow of arms and ammunition through Lourenço Marques. In May 1875 the Governor of Lourenço Marques wrote despondently of

> "the district of Lourenço Marques, or speaking more correctly the Fort of the same name - because we do not really rule except up to the range of the ancient guns of our tumbledown ramparts... surrounded by more or less powerful chiefs in whose loyalty but little trust could be placed, peace has been preserved since 1868 with them through a miracle of equilibrium... in reality they live freely at their own good pleasure." 120

A few years later another governor referred to the district as "a national disgrace" while contemporary British travellers were even less enthusiastic about the results of Portuguese rule at Lourenço Marques.[121]

Tribute collected by the Portuguese from the villages in the Crown lands consisted mainly of a basket of millet or sorghum and rarely exceeded the taxes in kind paid by individual villages to their chiefs. This form of "hut tax" was considered by the Governor to be "more a sign of vassalage or feudality than a source of revenue for the state."[122] Furthermore, tribute in kind was paid irregularly and often entailed a fair amount of reciprocity in the form of government stipends and, although the

---

120. BO. 22 May 1875, GLM to GGM, 24 April 1875. Reprinted in Moçambique, Dec., 1951, no 68, p. 73. A translation exists in GH 837 encl. in Br. cons. to FO, 27 May 1875. See also AHU., Moç., CG. pasta 29 GLM to MSMU, 19 Jan, 1874.

121. João de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provinciais Ultramarinas, II, 267; St Vincent Erskine, "A Journey to Umzila's south-east Africa in 1871-1872", in JRGS, 1875, 48-9; FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; BPP. 1876 LXXIV, Cons. Rep. for Mozambique, 1875.

122. BO. 32. 6 Aug., 1877, Lourenço Marques District Report, June 1877; BO 11, 17 March 1879, Lourenço Marques district report for the financial year 1877-78; see also FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; Junod, "Les Baronga", 140.

Portuguese equated tribute payment with the recognition of vassalage, it did not prevent "tributary chiefdoms" from simultaneously recognizing the overlordship of one or more other suzerains.[123] Another form of tribute payment was made in labour for colonial military service, porterage and public works.

The structure of the Delagoa Bay social formation provided for the expatriation or sale of kinsmen who were considered deviants or dissident elements. Thus the labourers that vassal chiefs supplied to the Portuguese were drawn from their unwanted followers and chibalo labour and forced conscription provided the chiefs with a useful and profitable means of ridding themselves of "umtagatis (wizards), riff-raff, the overclever and agitators".[124] Much of the unrest in the Delagoa Bay hinterland was caused by this forced labour, for if Portuguese demands for labour became excessive, they cut into the labour power controlled by the chiefs.

The late 1870s mark a watershed in the history of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The MacMahon award guaranteed the Portuguese tenure of Lourenço Marques and, with a liberal government in power in Portugal, gave a new impetus to the development of the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[125] The regularization of migrant labour to various parts of South Africa increased the amount of sterling entering the area and commerce with the newly-discovered goldfields of the eastern Transvaal offered new sources of revenue to the customs house and to those engaged in porterage. The purchasing capacity of wages that were repatriated in sterling, the gun trade with the interior and experiments with vegetable oils drew traders to Lourenço Marques and gradually provided the revenue for a sound administration.

---

123. Seisal to Lytton, encl. "Case for the Portuguese government", 15 Sept., 1873 in Theal (ed) RSEA IX, 123-25; FO 63/1050 Leslie "Delagoa Bay Statements"; GH1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879; UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes..."; Noronho, Lourenco Marques, 53.

124. SNA 1/1/27 no. 55, R. du Bois to SNA 22 March 1876. In October 1875 all the chiefs of the Crown lands but one refused to supply the governor of Lourenço Marques with labour.

125. These included the draining of the swamp around Lourenço Marques and plans for a railway to the Transvaal. Noronho, Augusto Castilho, 12-3; S.E. Katzenellenbogen, South Africa and southern Mozambique, (Manchester, 1982), 12-20.

But the local need for labour rose proportionately with the economic development of the settlement and, as the Portuguese increasingly forced labour away from the higher wage markets in South Africa, the fragile alliance between the colonial state and the chiefs collapsed.

Chapter 5

THE COMMODITIZATION OF LABOUR AND THE BREAKDOWN OF THE LUSO-AFRICAN ALLIANCE

The favourable results of the MacMahon arbitration did not dispel Portuguese fears of Britain's intention to annex Delagoa Bay. These fears were fanned by the presence of the British anti-slavery squadron off the Mozambican coast and by the numerous scientific and missionary expeditions which were mounted by the British to explore parts of south-east Africa claimed by the Portuguese.[1] A major means of continuing British involvement in the Delagoa Bay area after the MacMahon award was presented by the movement of labourers to Natal and by the gun traffic between Lourenço Marques and the Zulu.

Political Developments in the Southern Delagoa Bay Hinterland

The sale of guns to the Zulu by John Dunn had been encouraged by Lt-governor Keate who in 1869-70 wished to bolster Cetewayo's power in order to stabilize Zulu politics, discourage Boer land-grabbing and secure Natal's northern frontier. But because of the political problems involved, the direct sale of guns to the Zulu was prohibited in June 1875 while their export to the Portuguese possessions north of Natal was not disallowed.[2] Fire-arms, which had previously been sold at Lourenço Marques almost entirely for hunting purposes and which had provided the settlement with the means to participate in the lucrative ivory trade[3] then became a major article of commerce and provided the settlement with much needed customs revenue. The political influence of the gun trade in cementing Zulu support for the Portuguese in the Delagoa Bay hinterland was not lost on the British. Frederic Elton observed

---

1. AHU. Moc., CG., pasta 30. GLM to GGM 16 Sept., 1876; MNE caixa 663 Duprat to MNE 3 Aug., 1876; AHU. Moc., CG., pasta 32 GLM to Conselheiro Director Geral do Ultramar 25 Dec., 1878.

2. GH 1052 Dunn to Lt. Gov., 21 Oct., 1878; MNE caixa 697 Walter Peace to MNE 17 June 1875; J.J. Guy, "A Note on Firearms in the Zulu kingdom", JAH, XII, 4, 1976; Idem., The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, 89, 97-8.

3. GH 29. no. 8. Howard to Clarendon, 25 Aug., 1856 in Clarendon to Scott, 4 Oct., 1856; GH 30 no 92. Marquis de Soulé to Howard, 20 April, 1857 - Howard to Clarendon, 22 April 1857; Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 15 June, 1854. The Lourenço Marques-Zulu gun trade is dealt with on pp. 300-302.

in 1875 that it was

> "in the interest of the Zulus not to interfere with the Portuguese trading station (at Lourenço Marques), so long as it may serve their purpose as a secure base for the supply of arms and ammunition." [4]

From August 1875, large parties from Zululand, numbering between 500 and 2 300 carriers, arrived on the beaches of Tembe in order to fetch guns, percussion caps, powder and ammunition.[5] British sources estimated that in the three years following 1875, many thousands of guns, together with large amounts of gun powder were annually imported into Lourenço Marques.[6] The British opposed the gun trade because it both armed the Zulu and provided the settlement with a viable source of income.[7] But the fear that Britain would use the arms trade as a pretext to occupy Lourenço

---

4. GH 837 Elton to FO., 3 Dec., 1875. See also p. 180.

5. BO 40 2 Oct., 1875, Lourenço Marques District Report, 1 Aug-15 Sept, 1875; BO 43 6 Nov., 1875, Lourenço Marques District Report, 15 Sept. - 15 Oct., 1875; BO 15 10 April, 1876 District Report, Feb., 1876; BO 51, 31 July 1876, District Report, June 1876; BO 12 Nov., 1876; BO 6, 5 Feb., 1877 District Report Dec., 1876; FO 84/539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.

6. The Royal Navy gave figures of 6 000 to 7 000 guns imported annually. GH 829 Purvis to Lt. Gov., 20 March, 1878; Vice cons. Thompson estimated an annual importation of 20 000 percussion guns, 500 rifles, 10 000 barrels of gunpowder of which 2/3 went to Zululand. FO 84/1539 Thompson to O'Neill encl. in O'Neill to FO 10 Oct., 1879. These figures would seem to be exaggerated as, following the end of the Anglo-Zulu war, only 7 700 guns were surrendered by November 1880, see NA. Despatch book Melmoth Osborne, Osborne to Colley 10 Nov., 1880, cited in C.S. Shields, "The Life of John Dunn" (MA, Unisa, 1939), 19. As the Portuguese were quick to point out, many British merchants were involved in the gun trade with Lourenço Marques and many thousands of guns were sold by the Griqualand West and Cape governments, cf. AHU. Moç., CG., GLM to GGM 17 March 1878; MNE caixa 664 Duprat to MNE 29 Feb., 1879; Ibid., 30 April 1879. On the enormity of the gun trade at Kimberley which was only prohibited in 1877, cf. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 100.

7. PRO. CO. 179/122 Minute 17 Feb., 1876 on Elton to Derby 3 Dec., 1875. Cited in Etherington, "Frederic Elton and the South African Factor". See also GH 29 no. 8. GGM to MSMU 5 May 1856 in Clarendon to Scott 4 Oct., 1856.

Marques[8] led the Portuguese to prohibit the sale of guns and ammunition at the settlement in February 1878.[9] This prohibition dealt a severe blow to the economy of Lourenço Marques but more importantly, it closed Cetewayo's major source of guns and threatened the Luso-Zulu alliance, although the Zulu were still able to procure firearms from Umzila via Inhambane.[10]

In July 1878 a Zulu delegation arrived at Lourenço Marques but was unable to bring about a relaxation of the arms ban.[11] In September 1878 an attempt by the Portuguese to occupy Inyak was repulsed by the Maputo and, for the second time in as many years, Lourenço Marques came under threat of attack.[12] This emphasized the destabilization process resulting from the termination of the gun trade since without Zulu support, the Portuguese were unable to extend their power or implement the MacMahon award. This situation continued until the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu war when the Maputo, ostensibly fearing a Zulu invasion of their country, allowed a Portuguese detachment to occupy Inyak in exchange for arms and ammunition.[13] The outbreak of renewed hostilities with the Maputo coincided with a succession dispute following the death of Nozingile and gave rise to fears in Natal that the flow of

---

8. CPC. CdO 1878-k879, Carvalho to MSMU, 15 Oct., 1878. See also MNE caixa 697 vice cons. Durban to MNE 21 Oct., 1974.

9. CPC. CdO 1878-9. Carvalho to Frere 20 April 1878; Carvalho to MSMU 27 Oct., 1878. In the case of war being declared, the clearing out of the customs house would also be prohibited.

10. AHU. Moç., CG pasta 31 GGM-MSMU 20 July 1878; GH 829 Menlove to Lt. Gov., 9 June 1878; GH 845 GGM to Lt. Gov., 30 July 1878; G. Inhambane to Lt. Gov., 2 Aug., 1878; James Stuart Archive I, 64, evidence of Bikwayo (ed. Webb and Wright).

11. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 31. GLM-GGM 5 Aug., 1878; BO 34. 26 Aug., Lourenço Marques District report for July 1878. GH 1052 Bennet to Lt. Gov., 26 Sept., 1878.

12. AHU. Moç., 1ª Rep., pasta 1. GLM-GGM, 7 Oct., 1878 in GG to MSMU 1878; SNA 1/1/32. Acting NA, annot. to Bennet to SNA, 18.10.1878; GH 829 Capt. Purvis to Lt. Gov., 20 March 1878. For hostilities in 1876, see FO 63/1039 Elton to FO 19 Jan., 1876; Idem., 17 Sept., 1876.

13. The Portuguese had previously levied an arms embargo against Maputo, AHU. Moç., 1ª Rep., pasta 1. GLM to GGM 7 Oct., 1878. GLM to GGM 1 Nov., 1878 in GGM to MSMU 18 Nov., 1878; GGM to MSMU 22 Feb., 1879; GLM to MSMU 4 Aug., 1879; MNE caixa 664 Thompson to Duprat 7 May 1879 in Duprat to MNE 20 June 1879.

Maputo labour to the British colony would be impeded.[14]

The British invasion of Zululand in 1879 increased the importance of Lourenço Marques as a central factor in a future South African confederation and gave rise to the diplomatic offensive which culminated in the abortive Lourenço Marques treaty of 1879. This envisaged a direct British involvement in the administration of Lourenço Marques and, although the treaty was extremely unpopular with imperialist interests in Portugal, it was only abandoned in 1881 when the planned confederation evaporated following the accession to power of the Liberal Party in Britain and the proclamation of Transvaal independence.[15] But the British remained fearful that Delagoa Bay or the strategically important coastal areas south of the Bay, would fall into the hands of Germany or the Transvaal and because of this, the independence of the Maputo came under threat in the 1880s.

After Nozingile's death in 1876 his Swazi wife, Zambili, was only able to secure the chieftaincy for her young son, Ngwanasi, by declaring herself queen regent, by forcing all opposition into exile and by looking to the British for support.[16] In 1887 when the Portuguese mounted tax raids into areas north of the Maputo river occupied by Zambili's followers, the queen regent appealed to the British for help.[17] This led to the signing of the Anglo-Maputo treaty of friendship in July 1887 and the division of the chiefdom into factions supporting either the British or Portuguese. Zambili initially headed the pro-British group and in June 1888 when she realized that the treaty of the previous year would not secure the unity of the Maputo, she offered to accept the MacMahon line, although it bisected her territory, provided that she and her followers were given compensatory territory stretching as far

---

14. I.I. 1/1. R63/76 Elton to PI, 20 Jan., 1876; SNA 1/1/29 no 73 Dunn to SNA, 3 Sept., 1877.

15. Pedro Gastao Mesnier, Considerações acerca do tratado de Lourenço Marques (Porto 1882); Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble for Africa, 20-37.

16. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 32 GGM to MSMU 30 Jan., 1880; SNA 1/1/41.526 "Message from Zambia (Zambile)" 6 Sept., 1880; SNA 1/1/45.158. "Statement of Tonga delegation", 25 March 1881.

17. MNE Caixa 697 acting vice consul Snell to MNE 21 July 1887; AHU Moç., 1ª Rep., pasta 2 GLM to GGM 29 July 1887 in GG to MSMU 21 Aug., 1887; AHU Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 4 GLM to MSMU 2 Sept., 1887.

south of the Mkuzi as the Shibigan river.[18] In the same month Zambili crushed a group of conspirators who supported the claims to the chieftaincy of Nozingile's son Shimaka. These dissidents were in turn supported by a group of concessionaires who wished to gain control over a strip of territory linking Sordwana Bay with the "New Republic",[19] an area that had been presented by Dinizulu to his Boer allies in 1884 in return for their assistance against Zibhebhu and that had been annexed to the Transvaal in 1887.

When the British refused to extend Zambili's territory south of the Mkuzi and the Portuguese presented her with gifts and promised to annex all of the Maputo territory, Zambili swung her allegiance from Britain to Portugal.[20] This change in policy was confirmed when the British forestalled Transvaal claims on Sordwana Bay by annexing to Zululand in December 1888, the lands of chiefs Sibonda and Ncamana which were situated on the north bank of the Mkuzi.[21] This was followed by the annexation in February 1890 of the lands of chiefs Fokoti, Umjindi and Ludvico. But by extending their power north of the Mkuzi river, the British had disregarded Zambili's claims that Mpande, Cetewayo and the Natal government had recognized her rights to suzerainty over the chiefs living in the area.[22]

---

18. FO 84/1902 vice consul Drummond, Delagoa Bay to Havelock, 13 Dec., 1887; ZGH 712. G383 vice consul to Martin, 10 June 1888; Ibid., GH833 Drummond to vice consul to Natal Governor 1 Jan., 1888; SNA 1/1/114.342 Bruheim to Natal Governor, 19 April 1889.

19. ZGH 712.317/88 vice consul to Havelock 25 June 1888; Ibid., 400/88 Bruheim to Sommerschield 24 June 1888 in vice consul to Martin, 3 July 1888; Ibid., 401/88 Coope to Havelock, 5 July 1888; FO 84/1902 Bruheim to Sommerschield n.d. in vice consul to FO, 6 July 1888.

20. ZGH 713.481/88 Martin to Havelock 20 July 1888; FO 84/1970 vice consul Knee to FO 15 May 1889.

21. BPP 1890 c6200, Knutsford to Loch, 10 Jan., 1890 and Mitchell to Knutsford 15 Feb., 1890. For attempts by the Transvaal to secure a route to the sea via Maputoland and on "concession politics" and international rivalries in the area, see Eric Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble for Africa (Johannesburg, 1967), 96-116; N. Garson, "The Swaziland Question and a Road to the Sea (1884.1895)" SAAYB, II, 1957, 306-311, 373-396.

22. See map 2 , p 72. ZGH 713.480/88 Martin to Havelock 20 July 1888; ZA635/89 Bruheim to Osborne (n.d.) in Osborne to Mitchell, 4 Sept., 1884; BPP c62001890. Zambili to SNA 1 March 1889.

The remarkable cultural fluidity which today marks the trans-Mkuzi area makes the reconstruction of its history particularly difficult. The ease with which people of "amatonga" descent today claim to be Zulu or Swazi was first noted in the nineteenth century.[23] At that time the people living to the north of the Mkuzi were designated on maps and referred to by travellers as "amatongas".[24] However, the followers of several chiefs and sub-chiefs were the descendants of refugees from civil unrest in Zululand[25] and even amongst the Tsonga-speakers, many were not members of the Maputo clan. Recently collected oral tradition is probably correct in asserting that although the Maputo sent expeditions south to collect tribute, they never occupied the trans-Mkuzi area.[27] Sovereignty vacillated with the ability or desire of the Maputo or the Mandlakazi or Swazi to exert their power over the chiefdoms in the area and it was not unusual for a chief to pay tribute to more than one sovereign.[28] Nevertheless following the defeat of Zibhebhu the Maputo were able to advance at the expense of chiefs like Manaba and Ncamana who had supported the Mandlakazi during the Zulu civil war.[29] Thus Britain's annexations north of the Mkuzi divorced the Maputo from a traditional

---

23. James Stuart Archives I (ed Webb and Wright) 150-151, evidence of Giba. On the modern ethnic heterogeneity of the population, cf. Krige and Feldgate, "An Ecological Survey of the Tembe-Tonga."

24. W. Drummond, The Large Game and Natural History of South and South-east Africa, 33-34. 429; W.C. Baldwin, African Hunting from Natal to the Zambezi, 1852-1860, 92-3. 218-221; D. Leslie, Among the Zulus, 257; F. Jeppe's map of the Transvaal, 1878. Tsonga-speakers lived as far south as the Hluhluwe/Shibigan. See pp. 70-71.

25. Ingwavuma Magisterial District Book 3(c); ZA 26.654/89 Saunders to Osborne 10 Sept., 1889 encl. in Osborne to Mitchell 12 Sept., 1889; ZA 27 Saunders to Res. Comm., Zululand 4 June 1895; JSA., file 25 p258 evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.

27. Krige and Feldgate Ecological Survey, 11-12. See also GLM to GG 4 Jan., 1892 in Commissão Organizadora (ed) Mouzinho, Governador de Lourenço Marques (Lourenco Marques, 1956), 159 (henceforth cited as Mouzinho).

28. BPP 1890 c.-6200 Martin to Lt. Gov., 21 July 1888; Ibid., Havelock to Knutsford 4 May 1889; ZGH702.1/87 "Message from Sibonda", 2 Dec., 1886; ZGH713.482 Martin to Havelock 21 July 1888.

29. ZGH 716.759 Coope to Havelock, 27 Sept., 1888; ZGH 723/544 Saunders "Report with reference to concessions....1889"; ZGH 724.677 Saunders to Res. Comm. Zululand, 21 Sept., 1889; BPP 1890 c.-6200 Saunders to Osborne 10 Sept., 1889. ZGH 736.2233/91 minute, acting Res. Comm., Zululand, 13 March 1891; JSA file 25 p258, Mahungane and Nkonuza.

area of tribute extraction and by so doing pushed them into the arms of the Portuguese. By the end of 1888 a Portuguese residency had been established at the Maputo capital which was moved north of the MacMahon Line.[30]

The western Delagoa Bay hinterland was invaded intermittently by Swazi armies whose major aim was the extraction of "tribute" and the enforcement of their dominance over the trade route passing from Lourenço Marques through Matolla. These acts prevented a free flow of labour from Gazaland to Natal and prompted Umzila to ask the British to transfer his relative Sotondose, a chief of the Nxumalo clan which had formerly adhered to the Ndwandwe confederacy, from the Newcastle-Umsinga area to the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Sotondose would act as a buffer against Mawewe and the Swazi and would bolster Umzila's military strength with sufficient Nguni soldiers to protect Gaza workers passing south to Natal.[32] But despite the death of Mawewe in 1872 the Swazi continued to collect tribute some six miles from Lourenço Marques and as late as 1881 were presented with sagwate by the governor.[33]

In 1884 the Nwamba, Mabila and those Gaza who after the civil war had settled under Mawewe in northern Swaziland, were able to return to their traditional lands because of the political turmoil in Gazaland caused by Umzila's death and Gungunyana's usurpation of the throne. Three years later the Mabila agreed to

---

30. BPP 1890 c.-6200 vice consul Knee to Salisbury 15 May 1889; ZGH 739.444 Bruheim to acting Resident Commissioner Zululand, 22 May 1891; Paul Berthoud letter of 13 Dec., 1888 in L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, 1889.

31. Matolla paid "tribute" to both the Swazi and Portuguese, FO 63/1050 "Delagoa Bay statements of David Leslie" in Dean to Hammond, 14 July 1873; BO12., 24 March 1879.

32. BPP 1890-91 LVII, 198 Statements from Umzungulu and Dubule, messengers from Umzila, 6 Aug., 1870.

33. BO 17 March 1879 Lourenço Marques District Report for 1877-78; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO 20 Sept., 1879; D. Fernandes das Neves, "Exploracao do rio Bembe", BSGL, 3, 6, 1882, 343.

subject themselves to the Portuguese.[34] They were later followed by Mawewe's son Hanyane and his adherents who, encouraged by the Portugese and dissident elements within Gaza and probably by the Khosa chief as well, settled in the Ntimane area immediately south of the bend in the Nkomati river.[35] Here Hanyane developed his power base and, in a loose alliance with the Khosa, acted as a pro-Portuguese counter-poise to the Gaza.[36] Although the Swazi king claimed in the mid-1880s that the people living between the Lebombo's and Delagoa Bay paid tribute to him,[37] the influence of the settlement at Lourenço Marques began to spread into its hinterland in the early 1880s.

Under the governorship of Major Chaves de Aguiar, alliances between Portugal and her African allies were concretized by the signing of so-called "treaties of vassalage" and the sporadic gathering of taxes in kind was abandoned. In December 1880 three chiefdoms living to the north of Lourenço Marques signed treaties of vassalage according to which they agreed to supply the Portuguese with labourers, porters and soldiers and an annual hut tax of 1s6d ($340) paid in specie, which was largely earned on the labour markets of South Africa.[38] "Vassalage" meant in reality a political alliance which brought with it a form of most-favoured-nation status that bolstered the power of the chiefs as it supplied them with presents and goods which they could trade or distribute to their

---

34. Ferrão's informants give 1883 as the date of Umzila's death, Circumscripçoes, 87. But cf. Liesegang Beiträge 99-100. It seems possible that the return of'Mawewe's people' to Moçambique was portended by a sortie on a small Portuguese customs post in late 1883. Cf. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 4 GLM to MSMU 2 Sept., 1887. SS 869 R5604 Portuguese consul, Pretoria to SS 2 Dec., 1883; Ibid., 8 Dec., 1883; BO6 9 Feb., 1884.

35. Hanyane's lands were proclaimed Transvaal territory after the border delimitation of 1880. Attempts by Abel Erasmus to collect the heavy Transvaal hut tax of £2.18s6d resulted in a skirmish and Hanyane's flight. AHU. 2ª Rep., pasta 4 GLM to MSMU 2 Sept., 1887; SS1439 R6126/87 encl. in R5173/87 "Rapport in zake Hanyane"; LA461 A. Erasmus to Portuguese consul 16 Aug., 1887; A.C. Myburgh, The Tribes of the Barberton District, 78-9; Mouzinho, 84.

36. AHU. Moç., 1ª Rep., pasta 1 GLM to GG 16 Nov., 1886; AHU 2ª Rep., pasta 4, GGM to MSMU 24 Sept., 1887; P. Berthoud, "Oeuvre du Littoral", BMSAS, 71, April 1887, 212; J. Malungana, "Une Visite chez Magoude" Sept., 1884, BMSAS 58, 1885, 171-2; GLM to GGM 12 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 108.

37. WUL. A74. Machado, "Interview with Swazi King over boundaries" (n.d. ? 1886-87).

38. The chiefdoms were Xerinda, northern Manyisa and Nwamba. AHU 1ª Rep., pasta 1 GG to MSMU 12 Dec., 1881; BO6. 4 Feb., 1882 "Termo de Vassalagem...", BO3. 21 Jan., 1882, "Termo de

followers. The vassalage relationship also provided the chiefs with guns and ammunition that could be used to provide dependents with meat or exchangeable hunting produce, to quell dissent and protect followers. The military benefits of vassalage became apparent in 1882 when Mazwaya and Xerinda detachments armed by the Portuguese, raided chiefs south of the Nkomati bend.[39] But when the hut tax was raised to 3s6d ($800) in July 1883, armed opposition forced the Portuguese to rescind the increase[40] for, as a visiting evangelist noted,

> "the Portuguese have only the port where ships debark. Delagoa Bay is the only place that they occupy and dominate. Everywhere else they are under the power of the native chiefs."[41]

In 1886 the salaries of civil servants were about three months in arrears, officers entrusted with tax collection were provided with no clerical assistance and the garrison was often on the verge of mutiny.[42] Thus the Portuguese, despite their treaties of vassalage, did not possess the level of organized violence needed to extort taxes comprehensively from the African populace. The

---

Vassalagem prestado pelo regulo da Cherinda, Mahatane (menor) et pelo regente Didisse"; GLM to GGM 22 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 115; SMA514 Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Jan., 1895.

39. FO 84/1616 O'Neill to governor Natal 22 July 1882, copy in GH837; FO 84/1616 O'Neill to governor Natal 22 Aug., 1882.

40. Unrest was reported, presumably over the new taxes, in Xerinda. In 1886 the Mazwaya and Mafumo, in an engagement referred to as a "skirmish", quelled a minor tax rebellion mounted by the Xerinda, northern Manyisa and Ntimane clans. Treaties of vassalage entered into in 1887-88 stipulated the old hut tax of $340. Cf. note 45. Eduardo de Noronho, "Lourenço Marques e as suas relaçoẽs com a África do sul", BSGL, 15.2.1896, 86; Unisa/ JC Junod, "Les Causes...".

41. E. Creux, "Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo...à la baie Delagoa", BMSAS, 1882, 42. For complementary views cf. SMA1255/B Paul Berthoud, "Report on the expedition to Magude", 6 Oct., 1885; H. Joest, "Reise in Afrika im Jahre 1883", Zeitschr. fur Ethnologie, 17, 1885, 212. For unrest in Xerinda in 1883 cf. Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 86, 183.

42. BO 19. 8 May 1886; Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 183, 189; SMA 497/E Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 30 Oct., 1888; João de Andrade Corvo, Provinciais Ultramarinas, II, 273.

hut tax returns for the economic year 1883-4 amounted to just under £300 which represented payment by only 36% of the huts enumerated in the census. The hut tax produced about £600 each year for the next two years and then from 1887 to 1890, at least partly due to the sharp reduction in labour emigration to Natal, was not collected at all.[43] Despite the ethereal content of Portuguese rule, treaties of vassalage were concluded in 1887-88 with Mabila, two small Ntimane chiefdoms and Maputo and calls were made for the Delagoa Bay hinterland to be settled by European colonists.[44]

A new phase in the history of the Portuguese penetration of the Delagoa Bay hinterland emerged when Lt-colonel Francisco Lopes Serra, a former interim governor who was familiar with the African languages and peoples of the area, was nominated to the newly-created post of Military Commander of the Crown lands in November 1887. This effectively placed the administration of the African population under military jurisdiction and the following year a magistracy and administrative centre was established by Serra at Angouane in Mabota, some 13 kilometres from Lourenço Marques. Another indication of the growing seriousness of Portugal's intention to occupy the Lourenço Marques hinterland was the seconding of an adjutant and a clerk to help Serra collect taxes and the initiation of a wage bonus for all civil servants proficient in a Bantu language.[45]

---

43. GLM, Mouzinho de Albuquerque to GGM 18 Aug., 1891 in Commissão Organizadora (ed) Mouzinho, 227; BO 32. 8 Aug., 1885; BO 19. 8 May 1886; BO. 10 Aug., 1886, GLM Report for March 1886; BO 2. 21 Jan., 1888.

44. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 5 GLM to GGM 2 Dec., 1887 in GGM to MSMU 22 Dec., 1887; BO11. 12 March 1887; BO5. 4 Feb., 1888; BO 9 March 1888; BO18. 5 May 1888; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 5 no 28 of 1888 "Projecto de regulamento para a fundação de colonias na districto de Lourenço Marques"; Anon., Colonias Agricolas no Districto de Lourenço Marques (SGL, 1890).

45. Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 55, 183, 198; Unisa/JC., Junod, "Les Causes..."

Political Developments in the Northern Delagoa Bay Hinterland

In October 1885 the Portuguese concluded a treaty of vassalage with Gungunyana and in May 1886 a Portuguese resident was installed at Mossurize, the Gaza capital.[46] Despite this treaty Portugal's continuing powerlessness before the Gaza was underlined when in October 1886, after attempting to extend their control beyond Inhambane, a Portuguese army of 5 000 men armed with modern rifles was routed by a Gaza force. Inhambane lay at the mercy of the Gaza and Gungunyana severely punished those of his recalcitrant followers who had aligned themselves with the Portuguese.[47]

The Limpopo-Olifants rivers had since 1862 formed the southern frontier of the Gaza state[48] and raids into the Khosen area, between the Nkomati and Limpopo rivers, were rare and generally unauthorized.[49] The Khosa were considered allies rather than subjects of the Gaza, and they were sufficiently autonomous to be able to refuse to supply troops to the Gaza for their razzias against the Chopi chiefdoms.[50] The balance of power in the northern Delagoa Bay hinterland shifted markedly when Gungunyana moved from Mossurize to Bilene with some 80 000 to 100 000 of his followers

---

46. FO 84/2142 encl. 2 in Marques de Soveral to FO 4 Jan., 1891; GH837 Br. consul to Sec. State for Foreign Affairs, 4 July 1886. See also Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble, 125ff.

47. ABM:ABC. 15.4 vol. 12 Richards to Bebour 2 Nov., 1886; Ibid., Ousley to Smith 25 Oct., 1886; idem., 15 Nov., 1886; The Natalian 13 Nov., 1886. But cf. Eric Axelson whose Lisbon sources overemphasize the strength of the Portuguese, Portugal and the Scramble, 126-9.

48. F. Elton, Natal Mercury 10 Oct., 1871; BPP LXXIV 1876 Consular report for Moçambique, 1875; Gautier, "une excursion au nord du Transvaal", Globe, April 1884; ABM:ABC. 15.4 vol. 12 Bates to Smith 30 July 1888.

49. Paul Berthoud letter of 20 Dec., 1884, L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, VI, 1885, 99; Patrick Harries, "Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction; the nature of free and unfree labour in South-east Africa", JAH, 22, 1981, 320.

50. Crewe "Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo...á la baie Delagoa", BMSAS, 45, 1982, 42; SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud "Report on the expedition to Magude", 9 Oct., 1885; A. Grandjean, "Voyage a Antioka", BMSAS, 7 Dec., 1889.

in mid-1889.[51] This move facilitated Gungunyana's war against those Chopi chiefs who had not accepted Gaza rule and allowed him to punish at least one Bilene chief who, following the establishment of a Portuguese military post in Bilene in February 1890, had placed himself under the governor of Lourenço Marques.[52] The move also jeopardised the independence of the Khosa as the Gaza king sought new areas of settlement for his excess population and prohibited the Khosa from giving refuge to his enemies. In extending his power southwards, Gungunyana was able to take advantage of a Khosa succession dispute.

When the Khosa chief Magude died in 1885 the son born of his first wife was eight years old. This son Shongeli (Chonguele; Sangele) was the rightful heir according to the legal system brought north by the Gaza Ngoni but according to local law the legitimate heir was Wanyanyane, the product of a leviratical marriage between Magude and the wife of his deceased elder brother.[52] Shongeli was supported by the prince regent Mavabaze, who pushed the opposing party into exile and then installed the young Shongeli as king under his regency.[53] Gungunyana was able to exploit the bitterness engendered by this dynastic dispute when he turned his attention to the area south of the Limpopo. In 1889 Mavabaze assisted the Gaza in raiding the Chopi for provisions with which to feed the large numbers of Gungunyana's people who had moved south. But the Khosa regent refused to jeopardize his loose alliance with Hanyane's Ngoni and the Portuguese by participating with Gungunyana in a proposed attack on Hanyane.[54] The Gaza king then summonsed Mavabaze to appear at his court and when he refused to do so out of fear for his life, Gungunyane threatened to invade Khosen. This caused large numbers of people to flee from the eastern parts of Khosen which bordered

---

51. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 6 GG to MSMU 3 Aug., 1889; AHU. Moç., 1ª Rep., pasta 4 Gaza Res. to GGM 18 Nov., 1889; ABM:ABC. 15.4 vol. 12 Ousley to Smith 18 Sept., 1889.

52. SMA 467 Grandjean 1890; Grandjean letter of 17 Oct., 1891 in BMSAS no 100, Dec., 1891; Mouzinho, 107.

53. SMA 497/D Paul Berthoud to Leresche 4 Feb., 1888; 497/E P. Berthoud to Leresche, 11 Oct., 1888; 467 Grandjean 1890.

54. SMA 467 Grandjean 1890; SMA 483 Grandjean to Leresche 20 Feb., 1890; 514 Grandjean to Leresche 5 Jan., 1895; SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche 17 Oct., 1890; GLM to Freire de Andrade 10 June 1891 in Mouzinho, 96.

on Bilene and brought increasing pressures on Mavabaze to visit Gungunyane. His refusal to do so rapidly lost him the support of his councillors and in May 1890 he and Shongeli fled south of the Nkomati where they sought the protection of the Portuguese.[55]

The Portuguese at Lourenço Marques were at that stage in no position to offer refuge to Gungunyana's enemies for a dispute had arisen with Britain over the western border of southern Mozambique in which Portugal needed the support of the Gaza king.[56] For this reason Hanyane, despite his popularity, and the prestige that his submission gave to the Portuguese, was kidnapped and, in compliance with Gungunyana's requests, exiled to Mozambique Island where he died in 1893.[57] The Gaza king made similar appeals for Mavabaze to be exiled or repatriated. In this he was supported by two newly-appointed Portuguese officials, the so-called Superintendent-General of native affairs in Gazaland, a metropolitan appointee accountable only to the Imperial government, and his subordinate, the Superintendent of native affairs in Bilene. These men believed that Mavabaze had assisted Hanyane in "intriguing" with the British South Africa Company and that he should be obliged to return to Khosen. Many of Mavabaze's adherents were of the same opinion for following his flight, Khosen had fallen increasingly into the Gaza orbit and Gaza settlers were rapidly colonizing the eastern areas.[58] But when Mavabaze did return, under pressure, to meet Gungunyana in May 1891, he found his position untenable and, fleeing south to Lourenço Marques, he sought Portuguese vassalage in August of that year.[59] But

---

55. SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche 19-30 May 1890; SMA 483 Grandjean to Leresche 6 Sept., 1891.

56. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, GLM to GGM 22 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 113; Antonio Enes Moçambique. 172. On the border disputes between Portugal & the BSA Co.see Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble and P. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South-central Africa 1890-1900 (London, 1962).

57. SMA 514/A Grandjean to Leresche, 24 May 1895; Augusto de Castilho, "Acerca de Lourenço Marques", BSGL, 14 May 1895, 558; Freire de Andrade to GLM 8 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 98-99.

58. SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche 27 July 1890; Ibid., Grandjean to Leresche 17 Oct., 1890; SMA 467 Grandjean, 1891.

59. GLM to GGM 7 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 121; BMSAS., 9 Oct., 1891, 328-330.

when Gungunyana heard that Mavabaze had placed himself under the Portuguese, the Gaza king sent the governor of Lourenço Marques "a considerable amount of money" in order to have Mavabaze exiled and Shongeli repatriated. As an added incentive, Gungunyana also threatened to send an expedition of 3 000 men into the Crown lands in order to kill Mavabaze and his followers.[60]

The Portuguese administration was deeply divided over the appropriate course of action. The military Commander of the Crown lands and the governor of Lourenco Marques wished to accept Mavabaze's offer of vassalage as it would increase Portugal's prestige and provide the district with a new source of taxation. They felt that, following the settlement of the western border dispute with Britain in June 1891, they no longer had to pander to Gungunyana and that effective occupation of Lourenço Marques district could only be achieved once Portugal had gained control of the populous and fertile Khosen and Limpopo-Olifants areas which straddled the trade and labour routes leading to the Transvaal. Only the building of roads and the establishment of military garrisons would effectively exclude the Transvaal from the area south of the Limpopo.[61] The Superintendent-general of native affairs in Gazaland, who was more familiar with the strengths of the Gaza empire and had provided their armies with military aid against the independent Chopi, opposed the acceptance of Mavabaze's vassalage which he feared would lead to war with Gungunyana.[62] A compromise was eventually reached; Mavabaze was settled as a Portuguese vassal on the Nwamba-Mafumo border and in September 1891 Shongeli was returned to Khosen under the protection of a detachment of Portuguese troops. Although Shongeli was recognized as chief of the Khosa, as a minor he was directly subordinate to Gungunyana. The troops which acccompanied him to Khosen constructed a fortified outpost on the right bank of the Nkomati river which ostensibly gave Shongeli an element of protection but also extended

---

60. GLM to GGM 15 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 127.

61. GLM to GGM 28 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 118; Military commander of the Crown Lands to GLM 25 July 1891 in Ibid., 120.

62. Supt-general of Native Affairs to GGM 29 Sept., 1891 in Mouzinho, 134; GLM to GGM 5 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 133. See also GLM to GG 20 July 1891 in Ibid., 110; GLM to Freire de Andrade 10 June 1891; GLM to Supt-gen. Native Affairs 27 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 135; GLM to GG 29 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 139.

the Portuguese field of hut tax collection.[63] In reality the post at Stocolo afforded Portugal a military presence on the frontier with Gazaland, which was then recognized to have moved south to the Nkomati.[64] Portuguese ambitions suffered a setback when Gungunyana agreed to allow the military commander of the Crown Lands to collect taxes in the trans-Nkomati area only on condition that he be the recipient of all revenues or alternately that the hut tax be doubled and divided equally between Gungunyana and the governor.[65] In the event, the Portuguese presence in the Nkomati-Limpopo area was restricted to a Resident who, according to a missionary, was "charged with keeping the country for Gungunyan ."[66]

Under Gaza pressure, the Khosa continued to desert the area east of the Nkomati bend and were replaced by followers of Gungunyana. Many Khosa sought refuge west of the Nkomati and joined Mavabaze. A missionary wrote in September 1891 of eastern Khosen that "all the villages are abandoned, a part of the huts entirely destroyed, others half ruined; (there are) everywhere traces of panic and rapid flight."[67] This exodus of the Khosa population continued well into 1892 and in May the Gaza king was obliged to station detachments on the Nkomati drifts in an effort to prevent people from joining Mavabaze.[68] The following month

---

63. GLM to GGM 15 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 129; GLM to Supt.-gen. Native Affairs 27 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 137; Idem., 2 Dec., 1891 in Ibid., 140; SMA467 Grandjean 1891; Grandjean "Notices", BSNG., 1893, 120.

64. SMA 872/F Grandjean "Rapport sur Antioka, 1891" 7 Dec., 1891; SMA 467 Grandjean 1891; SMA 435 Liengme to Leresche 27 July 1891; GLM to GGM 12 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 107.

65. GLM to GG, 12 July, 1891 in Mouzinho, 107; Supt. Native Affairs, Bilene to GLM 1 Dec., 1891.

66. SMA 872/F Grandjean, "Rapport sur Antioka, 1891" 7 Dec., 1891.

67. Grandjean, Letter 6 Sept., 1891 in BMSAS., 10 Dec., 1891, 353; Idem., "Rapport du Conseil", BMSAS, 103, June 1892, 70; Idem., "Antioka" 11 Dec., 1893 in BMSAS, 14 April 1894; SMA 872/F Grandjean "Rapport du Antioka, 1891" 7 Dec., 1891; SMA 484/B P. Berthoud to Leresche 16 March 1892; SMA 513/B Grandjean to Leresche 5 Sept., 1895; GLM to GG 15 June 1891 in Mouzinho, 101.

68. SMA 1256/A Grandjean "Rapport sur l'oeuvre missionaire, 1892"; SMA 872/E Grandjean to Leresche 6 May 1892; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, Feb., 1893; Grandjean "Voyage de Lourenço Marques et Antioka",BMSAS, 104, Aug., 1892.

Gungunyana consolidated his hold over his southern marches when he expelled the Portuguese Resident in Khosen, whom he accused of building fortifications and extracting forced labour.[69] He then threatened to go to war with the Portuguese if they did not remove their garrison in Bilene and return two of the king's sons who in effect were being held hostage at Mozambique Island.[70] It was generally conceded that without large numbers of imperial troops, bankrupt Portugal would be crushed by the Gaza[71] and consequently, following British mediation, the Portuguese capitulated to Gungunyana's demands.

The Expansion of Portuguese Rule into the Central Delagoa Bay Hinterland

South of the Nkomati where, unlike Khosen or Maputoland, the population was "a human agglomeration without organization",[72] Portuguese expansion met with more success. With Francisco Serra as military commander of the Crown Lands and a vigorous imperialist, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, as governor of Lourenco Marques, the hut tax was raised from 1s6d ($337) to 4s ($900). The establishment of military posts in the interior facilitated the collection of hut tax and in 1890-91 a total of £2 850.4s (12 825$900) was accumulated from 12 251 huts, an improvement of some 10 000$000 on the previous hut tax collection of 1886-87. In 1892 the taxation of 22 116 huts produced a revenue of £4 423.4s (19 904$400).[73] The hut tax, of which 10% went to the collector, was often gathered with extreme brutality for if an individual were unable to pay, his home would be fired.[74] These methods of

---

69. SMA 467 Grandjean 1892.

70. FO 84/2224 Br. consul, De la Cour to FO 4 June 1892; Idem., 7 June 1892, 11 June 1892, 25 June and 25 July 1892.

71. SMA 484/A P. Berthoud to Leresche 27 Feb., 1891; GLM to GG 12 June 1891 in Mouzinho, 108; Trindade Coelho (ed) Dezoito Annos em Africa, 288.

72. A. Grandjean, "La Mission Suisse à la Baie de Delagoa", Le Chrétien Evangélique, XL, 9 Sept., 1897.

73. GLM to GGM, 18 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 227; Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 54. Grandjean, "Notices", BSNG, 1893, 120.

74. This was the case in Matolla in 1892 when because of an extended drought people were unable to pay taxes and "the majority of villages" were burnt down. FO 84/2224 De la Cour to FO 4 April 1892; BO2. 21 Jan., 1888.

collection, when combined with an increasing level of extortion, constituted an important cause of the Luso-Gaza war which broke out in 1894 following an official rise in the hut tax from $900 to 1$350 (6s) in June and a, perhaps unofficial, rise later that year of up to 12s to 14s.[75] Many people were unable to pay the hut tax because of the ecological and epidemiological upsets that plagued the late 1880s-90s. But according to Junod, the ability of the African population to pay hut taxes was primarily marred by the demands of the Portuguese for unpaid labour, "lasting weeks if not months", as this forced agriculturalists to neglect their fields.[76] During the 1890s the crucial issue of contention that arose between the Portuguese and the population of the Crown Lands, was that of labour rather than taxation.

The unification of the peoples of the Delagoa Bay hinterland was precluded by clan endogamy, dynastic disputes, the competition between clans for refugees and dependants and historically entrenched trade rivalries. Consequently, as the British consul noted in 1892, although the Portuguese were weak, the African population was "divided into a number of petty tribes, the chiefs of which are all antagonistic to, and ready to go to war with, the others." If a vassal chief refused to supply labourers for the public works, guns and ammunition were given to "other chiefs to make war on the one who refuses to obey orders."[77] Labour was always the scarcest and most valuable factor of production in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. But as long as the labour needs of the Lourenço Marques settlement were limited by its lack of development, vassal chiefs were able to comply with requests for chibalo labour by sending social deviants to the Portuguese and in return for supplying this labour the chiefs participated in the benefits of the vassalage relationship which had developed in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. But the terms of this relationship turned against the

---

75. Carlos Santos Reis, A População de Lourenço Marques em 1894, 83; SMA 516/B Junod to Leresche 3 Aug., 1894; FO 63/1281 Bernal to FO 1 Sept., 1894; UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes..."

76. SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend entre Mahazoule et Mobvesha".

77. FO 84/2224 Br. consul to FO 4 April 1892. When Junod queried why Africans did not unite to fight the Portuguese he was told, "every time that a clan expressed the wish to chase out the whites, others would oppose them as they did not want to give up their access to material goods (renoncer aux étoffes)". UNISA/JC Notebook marked "Le Problème Indigène".

chiefs and elders and especially against young men as the value of labour rocketed in the 1890s with the massive emigration of the Delagoa Bay workforce to the mines of the Witwatersrand.

As early as 1887 British officials in Maputoland estimated that up to half the economically-active male population was employed in South Africa.[78] This view was supported by population and hut tax returns and by travellers, one of whom reported in 1896 that "the Amatongas who remained in the country were either home from the Rand for the holidays or belonged to that class content to live without work."[79] Many labour emigrants settled permanently in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and Cape Town.[80] Statistics indicate that 30 to 40 per cent of Mozambican migrants settled permanently on the Witwatersrand. This suggests a permanent emigration in the mid-late 1890s of 15 to 20 per cent of the male population with a temporary loss of a further 30 to 35 per cent working as migrants.[81] The loss of manpower was worsened by a high mortality rate in the wage labour areas. In Kimberley this rose from 7.3 per cent in 1877 to 9.92 per cent in 1888 while on the Witwatersrand the death rate has been estimated at 8 to 10 per cent.[82] When added to a probable 2 to 3 per cent loss on the routes leading to and from the labour centres,[83] this meant that in some areas migrant labour resulted in a permanent loss of between

---

78. ZGH.708. Z288/87 Saunders, "Supplementary Report on the character of the Amatonga people, 1887"; FO 84/1846 O'Neill to FO, 26 Feb., 1887.

79. ZA 27, "Report of the Amatongaland Boundary Commission, 24 Dec., 1896"; Cuenod mss., Henri Berthoud, "Expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891". Population returns for 1884-5 are in BO 4, 23 Jan., 1886; 1886 in BO 4, 22 Jan., 1887; 1887 in BO 3., 21 Jan, 1888, 1892 in Noronho in Lourenço Marques, 54-55; see also Circumscripçoẽs de Lourenço Marques, 1909. p. 142.

80. JSA file 25 p261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 1897.

81. TA.SSa330 "Aantal Naturellen Vertrokken..." p183; TLC., evidence of Ferraz, 246 and Wirth, 112; CMAR 1895, 56; SPG., W. Smythe to SPG., 5 Jan., 1899.

82. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 162; A. Jeeves, "The Control of Migrant Labour on the South African Goldmines in the era of Kruger and Milner", JSAS, II, 1975, 17.

83. Cabral, Raças, Usos, 86, 102; MNE697 Portuguese consul Durban to MNE, 28 Sept., 1891. See also p. 31, 87-8, 104-5.

25 and 30 per cent of the male population.

The demand for labour on the Witwatersrand increased dramatically in 1895 as numerous deep level mines entered the development stage. But the increase in labour migration was paralleled by the development of Lourenço Marques as a feeder port for the Rand which necessitated the local employment of large numbers of workers in transport activities and the construction of a modern economic infrastructure. Large numbers of men were employed on the construction of the railway to the Transvaal and their daily wages of 2s to 2s6d compared favourably with those paid to emigrant workers.[84] Many men were also employed in porterage, shipping, landing and forwarding goods, in customs clearance, public and municipal works, domestic service and various other spheres of the local economy, whose growth was closely tied to that of the Witwatersrand.[85] Because of the competition for labour between these different sectors and the south African economy, African workers in Lourenço Marques could earn as much as 1s6d to 3s per day.[86]

These relatively high wages were the major cause of the chibalo system which provided African labour for various public works. Mouzinho de Albuquerque claimed that chibalo workers recieved daily wages of 11d ($200).[87] However, the British consul in Lourenço Marques reported in 1892 that chibalo workers never received more than 5s for three months labour. He characterized chibalo as

---

84. SMA 503/A Grandjean to Leresche 15 Nov., 1889; BPP LXXVI, 1890. Br. consul,report for 1889; Ibid., 1895 XCIX; CMAR 1894, 29; A Voz Publica, 13 Oct., 1894.

85. In 1903 there were 7 463 wage-earners in Lourenço Marques. These included forwarding, landing and shipping 2 230, domestic service 1 870, customs clearance 1 298, harbour works and railways 650, building and construction 555, public and municipal workers 450. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 29.

86. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9 Freire de Andrade, "Relatório do Reconhecimento do Rio Incomati, 1891"; Richardson The Crowded Hours, 163; Grandjean, "Voyage de Lourenco Marques á Rikatla, June 1892" in BMSAS, 104, 1892.

87. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Moçambique 1896-98, 145; BPP 1895. XCIX Consular Report, 1893.

> "a system of forced labour as established by the Portuguese government of this district which seems to carry with it many of the component parts of slavery, while it ensures none of that protection which expensive slaves receive... Workers get no food but are promised 'ordinary wages' of 1s to 4s per day. After 2 to 3 months they are sent home with a few shillings or in some cases nothing at all."[88]

The Mafumo, Matolla and Tembe chiefdoms which lived close to Lourenço Marques suffered most from chibalo demands, especially as they were fully conversant with wage rates paid in the town and in south Africa. Periods of forced porterage could last for 9 to 10 months without any wages materializing. The British consul related the story of a party of 160 Mafumo men who were promised premiums of £10 to carry goods to Manyisa. But only a few headmen received £2 and the porters, who were expected to be away for a year, were threatened with imprisonment if they deserted.[89] The chiefdoms around Lourenço Marques were the first actively to oppose the developing chibalo system. But the refusal to supply the Portuguese with forced labour came not from the chiefs and elders who benefitted in several ways from their alliance with the Portuguese but from the cadets whose labour power was becoming increasingly commoditized through wage labour.

The youths of Matolla were the first to refuse to supply labour to their chiefs for chibalo. The Portuguese replied by kidnapping the Matolla chief Sigaule, his mother and other notables whom they held hostage at the Angouane magistracy. Junod recounts that "the young people have persisted in refusing (to supply chibalo) by saying 'we have just returned from chibalo, how can we already return?' and by 'declaring that they did not have the time to repair their own houses'." Sigaule was eventually freed only when "the mature men and those of headring status" offered themselves in exchange for their chief.[90]

Early in 1894 a particulary severe chibalo was imposed on the people of the Crown Lands when they were forced to construct

---

88. FO 84/2224 Br. cons. to FO 4 April 1892.

89. Ibid., UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes..."

90. UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes...."

the roads needed by the Portuguese in order to occupy effectively the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The Tembe, Matolla, Nwamba, Mabota, Mafumo and Mazwaya all worked on these roads and in some areas left their villages deserted of men. This widespread chibalo was particularly detested because of the political implication of the roads. A popular song invented and sung on the roadworks lamented

> Young chief, do not speak too loudly.
> Imitate the small elephant.
> Young chief! We call you Mahazoule!
> You should live far away in Johannesburg
> You fear being deported over the sea and (having) to leave us![91]

The exiling of dissident chiefs became commonplace during the 1890s and led the African population to believe that the Portuguese wished to break their national life by expatriating their chiefs who were, according to Junod, "the embodiment of the nation, the representation in skin and bone, of national unity."[92] Thus, following the deportation of Hanyane in 1889, the Tembe chief Mabai was exiled to Mozambique Island in 1893 for the killing of a Maputo man in Tembeland. A few months later a sub-chief of the Mabota named Gouaba was also deported and his land was given to a concessionaire.[93]

Forced conscription constituted a further source of structural disequilibrium in the vassalage relationship. Junod felt that with the experience gained through migrant labour, people no longer considered deportation, in the form of forced military service on the Zambezi or Angola, as just punishment for a severe crime, but preferred jail sentences instead. The arrival of a black corvette, known as the Misi or hyena because of its whistle, foreshadowed

---

91. Ibid., SMA 519/B Loze to Leresche 17 May 1894; 516/B Junod to Leresche 3 Sept., 1894; Junod, "Tembe", BSNG, 1895, 115.

92. UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes..."

93. Ibid., SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend..."; SMA 1127/B Junod "Quelques considerations aidant á comprendre le correspondence entre le regule Nouamantibyana et Henri Junod". SMA 1254/A P. Berthoud, "Rapport sur la station de Lourenço Marques em 1893". Concessions were largely speculative at this time. But for the belief that they would entail a sub-imperial penetration of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, cf. SMA 528/B P. Berthoud to Leresche 13 July, 1894.

razzias throughout the streets of Lourenço Marques. Those workers who, unable to flee the town, were captured by the press-gangs, were then subjected to a language test which divulged their area of origin. Ronga-speakers, whose disappearance from the chiefdoms surrounding Lourenço Marques was politically undesirable, were then generally freed while members of outlying chiefdoms, who spoke different dialects,[94] were conscripted into the army. The unexpected and forced conscription of a father, elder brother or son could deal a shattering blow to the productivity of a homestead but perhaps of equal importance was the fear deportation inspired.

As in other parts of Africa, people in the Delagoa Bay hinterland often rationalized the disappearance of individuals in terms of anthropophagy. Europeans were thought to take people to an island at sea where they were fattened and eaten. According to an informant of Junod's the Misi "called men and devoured them". A Wesleyan evangelist who had grown up and preached in the Delagoa Bay area believed similarly that "when (the Portuguese) have arrested a man they tie stones to him and sink him in the Bay."[95] As the labour demands of capitalist development expanded it became increasingly impossible for the chiefs to supply the Portuguese with labour under the old system. The consequent intervention of the colonial state in the labour market transformed "vassalage" from a political alliance of some mutual benefit to one of exploitation. Uneasy co-existence was replaced by resistance and the intervention of the Portuguese in a succession dispute, which divided one of the vassal chiefdoms, was thus merely a catalyst for war.

When chief Mapunga of the Mazwaya died in 1891 his designated heir Mahazule had the full support of Francisco Serra. However Mobvesha, the head of the Hlewane junior branch of the Mazwaya,

---

94. Generally Djonga or the linguistic cluster that evolved into Thonga-shangaan. UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes...". Press ganging was one of the major causes of the scarcity and expense of labour at Lourenco Marques , BPP 1895 XCIX consular report for 1894.

95. Ibid., Junod, Life, II, 353-354; Robert Mashaba, letter of 22 Oct., 1894 in the Mission Field 1895, 38. For similar beliefs such as chifwambwe in Central African, see G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African (Edinburgh, 1958) 10-11. For West Africa, P. Curtin (ed) Africa Remembered (Madison, 1967), 92-3, 151n, 215, 313, 331.

wished to take advantage of Mahazule's youth by segmenting from the rest of the clan and settling west of the Nkomati. But because of opposition from Mahazule and Serra, Mobvesha was obliged to flee to Nwamba in mid-1891. Although he returned to live near Angouane, peace was maintained until the second half of 1893 when Mobvesha again attempted to move to the west where there was no flooding of the Nkomati and where he would be free of the Mazwaya royal house. When this move was again prohibited by Mahazule, Mobvesha turned to the new military Commander of the Crown Lands, Nogueira, whom he supplied both with labour and, according to Junod, "a large amount of money".[96] Consequently Mahazule distrusted the impartiality of Nogueira's tribunal and when he did report at Angouane in July 1894 to settle the dispute, he was accompanied by his entire army as he feared that Nogueira might attempt to kidnap and exile him. Mahazule refused to discuss the case, refused to pay the new hut tax and, in symbolically ending his vassalage, returned his government uniform, which he advised Nogueira to present to Mobvesha. In August 1894, ten Mazwaya councillors arrived at Angouane to put Mahazule's case but, when they complained after Nogueira had decided in favour of Mobvesha, they were arrested. The first act of the Luso-Gaza war took place when these councillors were freed by the Mazwaya army.[97]

The Luso-Gaza War and its Aftermath

The Portuguese initially turned to Nwamantibyana, the vassal chief of Mafumo who, although he was willing to aid them, was physically restrained from doing so by his councillors. But while the elders demanded caution, the young men clamoured for war with the Portuguese.[98] Nwamantibyana's indecision increased the threat to the Portuguese posed by the Mazwaya and forced them to retire from Angouane in September 1894 and look to the Maputo for assistance.

Although British annexations to Zululand of territories claimed by the Maputo had pushed them into the arms of the Portuguese, they

---

96. SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend..."; Junod, "Baronga", 166.

97. SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend...", SMA 1127/B Junod, "... la correspondence entre le regule Nouamantibyana et H.A. Junod"; UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes..."; Junod, Life I, 409-410; Reis, População de Lourenço Marques, 82-83

98. Junod, Life I, 514.

had consistently refused to provide labour for road construction or pay hut tax until Portugal implemented the promises made to the Maputo envoys in Lisbon in 1889.[99] These included horses for the chief, a public school and especially, that the chiefdom would not be divided between Portugal and Britain. However, the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 1891 recognized Portugal's rights to the area only as far south as a line running from the Pongola-Maputo confluence to the sea. Pending incorporation by the British, the Maputo living south of this line were not expected to pay tax and consequently Zambili and her son Ngwanasi decided that those living north of the line should also be exempted.[100] Ngwanasi was advised by his councillors to send an army to aid the Portuguese. The Maputo army arrived before Lourenço Marques on 3 October 1894 and, having discarded with disdain the flintlocks proffered by the Portuguese, were given over 1 000 Martini-Henrys and Sneiders. But when the army was about to cross from the Tembe beaches to the north side of the Bay, word spread that they were to be pressed into the Portuguese army and sent to Mozambique Island.[101] Ngwanazi's pro-Portuguese councillors were discredited by this perfidy of the Portuguese and, perhaps as planned, the chief then took his counsel from the young men of his own age-set who advised him not to form an alliance with the Portuguese.[102]

The willingness of the Maputo to stay neutral persuaded the Mafumo to enter the war on the side of Mahazule's Mazwaya. On 8 October Henri Junod took a message from chief Nwamantibyana to the governor-general of the province. In it he stated that

> "The reason why we are tired of the whites is because they seize us in large numbers and send us to other

---

99. SMA 516/B Junod to Leresche, 3 Sept., 1894.

100. FO 84/2224 DelaCour to FO 4 April 1892; GLM to GGM., 4 Jan., 1892 in Mouzinho, 157-160; GLM to GGM 12 Feb., 1891 in Ibid., 156.

101. SPG. Rev. Charles Johnson, Journal of his Expedition into Tongaland, Aug.-Sept., 1895, Pt. I; JSA file 74 p 67, evidence of Majuba; FO 63/1281 Bernal to FO 10 Oct., 1894.

102. H. Junod, "Tembe", BSNG 1895, 119-120; KCL., Richter in von Wissel, p 6; Gustav Bruheim, a son-in-law and major adviser of Zambili especially lost face as he was blamed for the failure of the expedition, BPP, 1895- c.-7780 Res. magis., Ubombo to Res. Comm., Zululand, 17 Jan., 1895.

> countries. There are many of our people who have been deported. They call us for their town works. We go and then they take us. They even told me that they would seize and deport me... I have paid the hut tax and the labour tax; and also the great road. I have never seen what I earned for that. Now you want to kill me. I want my people you have arrested; give them back to me and it will be finished."[103]

Nwamantibyana and Mahazule then laid seige to Lourenço Marques.

In the north Gungunyana crossed the Nkomati and attacked two small pro-Portuguese Ntimane chiefdoms in order to keep communications open with the south. His defeat of these chiefdoms was swift because of the division between the young men and the elders. One missionary reported that

> "all the young men would prefer to be under Gungunyane... but at the same time their 'uncles' who were their tutors during their minority, parleyed with the Portuguese and formed armies which they put at the disposal (of Portugal) probably adding as a condition that the Portuguese give them back the power that they formerly exercised and put aside their nephews."[104]

Although Gungunyana had not formerly entered the war against the Portuguese his actions in Ntimane anticipated a widened political consciousness that was to link the various independent chiefdoms of southern Moçambique in an anti-colonial front. As a contemporary observer noted,

> "We must realize that (the) cohesion, utterly lacking in these tribes at the time of the Zulu invasion of 1820-1830, now exists among them thanks to the authority of Gungunyana whom they all recognize."[105]

The siege of Lourenço Marques was lifted only in early December with the arrival of Portuguese imperial troops. Angouane was then re-occupied and on 28 February 1895 Nwamantibyana and his Mafumo

---

103. H. Junod, "Lettre du chef Nouamantibyana á M. Junod, 10 Oct., 1894", BMSAS, 118 Dec., 1894, 215; UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes.."

104. SMA 1254/C Junod, "Rapport sur la station de Lourenco Marques 1894"; SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 4 April 1895.

105. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Jan., 1895. SMA 1128/A Junod to Breyner n.d. ?4March 1896. For a list of the major combatants and their military strengths, see appendix 2.

forces were defeated at Marakwene on the lower Nkomati by the Portuguese and their one constant ally, the Matolla who straddled the railway line leading to the Transvaal. The Portuguese pursued a scorched earth policy and "the country was devastated. Up to fifty kilometres to the north of Lourenço Marques, the country, once covered in huts and villages, is now devastated."[106] Nwamantibyana and Mahazule then retreated to Khosen and the Portuguese consolidated their hold over the chiefdoms south of the Nkomati. The Khosa were divided over whom to support in the conflict and when the Portuguese army crossed the Nkomati in August, numbers of young people were reported to be leaving in great haste for the mines.[107] On 8 September 1895 Nwamantibyana and Mahazule were defeated at Magule on the Nkomati bend and sought refuge with Gungunyana.

In Gaza, the anti-Portuguese attitude of the king was supported by the "younger party" while another group, headed by Mandjobo the governor of Bilene, wanted Gungunyana to hand over Nwamantibyana and Mahazule to the Portuguese.[108] The Gaza king was supplied with arms by at least one labour recruiter and, before the arrival of Imperial troops, "a Johannesburg consortium" offered to lead an attack on Lourenço Marques in exchange for control of the town.[109] The shortage of workers on the Witwatersrand mines brought about by the Luso-Gaza war caused the managements of numerous mines to attempt a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Thus Charles Fisher of Compound Mine and Underwood Fisher of Paarl Central Mine, men who had good reputations with their "Shangaan" workers, introduced ambassadors sent to them from Gungunyana, to the

---

106. Paul Berthoud, Les Negres..., 200, 205; Idem., "La Guerre au Littoral", BMSAS Feb., 1895, 245-247; Grandjean La Mission, 157-58.

107. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 4 Aug., 1895; Grandjean to Renevier, 21 Oct., 1895.

108. G. Liengme, "Un potentat Africain: Goungounyana et son regne", BSNG, 13, 1901, 130, 134.

109. FO 63/1281 Bernal to FO 11 June, 1895; SMA 840 Liengme, 3 Jan., 1896.

Imperial secretary in Cape Town.[110] The Chamber of Mines, which had unsuccessfully attempted to construct shelters along the Nkomati labour route in June-July 1895, sent at least one special envoy to Gungunyana in an attempt to end the war and reopen the flow of labour from Gazaland to the Rand.[111] But these and all other attempts at a peaceful conclusion to the war failed and in November 1895 Gungunyane was decisively defeated.

The Portuguese victory resulted in the expatriation of the Gaza king and the chiefs of Mafumo and Nwamba.[112] Soon after the end of the war, chief Sigaule of Matolla shot himself, reputedly after the Portuguese threatened to exile him because of his failure to supply them with chibalo labour.[113] The Mafumo chiefdom was dissolved and its members fled to the Transvaal or were incorporated into the neighbouring Matolla and Mabota. The Mazwaya population was also seriously depleted by the war.[114] In the south, the Maputo lost the chiefdoms of Sambaan and Umbegiza when in April 1895 the British annexed them to Zululand in order to foil Transvaal plans for access to the sea. For the same reason, the MacMahon line was implemented and "British Amatongaland" was proclaimed a protectorate in May. Following the Portuguese victory over Gungunyana, Ngwanasi fled to the Ubombo district where a British resident was established in June 1896. The Maputo were irrevocably divided when British Amatongaland was annexed to Zululand on 27 December 1897.[115]

By April 1897 the British consul reported that in the Lourenço Marques district, "the greater portion of the revenue is contributed by the direct hut tax on natives." But he warned that martial law

---

110. The British declared themselves unable to intervene in the war as Gazaland was recognized as Portuguese territory according to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 1891, MNE 709 news-cutting encl. in Consul, Pretoria to MNE 23 Dec., 1895.

111. SMA 840 Liengme to Leresche, 3 Jan., 1896.

112. SMA 483 Grandjean "Journal du voyage, 1896"; Junod, Life I, 251, 1.

113. JSA file 74 p 139, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 1897.

114. SMA. 519/C Loze to Leresche, 23 Aug., 1895; Junod, Life I, 388, 542, II, 5.

115. Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 1898.

and the collection of the estimated £22 000 in hut taxes by the military authorities would lead to rebellion. In Khosen and Bilene a war tax of £1 or one head of cattle, together with a hut tax of 10s, was imposed in 1896. Each petty chief was also expected to supply a contingent of workers for chibalo.[116] These extortions caused the Khosa to join the Gaza, led by Gungunyane's old general Maguigane, in a final war against the Portuguese in 1897. This war led to the break-up of the Khosa kingdom, the flight of some 2 000 Gaza Nguni into the Lydenburg district of the eastern Transvaal, and placed the Sul do Save firmly under the control of the Portuguese.[117] Many refugees from the Luso-Gaza wars settled in Lourenço Marques where the African population soared from 1 059 in 1894 to 4 902 in 1897.[118] Numerous others became rootless in-migrants who moved from one area to another in search of a means of subsistence.[119]

Over the years 1897-98 and 1898-99, an annual hut tax of 64 000$000 or £14 222 was drawn from the African population of the Lourenço Marques district.[120] The ability of Africans to pay this hut tax was contingent upon their access to the labour markets of South Africa. But the imposition of the hut tax, together with the extraction of numerous levies from migrant workers, was only made possible by the break-up of the chiefdoms and the political subjugation of the African people of southern Mozambique in the wars of 1894-5 and 1897. The subjugation of southern Mozambique allowed the Portuguese to intervene in the labour market with all the power at the disposal of the colonial state. The modus vivendi labour agreement of 1901 drastically reduced African wages

---

116. SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 24 Jan., 1896; Idem., 24 June, 24 Nov., 1896; FO 63/1336 Consul Casement to FO, 9 April, 1897.

117. Transvaal Native Administration Annual Report, 1904-5, B22; Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low-veld, 179-81. Shongele was obliged to pay an annual reparation of £200. He died in 1898 and Khosen was broken up in 1900. Ferrão, Circumscripçoes, 111.

118. Reis, População de Lourenço Marques, 33-4; TLC., Report, 29.

119. SMA 1760. Grandjean diary, 274; Junod, Life I, 358-9, 537.

120. J. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Providencias publicadas pelo Commissario Regio na provincia de Moçambique desde 23 Maio até 9 Julho 1898. (Lisbon, 1899), 184-5.

in exchange for rail, labour and fiscal privileges that largely benefitted metropolitan coffers. Thus to see the Luso-Gaza wars as tax rebellions[121] or as the result of succession disputes[122] is to take too narrow a perspective. The wars must be set within the context of imperialism and the conflict over manpower which arose out of the clash between two forms of accumulation; one which valued labour as a commodity and generator of surplus value and the other which viewed labour as the primary factor of production and as a means of attracting followers and hence power and respect.[123] The delicate balance between the two was made uneasy and finally overturned by the increasing labour needs of capitalist development. Thus without taking an instrumentalist perspective,[124] it is possible to trace the causes of the Luso-Gaza wars and the invasion of southern Mozambique to the cheap labour needs of the Witwatersrand mines.

---

121. J.J. Texeira Botelho, História Militar e Política dos Portuguezes em Moçambique, (Lisbon, 1934), 433-68; A. Issacman, "Resistance and Collaboration..." AHS, 10, 1, 1977, 53-4.

122. Junod, Life I, 511; D.L. Wheeler, "Gungunyana the negotiator", JAH, IX, 4, 1968, 596.

123. For the importance of labour in pre-industrial societies, cf. pp. 308 ff.

124. With the power of hindsight Junod came to blame the war of 1894-5 on Portugal's wish to supply the Transvaal mines with labour. Cinquante Ans Apres, (Lausanne, 1925), p. 13.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the historical development of the trading settlement at Lourenço Marques has shown that the Portuguese had little control over the resources of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Until 1894-1897 the exactions of the Portuguese upon the people of the area were merely another misfortune, along with the extortions of the Swazi, Gaza and Zulu and the trials of a harsh environment. Consequently the early causes of labour migration cannot be traced to colonial intervention in the labour supply. It has however been ascertained that although warfare was not determinant in generating a flow of labour it did limit the ability of people to feed themselves and widened the difference between actual and desired standards of living. Political turbulence and insecurity induced a high degree of geographical mobility and the direction of this mobility took different paths according to fluctuating local conditions.

The following four chapters seek to determine why such a large part of the male population of the Delagoa Bay hinterland sought to sell its labour in South Africa and why the movement of workers onto the labour market took a migratory form.

SECTION TWO

The Economic and Social Origins of Labour Migration

INTRODUCTION

African historians have tended, whether under the influence of Romanticism or Nationalism, to idealize the pre-colonial past and little has been written on the precariousness of existence before the introduction of modern medicine and farming methods.[1] For many people in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, temporary wage labour in south Africa furnished the means needed to secure a level of nutrition that was sufficiently high to provide resistance to endemic and epidemic diseases. This was particularly important during the late 19th century when the Delagoa Bay hinterland was hit by an extended ecological crisis, a change in the terms of trade which made the commoditization of labour power more profitable than the commoditization of the product of labour, and by the narrowing of economic alternatives to migrant labour. Migrancy was engendered not only "from below" but also "from the top" as the rulers of the Delagoa Bay hinterland adapted existing forms of surplus appropriation to benefit from migrant labour.

As outside earnings became an integral part of the rural economy, migrant labour became self-perpetuating as, by education, tradition and habit, it was accepted as a self-evident law of nature. Migrant labour became one of the conditions for the reproduction of the existing mode of production and the migrant was anchored to his rural base by the perpetuation of communal land ownership, late

---

1. A partial exception is Joseph C. Miller, "The significance of drought, disease and famine in the agriculturally marginal zones of west-central Africa", JAH, 23, 1, 1982 and Jill R. Dias, "Famine and disease in the history of Angola, c.1830-1930", JAH, XXI, 3, 1981. But cf. the growing body of work on the history of famine, disease and mortality in the industrialized world. In central Europe in 1880 the life expectancy for men was about 30 years and about 35 for women. In 16th and 17th century France only about half the population reached the age of 20. Similarly high mortality rates existed in Japan and other countries. To cite only the most recent literature, cf. M. Mitterauer and R. Sieder, The European Family (Oxford, 1982), 34-5; Peter Laslett, (ed.) Household and Family in Past Time (Cambridge, 1972), 501-502; Paul Slack, Death and Disease in Pre-Industrial Europe, (London, 1982); E.A. Wrigley and R. Schofield, The Population History of England, 1541-1871 (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).

inheritance, settlement patterns based on kinship and fealty and by a socialization that encouraged early marriage and travel but disdained bachelorhood and spinsterhood. Far from being an individualistic, risk-taking venture entered into by "men of two worlds", migrant labour emerged as an integral and "natural" resource whose exploitation increased the chances of survival in a harsh environment.

Chapter 6

LIFE AND DEATH:
Food and Disease

The Ecological Framework

The geology of the flat, low-lying coastal plain stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Lebombo mountains is one of largely unconsolidated Quatenary and Tertiary sediments marked by infertile and acidic soils. Drought was ubiquitous in these areas, where porous soils were unable to retain the light and irregular rainfall which fell in the interior and where high evaporation rates were caused by summer temperatures which often exceeded 100°F. In these areas, by far the major part of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, an entire crop could be lost within ten days due to unseasonal rainfall.[1]

The sandy soil areas were cut by fertile alluvial plains which, in the case of the Limpopo, could reach a width of twelve miles. These areas were particularly valuable because of the rich silt deposited by annual flooding.[2] A range of fold hills reaching 300-400 feet flanked the coastal areas of Maputo, Tembe and Nondwane. Patches of fertile red and black soils which are humus-rich and water-retentive were situated on the eastern slopes and tops of these hills. Summer temperatures were moderated by sea breezes and the rainfall on the coast was higher than that in the interior. A number of seasonal swamps and lakes lay in the depressions found to the west of the coastal hills, as well as in the perennial Muze swamp zone which stretched north of the Mkuzi river. These swamps had a high water table and, together with the black soil in the depressions, constituted good areas for agriculture.[3] In virtually the entire Delagoa Bay hinterland, subtropical forest had been turned into wood and bushland by fire, cultivation and

---

1. Crops in these soils probably "saw" less than 50% of the annual rainfall. Hornby, "Report on tsetsefly problems of Maputo", Anais do Instituto de Medicina Tropical, 1947, vol 4, 316.

2. St. Vincent Erskine, "1871-2 journey", ms., RGS., ch. 10, pp 11-12; A. Longle, "De Inhambane a Lourenço Marques", BSGL, 6, 1, 1886; SMA 1760 Grandjean 15 July 1890; SMA 435/G Liengme to Leresche, 16 Oct, 1891; Grandjean, "Le Bassin du Nkomati", BSNG XII, 1900.

3. H. Berthoud, "Deux problemes hydrographiques du pays de Gaza", BSNG, XV, 1904.

grazing. However, isolated forest areas still existed in Maputoland and a large forest, situated south of the Nkomati bend in Ntimane and Xerinda, provided fresh land for Gaza immigrants in the 1890s.[4]

Coastal rainfall was sufficient to support cereal cultivation in the water-retentive black and red soil areas. But it was extremely irregular and this limited the cultivation of the sandy soil and dry areas east of the Lebombos.[5] The Dutch noticed in the 1720s that if rain did not fall in the correct season, the summer heat soon dried and killed all planted seeds.[6] Junod noted similarly that if rain did not fall in November or December, "it is a dreadful misfortune... famine will certainly follow as cereals can only be sown during these two months."[7]

By 1880 at least two types of maize were grown in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. These were probably the hardy, quick-maturing but low-yielding "flint" strain and the "dent" type of maize which grows best in the alluvial soil areas.[8] In fertile, well-watered soil it was often possible to harvest two crops in one year; the one on high ground next to the river was harvested in summer and the other, planted in the fresh alluvium, was harvested in autumn.[9] The yield per acre in the alluvial plains of the

---

4. See Ario Lobo Azvedo, O Clima de Moçambique e a Agricultura, pp. 199-207 for a preliminary account of the soils of present-day Maputo district.

5. Junod, Life II, 2-4. For 20th century accounts of rainfall in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, see also A.L. Azvedo, O Clima de Mocambique, 9-102; M.A. Peres, "Preliminary Investigations on the rainfall of Lourenco Marques", SAJS, XXVII, 1930. For irregularity of rainfall, see figure 4, p. 230.

6. C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd om Delagoabaai", (PhD, Stellenbosch, 1954), 140, 144.

7. This probably refers to the lower Nkomati area where Junod worked as a missionary, Life, II, 315-316; see also Seidel, "Die Ba-Ronga an der Delagoa Bay", Globus, 74, 12, 1898, 188.

8. WUL. American Zulu Mission, Pinkerton Diary, August 1880. For maize types, see Hedges, "Trade and Politics", 41-42.

9. SMA 467 Grandjean 1890; BMSAS, 1890, 122; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire d'Andrade, 1891; E. Schlaefli-Glardon, "De Valdezia á Lourenço Marques, journal de voyage", BSNG., VII, 1893, 156; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 74.

Nkomati and Limpopo-Olifants was also far superior to that of other areas.[10] In the more perennial swamp areas an early maize was planted close to the water and ripened before the main crop.[11] But as maize needed fertile soil and regular rainfall, in the drier areas it was replaced by various strains of sorghum and especially millet.[12] The leaves and tubers of cassava and sweet potato plants were also important famine-breakers as they grew well in sandy soil. Groundnuts also grew well in the dry areas and, roasted or as a relish, provided people with an important source of protein and fat. Rice was grown under tidal irrigation on some rivers and, together with inferior sugar-canes, was cultivated in the coastal depressions where perennial water was found. Pumpkins were grown for their leaves and fruit, and watermelons, bambarra nuts and cow-peas all proved popular. Mung beans were particularly important as they are fairly drought-resistant and, harvested in May, they were the last crop to ripen.[13]

Despite the spreading of risk by cultivating a variety of crops, agriculture in most parts of the Delagoa Bay hinterland was dominated by poor soils and irregular rainfall. This meant that in most areas the amount of food produced from one year to the next was highly unreliable. Ecological problems were aggravated by political uncertainties which brought "tax raids" by Zulu, Swazi, Gaza and Boers, at different times and into different areas. This made the open storage of cereals difficult and caused grain to rot in pits or, hidden in the bush, to fall prey to animals and insects. Even where grain could be kept in conventional storage facilities,

---

10. Junod, Life II, 9.

11. BO 46, 13 Nov., 1876, 317; Junod, "Correspondence", BSNG, 1893, 532.

12. Sorghum (maphilia; mapira); millet (mabele); pennisitum millet (moexeira). Junod Life II, 10-11; P. Hair, "Milho, meixoera and other foodstuffs of the Sofala garrison, 1505-1525", in Cahiers d'Études Africaines, XVII, 1977.

13. Junod, Life II, 11-15; H. Junod "Lourenco Marques" in BMSAS, 117, Oct., 1894, 180; Junod, Life II, 12-13; For descriptions of foods cultivated, see BO 45. 5 Nov., 1877, 324; BO 4. 22 Jan., 1887; BO 20. 14 May 1887 "Relatorio do Excursão agricola ao Districto de Lourenço Marques"; ZGH 796 2892 Foxon, "Information regarding the British Protectorate of Maputoland, 1896"; P.J. Quinn, Foods and Feeding Habits of the Pedi, (Johannesburg, 1957) especially, 40, 45-46.

these were unsophisticated.[14] Thus in most of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, November and December were months of hunger when little food was left in the granaries and much energy had to be expended on cultivation. During this time of year, and especially during periods of drought, alternative sources of food to cultivated crops had to be found. Foremost amongst these were fruits gathered from the sparsely populated dry areas of the western and north-western Delagoa Bay hinterland and from the clan commonage separating the various homesteads.

The mafureira almond of the Natal mahogany (nkuhlu; Trichilia emetica) ripened in November and December. The pulp and nut of this fruit are rich in oil and constituted an important drought-breaker, body oil and export product. The edible pulp of the fruit of the dull-leaved kwakwa tree (Strychnos innocua) was dried or smoked and then pounded into a storeable flour. The monkey orange (nsala; Strychnos spinosa) was also an important drought-breaker as it matured between May and November and the fruit of the wild plum (bukanye; Herpethyllum caffrum) was made into a popular and nutritious beer.[15] Several other fruits of lesser importance were also gathered from the clan commonage and various plants such as tomatoes, onions, pineapples, water-lily bulbs and water chestnuts, were either gathered or cultivated. Trees growing on the communal land provided wood for construction, carving implements and utensils, mortars, canoes and especially, provided fuel for cooking and warmth. Fresh and sea water fishing and the gathering of several kinds of crustacae and molluscs were practised throughout the year.[16]

---

14. St. V. Erskine, 1869 journey, ms in RGS, 96; 1871-72 journey ms. in RGS, ch 6, p. 4; Fernandes das Neves, A Hunting Expedition to the Transvaal (London, 1879), 68; Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 1898. For conventional granaries, see Junod, Life I, 315.

15. Junod, Life I, 395-399; II, 15-19; Sá Nogueira, Dicionário; Keith Coates Palgrave, Trees of Central Africa; E. Palmer and N. Pitman, Trees of Southern Africa, 3 vols (Cape Town, 1973).

16. This interpretation differs from that of Hedges, who sees fishing as a largely coastal activity, Hedges, "Trade and Politics", 53-4. But for contrary evidence, cf. SMA 513/B Grandjean-Leresche, 5 Sept., 1894; Delegorgue, Afrique Australe, 465; C. Hilliard, "Notes on the Manucosi or King George river", ms in RGS, p. 6; Schlaefli-Glardon, "De Valdezia", 173; Freire d'Andrade, "Exploração Português em Lourenço Marques e Inhambane", BSGL 13, 5, 1894, 311; Junod, "Tembe", BSNG., 1895, 115-116; ZGH 796.892/96 Foxon, "Further information regarding Maputoland, British Protectorate"; Junod, Life I, 175; II, 338-339.

Fish were caught in tidal basket traps, in specially constructed weirs, and, often from sailing boats, on a hook and line. The collective fish hunt or tjeba often involved several hundred people and was of great importance as it took place during the "hungry period" at the end of the dry season, before the rains of November and December replenished the lakes and before the flood waters came down from the Highveld.[17]

Another product of the clan's commonage and an important source of protein, which often served as a famine-breaker, was the meat derived from hunting small game and from foraging for large land-snails (achatina), tortoises, the large kwhale lizard and locusts. Men who hunted game in order to provide food for their families were distinguished as hloti, from the professional hunters of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. They generally hunted in the dry winter season when bush cover was low and when the movement of wild animals was restricted by the seasonal shortage of ground water and palatable grasses. This was also the season when male labour could be spared from agricultural activities and when the threat posed by malaria, tick-bite fever and dysentery, together with the barrier presented by rain-swollen rivers, was minimized. Game was hunted not only for meat but also for skins and the animal fat used as a soap and in cleansing and softening hides.

Cattle were pastured on the clan commonage and were an important bridewealth medium whose ritual slaughter on special occasions brought prestige to their owners.[18] But their ultimate importance lay in their "convertability" to beef during times of famine. Cattle provided milk, hide for shields, thongs, skins, cleansing fat, horns, dung fertilizer and a dung cement used in the construction of hut floors and walls. Although beef was a prized famine-breaker and alternative to cultivated crops, in that cattle could be moved to available water resources, the ecology and political geography of the Delagoa Bay hinterland severely limited cattle-keeping.

A lack of ground water in the dry sandy soil areas restricted cattle to the neighbourhood of seasonal or perennial water points. Tidal or fresh water swamp grasslands provided particularly good

---

17. Jeannert, "Les Ma-Khoca", BSNG, 1895, 127; Junod, Life II, 85-88; see also H.P. Braatvedt, Roaming Zululand with a Native Commissioner, (Pietermaritzburg, 1949), 106.

18. Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 250; AHU Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Relatório de Freire d'Andrade, 1891, p. 41; Junod, Life I, 48, 61, 369; II, 413.

pasture and attracted cattle from areas where sourveld pastures were burnt during the dry winter months.[19] But the centralization of cattle around water points made them more susceptible to raiding parties, disease and tsetse fly.

Tsetse was endemic to the Delagoa Bay hinterland; trypanosomiasis was carried by a blood parasite, or trypanosome, which was injected by the tsetse fly into a living vector. Five species of tsetse, each adapted to a specific floral and faunal environment, existed in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The most virulent and widespread species was that of Glossina morsitans which lived essentially off ungulates rather than the water and bush cover favoured by the other species.[20] Clearing tsetse from an area required the extermination of those wild animals which served as vectors for the trypanosome and the clearing of the floral habitat of the tsetse fly. As each beast needed 12 acres of pasture, bush clearance was a labour intensive operation which was traditionally hindered by the practice of slash and burn agriculture in the drier areas where land was often left fallow for two year periods.[21] The area occupied by the tsetse fly also changed due to normal seasonal, as well as severe environmental, adjustments brought on by drought or flooding. Nineteenth century observers felt that tsetse infestation had expanded as pastures reverted to bush and woodland following the extensive loss of cattle to the Ngoni invaders during the 1820s and 1830s. Because of the ease with which tsetse flies moved and multiplied, trypanosomiasis at times took on epidemic proportions and could cause the depopulation of an area.[22]

---

19. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "L'État du Littoral", Sept., 1887. Oral testimony of A.J. Roberts who lived in Lourenço Marques during 1887-88 in W. Punt, Louis Trigardt se Laatste Skof, 122, 125.

20. Jaime Dias, "Qual seria o status glossinico no territorio de Moçambique, ao sul do Rio Limpopo anteriormente á grande panzootia de peste bovine de 1896?" In Bol. Soc. Estudos Moc., 1961, 128; H.E. Hornby, "Report on tsetsefly problems of Maputo", Anais do Instituto de Medicina Tropical, 1947, vol 4; D. Bruce, Preliminary Report on the tsetse-fly disease or nagana in Zululand, (Ubombo, 1895).

21. St. V. Erskine, 1869 ms., 106,110; Bishop D. McKenzie, diary June-July 1881 in anon., Missionary Life of Douglas McKenzie, 13; BO 20. 14 May 1887 "Relatório do Excursão agricola ao Districto de Lourenço Marques"; Leslie, Among the Zulus and the Amatongas, 259; ZA 27 Saunders to Res. Comm. Zululand 8 July 1895; T. Baines, The Gold Regions of South-eastern Africa, 153.

22. St. V. Erskine, 1874-5 ms., ch 1, p. 3; SMA 1255/A; E. Rosset, "Voyage au Limpopo", July-Aug., 1894; C. Fuller, Louis Trigardt's trek across the Drakensberg 1837-38, ed. L. Fouche, 141-142, 367, 333.

But the presence of trypanosomiasis did not everywhere exclude cattle keeping, nor did it entirely preclude a local trade in cattle or their importation into the area, for the flies lived in belts or patches which could be circumvented by knowledgeable guides.[23]

Other, generally tick-borne, diseases such as gall-sickness, heartwater and biliary fever exhibited a dynamism similar to trypanosomiasis because tick infestation is highest during summer. Mortality was especially high during periods of drought when the animals' resistance to disease was weakened.[24] These habitual threats to cattle, and hence to beef and milk as sources of food, were overshadowed during the second half of the nineteenth century by war and drought; scourges which laid the basis for the great epizootics of the period. Because cattle were highly visible, mobile and valuable they constituted an ideal form of booty for any raiding party. Because of this, milk was an unreliable nutrient and people, especially during periods of political uncertainty, preferred to keep pigs and fowls, which were food taboos of most Nguni speakers, as well as goats, all of which were resistant to trypanosomiasis.[25] It becomes clear that an inherent imbalance existed between man and his environment in the 19th century Delagoa Bay hinterland and the ability of people equipped with a limited technology to transform nature for the own purposes by means of their productive labour was severely restricted.

The Precariousness of Food Production

The precariousness of agricultural production and cattle-keeping was constantly alluded to by Portuguese officials, missionaries and travellers.

After reaping good harvests in 1860-61 which resulted in a small

---

23. N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in eastern Africa, 59; SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 12 Jan., 1863; AHU. Moç., pasta 9, 2ª Rep., Freire de Andrade Report, 1891; FO 63/1317 Consul to FO, 4 Aug., 1896; KCL., Arthur Richter in von Wissel, 9. See also note 185, p. 256.

24. M.W. Henning, Animal Diseases in South Africa, 276-296. Biliary was confined to horses and dogs.

25. Fynn, Diary, 46; Struthers, "Hunting journal", 7 June 1854, 89; 6 July 1855, see also BMSAS 94, Feb., 1891, 197.

export of cereals,[26] the Delagoa Bay hinterland was in 1862 struck by the widespread drought affecting all of southern Africa. The drought soon took on famine proportions in those areas where it was accompanied by the ravages of the Gaza civil war. According to the Governor of Lourenço Marques the drought was marked by a "great loss of foodstuffs for, despite the previous year's good crops, famine was worsened by war."[27] Oral testimony collected 38 years later recalled that "During the civil war certain parts of Khosen were in a continual state of devastation. They speak of a famine which lasted five years (during which) the most hardy were discouraged from working in fields which they would see devastated."[28] The rocketing cost of food at Lourenço Marques was indicative of the general shortage of food during the drought. From May 1862 to October 1863 the price of millet at the settlement rose from $172 to $590 per panja. The price of maize climbed from $172 in May 1862 to $690 in October 1864 and to 1$150 per panja in May 1865.[29]

The devastation caused by drought and the civil war was worsened by the advance of a strain of cattle peripneumonia, which had arrived at the Cape in 1854 and which had spread to the Zoutpansberg by the following year.[30] Probably because of problems encountered in crossing the tsetse belt, this disease only reached the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1861. By August 1862 the Governor of Lourenço Marques reported that peripneumonia had killed "almost all"

---

26. Some 333 panjas of "mantimento catreal", which was distinguished from "mexoeira", was exported in 1861 and 1862. A panja was a measure of capacity for dry goods used in Moçambique equal to 27,71 litres, which is 1,29 litres more than 3 pedes (6 gallons) or 3/4 bushel. In some areas a panja was measured as 30 litres. BO 18. 5 May 1860, 78; BO 20. 18 May 1861; BO 22. 31 May 1862.

27. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 21 GLourenço Marques to GGM 8 Feb., 1863; ACU 1864 Fernandes das Neves, "Notícia de uma caçada em Inhambane" 61; Ibid., "Notícias do anno 1862", 59; BO 32. 27 Dec., 1862, GInh. to GGM 21 Nov., 1862; BO 22. 30 May 1863.

28. SMA 467 Grandjean, 1890.

29. BO 40. 5 Oct., 1861; BO 22. 31 May 1862; BO 42. 17 Oct., 1863; BO 42. 15 Oct., 1864; BO 19. 13 May 1865. The price per panja of meixoeira (millet) and maize fell to $135 and $128 in 1866-67, BO 22, 22 May 1869.

30. SS 7. R827/55 Landdrost Zoutpansberg to Kmdt. Gen., 1 June 1855; Ibid., R 851/55 26 June 1855.

the cattle in the area. A cattle epidemic, probably that of 1862-3, was thought responsible for the destruction of the original cattle breed on the lower Limpopo.[31] By February 1863 "lungsickness" had killed more than 3 000 cattle in the territory around Lourenço Marques claimed by the Portuguese and a further 5 000 cattle were thought to have died because of the drought and war.[32]

The cattle losses caused by the epizootic were increased when in February 1862 Umzila lost most of his cattle to the forces led by Mawewe and his Swazi allies.[33] The uncertain food situation caused by the drought and cattle epidemic constituted a major reason for Umzila's move northwards and his pillage of the area south of the Zambezi.[34] But with Umzila in the north, Mawewe and the Swazi were able to replenish their lungsickness-ravaged herds by raiding large numbers of cattle from Umzila's allies in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. These raids discouraged cattle-keeping for, as one traveller was told in 1869, "our ivory we can hide, but our cattle we cannot."[35] As late as 1880, at least one chief living in the vicinity of Lourenço Marques refused to keep cattle for the fear that they would attract Swazi raiders.[36] Before the Zulu defeat of 1879 and the civil war of 1883, similar fears were expressed by people living to the south of Lourenço Marques who felt that any accumulation of cattle would merely attract Zulu tribute gatherers.[37] By the mid-1860s it was recognized that the

---

31. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 21. GLM to GGM, 13 Aug., 1862 encl. in CG to MSMU 14 Oct., 1862; St. V. Erskine, 1871-2 ms. in RGS., ch 8 p 7.

32. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 21. GLourenço Marques to GGM 8 Feb., 1863.

33. It was reported that the white cattle taken from Umzila alone filled the Swazi king's cattle kraals, H. Merensky, Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben im Transvaal, (Berlin, 1899), 83; AHU. Moç., pasta 19, GGM to MSMU, 28 May, 1862.

34. SNA 1/1/96 encl. in no 73, "Statements of...messenger of Umzila", 16 May 1870; AHU. Moç.CGpasta 21, GInh to GG, 16 Jan., 1863, encl. in GGM to MSMU, 8 Aug., 1863.

35. St. V. Erskine, 1869 ms. in RGS., 244; AHU. Moç., CG. GGM to MSMU., 28 June 1862.

36. WUL., Am Zulu Miss., Pinkerton diary, 4 Aug., 1880.

37. BPP 1890 c.-6200 Saunders to SNA 17 Nov., 1887; Fynn, Diary, 46.

drought and epizootic had caused men to concentrate on hunting as a source of food and had forced many others, who had formerly supplied the settlement with food and cattle, to seek work in Natal. Over the next few years the African population continued to supply food to the settlement and visiting ships, but little was left for export.[38] Our knowledge of food production in the vicinity of Lourenço Marques becomes clearer from 1875, after which an annual, and at times monthly, report was made on agricultural conditions affecting the territory claimed by the Portuguese.

After a good harvest in 1875, sufficient maize was produced to allow the export of 44 061 kilos, worth £5 377, to Natal.[39] But summer rains later that year were poor in most areas, except for Maputo land and the upper Nkomati, the consequent "paralysis" of agriculture resulted in high food prices in Lourenço Marques in 1876 and the Governor of the settlement feared a year of "disastrous famine."[40] By December 1876 the widespread drought affecting southern Africa had gripped the Delagoa Bay area; cereal cultivation came to a standstill and people had to exist on mafureira almonds and venison. Because of the drought, many men sought wage labour in Natal and the Cape. In January 1877 it was reported that people were abandoning cultivation altogether and had turned to gathering wild fruits; food was imported from Mozambique Island and Zanzibar, but only the wealthy could afford to buy it.[41] But in February 1877 rain fell, by April the food crisis was over and the harvest was large enough for 37 908 litres or 1 067 bushels of maize to be exported, of which 7 840 kilos, worth £857 was sent to Natal. This abundant harvest allowed the Governor to report that, along with mafureira almonds, maize was the major export of Lourenço Marques in 1877.[42] But the successes of 1877 were threatened by poor

---

38. ACU., GLM 15 April 1865, Report for 1964, p 97; BO 41. 14 Oct., 1866, GLM to GGM 13 Sept., 1866. In 1866-67 exports of rice, maize and millet amounted to 5 258$586 (£1 168, 10s). BO 22. 22 May 1869.

39. NBB 1875, "Imports and exports". The total maize exports for 1875 were declared as 10 000 panjas (277 100 litres or 7 864 bushels). BO 27, 3 July 1875.

40. BO 7. 14 Feb., 1876; BO 15., 10 April, 1876; BO 46. 13 Nov., 1876.

41. BO 6. 5 Feb., 1877.

42. NBB 1877 "Imports and exports," BO 13. 25 March 1877; BO 45. 5 Nov., 1877.

rains in the summer of 1877/78. This caused the price of cereals to rise in Lourenço Marques in December and the price only declined in March as new cereals entered the market. By April the harvest had been successful enough to provide a healthy volume of maize exports which included 10 920 kilos valued at £1 250, for Natal.[43] High summer temperatures and lack of seasonal rain at the end of 1878 killed all the seeds planted in anticipation of the October rains and dried up the cattle pastures. Favourable rains in November and succeeding months allowed seeds to be resown and, by March 1879, food prices dropped after a good harvest.[44] Irregular rainfall continued to be a major problem when poor rains at the end of 1879 resulted in a food shortage in 1880 which was only alleviated by late rains in January, February and March of 1881.[45] In that year many pigs died for the first time from trichinosis, an infestation of the body with the larvae of the trichina worm.[46] Seasonal rains in October and November 1881 produced good crops but this was followed by food shortages brought on by poor rainfall during the following two summers.[47] The summer of 1884-85 produced good rains and crops but by December part of the maize crop had been lost due to unseasonal rain and the following month the Governor described the food situation around the settlement as "precarious" because of insufficient rain. By April 1886 lack of rain had limited the amount of maize harvested and people fell back on more hardy crops such as groundnuts, millet, sorghum and beans.[48] At the end of 1886 sowing was withheld because of late rains and during the summer of 1886/87 agriculture was reported to be "completely stagnant". Poor early rains during the following summer resulted

---

43. BO 11, 18 March 1878; BO 20, 20 May 1878; BO 22, 3 June 1878; NBB 1878, "Imports". The official maize export was recorded as 300 588 litres (approx. 8 500 bushels).

44. BO 8, 24 Feb., 1879; BO 11, 17 March, 1879; BO 20, 19 May 1879; BO 21, 26 May 1879.

45. BO 11. 14 March 1881.

46. Antonio Ferreira, "Relatório do Serviço de Saude de Lourenço Marques, 1886" in Archivos Medico-Coloniaes, 4, 1890, 74.

47. BO 51. 17 Dec., 1881; BO 25. 10 June 1882; BO 29. 8 July 1882; BO 6. 9 Feb., 1884; BO 24. 14 June 1884; BO 45. 8 Nov., 1884.

48. BO 2. 10 Jan., 1885; BO 7. 13 Feb., 1886; BO 11. 13 March 1886; BO 16. 17 April 1886; BO 23. 5 June 1886.

in the loss of the first crop.[49]

When the Governor of Lourenço Marques stopped his agricultural reports in 1888, it was generally regarded that Lourenço Marques was the poorest agricultural district in Mozambique.[50] Unpredictable agricultural production was partially offset by an increase in cattle herds brought about by the shooting out of those animals which acted as vectors of trypanosomiasis.[51]

Reports sent by Swiss missionaries from their station on the coastal hills bordering the lower Nkomati flood plains, 22 kilometres north of Lourenço Marques, give a good impression of food production in that area after 1887. When unseasonal rain fell in August of that year, crops were hastily planted and maize grew to a height of one metre before drying on the stalk and dying for lack of rain. Drought conditions began to emerge in September and October 1887 and continued when maize, planted in spring 1888, dried on the stalk.[52] Insufficient rain resulted in the loss of three quarters of the crop of 1888/89 and the importation of maize from Natal at three to five times the Lourenço Marques price. At the end of the dry winter of 1889 the missionary at Rikatla lamented that,

> "For the last 15 months we have had only 3 to 4 days of rain - there is no more maize, nor any other provisions in the country. The inhabitants are wandering far and wide in search of (food). In (Lourenço Marques) where maize is imported, it sells at 3 times its usual price. The fields have produced nothing."[53]

---

49. BO 42. 16 Oct., 1886; BO 40. 2 Oct., 1886; BO 49. 3 Dec., 1887; BO 2. 14 Jan., 1888; SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud to Leresche 7 Oct., 1887; Berthoud to Leresche 14 Nov., 1887; 497/D Paul Berthoud to Leresche 4 Feb., 1888; BO 3. 21 Jan., 1888.

50. AHU. Moç., Diversos, caixa 2, "Relatório acerca de alguns portos de Província de Moçambique", Augusto Castilho 12 March 1883; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 3, Machado memo, 10 Nov., 1885.

51. BO 22. 14 May 1887, "Excursão Agricola do Districto de Lourenço Marques" by the provincial agronomist, March 1887. See especially pp. 272-274.

52. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud "L'état du littoral", Sept., 1887; Paul Berthoud, BMSAS, Feb., 1888; Grandjean, 15 Jan., 1889 in BMSAS, April 1889.

53. SMA 502/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche 28 Aug., 1889 also in BMSAS, Oct., 1889; Paul Berthoud estimated the price of maize to have quintupled by the 5 April 1889. L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, X, 1889; BO 27. 6 July 1889.

As the rains failed again, people were reduced to gathering fruit and many travelled from Rikatla to the fertile maize-producing areas on the lower and middle Nkomati in order to buy food.[54] But famine conditions existed even in the Nkomati flood plain where, as elsewhere, people were reduced to eating wild fruit and roots. The inaccessibility of maize in Khosen was partly attributable to the sale by local producers, imbued with a more cyclical sense of time, of their crops to Banyan merchants. These traders, who had spread throughout the area during the previous decade, used their knowledge of wider markets and communications to speculate in foodstuffs by buying up all surplus maize and then selling it for three to four times it original purchase price. Maize had also to be imported from the United States.[55]

This famine of the late 1880s, which was part of a more widespread drought affecting most of southern Africa, ended suddenly with torrential downpours in February 1890.[56] Yet by September Nondwane was again "as dry as is possible" and by the following year drought had brought to the area "conditions touching on famine."[57] In Khosen, recently inundated with immigrants brought south by Gungunyana, matters were far worse. In 1891 a Swiss missionary stationed on the Nkomati bend remarked on the "cruel suffering" that had been brought to the area by the drought of that year. In June 1892 food was rare and expensive in Khosen and the area was reported to be in "dire straits".[58] By September the missionary reported that

---

54. SMA 503/A Grandjean to Leresche 15 Nov., 1889; SMA 503/B Grandjean to Conseil, 9 Sept., 1889.

55. Grandjean, "Voyage a Antioka", BMSAS, Dec., 1889, 337; Grandjean, 16 Nov., 1889 in BMSAS, Feb., 1890. SMA 1256/A Paul Berthoud, "Marche sur l'Oeuvre...", 1889. The growth of Banyan trade is treated on pp. 287-293.

56. SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche, Feb., 1890; SMA 502/C Junod to Leresche, 13 Feb., 1890.

57. SMA 502/C Junod to Leresche 16 Sept., 1890; Paul Berthoud, L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, XIV, 1893.

58. SMA 467 Grandjean, 12 June 1892; SMA 1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur l'oeuvre missionaire, 1892", Grandjean, "Voyage a Antioka", 4 Aug., 1892 in BMSAS 1892, 119.

> "Most people are reduced to eating only grass and wild fruit or to preparing the pith of certain trees. Over half the population is constantly travelling in order to buy provisions where they are still available."

All supplies of maize had been consumed and there was no seed left for planting.[59] The British Consul reported from Lourenço Marques that the entire maize crop had failed due to the drought of 1891/92 and that the African population was "on the verge of starvation".[60]

Probably because the drought reduced pasturage and thus limited the resistance of cattle to disease, an epizootic swept through the Delagoa Bay hinterland where it killed large numbers of cattle in 1891.[61] Although one observer thought the disease to be lungsickness it was generally described as a "liver disease". This indicates that the epizootic was redwater or Texas fever, one of the symptoms of which is an enlarged and swollen liver. This disease had spread through southern Africa in the 1870s and, like the epizootic of 1862/63, took several years to penetrate the tsetse belt.[62]

The drought ended when rain fell in Khosen in September and more generally throughout the area in October 1892; seeds were planted early in Khosen and it was hoped that a first crop would be harvested in December, two months before the rest of the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[63] In January 1893 Khosen celebrated the end of the famine, but within days torrential rains flooded the riverine plains of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and in January and February the country experienced "the worst floods in living memory."[64] In Lourenço Marques precipitation in those two months reached 495 millimetres (19.48 inches) and 500 millimetres (19.6 inches) and on the lower Nkomati it was recorded as 462 millimetres (18.18 inches) and 508 millimetres (19.9 inches) (see figure 4).[65] Communications

---

59. SMA 872/E Grandjean to Leresche 9 Sept., 1892.

60. FO 84/2224 Consul Lourenço Marques to FO, 4 April 1892.

61. AHU., Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, 1891, p. 46.

62. SMA 484/B Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 9 March 1892; SMA 485/B Junod, "Rapport sur Rikatla", 1891; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, 1891 report, p. 46; Natal Mercury, 22, 23 April, 1873. For "redwater-fever" and its history see Henning, Animal Diseases, 261-277.

63. SMA 484/B Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 7 Sept., 1892; SMA 484/B Berthoud to Leresche, 14 Oct., 1892; SMA 872/E Grandjean to Leresche, 22 Oct., 1892.

64. SMA 467 Granjean to Leresche, 1 Oct., 1893.

65. Paul Berthoud, 16 March 1893 in L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée,

were broken and part of the harvest was lost when fields, roads and rivers were submerged by flood waters.

Figure No. 4

Rainfall Deviation in Millimetres



Recorded 1891/2 to 1894/5 in Nondwane and 1909/10 to 1942/3 in Lourenço Marques.

(Source: Junod,"Le Climat de la Baie de Delagoa", Bull. Soc. Sci. Naturelles de Neuchâtel, XXV, 1897; Ario Lobo Azevedo, O Clima de Moçambique e a Agricultura, 96.)

Due to the floods famine remained a threat and food was rare and costly during the October-November sowing season and before the harvest.[66] In Khosen the crops that emerged after good seasonal rain

---

XIV, 1893; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary 4-24 Jan., 1893.

66. SMA 528/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 4 Feb., 1893; Ibid., 14 Feb., 1893; SMA 1254/A Paul Berthoud, "Rapport de la Conference du littoral...en 1893"; Ibid., "Rapport sur la station de Lourenço Marques, 1893"; Grandjean, "Antioka", 2 March 1893 in BMSAS, 1893, 274; SMA 485/B Junod to Leresche, 16 Dec., 1892; SMA 513 Grandjean to Leresche 2 March 1893; see also SMA 1254/B G. Liengme, "Expedition et sejour a Mandlakazi", May-Sept., 1893.

at the end of 1894, were destroyed by locusts in December.[67] In February 1895 twelve days of rain resulted in flood conditions in Khosen where, "the fields of maize are completely covered in water, it is impossible to try and save the grain, it would hardly be worthwhile. And now our people, who thought they were dying because of the drought, are distraught because there is too much water."[68] Matters were made worse by the invasion of Khosen by five waves of locusts which in April and May "ravaged the greater part of the fields that we had sown anew following the flood."[69] Locusts and drought also destroyed the crops in the Lourenço Marques area and trebled the price of maize.[70] But in Khosen the famine was so bad that it was reported in May 1895 that parents were "selling" or pawning their children for £4-5 while others sought relief in wage labour.[71] Rain failed to fall over the summer of 1895/96, movement was made difficult during and after the Luso-Gaza war, locusts continued to plague the area and, because of the drought, wild animals were drawn to settlements where they ravaged hardy crops like sweet potatoes.[72] North of the Limpopo famine was one of the major causes for the inability of the Gaza to repulse the Portuguese invasion for, as the Gaza army had no commisariate, its full mobilisation was severely restricted by the inability of the countryside to support a heavy concentration of soldiers.[73] In the Tembe-

---

67. SMA 573/B Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Dec., 1894.

68. Perrenoud, "Antioka" 10 Feb., 1895 in BMSAS, June 1895. See also SMA 438/A Liengme to Leresche, 18 Feb., 1895; SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 4 April 1895.

69. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 27 May 1895; Grandjean, "Antioka" 25 May 1895 in BMSAS, Aug., 1895, 362.

70. SMA 517/B Junod to Leresche, 28 June 1895. Junod, Life II, 444.

71. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 27 May 1895. The people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland often turned to voluntary enslavement and the pawning of children in times of famine. See p. 316, note 45.

72. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 18 Aug., 1895; Ibid., Grandjean to Renevier, 21 Oct., 1895; SMA 515/C Jacques to sec., Mission Romande, 1 Oct., 1895; SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 26 Dec., 1895; Ibid., 24 June, 1895; Ibid., 3 March, 9 July, 15 Aug., 24 Nov., 1896; SMA 528/C Paul Berthoud to Conseil de la Mission, 26 Nov., 1896; ZA 27 "Report of the Amatonga Border Commission", 24 Dec., 1896.

73. Junod, "Littoral"; BMSAS, 12 April 1895, 279; Liengme, "Journal a Mandlakazi", BMSAS, 119, 1895, 252-63; Idem., "Un Potentat Africain", 99-100.

Maputo areas where the maize crop had been destroyed by drought and locusts, people were obliged to subsist on cassava, sweet potatoes, fowls and eggs. In most areas people lived from hunting, fishing and gathering and with the money earned from wage labour, they bought expensive imported food.[74]

The drought was eventually broken by late summer rains in early 1897.[75] But in several areas crops not destroyed during the second Luso-Gaza war were ravaged by locusts. In August famine returned to Nondwane where several people died of starvation and in fertile Khosen the population had to fall back, once again, upon sweet potatoes as a drought-breaker.[76]

The food situation worsened when Rinderpest, which had first reached the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1896, achieved epidemic proportions in July/August 1897. The epizootic destroyed large numbers of cattle which were valuable not only as a source of nutrition but as a means of transporting food to famine areas.[77] Rinderpest also killed numerous wild animals, especially the ungulate vectors of the Glossina morsitans species of tsetse fly. Thus although the disease largely destroyed the sources of beef and venison available to the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, it also almost entirely ridded the area of trypanosomiasis.[78] Starvation was inevitably accompanied by a drop in the birth-rate as lack of

---

74. SMA 517/B Junod to Leresche, 10 Oct., 1895; SMA 519/D Loze to Conseil 25 Sept., 1896; LA 459 ZAR consular Report for 1896. Maize cost 22s per bag in Lourenço Marques in 1896, FO 63/1316 Cons to FO 25 Jan., 1896.

75. SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier 11 Jan., 1897.

76. SMA 501/A Eberhardt to Grandjean, 22 March 1897; Ibid., 3 May, 3 July, 6 Aug., 1897; SMA 496/A Paul Berthoud to Grandjean, 15 July 1897.

77. SSa 547 Ra4401 encl. in Ra3260/97 ZAR Cons to SS 14 Aug., 1897; SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier 24 June, 1896; SMA 501/A Eberhardt to Grandjean 29 July 1897; SMA 542/B Loze to Grandjean 4 Sept., 1897; Ibid., 27 Nov., 1897.

78. Claude Fuller, "Tsetse in the Transvaal", 63-64. 341-348; Dias, "Status glossinico"; R. du Toit, "Problems presented by the control of tsetse flies in the Union of South Africa", SAJS, XLIII, July 1947. See also J. Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low Veld, (London, 1929), 65. Glossina austeni suffered a similar fate to G. morsitans. G. brevipaldis was less affected as it fed off hippos and G. pallidipes which fed off warthogs and bushpigs, remained in some parts of south-western Maputo.

food induces amennorhea, a temporary sterility which acts as a mechanism of involuntary contraception during a period of stress and serious food shortage.[79]

Famine, Disease and Mortality

Death from starvation was rare in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. But patterns of famine and mortality were intimately linked as hunger gave rise to nutritional deficiencies which weakened human resistance to disease. Thus the irregularity of food production was mirrored by the regularity of ecological and epidemiological misfortunes.

The supply of food became more uncertain during times of war when people were pushed into infertile or unhealthy areas and when food stocks were ravaged. But malnutrition was regarded as less of a danger than the inevitable ensuing disease. This was graphically expressed by an ambassador, sent to Natal by Umzila in 1870, who stated that,

> "It is hard to be always at war or ready for war. Death from the assegai is invariably followed by worse death from fever, for these two kinds of death are the constant companions one of the other."[80]

The relationship between war, famine and disease was circular as disease was not only an outcome, but also a cause of war. Thus it was believed that "famine, locusts, drought and war...often go together."[81]

Malaria and yellow fever, which was colloquially known as Delagoa Bay fever, constituted the two most effective barriers to any permanent colonization of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. These mosquito-borne diseases were endemic to the area and had decimated invading Zulu and Swazi armies and had instilled in neighbouring peoples an inherent fear of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, especially

---

79. Cf. Leroy Ladurie, "Amennorhea in Times of Famine" in Ladurie (ed), The Territory of the Historian, (Chicago, 1979).

80. SNA 1/1/96 encl. in no. 73, "Statement of Umzila's Messengers", 16 Aug., 1870.

81. SMA 514. Grandjean to Leresche, 11 Feb., 1895.

in summer.[82] Umzila recognized the protection afforded by his environment and referred to

> "General Bush and General Fever and many more powerful generals besides in the form of diseases with which he could infect invading armies."[83]

Voortrekkers, European explorers, traders, hunters and especially the Portuguese in Lourenço Marques before the draining of the swamp around the settlement in 1877, suffered terrible losses from "fevers".[84]

The indigenous inhabitants suffered less from malaria and yellow fever than foreigners. This was partly because they had knowledge of, and avoided, malarial areas and partly because, through long experience, people had developed methods of treating fevers. Consequently, some contemporary observers felt that the local population had built up a slight natural immunity to malaria and yellow fever and that they were only severely affected in bad years.[85] Nevertheless many people, especially children, suffered from impaludism which lowered their resistance to other diseases, induced miscarriages and could result in death.[86]

---

82. CSO 736.154 John Dunn to Col. Sec., 8 Jan., 1880; Fernando da Costa Leal, Uma Viagem na África Austral (Lisbon, 1943), 43; C. de B. Webb and J. Wright (eds) James Stuart Archive, I, evidence Bikwayo, 64, 68; Bishop McKenzie, journal in The Net, Dec., 1889; A.C. Myburgh, The Tribes of the Barberton District, 77.

83. SNA 1/1/96 Erskine to Shepstone, 30 Nov., 1872.

84. W.C. Baldwin, African Hunting from Natal to the Zambezi, 1852-1860, 82, 90; GH 1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879; Coqui, "Journey from Ohrigstadt to Delagoa Bay", in Pro RGS III, 1859, 374; C. Fuller, "Tsetse in the Transvaal", 320-22. Because of the malaria and tsetse on the eastern seaboard, most travellers journeyed northwards along the western edge of the Kalahari desert.

85. St. V. Erskine, 1869, RGS typescript, 40; St. V. Erskine, 1871-72 RGS typescript, ch. 9, p 17; ZGH 796.2233/96 Dr Stephens to Res. Comm., 3 March 1896. L. Bostock, Malarial Fever: its causes and prevention (Lourenço Marques, 1905), 13-14. But cf. C. Louis Leipoldt, Bushveld Doctor (London, 1937), 229-30, who believed Africans in the eastern Transvaal suffered more from malaria than whites. Unlike malaria, yellow fever is non-recurrent and survival brings immunity.

86. CSO 665.4069/78 Statement of Umango...messenger to Nozingile, 4 June 1875; SMA 1256/A Grandjean "Rapport sur l'oeuvre missionaire", 1892; JSA file 74, 67 evidence of Majuba. See also Hamilton-Stevenson, The Low Veld, 18.

Unlike most other diseases malaria was not a class disease related to malnutrition and poor living conditions and it counted amongst its victims wives of both Gungunyana and the Maputo chief Ngwanazi.[87] Anopheles mosquitoes, which acted as host carriers for the malarial blood parasites multiplied rapidly after heavy rains extended their ideally marshy breeding grounds.[88] Thus following the heavy rains of early 1893, pools of stagnant water accumulated and fever broke out throughout the Delagoa Bay hinterland; in Lourenço Marques alone there were 228 deaths from fever that year, compared to 153 during the previous year.[89] Malaria and especially yellow fever were also spread by people who, in seeking the most effective remedy to the diseases in flight from the infected areas, transmitted the blood parasites to areas where they were quickly spread by formerly uncontaminated anopheles mosquitoes. Thus because of the facility with which the disease moved and expanded, it was not unusual to find areas deserted due to sudden malarial infestation.[90]

Some areas of the Delagoa Bay hinterland were more malarial than others and people living on the eastern flank of the Lebombos were scared of travelling to the fever-stricken coastal districts.[91] The low-lying wet areas were particularly bad; Baines referred to Matolla as a malarial marsh and both travellers and local inhabitants remarked on Maputoland, where malaria was particularly virulent

---

87. L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, XIII, 1892, 189; SPG., Charles Johnson Journal, "Expedition into Amatongaland", Aug-Sept., 1895, part 1. Gungunyana was obliged to move his Bilene capital after six of his wives died of fever.

88. SMA 435/F Dr G. Liengme to Leresche, 16 Oct., 1891; Junod, "Rikatla", 18 Feb., 1893 in BMSAS, 108, April, 1893; Paul Berthoud, 16 March 1893 in L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, XIV, 1893; W.H.C. Malton, The Story of Lebombo (London, 1902), 76; E. & H. W(ilkinson), Soldiers of the Cross in Zululand (London, 1906), 110-111; Mrs Wilkinson, A Lady's Travels in Zululand (London, 1882), 186.

89. BPP. 1895, Trade Report for Lourenço Marques, 55; SMA 1254/B Henri Berthoud, "Rapport de la Conference du Littoral en 1893"; SMA 528/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 19 June 1893. See also Machado, "Chemin de fer de Lourenço Marques á Pretoria", BSGL, 5, 2, 1885, 266.

90. ZGH 796.2233/96 Dr Stephens to Res. Comm., 3 March 1896; ZGH 796.892/96 Foxon to Res. Comm. "Information regarding the Portuguese Protectorate of Maputoland"; E. & H. W(ilkinson), Soldiers of the Cross, 111.

91. BO 10, 1871, p 40.

between the first rains in October/November and the onset of winter in May/June.[92]

The worst epidemic, as opposed to endemic, disease to inflict the Delagoa Bay hinterland was smallpox which swept through the area at least four times in the thirty years following 1862. In that year the "small pox of Mawewe" which broke out in May, was by August reported to have "laid waste the negro population" and to have killed "hundreds of blacks and some whites" in the Crown Lands claimed by the Portuguese.[93] The Lourenço Marques physician in his report for 1862 remarked on the unhygienic conditions in the settlement where, because of smallpox, "the blacks were burying the natives in backyards or casting them onto the beach and when they buried them, they only covered the corpses with a light layer of soil." The springs were dirty and the cemetery a source of filth.[94] By May 1863 the epidemic had retreated to the interior where it caused a further great loss of life.[95] After re-emerging briefly in 1877/78,[96] smallpox entered Lourenço Marques from Zanzibar in 1882. In the interior it was reported that "whole villages died" while on the coast "few Europeans were attacked, but a large number of native were, many fatally, and this gave rise to the panic that spread amongst them during the plague."[97] Africans practised variolation and quarantined homesteads and

---

92. T. Baines, The gold regions, 109; BPP, 1890, LII Saunders to Shepstone, Nov., 1887, p 48; CSO 665.4069/78 Statement of Umango, 4 June 1875. In the Lowveld the November-May period was considered "suicidal" and only July and August were free of malaria, H. Raddatz, "Das Kaffernland des Untern Olifant", Peterman's Geogr. Mitteilungen, 1886, 54.

93. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 21 GLM to GGM 13 Aug., 1862 in GG to MSMU 14 Oct., 1862; SNA 1/1/12 Foohey to SNA 13 Nov., 1862; H.A. Junod, "Native customs in relation to smallpox amongst the Ba-Ronga", SAJS, July 1914, 1; Junod, Life, II, 463.

94. Eduardo de Noronho, O Districto de Lourenço Marques e a África do Sul, (Lourenço Marques, 1895), 157.

95. BO 21, 25 May 1863.

96. L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, XIII, 1892, 185.

97. Noronho, O Districto de Lourenço Marques, 159; Adolpho Vasconcellos, "Dos mappas estatisticos com relação ao movimento commercial no districto de Lourenço Marques, durante o anno de 1884", Bol. Soc. Geogr. Commerical do Porto, 1886, 64; H.P.N. Muller, Een Bezoek aan de Delagoa-baai en die Lydeburgsche goudvelden (Haarlem, 1887), 19.

chiefdoms in an attempt to stamp out the epidemic. The disease was only partly contained by the use of a vaccine brought from Durban, and continued to infect the area as late as August 1884.[98] A final small pox epidemic broke out in August 1890. Missionary sources estimated that it caused the death of several hundred Africans and that "whole villages have been destroyed."[99] It was claimed that the effects of the epidemic had been worsened by local variolation practices.[100] A further disease that could take epidemic proportions was typhoid fever, which was thought to have passed through Khosen in 1888.[101]

After "climatic and malarial diseases", respiratory problems such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, pleurisy and bronchitis were the most endemic forms of illness in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. All bronchial and pulmonary infections were encouraged by nutritional deficiencies, poor hygiene and wet summer weather. Their incidence increased markedly with migrant labour to the mines.[102]

Venereal diseases spread rapidly throughout the Delagoa Bay hinterland during the last half of the 19th century. Syphilis had existed at Lourenço Marques for many years but it only became endemic in the interior through the agency of migrant labourers and, with the growth of a rootless workforce at Lourenço Marques,

---

98. BO 20. 19 May 1883; CSO 921.3210/83. Vice consul, Delagoa Bay to Ass. Col. Sec., 11 Aug., 1883; SS 955.R2996 Native Comm., Spelonken to Landdrost Zoutpansberg, 24 June 1882; Ibid., 6 Aug., 1884.

99. SMA 484/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 25 May 1891; 485/B Junod, "Rikatla", 1891; SMA 485/A Junod to Leresche, 15 Aug., 1891; Paul Berthoud 16 Nov., 1891, L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, XIII, 1892.

100. G. Liengme, "L'emploi de la vaccine á la Baie de Delagoa" in L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, XII, 1892; SMA 485/A Junod, "Remarques sur l'epidemie de variole".

101. SMA 497/E Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 18 Oct., 1888; Noronho, Districto de Lourenço Marques, 149.

102. SMA 82/H Dr Liengme, "La Conference du Littoral", 1892; SMA 1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur l'oeuvre", 1892; Ferreira, "Relatório de Serviço de Saude de Lourenço Marques, 1886", 60, 71; Noronho, O Districto de Lourenç Marques, 149, 158, 163; Junod, Life, II, 474-75.

the commoditization of sex.[103] In 1887 it crossed the Nkomati and entered Khosen and by the early 1890s it had spread throughout most of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and was greatly feared.[104] Gonorrhea was only introduced with the construction of the Delagoa Bay railway but soon became known as "the disease which crushes the villages" because of its fertility-inhibiting nature.[105]

Other debilitating and widespread diseases that inflicted the area were measles, bilharzia, tick-bite fever, conjunctivitis and trachoma. Gastro-intestinal deficiencies called "dysentery" were especially prevalent during the hunger period before the summer rains when people were obliged to consume less digestible and more contaminated foods and use polluted water.[106] The tropical or leg ulcers known as leishmaniasis were caused by parasites which bored into feet and legs causing sores and gangrene. Endemic to the area, these parasites were perhaps related to sand fleas (jiggers or Pulex penetrans) which entered the area in the late 1870s or 1880s. Sand fleas caused body swelling which could result in death and their infestation of an area expanded rapidly in summer.[107] Pigs infected by the protozoal filaria worm suffered from trichinosis and, through the consumption by humans of contaminated pork, this resulted in elephantiasis.[108]

Thus, life was made precarious by nutritional problems and related diseases. A British official passing through Maputoland in

---

103. SMA 1256/A Grandjean "Rapport sur L'oeuvre, 1892"; Junod, Life, I, 206, 355; II, 610. But cf. Junod on more "traditional" means of transmitting venereal diseases, Life, I, 204-5. The Ronga and Tsonga words for syphilis (buba and vuva) are derived from the Portuguese word for a small skin tumor (buba).

104. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "L'état du Littoral", Sept., 1887; SMA 484/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 26 May 1891; Junod, Life I, 206.

105. Junod, Life, II, 476.

106. SMA 435 Liengme to Leresche, 27 July 1891; SMA 82/H Liengme, "La Conference du Littoral", 1892; Ferreira, "Relatorio de Servico de Saude, 1886", 60, 70; Noronho, O Districto de Lourenço Marques, 158; Junod, Life, II, 474.

107. Ferreira, "Relatório de Serviço de Saude, 1886", 72; BPP 1890 c.6200 Zambili to Shepstone, 1 March 1889. The jigger flea (tekenya) was introduced into Zululand from Moçambique, Doke and Vilikazi, Zulu-English Dictionary.

108. Ferreira, "Relatorio", 74-75.

1887 noted,

> "The men and women appear to die young. We only saw one man and one old woman in the country; these two may have been from 60 to 70 years of age. With these exceptions we did not see a single man or woman, who, I should say, was over 45 years of age. The death rate must be enormous during the hot season."[109]

Another traveller passing from Lydenburg to Lourenço Marques remarked on the extended bellies of "amatonga" children, which he compared unfavourably with those of the Swazi.[110]

The mortality rate, which was particularly high amongst young children, threatened the reproductive capacity of the family and hence restricted the rate of pre-capitalist accumulation. Various attempts were made by the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland to improve their nutritional intake. Full sexual intercourse was prohibited during post-natal lactation and hence prevented young infants from being deprived of the mother's milk by the birth of a younger sibling.[111] A determined effort to combat nutritional deficiencies was also made by the introduction and adoption of new crops.

New Crops: For Consumption and the Market

Junod hypothesized that because maize was included in first fruit ceremonies, it was of relatively recent introduction.[112] This is confirmed by historical evidence which indicates a late introduction, and especially adoption as a staple, of maize.

In the 17th century it was noticed that "the bread" of the Delagoa Bay area was a mustard seed "Guinea corn".[113] In 1708

---

109. BPP 1890. c.6200 C.R. Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887.

110. Cohen, "Erläuternde Bemerkungen", 228.

111. Junod, Life, II, 188-89, 192, 521.

112. Junod stressed that his evidence was drawn from only four chiefdoms around Lourenço Marques; Tembe, Nwamba, Mabote and the Mazwaye. The Maputo, who are a junior branch of the Tembe clan, did include maize in their first fruit festivals. This was perhaps due to their close historic ties to the Zulu and Swazi. Junod, Life, I, 395; Junod "Baronga", 143.

113. S. Bannister, Humane Policy, (London, 1830), appendix I.

this "maswelly" (moexeira; Pennisitum millet) was considered "indigenous wheat".[114] Eleven years later it was described as "a seed, not unlike coriander, which serves as the general food for the inland inhabitants." Then in 1723 "mawelle" (mabele: millet) and "maswella" (moexeira) were considered to be "what natives live from". This view was supported by two separate observers in the late 1750s.[115] A traveller passing through Delagoa Bay in the late 18th century considered that the "ordinary food is maise pounded and boyld". But this so-called "maise" was quite obviously millet as it was "a sort of corn as small as a mustard seed" and was differentiated from Indian corn, which was a more commonly-used term for maize.[116] In the 19th century maize was frequently mentioned especially in the wetter areas, but in the drier areas millet remained the staple and, as late as 1871, Frederic Elton referred to it as "the staff of life of south-east Africa."[117] Yet by the 1890s maize was regarded as the staple crop, not only in the fertile and wetter areas, but also in the dry, sandy soil zones and millet was largely relegated to the function of a yeast in beer brewing.[118]

It seems likely that the sudden and rapid adoption of maize as a staple in the second half of the 19th century was related to the loss of male labour to the plantations and mines of the Transvaal, Cape and Natal.[119] Because the maize cob is surrounded by a husk, less male labour was consumed in its protection during the long growing season than in the case of millet and sorghum. Maize only demands an intensive labour input over the harvesting period and

---

114. C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd om Delagoabaai", 74.

115. F. de Bucqoi in Theal, RSEA, vi, 433-4; Jan van de Capelle in RSEA, I, 418; Jacob Francken in RSEA, vi, 492; Bannister, Humane Policy, p. xxxv.

116. Penwell's "Account of Delagoa Bay" in RSEA, II, 463.

117. Owen, Narrative, 100, 117, 129; Fynn, Diary, 47; Hewetson, S.A. Commercial Advertiser, 20 April 1839; Custodio José Antonio Texira, "Descripcao dos rios da Bahia de Lourenço Marques" (Sept., 1838) in Argivo das Colónias, vd II, 1918; BO 14, 1871, 61; Elton in Natal Mercury, 10 Oct., 1871.

118. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, report 1891; Jeannert, "Les Ma-Khoca", BSNG, 1895, 127; BPP 1896 Consular Report 1904 for 1895; Junod, Life, II, 10.

119. The effect of male absenteeism on food production is dealt with on pp. 250-251.

most labour required in the preparation of maizemeal was expended in the crushing of the tenacious kernel, a task allocated by the division of labour to women. Maize's major advantage is that it produces far more calories per acre than other cereals, and is therefore an important and ready source of energy. In the fertile, well-watered regions of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, maize produced two harvests annually and storage problems, which aggravated the "hunger period" were partly overcome by the consumption of green maize on the cob in December. The major drawback to maize cultivation was its susceptibility to drought and this was partly overcome by the widespread adoption of drought-resistant cassava.

Like maize, cassava also emerged as a major foodstuff in the second half of the 19th century. It first entered Mozambique from Brazil in the 1770s and by the early 19th century it was grown in the Delagoa Bay area.[120] But people were initially ignorant of its culinary preparation as the prussic acid was not always successfully removed from the tuber. By the 1860s cassava was cultivated "in small quantities" in the vicinity of Lourenço Marques and in 1862, 60 panjas of cassava flour were exported.[121] A possible sign of its gradual adoption was that cassava was only introduced into the Spelonken in the late 1860s.[122] By the late 1880s the plant was grown as far south as Maputo but it has never penetrated the more fertile areas occupied by the Zulu.[123] In 1895 it was reported to be grown "freely" in Khosen and Junod, who left Mozambique in 1896, mentions that cassava was "extensively cultivated both in the sand of the hills and near the marshes."[124]

Cassava, like maize, is a labour-saving crop. As a perennial it need not be planted or harvested with other crops and, while it continues to grow for several years, it needs little attention,

---

120. M. Simoes Alberto and F.A. Toscano, O Oriente African Português (Lisbon, 1939), 78-79; Owen Narrative, 114; Texeira,"Descripção dos Rios", 63.

121. BO 21, 27 May 1865. Sixty panjas is approximately 1 663 litres, BO 34, 22 Aug., 1863.

122. Carl Mauch, Journal 1869-72, ed., E. Burke (Salisbury, 1969), 120.

123. BPP 1890 c.6200 Martin to Natal governor, 21 July 1888, 87.

124. Jeannert, "Les Ma-Khoca", 127; Junod, Life, II, 15.

apart from weeding during its early growth period. If properly tended, cassava will significantly outyield maize. The tuber is far more reliable than any local cereals as it is very resistant to drought and disease, can withstand locust attacks while the bitter strains are even immune to damage by rodents and monkeys. Cassava presents no storage problems as, after 2 to 3 years growth, it may be stored in the ground for a further 2-3 years and consequently spreads labour as it may be picked at any time. Furthermore, if the stalk is cut off the tuber is effectively hidden from human predators.[125] As distinct from maize, the crop survives well in sandy soil and consequently the two labour-saving crops, although lacking in protein, complement each other and spread the production risks involved in cultivating maize as a staple.

An agricultural innovation, which emerged largely as a response to market opportunities, was the production of vegetable oils, rubber and orchil lichen, which was gathered from rocks and trees and from which a red-violet dye was extracted. European vegetable oil importers suffered a setback in the 1860s following the importation of Russian tallow and American petroleum-based products. Fabre et fils, one of the major Marseilles trading companies dealing in West African vegetable oils, was dealt a further blow when in the same decade there was a rapid inflation of the West African cowrie currency. The company had made large profits by purchasing west African vegetable oils with cowrie shells brought from India as well as Mozambique Island, where they had established a trading post in 1855. Fabre et fils' oversupply of the west African market with "Zanzibar" cowries resulted in a spiralling inflation which lowered the value of the currency until it was eventually almost worthless.[126] However, between 1863-70 the cowrie currency only inflated by 37 per cent and profits were high enough for Fabre to establish five new stations along the Mozambican coast.[127] It

---

125. H.B. Ross, "The diffusion of the manioc plant from South America to Africa: an essay in ethnobotanical cultural history" (PhD., Columbia, 1954); D.L. Jennings, "Cassava in Africa". Field Crop Abstracts, 3, 23, 1970; E.F. Moran, "Manioc deserves more recognition in tropical farming" in World Crops, July-Aug., 1976.

126. Emile Isnard, Les Fabre (Marseilles, 1927), 160; BPP XC, 1881 C.2945 Consular report for Mozambique, 1880; Marion Johnson, "Cowrie currencies in West Africa", part II, JAH, XI, 3, 1970, 338.

127. L. Vail & L. White, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique, (London, 1980), 64. Stations were opened by Fabre at Mozambique Island (1855), Ibo (1860), Inhambane (1867), Quelimane and

was the need to find more profitable terms of trade, following the downturn in "currency speculation" in west Africa that persuaded the company to open a branch at Lourenço Marques in 1869. In the same year, the opening of Suez, under construction since 1859, reduced the sea journey from the trading settlement to Marseilles by one week.

In Delagoa Bay, Fabre used its West African experience of currency manipulation to stimulate the production of vegetable oils for the Marseilles market. Between 1869 and 1876 almost one million iron hoes, used as currency in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, were imported through Lourenço Marques.[128]

The profitability of Fabre's Lourenço Marques station drew Regis aîné of Marseilles and Dunlop Mees of Rotterdam to establish similar branches in 1873.[129] These companies acted as wholesalers who sold or extended credit, mainly hoes but also other trade goods, to sertanejos and Banyan traders who set up itinerant and fixed markets in the interior. These attracted African producers who exchanged, inter alia, groundnuts, sesame seeds and mafureira almonds, which were then sold by the traders to the French companies. Mafureira and sesame could be cheaply produced as they were the product of female gathering activities and little new land had to be opened, or labour expended, in their production.[130] Groundnuts could be cheaply produced using family labour and traditional tools. All three vegetable oils could be grown on marginal agricultural lands as they survived well in dry sandy soils.

Mozambican groundnuts were particularly valued at Marseilles because of their high oil return of 39% to 44%. The product of the first press was used as a cooking and salad oil and the product of the second press was used for lighting and greasing.[131] Mafureira almonds were much sought after as a vegetable tallow used in the manufacture of candles.[132] Sesame became particularly valuable

---

Chilwane (1868), LourençoMarques and Bazaroute (1869), see Chambre de Commerce, Marseilles, file 157.

128. The effect of this hoe currency manipulation upon the social structure of the Delagoa Bay hinterland is dealt with on pp. 296-9, 312-3.

129. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 29. GG to MSM, 17 Aug., 1875.

130. BO 52, 30 Dec., 1878; D. Leslie, Among the Zulu & Amatonga, 274.

131. Louis Pierrein Industries Traditionelles du port de Marseilles: le cycle de Sucres et des Oléagineux, 1870-1950 (Marseilles, 1975), 197.

132. Ibid., 200-1.

after the invention of margarine by the French in the early 1870s; it is a particularly rich, odourless vegetable oil which was especially valued at Marseilles because of its low residue.[133]

Agricultural producers in the Delagoa Bay hinterland responded rapidly to the market for vegetable oils. By 1875 the Governor of Lourenço Marques was able to remark that, "A lively commerce based on vegetable oils" existed at the Bay and that, "Thanks to the endeavours of foreign houses and of some merchants in the interior, the cultivation of oil-producing beans and the trade in hides has begun to assume a notable development."[134] Vessels like the "Endonne" arrived from Marseilles with tens of thousands of hoes and returned with a typical shipment of 5 344 kilos of groundnuts, 1 962 kilos of sesame and 2 207 kilos of mafureira, as well as other gathered vegetable exports such as 1 331 kilos of orchil lichen.[135] During the financial year 1876/77, vegetable oils, hides and maize constituted the major exports of the settlement and the decline in ivory and skin exports towards the end of the 1870s, was paralleled by a rise in agricultural produce as a source of export revenue.[136]

The vegetable oil companies not only presented a market for agricultural produce, they also bolstered the administration of Lourenço Marques by lending money to the irregularly and poorly paid Portuguese garrison and provided the settlement with valuable customs revenue, levied on both exports and imports.[137] The market for vegetable oil produce also stimulated the gathering of other products such as wax, rubber and gum as well as orchil lichen. Little evidence exists on the amount of produce gathered and

---

133. Because of its geographical position, Marseilles was unable to sell begetable oil residue, which was processed into animal fodder and fertilizer, for as high a price as its northern major competitor, Bordeaux. Compte-rendu de la situation commerciale et industrielle de la circonscription de Marseilles, 1871 (CCM, sit. comm.).

134. BO 15. 10 April, 1875; GH 837 GLM to GGM 24 April 1875 in Br. cons. to FO 27 May 1875.

135. A good record of ships' manifests was kept in the Boletim Oficial de Moçambique, especially for 1875-76.

136. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879.

137. GH 837, Br. cons. to FO 27 May 1875; SS 919.R2208/84 Gold commissioner, Lydenburg to SS, 6 May 1884 encl. in R1634/54.

cultivated for the market. The statistics compiled by the Lourenço Marques customs house excluded all exports, considered as "smuggled", that did not pass through the customs house and when figures were gathered, this was done on an irregular and haphazard basis. Furthermore groundnuts, mafureira and sesame were often gathered or grown specifically for market purposes and then consumed locally, especially in years of famine. Mafureira became an important export crop in 1874 when about 1 000 panjas (about 27 710 litres) were successfully sold in Marseilles. In 1875 some 8 000 panjas (221 680 litres) were exported and in 1876/77, a total of some 264 030 litres. But the following year the export of mafureira almonds dropped to 37 574 litres as people consumed them during a year of drought.[138] Liberal customs reforms in 1877 modified the 3% ad valorem tax on exports, which had been established in 1869. In its place a 1% tax was levied on all vegetable oil exports and 4% on wax and rubber.[139] This stimulated the export of sesame seed which rose from 1 040 litres in 1876/77 to 4 124 kilos in 1877/78. In 1885, even though production was then in decline, some 7 818 kilos of sesame, groundnuts and orchil was exported, largely to France.

Wax exports rose from 36 kilos in 1860 to a maximum of 9 235 kilos, worth over £750, in 1885. Rubber, which came largely from the Gaza area,[140] reached an export peak of 7 059 kilos, worth almost £1 065 in 1886. Exports of orchil lichen rose from 2 534 kilos in 1877 to 8 130 kilos, valued at just over £1 000 in 1883.

The Effect of Market and Demographic Changes on Agricultural Production

The minor boom in the production of vegetable oils in the 1870s and early 1880s led Regis aîné to establish a new branch on the lower Limpopo which had Bilene and Khosen as its catchment area.[141] But, for a number of reasons, vegetable oil production petered out in the

138. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 52, 30 Dec., 1878. These and the following statistics are drawn from the Boletim Oficial de Moçambique.

139. Vail and White, Capitalism and Colonialism, 62-63.

140. BO 6, 11 Feb., 1888.

141. Henri Berthoud, "Exploration entre les Spelonken et Lourenço Marques", L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, VII, 1886, 307.

1890s. Wholesale merchants suffered a severe setback as spiralling hoe inflation reduced their working capital and diminished the amount of credit that they were able to extend to Banyan and sertanejo middlemen. As hoes were replaced in the early 1880s by sterling as the major currency in the area, traders sought to exchange their wares for cash rather than depreciating produce. A further problem was the reliance of Mozambicans on already over-extended female labour for the production of vegetable oils. Of at least equal importance was the inability of Mozambican producers to compete on the Marseilles market with vegetable oil growers in India. Fabre had first exported groundnuts from India in 1856 and that country had several advantages over Mozambique. It possessed railways and a general infrastructural development that was almost entirely lacking in Mozambique; it had the capital to experiment with new strains and, perhaps most importantly, India had regular steamship contacts with Europe and was thus able to transport vegetable oil crops regularly and rapidly and consequently cut down on wastage and spoilage. The regularity of production in an area like the Delagoa Bay hinterland was severely hindered by continuous droughts, which caused producers to fall back on vegetable oil fruits as a means of subsistence, and by epidemics that closed Lourenço Marques to foreign trade. By 1890 India supplied three-quarters of the demand for vegetable oils at Marseilles.[142] India's growing monopoly of the Marseilles market was paralleled by a drop in the world price of vegetable oils. Following the opening of Suez, the amount of vegetable oil imported into Marseilles increased from 170 000 tons in 1870 to 440 000 tons in 1894. An adequate supply allowed buyers to depress the Marseilles price for vegetable oil from 49 francs per quintal of 100 kilos in 1877, to 23 francs in 1894. The price paid for Mozambican groundnuts fell from an average of 47 francs in 1873 to 26 francs in 1894. Over the same period Mozambican sesame fell from an average of 48 francs to 26 francs.[143] Massive imports of animal fats and cotton seed from the United States served further to debase the price of

142. Pierrein, Industries Traditionelles, 199-204; CCM (sit. comm.), 1882.

143. CCM (sit. comm.), 1873-1894.

fats and oils at Marseilles and largely ousted Indian producers in the later 1890s.[144]

The declining market for vegetable oils was accompanied by the virtual disappearance of the market for orchil when the vegetable dye was largely replaced by industrially-produced analine substitutes. The collecting of wax was discouraged by a price fall similar to that of vegetable oils. Wax from Mozambique sold on the Marseilles market for 215 francs a quintal of 100 kilos in 1872, 125 francs in 1889 and between 157 and 159 francs in 1897. This price drop was passed on to the producer as the value of wax at Lourenço Marques fell from $554 per kilo in 1867 to $360 in 1890 and $430 in 1898.[145] Rubber production suffered a similar decline. Uncontrolled tapping was injurious to trees and the quality of exported rubber and demanded an increased labour input to extract a fixed amount of rubber. By 1898 the export figures for wax and rubber had fallen to, respectively, 815 kilos worth £78 and 388 kilos worth £83.12s.[146] At least two observers blamed the decline in gathered produce on insufficient remuneration.[147] Declining international prices for gathered and cultivated produce constituted

---

144. Ibid., 1888-89. Shipping movements from countries like Mozambique and India were published in Le Semaphore de Marseilles but no division was made between production area within Mozambique. The annual Compte-rendu de la situation commercial et industrielle de la circonscription de Marseilles gives the price and volume of vegetable oil imports by country of origin. Animal fats imported from the United States rose from 6 000 tons in 1894 to 28 000 tons in 1897. Cotton seed imports increased from 11 000 tons in 1894 to 62 000 tons in 1898/9. This prompted Indian groundnut exports to Marseilles to fall from 133 000 tons in 1894 to 8 300 tons in 1897; Pierrein, Industries Traditionelles, 190-191, 196.

145. CCM (sit. comm.) 1872 to 1897; AHU. Moç., Alfândegas, packet 1382; Mappa Estatistica, (Alfândega, Lourenço Marques, 1899).

146. BPP 1887 British consular report no. 60 for Mozambique, 1885. In the area west of Inhambane rolls of rubber weighing in excess of one kilogram were initially sold in England as top quality rubber. By the 1890s rolls of 30 to 50 grams were sold wrapped around a stick and were often spoiled as the rubber was mixed with sand to give it added weight. Freire de Andrade, "Exploração Portuguêse em Lourenço Marques e Inhambane", BSGL, 13, 5, 1894, 358; Mappa Estatistica, (Lourenço Marques. Alfândega, 1899).

147. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, 1891; Junod, Life, I, 145-47.

a major restriction on the emergence of a peasantry able to exist independently of wage labour. Of perhaps equal importance was the prohibitive cost of exporting high bulk, low value products like maize, to the Transvaal. Before the advance of the railway into the Transvaal in the early 1890s, goods had to be carried by head porterage or by transport-riding which was made particularly expensive because of the tsetse belts.[148] A further restriction on the production of foodstuffs for the market arose out of increasing demographic pressure upon resources in specific areas.

Settlement patterns were influenced by warfare, human and animal diseases, soils, rainfall and proximity to water, markets and building materials. This resulted in a highly uneven and changing demographic structure. The heaviest concentration of population existed in the river plains where intensive cultivation was practised.[149] In 1871 St Vincent Erskine visited the alluvial plain of the Shangane tributary of the lower Limpopo which was being re-occupied as the Swazi threat diminished. He described the area in the following terms:

> "The valley seemed to be completely filled with native kraals, here I saw the first cattle I had seen in the country. I did not think any kafir country could be so thickly inhabited as the valley; though I have seen Natal of course and the Zulu and Swazi countries. It was densely inhabited when I was here in 1868; but it seemed now to have filled up to a much greater extent."[150]

Gungunyana's move south in 1889 and his colonization of the Bilene-Khosen area with about 80 000 followers placed further strains on the demography of that region and pushed many Khosas into the

---

148. See pp. 274-275.

149. Fernandes das Neves to GLM 8 June 1879 in Mozambique, 69, 1952; SMA 435/H Liengme to Leresche 29 Oct., 1891; SMA 435/G.Liengme to Leresche, 2 Oct., 1892; SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud "Rapport sur l'expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891"; Shaefli-Glardon, "De Valdezia", 1893, 156, 162-63; Grandjean, "Notices", BSNG 1893, 121. BSNG.

150. St. V. Erskine, 1871-2 RGS typescript, ch. 6, p. 4. The Shangane river was also known as the Shohozoli.

dry western areas.[151]

In the fertile coastal areas of Nondwane the population was estimated in 1880 to be about 350 inhabitants to the square mile. Most villages were built on fertile hillsides and around the lakes and marshes in depressions, and beyond the coastal region, which stretched for about 25 kilometres inland, the country was "almost deserted".[152] To the south and west of the lower Nkomati it was noted in 1885 that the sandy soils in the vicinity of Lourenço Marques supported a population of only about four people per square kilometre.[153] In Maputo people clustered around rivers and marshes and lived more closely together than the Swazi or Zulu.[154]

The overpopulation of specific areas forced people to break down subtropical forest areas and till the commonage which separated homesteads. This made agricultural production far more perilous as it reduced access to drought-breaking foods gathered from wild trees and by restricting the amount of land allocated to pasturage, encouraged over-grazing. Reductions in the amount of commonage also caused the depletion of fuels for cooking and warmth which forced people to transfer labour from cultivation to searching for fuels. In the settled areas over-population resulted in a decreasing production of foodstuffs due to over-cropping, soil exhaustion and erosion.[155]

---

151. SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud "Rapport sur l'expedition envoyée a Gungunyana, 1891"; SMA 484/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 2 Sept., 1891; SMA 435/H Liengme to Leresche 29 Oct., 1891; SMA 1256/C Grandjean, "Rapport sur l'oeuvre missionaire, 1892"; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade report, 1891.

152. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "L'état du Littoral, Sept., 1887"; Junod, Life, II, 5; Grandjean, "La Mission Suisse", Le Chrétien Evangélique, XL, 9, 1897, 426; Junod, "Rikatla à Maroukene", BSNG, VI, 1891, 323.

153. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 3, Machado memo., 10 Nov., 1885.

154. WUL. AB 867/Aa5 Zululand Bishop McKenzie to Archbishop, Cape Town, 21 Aug., 1889; ZGH 796.Z233/96 Stephens to Res. Comm., 3 March, 1896.

155. St V. Erskine, 1871-2 RGS typescript, ch 6, p 8; G. Liengme, "Rapport sur la visite faite á Gungunyana", July 1892 in BMSAS, 106, 1892; Caldas Xavier, "Os territorios ao sul do Save e os Vatuas", BSGL, 13, 2, 1894, 134; Junod, "Baronga", 188-89; Grandjean, La Mission, 71; Junod, Life, II, 8-9.

Migrant Labour and Agricultural Production

A major disincentive to the production of crops for the market was the absence of male labour power as many adolescent and adult males withdrew their labour from local agriculture and sought wage employment in Natal, the Cape and the Transvaal. The view that men were involved only in hunting and warfare and played little role in the cultivation of crops and domestic duties[156] seems to have little basis in historical reality. W.C. Baldwin, a hunter operating in Maputoland in the 1850s noted with approval that, "Amatongas are very industrious, both men and women working in their gardens." This was something unheard of amongst the Zulus, he added.[157] Numerous other observers also commented upon the willingness of men living in the Delagoa Bay hinterland to involve themselves in agriculture.[158] Although the fields worked by women were largest, it was common for a man in the southern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland to till and sow his own field (mpashu) and if it were planted with sorghum, to weed and harvest it.[159] Two of Stuart's informants remarked at the end of the 19th century that in the Maputo area, "men hoe and cultivate gardens as well as women. A man may have his own garden or work at one piece of land with his wife."[160] Probably the major agricultural task undertaken by males was the breaking of new ground, for it was only when fresh land was opened, especially in the drier slash and burn areas, that sufficient food could be produced to support the natural increase in population. Men also made and repaired agricultural tools and

---

156. H.F. Fynn, "Delagoa Bay" in RSEA, II, 439; RSEA, X, 106; Cape Monitor, 16 July 1853; BO 21, 27 May 1865; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade report, 1891, p. 6. Most of these observations were made during drought years when hunting became a major source of food and when raiding and warfare took on a new importance. A modern variant of this argument has been forcefully expressed by A. Rita Ferreira, "Labour Emigration among the Mozambique Thonga", Africa, 30, 2, 1960.

157. Baldwin, African Hunting, 84.

158. Struthers, "Hunting journal", 24 May 1854, p. 84; Armando Longle, "De Inhambane a Lourenço Marques", in BSGL, 6, 1, 1886, 19; BPP, 1890, c.6200, Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887.

159. Junod, Life, II, 23.

160. JSA file 74, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.

drying tables, built dwelling huts in winter and granaries in summer and cut the wattles and grass used in their construction and thatching.[161] Only men cultivated tobacco, which they manufactured into snuff or smoked, or which they used as an important medium of local trade.[162] Male labour and organizational skills were also vital in various other food-producing activities. They cared for the cattle and provided the large amounts of labour needed to create and maintain tsetse-free pastures. Men constructed fishing traps, mounted fishing expeditions[163] and contributed to the food supply by hunting extensively and by trading for cattle.

Thus the absence of male labour impaired the ability of many homesteads to produce sufficient food to meet subsistence needs from year to year. The impact of male absenteeism upon food production was aggravated by the pattern of labour migration which took little account of agricultural season. Thus most men travelled to Natal in winter when malaria and jiggers were less virulent and to the Transvaal in summer when the cold of the Highveld proved less of an obstacle.[164]

It seems likely that the ecological and epidemiological crises of the late 1880s and 1890s, that arose out of an unreliable access to food, were made increasingly precarious by the absence of male labour. This is supported by the findings of many contemporary observers who believed that Lourenço Marques's paucity of exports and the lack of any development of the town's hinterland were due almost entirely to the system of migrant labour. As early as 1865 the Governor of Lourenço Marques complained that, because of the upsurge in emigration to Natal and in hunting, Maputo no longer supplied the settlement with sufficient food.[165] In 1878 the

---

161. JSA file 12, "Customs", Evidence of Ndaba; file 74 evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza; ZGH 796.Z892/96 Foxon, "Information regarding the British protectorate of Maputoland"; Junod, "Baronga", 107; Junod, Life, II, 338; WUL. Am. Zulu Mission, Pinkerton, July 1880.

162. Junod, Life, II, 14-15.

163. Junod, Life, II, 86-87, 338.

164. See pp.31, 50. The loss of male labour was not offset by the introduction of the plough until the beginning of the 20th century. Its late introduction was probably due to the acidic and porous nature of much of the soil as well as social resistance to the breakdown of female cattle taboos.

165. BO 21, 27 May 1865.

Governor-General of the colony expressed his concern over the "emigration which is going to impoverish the interior of labour and which will necessarily be fatally translated into a greater or lesser diminution in the flow of products from the littoral."[166] In the same year, the Portuguese colonial official responsible for African welfare stated that labour emigration had led to a decline in agricultural production and he questioned the political and economic wisdom of its continuation.[167] In a report drawn up the following month he expressed the strong opinion that "emigration is nothing but a real cancer for this province from which the Blacks get very little."[168] In a report published two years later he complained that while migrants were away, their lands were left uncultivated and that when they returned they squandered the wages they earned instead of investing them in the development of the land.[169] This anti-emigration stance can be traced back to Portuguese humanitarianism which stressed that following the independence of Brazil, Portugal should turn from the slave trade to the development of her African colonies. Central to the abolitionist legislation of the 1830s was the belief that, rather than export labour, manpower should be employed locally to produce raw materials.[170] This view was subscribed to, but for different motives, by Africa Oriental, an occasional newspaper produced at Mozambique Island that was supportive of settler interests.[171] As labour emigration increased in scale, its various opponents became more vociferous.

In 1884 the Lourenço Marques director of customs made a well-publicized attack on the migrant labour system which, he stated,

---

166. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 31, GLM to GGM, 11 March 1876 in GGM to MSMU, 15 March 1878.

167. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 31, Report of the Curadoria geral dos individuos sujeitos à tutela publica de Moçambique, 21 Jan., 1878.

168. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 31, Report of the Curadoria geral, 8 Feb., 1878.

169. AHU. Moç., CG., pasta 32, Report of the Curadoria Geral to MSMU, 30 Oct., 1880.

170. Valetim Alexandre, Origens de Colonialismo Portuguêş (Lisbon, 1979), cited in Jill Dias, "Portugal in Africa", book review in African Affairs, Jan., 1982, 132.

171. Africa Oriental, 11 Dec., 1879; Duffy, A Question of Slavery, 71-2, 87.

was the cause of the inability of the Delagoa Bay hinterland to produce agricultural exports.[172] This in turn was largely responsible for the small revenue accruing from exports. Because of migrant labour, agriculturalists living in the interior were unable to produce sufficient food to meet the requirements of the inhabitants of Lourenço Marques and this had necessitated the importation of food. Thus the director of customs felt that migrant labour was, at least in part, responsible for the high cost of living at the settlement. In an attempt to bring down the price of food, the Lourenço Marques municipal council ordered seeds from Europe which were distributed free of charge to local chiefs.[173] In 1897 Pereira Rodrigues, the director of customs, was dismissed by the Royal Commissioner, Mousinho de Albuquerque for challenging the recent labour migration agreement with the Transvaal. Rodrigues complained that labour emigration drained Mozambique of the workers needed to develop the colony's agriculture and that a large part of the wages earned on the mines was spent on goods bought in the Transvaal. The remaining, repatriated wage was spent on imported foodstuffs, which absolved the workers from any need to produce marketable articles within Mozambique.[174] The British consul inadvertently sided with the opponents of migrant labour when he stated that,

> "unless facilities are offered for opening up the rich agricultural districts which exist here, the only future this city (Lourenço Marques) can possibly expect is that ...it may become the supply station for Barberton, Pretoria and Johannesburg."[175]

This view was supported by other contemporary observers, including the consul of the South African Republic, who believed that migrant

---

172. Adolpho de Castro Neto de Vasconcellos, reports in BO 32, 8 Aug., 1885; Estatistica das Alfandegas (Lourenço Marques, 1884); "Mappas estatisticas com relação ao movimento commercial no districto de Lourenço Marques, 1884", Bol. Soc. Geogr. Commercial do Porto, 1886.

173. BO 1885, 356.

174. Ministère des Affaires Étrangère , Paris, CCC., Lourenço Marques vice consul to Ministère des Affaires Étrangère 18 Dec., 1897. For the Portuguese metropolitan stance on the export of labour, see pp. 133-134, notes 160-164.

175. BPP 1893-94, Consular report for Lourenço Marques, (no. 1153), 1892.

labour had a debilitating effect upon indigenous agricultural production as migrants used their cash earnings to purchase the food that they had formerly grown themselves.[176] Available statistics indicate some support for this impressionistic evidence for by the late 1880s Lourenço Marques had swung from being an exporter to being a net importer of foodstuffs from Natal.[177]

Thus it seems that the limited response during the late 19th century of peasant producers living in the Delagoa Bay hinterland to the world market demand for cultivated and gathered products can be ascribed to a number of factors; low market prices and retail monopolies, the absence of cheap transport facilities linking producers with the large consumer markets in the Transvaal, the relative over-population of important fertile areas and, because of the migrant labour system, the general under-population of able-bodied adult males. The unwillingness of people to grow crops did not emerge out of an inherent preference for mine work rather than farming; it was rather a rational decision which saw temporary wage employment as a supplement to agricultural production and hence as a means of ending the old precarious dependence upon the environment, with all of its attendant famines and wars.

As early as 1886 the governor of Lourenço Marques believed that many people were dependent on earnings from migrant labour for an assured source of food.[178] The British consul at Lourenço Marques reported in 1891 that Africans

---

176. SSa 155 Ra1358/95 Verslag van de consulaat in Mozambique, 1894; BPP 1896 LXXXVIII Cons. report no. 1760 for 1895; BPP 1897 XCII Cons. Report no. 1904 for 1896; Alfredo Freire de Andrade, "As minas de oiro do Transvaal e sua influência sobre Lourenço Marques", Revista de Obras Publicas e Minas, 1898, 331; P. Berthoud, "Lourenço Marques" , BSNG, 1895, 105, 108. See also notes 172-173.

177. Natal Blue books. "Exports." The production statistics for the Delagoa Bay hinterland were at this time entirely absent and it is probable that maize was exported to the Transvaal without being declared. An illucidation of this point and the effect of changes in maize production upon social stratification must await further research. But cf. Mappas Estatisticas 1897-98 in which the director of the Lourenço Marques customs speculated that the maize production figures were less complete than commonly believed (p. iv).

178. BO 19. 18 May 1886. In his report for March 1886 the governor feared that the suspension of emigration to Natal "could have a terrible effect on the natives."

> "find it more profitable to work for Europeans and buy from them such food as they require. With the high rate of wages obtained they are both able to live better in this way than they could by cultivating the ground, and to have a surplus with which to drink or buy such luxuries as they may desire."[179]

J.H. Bovill wrote in the late 1890s that:

> "on account of the poverty and dryness of the soil (of the Delagoa Bay hinterland), which in appearance is just like sand, the natives in the least drought are often in a starving condition, through failure of their crops. The appearance of the soil to an ordinary European would lead him to believe that nothing could possibly grow in it, yet it is surprising how the natives do produce from it pumpkins, melons, sweet potatoes, beans, bananas, mealies etc., if they get the rain in its season. The uncertainty of the food crops is, of course, a great incentive to the natives to offer themselves for work, and the rate of wages offered in the labour market is a great attraction."[180]

In 1892 a Swiss missionary lamented over the fate of Khosen, which was normally a maize exporting area. Due to its fertility Khosen had remained dependent on agriculture for its subsistence rather than on migrant labour. This production strategy had caused the famine of the early 1890s to take on a far more serious aspect in Khosen than in those areas that had broadened their means of subsistence by supplementing agricultural production with wage labour.[181]

Henri Junod, writing in 1895 of the continuing famine and locust plague, stated that

> "For the blacks, the necessity to work for the whites in order to procure their food is a great tragedy, a calamity of the first order. For centuries the families have lived from the product of their fields - and if one earned money, the last few years, it was to buy clothes and luxuries. All is now changed."[182]

---

179. BPP 1892 LXXXII, Consular report no. 955 for 1891.

180. J.H. Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag (London, 1900), 64.

181. SMA 1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur l'oeuvre missionaire, 1892".

182. SMA 517/B Junod to Renevier, 16 Oct., 1895.

The ecological crises of the period had more than merely widened the gap between real and desired standards of living; in his first monograph, published in 1898, Junod claimed that wage labour had saved the people of the southern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland from the effects of drought, locusts, war and rinderpest.[183] This new dependence on wage labour for a means of subsistence is well illustrated in an anecdote recounted by Junod. When visiting a famine stricken community the missionary's offer of spiritual assistance was rebuffed by a woman who

> "pulled a small coin from its hiding place and said, 'Here is my cock.'"[184]

To this woman money had become a symbol of fertility in which she could place her trust, rather than in the vagaries of religion or agricultural production. In some cases migrant workers were immediately able to change their wages into food, in the form of cattle, which were purchased in the area of wage employment and then taken through the tsetse belt.[185]

As long as mining wages remained high, migrant labour constituted for many people a more profitable market response than agricultural production.[186] In the less fertile areas wage labour became the nutrient for survival in a rapidly changing world. It provided access to the cash needed to procure a regular and secure source of food and this in turn provided the means of acquiring and maintaining a large and powerful following. But a full understanding

---

183. Junod, "Baronga", 207.

184. SMA 516/A Junod to Leresche, 26 June 1894.

185. TA. SN 2. Barlow to SNA, 3 Sept., 1879; JSA, file 25, p. 261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.

186. Initial evidence indicates a rise in agricultural production in the early 20th century that co-incided with the sharp fall in mining wages during the period. Junod, Life, I, 538; TLC evidence of Lionel Cohen, pp. 163, 166; Donaldson, p. 603; Dyer, p. 281; TA/SNA 14. Na 172/02 WNLA circular, gen. manager to other directors, 1902; SNA 230 Na 2020/04 WNLA document entitled "East Coast Recruiting", 17 Aug., 1904; TA/GOV.1062 Ps 17/106/07 Director of Agric. to Selbourne, 1907.

of the growing dependence of the social formation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland upon migrant labour for its reproduction calls for an historical examination of the structure of both production and exchange. In many areas this was marked by a narrowing of economic options which left men with little alternative source of income to temporary wage labour.

Chapter 7

THE HUNTING ECONOMY:
Closing the Economic Options

The Importance of Hunting for Subsistence and Exchange

As a subsistence activity, hunting constituted a major source of protein in a milk-poor area and was especially important as a supplement to gathering activities in times of famine. But hunting produce was also an important medium of exchange and meat, skins, bones and the animal fats employed in cleansing and softening hides, were used domestically and in local trade.

A large market for animal skins developed in the second quarter of the 19th century with the adoption by males of the Zulu-Gaza form of dress. The old plaited palm leaf covering used to protect the male genitalia was replaced by a kilt of up to sixty strips of monkey, genet or civet cat skins which were cut roughly six inches long and half an inch wide.[1] These skins or cattle tails were also sometimes worn on the chest. Soldiers hung genet tails from their military and other shields, wore blue monkey skin strips at the side of the face, leopard and other skin headbands and topped these with crane, ostrich and other bird feathers.[2] Lion and leopard skins and claws were worn by chiefs. Wild and civet cat skins were worn on special occasions, and distinguished notables from commoners as only the former could afford the expensive catskin dress; commoners wore a less expensive dress of two pieces of ox of buck skin.[3] Alongside the local market existed a foreign market for these skins in the Gaza, Swazi, Zulu and Natal Nguni areas. By the 1870s a civet skin bought in Bilene

---

1. Theal, RSEA, VI, "Aanmerkelyke Ontmoetingen", Jakob de Bucquoi, 1719, 494; RSEA, II, 460, Penwell "Account", p. 468; Ibid., Owen, "Description", p. 481; Fynn, Diary, 49.

2. Africana Museum, Johannesburg, Junod Collection (1) 39/220-661; H. Seidel, "Die Ba-Ronga an der Delagoa Baai", Globus, 74, 12, 1898, pp. 186-87; F. Elton, Natal Mercury, 10 Oct, 1871; W. Bleek, Natal Diaries, p. 76; Junod, Life, I, 451. An excellent description of Khosa military dress is in SMA 1760 Grandjean Diary, 27 Jan., 1894.

3. Seidel, "Die Ba-Ronga", 86; Junod, Life, I, 451; II, 95-96; SMA 1760 Grandjean Diary, 27 Jan., 1894.

for 1s could fetch 3 s in Natal and cat and monkey skins bought in the Delagoa Bay hinterland were exchanged for cattle in Zululand. A seaborne trade in cat and monkey skins developed and in 1877, 24 991 of these skins entered Durban from Lourenço Marques.[4] The Maputo supplied the Zulu with large numbers of cat skins as sagwati.[5]

But the major hunting produce of the area and the reason for the existence of Lourenço Marques until the 1860s, was elephant ivory. Elephants were killed on the outskirts of the settlement as late as the 1830s and in the 1840s some 600 elephants inhabited an area of three square miles to the south of the Bay.[6] Smith and Hedges have shown the importance of ivory areas to the south of Delagoa Bay but, as their work has concentrated on trade between Zululand and Lourenço Marques, it has given the impression that the ivory trade with the Low and Highvelds was of little consequence.[7] However, even before Portuguese and Luso-Indian traders moved into the Transvaal to trade with Boer hunters in the 1840s and 1850s, much of the ivory procured by Delagoa Bay hunter-traders came from the High and Lowveld areas to the west of the settlement.[8]

---

4. Fynn, Diary, 47; NA/GH 1050 Supreme Court Case Agnew vs. Van Grunning, 24 May 1875; NA/SNA 1/7/9 "Passes issued", 10 June 1874, 20 May 1876. See also BO 29, "Report of Lourenço Marques customs for 1881", 29 Aug., 1882; ZGH 736.249 Statement of Faku, 20 March 1891.

5. Webb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 64-7 evidence of Bikwayo.

6. T. le Roux (ed), Dagboek van Louis Trigardt, 185; Delagorgue, Voyage, 490. See also Coqui, "Journey from Origstadt", ProGS III, 1859, 373. For the Dutch period, see C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd om Delagoa-Baai", 14, 60.

7. Smith, "The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni politics, 1750-1835" in L. Thompson (ed), African Societies in Southern Africa, 186-7; Ibid., "The struggle for control", 268; Hedges, "Trade & Politics", 230. Smith's evidence on the Zulu provenance of most of the ivory exported through Lourenço Marques is based on a statement, made by the traveller Francis Farewell, designed to raise funds for a trading expedition to Zululand. Farewell's commercial hyperbole also led him to aver that Shaka's kraals were made of ivory and that gold could be found in Zululand. Fynn, Diary, 52, 56; P. Kirby (ed) Andrew Smith & Natal, 161. Both Smith and Hedges refer to a report by Owen, in support of this thesis, yet Owen in his dispatch to the Admiralty clearly stated that the caravan that he had seen entering Lourenço Marques with 300 tusks had come from the west, not the south. ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm, 19 June 1824. The origin of this caravan was excluded from Owen's published account, Narrative, vol. II, 20. Nor is there any evidence to support the view that the caravan seen by Penwell in

As long as trading activities at Lourenço Marques were controlled by poorly financed monopolies which paid low prices for ivory and had few guns and as long as elephants remained in the vicinity of the Bay, ivory hunting remained an adjunct of other forms of subsistence and commercial hunting. The meat and fat of elephants were consumed or traded locally and the tusks were sold at Lourenço Marques. But in 1853 the newly installed Regenerado liberal government in Lisbon opened Lourenço Marques to foreign traders and lowered customs duties. This change in policy was brought about by the removal of the British Imperial threat following the recognition by Britain of the independence of the Boer settlers living to the west of Lourenço Marques in 1851 and the demise of the East India Company in 1858. The opening of the Bay resulted in European, and especially British Indian, traders establishing themselves in the area in order to participate in the ivory trade. These traders brought capital goods such as elephant guns which, valued at 38$000 in 1861, were four times the cost of "trade guns" at Lourenço Marques.[9] They also brought gun powder, lead, tin, spare parts, percussion caps and other technological innovations which revolutionized hunting in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Official ivory exports from Lourenço Marques more than doubled from 1846 to 1859, increasing from 11 364 kilos to 25 915 kilos.[10]

But ivory is a wasting asset and this new firepower caused the ivory frontier to retreat away from the settlement. In 1855 the best hunting fields were reportedly in Maputoland north of the

---

the late 18 century came from the south.

8. Stayt, The Bavenda, 76; N.J. van Warmelo, The Copper Miners of Musina, 68; R. Skully, "Phalaborwa Oral Tradition" (PhD., SUNY, 1978), 330-332; O.T., Chief Shikumba, interview, 18 April 1979.

9. BO 20. 18 May 1861.

10. FO 63/698 Parker to Palmerston, 18 Feb., 1848; BO 32, 11 Aug., 1860.

Limpopo.[11] But the following year Mpande complained for the second time of the encroachment by unauthorized Lourenço Marques hunters on his ivory fields and threatened to attack the settlement.[12] In 1859 the Governor of Lourenço Marques warned that the uncontrolled exploitation of elephant herds by "hundreds of hunters" was pushing the animals away from the settlement.[13]

The dependence of ivory hunters on merchants capital and the increased labour investment necessitated by the retreating ivory frontier brought about the emergence of groups of professional hunters known as amapisi. According to Stuart's informants, these men were "given guns by white people and (were) told to hunt elephants... the amapisi at one time were not known, for instance about 1840, they had not been heard of."[14] They developed a distinct material culture that distinguished them from the batimba hippopotamus hunter, the bahloti local hunters and the slaves used by merchants to hunt elephant. The wealth of the amapisi was reputedly second only to that of the chiefs and they had a special status in the community, exceptional hunters being remembered in song and tradition.[16] They wore coats, blankets and skins and carried bandoliers, powder horns and hunting knives. They developed special skills in order to hunt with highly charged heavy calibre guns suitable for elephant hunting. Like all long-distance hunters, they supplemented their own produce by trading for hunting goods. The amapisi were bound by a strong fellowship of common protective charms, songs, incantations, purification rituals, rites and taboos and they employed their own diviners. A recognized hunting code determined ownership in cases where, for example, two men shot the

---

11. Struthers, "The Hunting Journal", 84, 124, 128, 132-3; AHU. Moç., Diversos, 2, Texeira report, 1856.

12. SNA 1/6/2.87 Panda to Grey, 16 Jan., 1856. See also SAAR Natal 2. 359. "Statement of messengers of Panda, 27 Oct., 1848".

13. Onofre de Andrade, O Presídio de Lourenço Marques, 10.

14. JSA file 25 p. 259, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza. But for an earlier origin of the amapisi, cf. Hedges, Trade and Politics, 57.

15. AHU. Moç., 2ª Repartição, pasta 9, Freire d'Andrade report, 1891; Junod, Life, II, 68-69; TA/A.1266 BPC. no 1. Simoes to Paiva de Rapozo, 6 Dec., 1860.

16. Fernandes das Neves, A Hunting Expedition, 11.

same animal or a wounded animal had to be killed in a thicket. As the amapisi could spend long periods of up to more than a year away from home, advances were paid to them before they undertook a journey and their families, who perhaps acted as a security for creditors, were looked after in their absence. Each hunter was accompanied by as many as twenty men, often family members, who carried trade goods on the outward journey and returned with hunting produce. Guns and ammunition, which in Lourenço Marques could cost up to four times their European value, were generally lent out by traders on condition that a fixed part of the hunting produce was sold to the creditor before a specific date and the amapisi were paid a fixed portion of the value of the hunting goods produced in gunpowder or trade goods.[17]

Lourenço Marques ivory merchants had links with colleagues in the Transvaal and were often well capitalized. Paiva Raposo was able to call together 300 hunters and a sum of 12,000$00 (approximately £2,670) during the Gaza civil war while other merchants raised 2 000 rifles and 50 000 cartridges.[18] In the Transvaal, Cassimir Simoëns left an estate which included £3,500 of ivory and ostrich feathers.[19] Delagoa Bay elephant ivory was generally sent to India where it was used in the manufacture of women's galang bracelets. Mozambican ivory was of a good quality, size and colour for carving and most of the London ivory imported from Bombay was of Mozambican origin.[20] Elephant hunting was supplemented with hippopotamus hunting from the beginning of the 19th century when it was discovered that hippo ivory could be manufactured into dentures and rifle foresights.[21] A bull hippopotamus also produced as much as 200 lbs of flavour-free fat for casking or local trade and hide whips, cut from a single skin, could fetch up to £40.[22] The special techniques needed for hippo

---

17. Ibid., 7-14, 47-8, 267; Drummond, The Large Game, 16, 28, 131, 201-2, 223, 271; Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 44, 45, 62; De Vaal, "Albasini", 35, 52; Junod, Life, II, 59-63, 72-74.

18. SS 45. 9/62 Albasini to Schoeman, 8 Jan., 1862; Onofre de Andrade, Presídio, 19, 26, 28.

19. ABB. Albasini to Portuguese Consul, Natal, 24 March 1868.

20. BPP 1876 Consular Report, c 1421, 1875; Anon., "Le Commerce de l'Ivoire Africain", L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, VI, 1885, 242.

21. Owen, Narrative, I, 113; Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage, I, 85-6.

22. TA. W.179. H.T. Glynn, "Game & Gold", 246; TA. Private Papers, Greathead Diary, 1893 notebook, 17.4.

hunting gave rise to the batimba hunters. The rhinoceros was hunted for its horns, which were manufactured into aphrodisiacs in the Far East and, under Zulu influence, were locally fashioned into snuffboxes worn in incisions in the earlobe. Buckskins were exported and worn locally by males and animal bones were fashioned into various implements.

The Closing of the Western Hunting Grounds

The animal population to the west of Lourenço Marques was increasingly depleted following the colonization of that area by Boers in the 1840s; a colonization that effectively closed off ivory trading and hunting areas formerly exploited by people living in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.

One of the major reasons for the move by the voortrekker Hendrik Potgieter from Ohrigstad to the Zoutpansberg in 1848 was the lure of ivory and this drew Lourenço Marques traders like João Albasini after him.[23] Wherever possible, the Boers extorted taxes from Africans in the form of ivory. The Transvaal state gave a modicum of protection to English and other merchants trading for ivory for which they paid a higher price than Lourenço Marques merchants and which they sent to the Cape and Natal.[24] Boer access to capital, technology and their monopoly of the organized violence of the state as embodied in legislation allowed them to push their coastal competitors eastwards. The Boer use of horses, wagon transport and sophisticated firearms in the tsetse-free winter months resulted in what one trader referred to as a "fearful slaughter" of elephants. During the summer months when tsetse, malaria and tickbite fever settled on the huntingveld and prevented the use of horses and dogs and the summer grass obscured the game, Boers with sufficient capital employed African hunters in their "hundreds if not thousands", on a credit basis similar to that practiced in Lourenço Marques.[25] By the mid 1850s the Zoutpansberg figure of over 90 000 kilos of ivory exported each year was about

---

23. J.B. de Vaal, "Albasini" 12, 19; TA. A.375 Forsmann Collection.
24. SS 36/63 Albasini to Uitvoerende Raad, 10 April, 1863 in SAAR. Transvaal no 4; ABB. Albasini to GGM, 9 Dec., 1861.
25. De Zuid Afrikaan, 28 Jan., 1864; Staats Courant 15 Nov, 1867.

three to four times that of Lourenço Marques and represented the annual slaughter of almost 2 000 elephants.[26]

Boer settlement in the Zoutpansberg was based on hunting and pastoralism. But following the lungsickness epidemic of 1855 which destroyed large numbers of cattle, many men were pushed into hunting for a living. As pastoralists the Boers were also obliged to kill wild animals in order to protect their livestock and open up new pastures as well as to supply themselves with venison, clothing, shoes, whips, riempies and trading commodities. As the Highveld became shot out and as Boer pastoralists sought sweet veld winter grazing for their cattle, they fired their winter sourveld pastures and moved into the Lowveld for the malaria-free hunting season.[27] As early as the late 1850s Boers were hunting systematically as far east as Khosen on the Nkomati river bend.[28]

Boer legislation at first restricted African competition but later defined Mozambican hunters as poachers. The initial Zoutpansberg hunting laws of 1855 were adopted and codified by the South African Republic in 1858. Apart from game protective aspects, this legislation attempted to maintain a white monopoly of guns and to undercut African competition. Thus it demanded that all hunters should only operate in winter and that Black hunters operating west of the Lowveld and outside of their employers' farms, should carry passes or be accompanied by Whites. Africans were similarly prohibited from owning guns and horses; transgression of these laws was punishable by imprisonment or a fine and the confiscation of weapons which were forfeited to the captor.[29] Africans considered to be Portuguese subjects were also bound by this legislation.[30]

---

26. TA/A.17 J. Fleetwood-Churchill; TA.W179 Glynn, "Game"; De Vaal, "Albasini", 15, 77; Hattingh, "Die Trekke", 400-415; F.V. Kirby, In Haunts of Wild Game.

27. Stevenson-Hamilton, Low-veld, 76; SPG. MacKenzie to SPG, 3 June 1889.

28. Fernandes das Neves, A Hunting Expedition, 46. See also BO 49, 1870, p. 205.

29. O.J. Ferreira, "Stephanus Schoeman in Transvaal" (PhD., UNISA, 1977), 44, 168-69. See also Law 22 of Oct., 1858, Law 10 of 1870, Law 6 of 1891, Law 13 of 1893; Staats Courant, 22 Oct., 1858; SAAR Transvaal. 13, "Locale Wetten...", 106-109.

30. ABB. Albasini to Paiva de Rapozo, 20 Dec., 1860; Ibid., Albasini to GLM, 23 Dec., 1860.

Although the Lowveld was soon included in these laws, they were seldom enforced - much to the beneffit of the Delagoa Bay and other hunters and capitalists like Albasiini, who procured their ivory almost exclusively through "contracted" Black hunter-traders. However the 1864-67 frontier war im the Zoutpansberg allowed Albasini's competitors to demand the effective implementation of racial gun laws because many of the followers of the hostile chief Magato were armed with hunters' guns supplied by Albasini. But the Boers were unable to enforce amy of these laws after their retreat from the Zoutpansberg in 1867 and ironically it was Albasini and his followers as the rrepresentatives of the Republican state, who took advantage of raciall hunting legislation to eliminate competition.[31]

With the establishment of Occupation farms in the Zoutpansberg and the Lowveld in the 1880s and 1890s new game laws were legislated and, with a more organized and finamcially secure adminstration, the Republican state was able to emforce these laws. Consequently the large numbers of Mozambican humters who crossed the border in the summer months became a source of bounty to Transvaalers as the latter had the right to confiscate and keep all guns and hunting produce taken from "poachers".[32]

The Decline of the Hunting Economy

To the south of Lourenço Marques as early as the 1840s and more regularly from the 1850s, groups of well capitalized hunters operated in the Maputo and Tembe areas with the backing of Natal merchants. Much of the product of these hunts was sent back to Natal in coastal schooners, few of which declared their cargoes

---

31. SAAR. Transvaal, 6, pp. 167-169; EVR.109. Zoutpansberg Petitioners to Volksraad, 9 Jan., 1866; Staats Courant, 15 Nov., 1867.

32. SSa.176. R1406/95 in Ra869/95. Lothering to State President, 30 Jan., 1895; SS.4681. R1579/95 Burnes to Police Commissioner, 28 April, 1896; Kirby, In Haunts, 331. See also E.F. Sandeman, Eight Months in an Ox Wagon, 344-45 and note 29.

at Lourenço Marques.[33] These Natal-based hunters not only combined hunting with trading but also with labour recruiting, both overland, and from the 1860s by coastal schooner. In 1859 Mawewe, in an attempt to accumulate ivory, and perhaps control its overexploitation, levied heavy taxes upon Lourenço Marques ivory merchants and, in order to force Umzila's repatriation, closed his lands to all Transvaal hunter-traders in January 1861.[34]

Umzila's subsequent return to the Delagoa Bay hinterland initiated the Gaza civil war which, together with the drought and the ivory blockade, severely restricted the hunting and porterage of ivory to Lourenço Marques. This resulted in a drop in ivory exports from 33 090 kilos in 1860 to 10 736 kilos over the 1862-3 economic year.[35] Umzila's victory in 1862, and the ending of the drought the following year removed these obstacles to the production and movement of ivory. Moreover, the weakness of the chiefs of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and their uncertainty over Lourenço Marques' new status as Umzila's ally, caused them to forgo the normal extraction from hunters off the grounded tusk.[36] By the end of 1862, 1 200 hunters armed with guns were operating in the interior and the Governor of Lourenço Marques warned that uncontrolled exploitation of ivory resources would result in an overkill of elephants.[37] Summer hunting was especially destructive as it restricted the ability of game to reproduce itself. In 1863 he reported that

---

33. KCL. Alexander Anderson Papers. "Gunrunning at Port Natal"; SNA 1/1/12 Koch to SNA 23 Jan., 1862; MNE. caixa 697 Blandy to GLM, 20 May 1870; FO 63/1046 Lt. Gov., Natal to FO, 30 Oct., 1863; Bishop of Zululand, Mission Field April 1873, 106; Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 145; Natal Mercury, 2 May 1871-

34. In a message to Theophilus Shepstone, Mawewe explained that his hostility to the residents at Lourenço Marques was partly caused "by their manner of hunting." SNA 1/1/10 Statement of Mabulawa, 12 Jan., 1860; Onofre de Andrade mentions Mawewe demanding a head tax in cloth from all Lourenço Marques residents, pregnant women were to pay a double tax. Presídio, 18. See also Fernandes das Neves, Hunting Expedition, 1, 2; ABB. Albasini to GLM, 1 Dec., 1859.

35. BO 20., 18 May, 1861; BO 42, 17 Oct., 1863.

36. AHU. Moç. Corres. Gov. pasta 21, GLM to GGM, 8 Feb., 1863; GGM to MSMU, 8 May 1863; GGM to MSMU 19 Sept., 1863; BO 22, 30 May 1863.

37. AHU. Moç. Corres. Gov. pasta 21. GLM to GG, 13 Aug., 1862 in GGM to MSMU, 14 Oct., 1862.

> "A great commercial movement has made itself felt in the country. Almost all the inhabitants have gone into the interior, some to trade and others to hunt... except for a few officials, all the inhabitants and even the negroes of the Crown Lands are merchants and hunters."[38]

Others remarked on the "strings of kaffirs several miles in length carrying ivory."[39] With the ivory fields once again open for hunting, exports shot up from 10 736 kilos in 1862-3 to 40 935 kilos in 1863-4. Hippo ivory exports rose similarly from 1 760 to 2 780 kilos and rhino horn exports from 3 000 kilos to 6 590 kilos.[40]

But the overkill that resulted from this heightened production pushed elephants northwards. By the mid 1860s the best ivory fields were in the Inhambane, Sofalla-Senna area and, in marked contrast to the mid 1850s, there were few elephants left in Maputoland.[41] The strength which the Lourenço Marques hunters and ivory capitalists exercised in the period after the Gaza civil war proved ephemeral for the Mawewe-Swazi invasions of the Delagoa Bay hinterland rendered the area unsafe for large scale movements of goods for the next fifteen years. These invasions, which obliged Umzila to withdraw to Mosapa where the best ivory fields lay,[42] also caused him to reimpose royal taxation on ivory hunting, a move that was quickly followed by the chiefs living south of the Limpopo.[43] Nor did Umzila's victory improve the situation of the Zoutpansberg hunters as he did not forget the willingness that many Boers had

---

38. ACU, 1863, 72 Report of GLM; BO 17, 1863. GLM to GGM, 2 Oct., 1862.

39. FO 63/1047. Dickson, Munro and Co. to FO., 18 Aug., 1863.

40. BO 39, 26 Sept., 1863; ACU, 1864, p. 66, Fernandes das Neves; BO 42, 17 Oct., 1863; ACU, 1866. 2 a serie p 45.

41. AHU. Moç. Corres. Gov. Pasta 21. Albasini to GGM, 1 Sept., 1864 in GGM to MSMU, 18 Nov., 1865; Freire de Andrade, "Exploraçoẽs Portuguêses", BSGL, 5, 13, 1894, 320; BO 15, 1871; W. Drummond, The Large Game & Natural History of South & South-east Africa, 202, 215; Natal Mercury, November summary, 1870.

42. Drummond, Large Game, 215; ABB. Albasini to GLM, 7 April, 1862.

43. ABB. Albasini to GLM, 15 Oct., 1864; ACU, 15 April 1865, p. 97; BO 17, 1871, p. 74. See also BO 41, 14 Oct., 1866; Natal Mercury, 16 Dec., 1869. On game protective elements in taxation, see BPP 1890 c.6200 Erskine to SNA, 22 July 1871.

shown to surrender him to Mawewe. But Albasini too was excluded from Umzila's ivory fields because, despite his acceptance of some ivory and slaves, his assistance in the civil war had not materialized.[44]

The problems arising from the continued closure of the Gaza ivory fields, upon which the Zoutpansberg hunting community and the Portuguese coastal settlements were dependent for their livelihood, were aggravated by contemporary frontier wars in the northern Transvaal against Rambuda and Magato.[45] These wars prevented hunter-traders from reaching Mzilikatze's country and closed the northern Zoutpansberg as an ivory producing area.[46] This led to a draining of the Schoemansdal treasury and was an important reason for the Boer retreat from the town in 1867. A number of Boer hunter-farmers remained in the Spelonken area at the south-eastern point of the Zoutpansberg. They were largely dependent upon the protection of anti-Magato elements for their continued existence and, like Albasini who maintained a force of about 700 hunters and over 100 guns, they were badly hit by the declining opportunities offered by elephant hunting.[47]

The unsettled interior markedly increased the Lourenço Marques capitalists' overheads, as the loss, through desertion or theft, of

---

44. SS 55. R210/64. Verklaring van Monene, 11 April 1864; SS 65. R290/65 "Verslag van die Kafir Dodanhana", 13 March 1865; UR. 2. Art. 1. Schoeman and Duvenage with messengers from Umzila, 4 April, 1868. Exclusion from the Gaza ivory fields seems to have been selective rather than general in nature. See ABB. Albasini to GLM 22 Dec., 1862; Albasini to GLM 22 July, 1863. See also SS 106. R1627/68 "Voorlopige rapport van Mozela", 26 Sept., 1868.

45. ABB. Albasini to GLM 31 March 1861; Albasini to GGM, 9 July 1866; TA/A.595 Struben ms; De Vaal, "Die Rol", 73; Natal Mercury, 16 Dec., 1869; SS 109.50, van Nispen to SP, 8 March 1869.

46. SS.38 46026/61 Albasini to St. Schoeman, 25 Aug., 1861.

47. SS.57 Verceuil to M.W. Pretorius, 8 July 1864; ABB. Albasini to GGM, 9 July 1866; De Zuid-Afrikaan, 28 Jan, 1864; SS.100 R784/68 "Notule der Zittung", 2 May 1868. For the politics of the period see De Vaal, "Rol", 112; R. Wagner, "Zoutpansberg: the dynamics of a hunting frontier, 1848-67" in S. Marks and A. Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa; O. Ferreira, "Stephanus Schoeman", 275-282.

guns, ammunition and trade goods invested in hunting expeditions drained their profits.[48] In late 1859 and 1860 Mawewe took ivory from hunter-traders working for Boda Cassimo, Fernandes das Neves and João Albasini and another hunter-trader, Augustinho de Quadros, lost his life.[49] In February 1861 Mawewe attacked and killed several porters, returning from Mzilikatze, who were employed by Paiva de Rapozo and left José Nicolau da Cunha for dead. Several Boer hunter-traders were similarly harassed and sustained considerable losses.[50] After his defeat by Umzila, Mawewe continued to harass hunter-traders operating in the Delagoa Bay hinterland and in 1863 killed 69 hunters, employed by a Natal merchant, who subsequently claimed losses of £6 000, including £3 500 of ivory.[51]

The continuing hostilities between Rambuda-Magato and Albasini prevented Delagoa Bay hunter-traders from operating in Mzilikatze's country.[52] Other hostilities claimed the lives of fifty-one of Modjadji's followers who were killed six miles outside Lourenço Marques in retaliation for the earlier death of a party of Matolla hunter-traders in Modjadji's area in the mid 1860s. As late as 1871, following the Maputo-Tembe war, a hunter-trader-labour recruiter wrote of the area north of the Tembe river as

> "...in a frightful state of anarchy. Even the different tribes which constitute Umzila's kingdom are always plundering one another and the smaller tribes about.

---

48. TA/BPC A.1266 no. 1. Simoes to Paiva de Rapozo, 6 Dec., 1869; T.S. van Rooyen, "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal tot 1882", SAAYB, I, 1951, 192.

49. ABB. Albasini to GLM, 1 Dec., 1859; Albasini to GLM, 4 March 1860.

50. SS.37 R4298/61. Albasini to SP, 2 March 1861; ABB. Albasini to GLM, 18 April 1861.

51. NA/GH 1214 no 23, Scott to Newcastle, 3 March 1863; GH.1214 no. 125, Scott to Newcastle, 30 Oct., 1863. See also Fernandes das Neves, "Exploração do Rio Bembe", BSGL, 3, 6, 1882, 343.

52. ABB. Albasini to Vogichande Prichande, 30 April 1864; Albasini to GLM, 15 Oct., 1864; TA/A.595 Struben ms.

> Every man travelling through another tribe is constantly in danger of his life... one tribe is constantly on the watch for the people of another bearing goods."[53]

While increased overheads lowered the ivory merchants' profits the credit system of hunting and the Banyan monopoly of ivory purchases severely depressed the hunters' profits. Thus, despite the fall in the volume of ivory produced and the added labour involved in its production, the value of ivory calculated by the Lourenço Marques customs remained constant from 1863 (2$863 per kilo) to 1885 (2$641 per kilo).[54] This was probably a reflection of the value of ivory in India which remained constantly low until 1875, i.e. during the critical years faced by Lourenço Marques ivory capitalists.[55] The northward emigration of elephants when combined with a low purchasing price, caused ivory production costs to soar in labour terms without a corresponding rise in remuneration as hunters travelled greater distances after scarcer resources. The overkill of elephants was paralleled by the overkill of rhinoceroses especially of the more palatable white rhinoceros whose horn is two to three times the size of the black rhinoceros. The market for hippo ivory suffered a severe setback and then collapsed with the invention in the 1880s of xylonite, an industrial substitute used in the manufacture of dentures.[56]

By 1872 it was remarked that Portuguese merchants who had monopolized the ivory trade at Lydenburg were fast disappearing.[57] In 1875 an impoverished Albasini was forced to leave the Spelonken in search of a new source of livelihood. In doing so he attempted

---

53. FO 63/1047 D. Leslie, statement in Keate to Kimberley, 15 Sept., 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; Leslie to SNA, 19 July 1871.

54. The value of goods estimated by the Lourenço Marques customs seldom bore any resemblance to their real market value. They do however, indicate changes in price. BO 42, 17 Sept., 1863; AHU. Moç., Alfândega packet 1382. On the Banyan monopoly, cf. Natal Mercury, 11 April 1971.

55. The value of Indian ivory was depressed during the 1860s. Between 1870-1875 it rose from 8s 6d per kilo to 9s 6d per kilo and in 1876 shot up to 17s 6d, levelling at 24s 1d in 1890-91. Indian figures are drawn from BPPs, especially 1878-9, LXVIII, pp. xii and 44. See also anon., "Le Commerce d'Ivoire", 245.

56. TA/W.179 Glynn, "Game", 246; Kirby, In Haunts, 9.

57. WUL. A.55f R. James,"Reminiscences."

to apply his intimate knowledge of the peoples and environment of the north-eastern Transvaal to that last resort of ivory hunter-traders made redundant by overkill, labour recruiting.[58] In 1877 otherwise liberal Portuguese tax reforms raised the export duty on ivory from 3 to 6 per cent and the following year the Governor of Lourenço Marques blamed the economic crisis in the town on the decline of the hunting economy as the interior no longer produced sufficient commodities to pay for imports.[59] For the ivory capitalists, the problem of heightened overheads incurred by taxation, raiding and overkill was compounded by a vacillating Portuguese policy which often restricted the importation of guns and ammunition through Lourenço Marques.[60] In 1882 one observer noted that, because of the depletion of elephants in Gazaland, Lourenço Marques ivory merchants found it more profitable to trade in Bilene, on the south-east border of Gaza, where they exchanged their goods for sterling specie earned by migrant workers in the Transvaal and Natal. The Zoutpansberg saw a brief resurgence in ivory hunting in 1885 when a treaty of friendship was signed with the newly-installed Gungunyana allowing Zoutpansberg hunters into Gazaland. This led to more ivory being produced in the Zoutpansberg in that year than over the previous decade and this caused Gungunyana to once again restrict entrance to the hunting fields.[62]

Because of the declining hunting economy the twenty years following the mid 1860s were marked by a transfer of Lourenço Marques merchant capital from ivory hunting to retail trading. Although virtually all ivory exported in 1885 (1 052 kilos) and 1890 (952 kilos) went to India, by 1899 following the introduction

---

58. P. Berthoud, Lettres Missionaires de M. & Mme P. Berthoud 1873-79, 250, 376.

59. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879. District Report for Lourenço Marques, 1877-78.

60. BMSAS, 45, 1882, 39. See pp. 301-302.

61. Cardosa, "Expedição", 184.

62. TA/SS 1036. R824/85, "Traktaat tuschen zyn Hoog Edele Staats President en Koning Omdonga", in Nat. Comm. Zoutpansberg to Supt. Natives, 13 Feb., 1885; P. Berthoud, in L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, VII, 1886, Hattingh, "Die Trekke", 403.

of a 10 per cent export tax, all 155 kilos exported went to Germany.[63] As ivory production declined a new market, based on the purchasing power of migrant workers' repatriated wages, developed in the interior.

The depressed ivory trade persuaded hunters to transfer their labour from ivory hunting to the production of less capital and labour intensive horns and skins for the Natal, French, Dutch and local markets. Skins were taken to Natal in coastal schooners carrying migrant workers and ivory. French ships taking vegetable oils to Marseilles carried as many as 100 000 skins on a single voyage.[64] Smaller game was hunted almost exclusively with cheap flintlock and percussion guns and consequently it was possible for large numbers of men to draw a living from hunting.[65] By 1874 ivory had been replaced by buckskins as the major Lourenço Marques export.[66] But the increased circulation of guns heightened the depletion of game in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Similarly, the general displacement of flintlock by percussion guns and their easy availability and cheapness, together with ammunition at Lourenço Marques, was a major reason for the great slaughter of game in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[67] The more efficient breech-loader was seldom used and at one time breechloaders could only be procured in Kimberley and then only at the cost of a return journey skirting the northern border of the Transvaal because of the latter's restrictions upon blacks carrying guns. When breechloaders were later sold at Lourenço Marques their cost was considered exhorbitant.[68] Over the economic year 1877-78 dried skin

---

63. AHU. Moç. Alfândega, packet 1382; AHU. Moç. 2ª Rep. pasta 7 Alfândega de Lourenço Marques, 1890; Mappa Estatistica, (Alfândega de Lourenço Marques, 1899). See also BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 52, 30 Dec., 1878.

64. For one year, see BO 7, 13 Feb., 1875; BO 10, 6 March 1875; BO 40, 2 Oct., 1875; BO 43, 6 Nov., 1875; BO 50, 11 Nov., 1875.

65. Alice Times, 10, 17, 31 March 1876.

66. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 47, 19 Nov., 1877; Alice Times, 10 March 1876.

67. FO 84/1539 Vice-consul O'Neill to FO, 10 Oct., 1879; BPP c.-6200 1890 Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887, p. 45. See also pp. 300-302.

68. NA/SNA 1/3/26 Res. Magistrate, Upper Tugela to SNA, 29 March, 1896; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.

exports totalled 142 996 kilos. In 1883 some 42 197 kilos were exported, in 1890 32 614 kilos and in 1899 a total of 10 263 kilos.[69] Although the 1877-78 figures were inflated by Boer exports, the later figures confirm contemporary impressionistic reports of a rapid animal overkill throughout the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[70]

A similar decline is to be found in the export of monkey and civet skins from Lourenço Marques. As Maputoland became increasingly independent of Zululand in the 1880s, the production of tribute in the form of monkey and civet skins declined. This gave an initial fillip to the seaborne trade in these skins to Natal. However, this sector of the skin trade declined rapidly as the Inhambane interior, still largely untouched by southern market demands, superseded Lourenço Marques as an exporter of monkey and civet skins to Durban.

Figure No. 5

Monkey & Civet Cat Skin Exports to Durban

Lourenço Marques figures above; Inhambane below:[71]

1877	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882
24 991	5 054	4 593	22 458	33 932	11 467
-	-	2,937	n/a	n/a	n/a

1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888
17 713	19 839	10 517	6 549	2 006	2 505
n/a	n/a	21,778	18,870	10,843	15,348

69. AHU. Moç., Alfândega, packet 1382; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep. pasta 7, Alfândega de Lourenço Marques; Mappa Estatistica.

70. P. Berthoud, "Lourenço Marques", BSNG, 1895, 108; ZA 27 Report of Amatongaland Boundary Commission, 24 Dec., 1896; ZGH.796. 892/96 Foxon Report, 27 July 1896.

71. Natal Blue Books, annual series.

The collapse of the cat skin trade was compounded by the disintegration of the Zulu army after the wars of 1879-83. In the Delagoa Bay hinterland the shooting out of cats and the ready availability of European clothing brought home by migrant workers or purchased locally with their wages, brought about a discarding by males of skins in favour of European or Europeanized dress.[72]

The disintegration of the hunting economy had a number of effects on the social formation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. It virtually terminated access to a major source of protein and, when combined with cattle losses and the rise in importance of carbohydrate-rich crops like maize and cassava, this laid the basis for a structural malnutrition and a heightened dependence on purchased foodstuffs. The closing of the ivory frontier destroyed the amapisi and the diminution of small game restricted the ability of the bahloti to sell hunting produce. But as old ways of making a living closed, new ones opened.

The Response of Commoners and Chiefs to the Declining Hunting Economy

From the 1870s porterage from Lourenço Marques to the eastern Transvaal goldfields was particularly important because of the difficulties involved in transporting goods during winter over the Drakensberg from Natal.[73] Transport-riding from Lourenço Marques was restricted, especially in summer, by tsetse infestation, poor oxen and the bad state of the roads, constructed in the first half of the 1870s, between Lourenço Marques, Lydenburg and Pilgrims Rest. Although the mortality rate of draught oxen dropped from 50 per cent in 1851 to 10 per cent in 1874 and 2 per cent in 1884, the ease with which tsetse could suddenly infect an area remained a constant problem for transport riders. Thus in 1886,

---

72. Seidel, "Die BaRonga", 1898, 186. Nineteen photographs taken by a Swiss missionary of the 1895 Gaza mobilization show that all soldiers had a kilt of cloth under a kilt of skins. Most wore shirts or a toga-like cloth over the shoulder; SMA 2001/B. For Delagoa Bay elders wearing waistcoats, red coats, British military helmets, shirts and cotton cloth, see photographs in SMA 2001/A. See also SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 24 Nov., 1896; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 24 Jan., 1894.

73. MNE. caixa 663. Duprat to MNE, 9 Oct., 1874; Natal Mercury, June survey, 1874; SS 788. R 991/83 Nationale Boerenshandels Vereniging to Govt., March? 1883.

a severe drought drew the ungulate vectors of trypanosomiasis to the newly constructed shorter road between Lourenço Marques and Barberton and this resulted in a high oxen mortality rate that bankrupted tranported riders like J.W. Colenbrander and Percy Fitzpatrick.[74] Porters carrying up to 80 lbs took 8 to 10 days to walk from Lourenço Marques to Lydenburg for which they received 15s per 100 lbs and then a further 12s for the journey from Lydenburg to Pretoria. There were probably about 750 men employed as porters on the Lourenço Marques route at any given time during the late 1870s.[75]

Road construction and porterage introduced many men to wage labour and offered carriers the opportunity of supplementing their incomes from porterage with several months on the Goldfields before returning home. The amapisi who were dependent on large numbers of porters to carry the product of the hunt, were unable to compete with these fees. By 1879 porters carrying hunting produce were reported to be fast decreasing in relation to the increase in porterage to the eastern Transvaal.[76] However, porterage did not constitute a long-term alternative to hunting. In July 1891 the railway from Lourenço Marques to Komati Poort was opened and the extension to Pretoria was completed on 1 January 1895. The railway and the decline in tsetse infestation removed the raison d'etre for porterage.

A more important alternative to hunting was presented by labour migration, which in itself can be seen as both a cause and a result of the declining hunting economy. As early as 1878 the Governor of Lourenço Marques noted that

> "The hunting of animals which still a few years ago occupied many hands ... has grievously declined because of the diminution of said animals and because of their emigration to the distant interior and because of the

---

74. P. Berthoud, letter, 25 June 1887 in L'Afrique Civilizée, VIII, 1887, 307; BO 2, 8 Jan., 1887.

75. Cohen, "Erläuternde bemerkungen", 173; GH 1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879.

76. BO 17, 24 March, 1879.

> lack of manpower, which prefers to leave for foreign colonies where they will find more remunerative work."[77]

In similar fashion, Cetewayo complained that the movement of labour from Maputoland to Natal had caused a decline in tribute, largely in game skins, sent from that area.[78]

While the decline in the hunting economy released male labour for migrant labour, it also threatened the existing social relations of production and the economic base of chiefly power. Before the advent of gun hunting the chiefs were able to mobilize 1 500-2 000 people in communal hunts and in the construction of game traps and fences that were up to two kilometres long.[79] The organization of these hunts and the control of the redistribution of their product provided chiefs with the means needed to attract followers and retain the loyalty of dependants. Participation in the market economy through the sale of labour allowed a decentralization of gun ownership. When guns were imported, they were initially confined to the notables but when they became more generally available, it was the notables who held the better guns, such as percussion and later breechloaders, and flintlocks and later percussion guns, tended to be confined to commoners.[80] While modern guns were invested with an element of symbolic political power, it is important to note that the chiefs were unable to control the circulation of guns or gunpowder.[81] The hunting taxes demanded by a chief varied from the joints of a buffalo, eland, giraffe or antelope, to half the joints of a hippopotamus or as much as the grounded half of the slain animal. Skins taken from lions, leopards or honey badgers automatically belonged to the chief

---

77. BO 3, 1879, p. 17. "Relatório do districto de Lourenço Marques, 1877-78".

78. SNA 1/1/13 J. Dunn to SNA, 8 July 1863. See also SNA 1/6/3 "Statement of messengers sent by the government to Ceteswayo and Panda".

79. Owen, Narrative, I, 113, 134, 268; Threlfall, Cape Monitor, 16 July 1853; Hilliard, "Notes on the Manucosi"; Junod, Life, II, 58-9, 339.

80. Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 94, 144; JSA file 25, p259, Mahungane & Nkonuza; Bleek, Diary, 28; ZA 27 Report of Amatongaland Boundary Commission, 24 Dec., 1896; ZGH 796. 892/96 Foxon Report, 31 Aug., 1896.

81. However there is some evidence that the Portuguese gave gunpowder to chiefs. SNA 1/1/13 Fookey to SNA, 13 Nov., 1862.

as did the grounded tusk of an elephant and the contents of a crocodile's stomach, the latter being used in magico-religious rites.[82]

In response to the thinning out of game and the consequent decline in chiefly revenues from hunting, the chiefs tended to add to the burden of taxation placed on hunters. In the case of Umzila, this evolved into de facto hunting concessions which, in addition to the grounded tusk, foreign hunters were obliged to pay in exchange for the right to kill or skin a predetermined number and type of animals.[83] Gungunyana protected and monopolized all the elephant ivory in Gazaland. The more powerful of the Delagoa Bay hinterland chiefs, such as Ngwanasi of the Maputo, also came to monopolize all elephant hunting for the royal house and hence removed ivory hunting altogether from the world of the commoner.[84] Thus, when the Delagoa Bay hinterland was conquered and occupied by the Portuguese, hunting had largely ceased as a branch of production. The colonial imposition of strict regulations and heavy fees on hunting, together with the implementation of game preservation policies and governmental claims to the grounded tusk brought a final end to hunting.

But the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland not only drew a living from their environment. They were also able to capitalize on their geographical position as the natural middlemen in any trade between the Zulu, Swazi, Gaza and other people wishing to procure European-made goods at Lourenço Marques. Thus the causes of labour emigration should be sought not only at the point of production but also at the level of exchange.

---

82. BO 17, 1871, p. 74; Junod, Life, I, 40; II, 57, 76; SMA 467 Grandjean, 1890.

83. Drummond, Large Game, 215; G. Lacy, Pictures of Travel, Sport and Adventure, 52-3; Natal Advertizer, "Exploits of Reuben Benningfield", 26 June 1925; Junod, "BaRonga", 140; Life, I, 406.

84. ABM. ABC: 15.4 vol 12. Richards to Mean, 24 Aug., 1884; BO 6, 11 Feb., 1888; Junod, Life, I, 338.

Chapter 8

PATTERNS OF TRADE AND CONSUMPTION AND THEIR EFFECT UPON MIGRANT LABOUR

The Structure of Merchant Capital

Commercial enterprise was fostered in several ways; children were instilled with a respect for the knowledge engendered by travel and were taught commercial skills.[1] Traders were esteemed as adventurous and wealthy men and various chiefdoms were renowned for their mercantile abilities.[2]

Throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries imported beads, used as ornamentation, bridewealth and currency,[3] constituted a major article of commerce with the interior. The market for beads was extremely localized, dynamic and specific and consequently demanded a well-developed commercial acumen. Beads and cotton goods from Lourenço Marques were traded extensively throughout the Low and Highvelds[4] and were found in such dispersed areas as the

---

1. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9. Freire de Andrade report, 1891; H.A. Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 20; Junod, Life, I, 339; H-P. Junod, and A. Jacques, The Wisdom, 93-101.

2. Owen, "Description of Delagoa" in RSEA, II, 469; A. Mackenzie (ed) Mission Life among Zulu-Kafirs (Cambridge, 1866), 298; BMSAS, 86, October 1889, 330; Junod, "BaRonga", 241. See also Krige, Rainqueen, 67-68.

3. Van der Capelle (1723), RSEA, I, 417; Ledeboer (1727), RSEA, I, 428; Francken (1757), RSEA, VI, 499; Boteler, Voyage of Discovery, 90; Owen, Narrative, 118; Hillier ms., 1857, p. 8 in RGS; St. V. Erskine to RGS President, 11 Dec., 1868.

4. Preller (ed), Dagboek van Louis Trigardt, 76; T. Arbousset, Narrative of an exploratory tour to the north-east of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Town, 1846), 180; TA/BPC, I, C. Simoëns to Paiva de Andrade, 28 June 1858; Simoëns to Cabral, 4 Aug., 1858; UNISA. Nachtigal, Tagebuch, 1879, 283; Grandjean, La Mission, 57, 59.

trans-Limpopo, the edge of the Kalahari, Basutoland and Gaikaland.[5]

European and Indian cotton cloth, which initially had to compete with locally-woven cotton and bark cloth, quickly became the major commodity imported through Lourenço Marques. In the 1820s women's attire consisted of

> "a piece of dungaree, about eight inches broad, attached in front to a single or double row of beads or shells, supported by their hips and brought to a knot behind, from which was suspended a string of 10 or 12 iron balls."[6]

This cloth was woven on a horizontal loom by women in most parts of southern Mozambique as far south as Maputoland.[7] Although imported cloth was reported in 1823 to be "of prime value",[8] unmanufactured cotton was of such importance as a trade commodity that a commercial crisis developed in Lourenço Marques when imports were curtailed by the American civil war.[9] In 1866-67 some 2 673 kilos of dyed thread valued at 6 467$900 and 1 293 kilos of raw cotton worth 2 676$000 were imported through Lourenço Marques.[10] Only women wore locally-woven cotton cloth and, when European and Indian cloth was imported it was initially confined to female attire. Thus even

---

5. CO 48/62, Philip to Somerset, 13 April 1824; J. Thompson, "From Cape Town to Cape Correntes", in Walekenaer (ed), Histoire des Voyages, vol. 21, p. 17; Livingstone's Private Journals 1851-3, (ed) I. Shapera (London, 1960), 41-2; Merensky, Erinnerungen, 60; L.M. Thompson, Survival in Two Worlds, 10; A. Smith, "Trade of Delagoa Bay", 179.

6. ADM 1/2269 Osborne, "Description of the peoples of Delagoa Bay, 28 Sept., 1822". See also Boteler, Voyage of Discovery, 27; Owen, "The Bay of Delagoa", RSEA, II, 468; Fynn, "Delagoa Bay", RSEA, II, 481.

7. Penwell, "Account of Delagoa Bay", RSEA, II, 460; St V. Erskine to President RGS., 11 Nov., 1868 in RGS; Junod, Life, II, 98; ZGH 708 2 288/87 Saunders, "Report on the...amaTonga people, 17 Nov., 1887". See also SNA 1/6/2 "Statement of Umkunhlana, messenger from Langa (Mawewe)", 5 Oct., 1859. For weaving by Tsonga-speaking immigrants in the north-eastern Transvaal, see Berthoud, Lettres, 14 June 1876, 310; War Office, Native Tribes, 134.

8. ADM 1/2269 Owen, "Report on the Portuguese settlements, 15 April 1823"; Owen, Narrative, 118.

9. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 20, GG to MSMU 13 Nov., 1862; pasta 21, GG to MSMU, 19 Sept., 1863.

10. BO 22, 22 May, 1869.

in the late 19th century Mafumo herdboys, who wore cotton clothing, were taunted by their Matolla peers, "crowd of women that you are, clad in cotton material."[11] Imported cloth was also traded in the interior where the Portuguese term peça, a length of two fathoms of cloth, was later incorporated into the Venda, north Sotho and Tsonga languages.[12]

Metals also constituted a major trade item. Despite the lack of any ore deposits in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, when Europeans first arrived on the coast in the 15th and 16th centuries, they noted the presence of iron, copper and tin.[13] The high quality of copper neckrings worn in the Delagoa Bay area was frequently commented on in the 18th century and several hundred kilograms of copper and tin were exported from the bay during the 1720s.[14] Bronze was smelted in the area and larger quantities of high quality brass were taken to the northern Nguni.[15] The copper used in the Delagoa Bay hinterland came from the Phalaborwa-Murchison range and Olifants-Selati mines and perhaps from as far north as Messina.[16] Heavy copper and brass arm, leg and neckrings were considered a sign of distinction in the 19th century and were used as a bridewealth medium and in tribute presentations.[17] Although

---

11. Junod, Life, I, 69.

12. Sá Nogueira, Dicionário Ronga-Português (Pesa); N.J. van Warmelo, Venda-English Dictionary (Pesa); D. Ziervogel and P.C. Mokgokong, Groot Noord-Sotho Woordeboek (Pesa).

13. E.G. Ravenstein, A Journal of the first Voyage of Vasco da Gama 1497-1499, 18; C. Montez, Descobrimento e Fundação de Lourenço Marques, 1500-1800, (Lourenço Marques, 1948), 31; H. Junod, "The Condition of the Natives", 18-19; C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd om Delagoabaai", 14.

14. Jan van der Capelle, RSEA, I; Jacob Francken, RSEA, IV, 493; Jakob de Bucquoi, RSEA, VI, 43; Penwell, RSEA, II, 463; Coetzee, "Die Stryd om Delagoabaai", 163-174, 192-93; T.M. Evers, "Three Iron-Age industry sites in the eastern Transvaal Lowveld", (M.A., University of the Witwatersrand, 1974), 91-94.

15. Coetzee, "Die Stryd", 193; KCL Fynn Papers, "Miscellaneous notes on Native Industries"; JSA file 15, p. 68, "Description of Tribes."

16. Penwell, RSEA, II, 463; Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 21; Evers, "Three Iron-age sites", 93-4.

17. ADM 1/2269 Osborne, "Description of the peoples of Delagoa Bay, 22 Sept., 1822"; Fynn, RSEA, II, 481; Owen, RSEA, II, 468; Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 18.

zinc was imported through Lourenço Marques and was alloyed with copper in the Transvaal to produce brass,[18] a large amount of European brass was exchanged at Lourenço Marques for hunting and agricultural produce. Much of this brass, in the form of large unworked bars or rings, was then carried to Zululand where it was exchanged for livestock and skins.[19] Imported copper manillas were used in trade with the Zoutpansberg and brass and iron wire was used to bind weapons.[20]

Iron was used in the manufacture of weapons and, fashioned into rings, balls and wire, was employed at various times as a bridewealth medium together with beads, copper and brass rings, cattle, goats, mats and baskets.[21] As a currency iron hoes were durable, transportable, easily stored, and were divisible and convertible into use values such as spear heads, wire, sweat scrapers or agricultural hoes. The lotus-shaped marriage hoe was readily exchanged over a wide area.[22] In the Delagoa Bay hinterland these hoes were given the adjective beja which was the Tsonga name for their area of provenance in the northern Transvaal.[23] Hoes of a regionally specialized shape were also used as bridewealth and currency in the Inhambane area[24] and throughout the northern and eastern

---

18. WUL. Nicholson papers, A.82. Peringuez to Nicholson, 24 Oct., 1921; T.G. Trevor, "Some Observations on the Relics of pre-European Culture in Rhodesia and South Africa", Jrnl.Royal Anthrop. Institute, LX, 1930, 394, 396. For zinc imports see BO 1, 2 Jan., 1875; BO 43, 6 Nov., 1875; BO 2, 16 Jan., 1876; BO 7, 14 Feb., 1876; BO 21, 22 May 1876.

19. JSA file 25, p. 261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza; file 12, p. 123, evidence Ndukwana; file 74, evidence Mabola; Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive, I, 24, 41, 109.

20. FO 97/303 Owen to Admiralty, 6 Sept., 1825; Account book of Manuel da Gama, 1859-63, an Indo-Portuguese trader in the Zoutpansberg; J. Mouzinho de Albuquerque collection of weapons, Pretoria museum; Junod, Life, I, 452-3.

21. Jakob de Bucqoi, (1719), RSEA, VI, 434; JSA file 74 p 9, evidence Mahungane & Nkonuza, evidence Mabola, file 25, evidence Ndaba; Junod, Life, I, 275.

22. Fynn, "Delagoa Bay", RSEA, II, 481; J. Flygare, De Zoutpansberg en de BaVenda Natie (Pretoria, 1899), 8; B.H. Dicke, Appendix G to C. Fuller, "Tsetse in the Transvaal", 9th-10th Reports of Vet. Educ. S.A., 1924.

23. Junod, "BaRonga", 88; Life, I, 276; Grandjean, La Mission, 57; O.T., Nelson Mhlongo, chief Dzumeri's village, Letaba district, Gazankulu.

24. BO 13, 26 March 1864, 81; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep. pasta 1. Director Inhambane customs to GG, 26 June 1885; ABM: ABC.15.4. vol 12, Ousley to Smith, 1 May 1886; Cabral, Raças, Usos e Costumes, 98.

Transvaal.[25] Although chiefs fixed the size of a brideprice and the bride's father stipulated the medium of payment, it was common for the size and medium of the brideprice to fluctuate according to the availability of the specific bridewealth mediums.[26] It is traditionally believed that hoes became increasingly important as bridewealth following the loss of cattle to the Ngoni invaders in the 1820s and 1830s but that it was only following the cattle epidemic of the early 1860s that hoes became the major medium of bridewealth in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[27]

Sweet potato plants brought from the coast were exchanged in the north-eastern Transvaal for metal objects[28] and it seems likely that coastal traders as well as Tsonga-speaking settlers introduced other foodstuffs into the Transvaal such as groundnuts, various millet strains,[29] maize,[30] cassava, fowls,[31] and possibly tobacco. Tobacco twisted into coils and rolls was important in both long-distance and local trade.[32] Salt was also vital in local trade as it was both a dietary necessity and an important element in tanning. Salt encrustation was taken from the edge of coastal saline lakes during neap tides and the annual dry season. In the interior a less

---

25. SAAR., Transvaal no. 4, Supl. Stukke 36/63 Albasini to Volksraad, 10 April 1863, "Verslag van Kafirs Opgaven..."; BMB, 1874, 90; BMSAS, 1876, 13, 72, 284-5; Stayt, The Bavenda, 75; Krige collection, South African museum. See also numerous Zoutpansberg native commissioner case returns in TA. SN 3 and SN 5.

26. CO 48/62 Owen to Philip (n.d.) in Philip to Somerset, 13 April 1824 encl. in Somerset to Bathurst, 22 April 1824; JSA file 74, p 38, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.

27. Grandjean, La Mission, 56; Junod, Life, I, 276; Junod, "BaRonga", 87.

28. O.T., Nelson Mhlongo, chief Dzumeri's village, Letaba district, Gazankulu.

29. Krige, Rainqueen, 36. The Tsonga and Venda words for "groundnut" are almost identical, see van Warmelo, Venda-English dictionary. Ibid., The tshivalo and tshivedyane strains of millet in Vendaland were introduced by Tsonga-speakers.

30. O.T., Edward Mabyalane, Kurulen, north-eastern Transvaal. 30 March 1979.

31. The Journals of Carl Mauch, (ed) E.E. Burke (Salisbury, 1969), 120. The Venda word for cassava (mutumbula) is almost identical to the Ronga word (ntumbula). Krige, Rainqueen, 45.

32. The Venda word for tobacco (fola) is very similar to the Portuguese word for "leaf", folha. Grandjean, La Mission, 59; Kirby, In Haunts of Wild Game, 361; TA ".179. H.T. Glynn, "Game and Gold", 214.

palatable and impure salt was laboriously filtered from saline grasses and soils.[33] Earthenware produced in specific areas with good clay resources was extensively traded as were baskets manufactured by weaving specialists.[34]

Trade at Lourenço Marques was strongly influenced by Portuguese tariff legislation. Following the dissolution of the Commercial Company at Lourenço Marques in 1843, foreign traders were almost entirely excluded from the Bay until the promulgation of a new tariff structure in 1853. This included the establishment of a customs house, the running of which was contracted out to a local merchant, the opening of the settlement to foreign trade and the introduction of a three tier ad valorem taxation set at 4, 8 and 12%[35] The number of "Portuguese" traders at the settlement rose from about 15 in 1848 to 55 in 1861, the majority of whom were Luso-Indians.[36] Although many of the traders of Asian descent were Moslems, they were generically known as "Banians". They were drawn largely from Goa, Diu and Damão and by the late 1860s had formed a "Banian association" in Lourenço Marques.[37] These men traded along the routes to the Highveld, married Boer women and as Portuguese citizens were, until 1871, entitled to a burgher farm in the Transvaal.[38]

---

33. F. Elton, Natal Mercury, 10 Oct., 1871; Mauch, Journal, 1 Sept., 1870; Anon., Missionary Life of Douglas McKenzie, entry for June-July 1881; BPP 1893-4. Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.

34. Junod, "BaRonga", 225, 231.

35. FO 63/698 Parker to Palmerston, 18 Feb., 1848; BO 32, 8 Aug., 1885.

36. FO 63/698 Parker to Palmerston, 18 Feb., 1848; BO 21, 25 May, 1861.

37. BO 20, 16 May, 1868.

38. Until the early 1870s Transvaal Boers expressed surprise at the presence of white Portuguese. Fernando da Costa Leal, Viagem, 16; Fernandes das Neves, Hunting Expedition, 113-14; Naude, "Boerdery", 65. See also Mauch, Journal, 38.

They established trading outlets which were linked to Lourenço Marques throughout the northern and eastern Transvaal and at least one of their number, Cassimir Simoẽns, left assets of £40 000 on his death.[39]

Despite the legislation of 1853 the settlement was only effectively opened to foreign trade in 1864 following a severe economic crisis.[40] The opening of Lourenço Marques to foreign trade attracted large numbers of British Indians to the settlement. These men exhibited a high degree of literacy and, as distinct from the Hindu and Catholic Luso-Indians, many of whom were employed in the civil service, British Indians were largely Moslem and constituted more of a trading caste.[41] Most came from Bombay and Cutch and they drew the Delagoa Bay hinterland indefatigably into an Indian Ocean trade network stretching as far south as Durban.[42]

The establishment of European trading houses at Lourenço Marques, drawn to the settlement by the production of vegetable oils in the late 1860s, initiated a marked improvement in commerce.[43] The simultaneous emergence of a coastal schooner traffic between Lourenço Marques and Durban, based on the ferrying of migrant labourers, and the opening of steamship and cable communications also helped draw small merchants to the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[44]

The European and Banyan importers at Lourenço Marques provided itinerant merchants or sertanejos with goods on credit which were then often distributed to African compradores who sometimes

---

39. The history of these Luso-Indian traders has yet to be written but cf. BO 18, 2 May 1863; ABB. Albasini to vice consul Natal, 2 March 1866; 8 June 1866; 24 March 1868; Albasini to Duprat, 17 Aug., 1869; TA Braz Pereira Collection; Manuel da Gama account book (private MS); De Vaal, "Die Rol van Joao Albasini".

40. BO 30, 23 July 1964; BPP 1876, LXXIV, Consular Report for 1875.

41. Carlos Reis, A População de Lourenço Marques em 1894, 30, 34-5.

42. FO 63/1110 O'Neill to Secretary of State, 17 July 1881; I.I. 1/40.757/87 PI to Col. Sec., 28 June 1887; BPP 1890-91 LXXVII, British consular report for 1889; FO 63/ 1282 Bernal to FO, 27 Nov., 1894; Standard Bank 1/1/102 Liabilities report, July 1897.

43. BO 10, 6 March 1875; AHU. Moç., CG.,pasta 29, GG-MSMU, 17 Aug., 1875; D. Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amatongas, 274.

44. Natal Mercury, November summary 1870. By 1874 Lourenço Marques was the fourth largest source of Natal imports, Natal Mercury, 22 Oct., 1874; BPP 1881 Consular report c2945 for 1880. See also the extensive cargo manifests in the Natal Mercury and the trade statistics in the Blue Books.

travelled for several months in the course of their trading operations.[45] The compradores followed narrow trading paths marked by small enclosures surrounded by thorns or stone walls that served as shelters. At the larger "depots" goods were traded, caravans rested and retailers sent out in all directions. The latter would return with merchandise and, when sufficient was accumulated, this was sent to the coast with the requisite numbers of porters and guards.[46] Oswald Hoffman, the agent for Lipperts and Dentzelman employed 120 African compradores who traded and recruited labour as far west as the Spelonken.[47]

The rivers that cut through the Lebombo mountains provided well-watered and provisioned trade routes into the South African interior. The mineral springs in Khosen and on the Nkomati acted as an entrepôt from which large numbers of traders passed up the Uanetzi river to the Olifants. From the Olifants river three routes led into the Transvaal. One route, which seems to have been dominated by the Gaza, led to the Olifants-Selati confluence and the rich copper and iron-producing Phalaborwa area. Another passed up the Groot Letaba river to the Eiland salt-producing area north of the copper-rich Murchison range. It then continued to Modjadji's where rain medicines and ivory were procured. The most important route passed up the Klein Letaba river to the salt-producing Soutini area. It then followed the river, passing iron-rich Tshimbupfe, before running between the mineral-rich carbonatite plugs of Iron Mountain and Magoro Kop. Leaving the Klein Letaba the route passed Albasini's headquarters at Goedewensch before continuing to the saltpans of the western Zoutpansberg and the iron- and copper-producing areas to the north. From Goedewensch another route led up the Levubu or Pafuri river to Messina and thence north of the Limpopo to Inhambane and, via the northern Uanetzi and Limpopo, south to Delagoa Bay.[48] Traders transported

---

45. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879. District Report for 1877-78.

46. B. Dicke, The Bush Speaks, 21-22; Schaefli, "De Valdezia", 150.

47. II. 1/4 Edward Cohen to Col. Sec., 12 Jan., 1878; II. 1/16, Hoffman to PI, 28 Feb., 1877; Hoffman to Col. Sec., 3 March, 1877; SS 263 R250/78 Veldkornet Grieve to Landdrost Zoutpansberg, 8 Jan., 1878.

48. P. Harries, "Production, trade and labour migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland in the second half of the 19th century" in Collected Papers of the Africa Seminar, UCT, 1978, pp. 30-31.

goods to riverside entrepôts in flat-bottomed, locally constructed sailing vessels capable of carrying several tons. In 1861 some 37 of these gatum were registered at Lourenço Marques in the name of Mafumo traders while Luso-Indian merchants owned 14 launches.[49]

Credit was essential in the Lourenço Marques trade with the interior as the goods entrusted to sertanejos yielded long-delayed returns. Overheads were high and merchants had few guarantees. The Governor of Lourenço Marques wrote in 1875 that

> "Merchants who venture to trade in the traffic in goods and spirits in the interior have to give at the villages where they wish to establish themselves a larger or smaller present to the king or headman of the village and to entrust part of their valuable property to Kafir buyers who travel on their account and trade for them - they sometimes settle their accounts and sometimes do not settle them - and it is necessary that this business must be most profitable to give a return."[50]

The high cost of porterage, in wages and slaves, the proclivity of compradores to disappear and the "wild revelries of degredado and ex-soldier sertanejos in the interior further depressed the merchants' profit margin; if a merchant wished to undertake a large trade speculation he had personally to accompany his goods into the interior.[51] Merchants' wealthy caravans, sometimes consisting of several hundred porters,[52] provided a constant target for raiding parties. These attacks resulted in a continual drain, particularly in times of war or famine, on Lourenço Marques merchants' human and

---

49. BO 20, 18 May 1861; AHU, Moç., CG. pasta 21, GG to MSMU, 21 May 1863. See also Fynn, Diary, 41, 49; Threlfall, Cape Monitor, 16 July 1853; FO 63/1316 Consul to FO, 24 Feb., 1896.

50. GH 837 GLM to GGM, 24 April 1875 in British consul to C.O., 27 May 1875. Also in Moçambique, December 1951, 68, p. 77 and in BO 22 May 1875.

51. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879, GLM, District Report for 1877-78; BO 1882, p. 142, GLM, Report for 1881; Joao de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provinciais Ultramarinas, vol. II, 265-266.

52. SS 919, R1634/84 Louis Kaufman report in Lydenburg landdrost to SS., 16 Sept., 1883; Henri Berthoud, letter entitled "Mes cheres freres et soeurs", 25 Jan., 1886 , in Cuenod collection.

material resources.[53] But as the production of ivory, skins and vegetable oils declined merchant capital swung from risky itinerant trading to a retail trade supported by migrant workers' sterling wages.

The Monetization of the Economy and the Boom in Retail Trading

The flow of sterling wages into the Delagoa Bay hinterland became increasingly important to the commerce of the area. As early as 1866 the circulation of currency at Lourenço Marques was dependent on migrants' sterling wages and in the early 1870s it was estimated that £4 000 to £5 000 in cash was spent in Maputoland each year.[54] Even before the large-scale movement of Delagoa Bay labour to the Diamond Fields in the late 1870s sterling constituted almost all the money in circulation and was the international currency most used and understood by the African population.[55] By the mid-1870s Banyans were no longer exchanging their goods solely for produce and instead were demanding part-payment in cash. The contemporary trade imbalance at Lourenço Marques was thought to be due to the purchase of imported goods with sterling, the export of which did not have to be declared.[56] From the early 1880s observers noted that trade in the Delagoa Bay hinterland was no longer dependent on the export of agricultural and hunting produce but instead rested on the purchasing power of migrants' sterling wages.[57] The British consul in Mozambique

---

53. NA SNA 1/1/10 Johnson to Portuguese consul Natal, 14 June 1860; SS 45 10/62 Albasini to Lddrst Schoemansdal, 8 Jan., 1862; BO 4, 25 Jan., 1862; SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 12 Jan., 1863; Delgado to SNA, 14 Aug., 1863; BO 22, 30 May 1863; AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 21, GG to MSMU, 24 Aug., 1863; BO 36, 9 Sept., 1865; Albasini to J. Nicolão da Cunha, 18 May 1869. See also pp.268-70 for raids on ivory trading expeditions.

54. GLM to GG, 11 April, 1866 in BO 41, 22 Sept., 1866; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amatongas, 392.

55. BPP 1876 Consular report c.1421 for 1875; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 7 June 1879; Junod, Life, I, 276.

56. BO 47, 19 Nov., 1877; BPP 1876 LXXIV, Consular report 1875.

57. Bishop McKenzie, The Net, Dec., 1881; Alfredo Freire de Andrade to GLM, 8 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 99. See also Antonio Cardosa, "Expedição ás Terras do Muzilla em 1882", BSGL, 3, 7, 1887, p. 184.

was in 1887

> "struck by the uncultivated appearance of the country and the comparatively large trade done in it (and) said once to a trader, 'Where are the exports or produce by which all those imports are to be paid?' 'The produce of this district', he replied, 'is English gold.' The native pays for everything here in hard cash.' And this is strictly true: the natural produce of the district is almost nil: its wealth consists in the savings of the natives from their earnings in one of our South African Colonies. Sterling is the local currency - when the Public Works Department tried to pay workers on the railway in Portuguese silver, the workers stopped working until paid in sterling."

This view was endorsed in 1894 by the SAR consul[58]. The monetization of the economy "from below" pushed workers onto the labour market and encouraged the shift in merchant capital from itinerant to retail trading, a process that was further assisted by the increasing incorporation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland into the world market economy.

Traders were drawn to Lourenço Marques because of the tariff reforms of 1877 which drastically lowered duties on imported articles, abolished a 3% public works tax and which favoured importers as no duty was levied on sterling exports.[59] But in the late 1870s, Lourenço Marques entered an economic depression following the prohibition of the gun trade, the collapse of railway speculations and a decline in export trade. Merchant companies faced with bankruptcy were obliged to demand more securities and guarantees from sertanejos. This led to a withdrawal of credit and trade goods were increasingly only extended in exchange for cash, produce or letters of credit.[60] In an area without wagon transport it was also more profitable for merchants to trade in specie than in high bulk agricultural and hunting produce whose transport to the coast by head porterage was particularly costly.[61]

---

58. FO 84/1846 O'Neill to FO, 26 Feb., 1887; SS 155 R1358/95 SAR consular report for 1894.

59. Import duties fell from 15-30% to about 10% and export duties from 3-8% to an average of about 3%. BPP 1883 C.3533 "Correspondence with respect to tariffs in the Portuguese possessions in Africa, 1877-83"; BPP 1881 XC C.2945 Consular report for Mozambique 1880.

60. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879, District report for 1877-78; João de Andrade Corvo, Estudos, II, 265-66.

61. Capt. Chaddock, "Exporation du Limpopo", L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, VI, 1885, 186.

But probably the most important impetus for the transfer of merchant capital from itinerant trading to retailing came from speculation in the Indian rupee which, linked to the Indian silver standard, underwent a steady devaluation between 1870-1893.

Indian rupees, together with Austrian Maria Theresa and Mexican Spanish dollars, were in the 1870s legal tender in most countries bordering on the Indian Ocean. But from 1873 to 1876 the rupee's value in London declined from 2s to 1s6½d and for the next ten years fluctuated at this price before sinking even lower.[62] Speculation in imported rupees valued at 1s10d in Mauritius and at 2s in Natal caused Natal banks to refuse acceptance of rupees in August 1876.[63] In Lourenço Marques, merchant companies offloaded silver rupees and dollars from branches elsewhere in Mozambique. This money was then used to pay government taxes and duties and gold was then employed in the remittance of profits to India. Consequently depreciating silver was accumulated by Portuguese officials while gold sovereigns earned by migrants in the British colonies and the Transvaal circulated in the commercial sector.[64] Indian exporters benefitted from the falling rate of exchange between silver and gold, for as the rupee depreciated the margin between cost and selling price widened. Profits were particularly high in areas like the Delagoa Bay hinterland where gold sovereigns were procurable through retailing goods bought in silver rupees from old stock and bank consignments in India.[65] Thus migrant workers supplied Indian traders with a constantly appreciating source of gold specie and with a means of facilitating international economic transactions.

By 1884 it was reported that Banyan retailers had cut out all intermediary traders and that they were oversupplying the market

---

62. M. de Cecco, Money and Empire, 62-68; D.H. Leavens, Silver Money, 72-74, 76. The rupee declined by 33% from 1873 to 1893 and by a further 17% in 1893-94.

63. CSO 558.1987/76 Collector Customs, Natal to Col. Sec., 3 Aug., 1876; CSO 559.2048/76 RM Durban to Col. Treasury, 3 Aug., 1876; 2061/76 Sec. Natal Chamber of Commerce to Col. Sec., 2 Aug., 1876; Ibid., 26 Aug., 1876 and Col. Sec. annot., 30 Aug., 1876 in CSO 561.229.

64. FO 63/1127 O'Neill to FO, 13 June 1882; GH 837 O'Neill to FO, "Report of a Journey", 28 Feb., 1887; GH 838 Br. Consul to GH, 22 Sept., 1888.

65. BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.

with cheap goods.[66] In contrast to Inhambane, where sertanejos continued to operate, retailers working through Lourenço Marques had by 1886 "established permanent trading stations in all possible places"[67] and within the next few years they had "spread everywhere".[68] From 1885-6 to 1889 the number of Banyans in the Lourenço Marques area increased from 400 to 250 established in the town and 500 in the interior.[69] Banyan traders soon established a monopoly of the Nkomati. Goods were shipped up the river and then carried to stores constructed in strategic areas like drifts and chiefs' homesteads.[70]

Besides Lourenço Marques, the two most important entrepots were Kouchalou in Bilene and Magule in Khosen. From the latter point goods were sent up the Dzembe tributary of the Nkomati to the Olifants-Limpopo and into the Lowveld. Magule was a Banyan village consisting of a dozen reed walls surrounding rectangular, zinc-roofed shops. Round huts for wives and servants flanked courtyards planted with trees and flowers.[71] Banyans, whose average age was gauged at 28 in 1894, generally took temporary wives in the areas where they settled and returned to India after a limited period or took long leave every few years.[72] The retail trade also drew

---

66. Vasconcellos, "Mappas estatisticas", 53. For a description of the stock held by one Banyan retailer in 1892, cf. Junod, Life, I, 146, note 1.

67. A. Longle, "De Inhambane a Lourenço Marques", BSGL, 6, 1, 1886, 36.

68. Paul Berthoud letter of 13 Dec., 1888 in L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, 1889, p. 92; SMA 435 Liengme to Leresche, 27 July 1891; AHU, Moç., 2ª Rep., Freire de Andrade report, 1891. See also H.P.N. Muller, Zuid-Afrika: Reisherinneringe (Leiden, 1899), 6-9.

69. BO 4, 22 Jan., 1887; BPP 1890-91 Consular report no. 855 for 1889.

70. Liengme, "Voyage de Lourenço Marques à Antioka", 25 Aug., 1891 in BMSAS, no. 99, Oct., 1891; Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 155; Grandjean, La Mission, 191.

71. Henri Berthoud, "Voyage chez Magoude", BMSAS, 64, 1886, 6; Grandjean, "Antioka, 11 Dec., 1893", BMSAS, 114, April 1894; Schlaefli-Glardon, "De Valdezia à Lourenço Marques", 167, 175.

72. SMA 50 2/A. P. Berthoud to Leresche, 20 Aug., 1889; Ibid., 23 Nov., 1893; SMA 516/B, Junod to Leresche, 3 Dec., 1894; Junod, Life, I, 279.

European wholesalers to Lourenço Marques from whom Banyan merchants obtained a large part of their trade goods.[73]

As silver rupees continued to depreciate, the Portuguese in August 1888 prohibited their importation into Lourenço Marques, although not elsewhere in Mozambique.[74] This did little to unify the town's currency for the Portuguese real was undergoing a similar depreciation. Although officially valued at 4$500:£1, the real was exchanged on the open market for 4$800 in 1882. By 1892 the open market rate had slid to 5$200, by December 1896 it had depreciated a further 25% to 6$000 and continued to fall unchecked.[75] The Governor of Lourenço Marques successfully called for the withdrawal of Portuguese banknotes in 1889 as railway workers, merchants and the African population in general would only accept gold, silver and draft orders. Officials were paid in notes whose circulation threatened Lourenço Marques' trade in specie with the more northerly Portuguese settlements.[76] Despite the withdrawal of Portuguese banknotes traders continued to profit from the depreciation in Portuguese currency by paying their customs duties and taxes in Portuguese specie while retaining sterling for their commercial transactions.[77]

Banyan traders were regarded by the Standard Bank as a much-respected clientele. They were punctual in meeting payments, had

---

73. SMA 1255/B H. Berthoud, "Rapport sur l'expedition chez Magude, 6 Oct., 1885"; BO 32, 8 Aug., 1885, 323.

74. AHU. Moç., 2a Rep., pasta 6. GLM to Conselheiro Director general do Ultramar, 27 Sept., 1889. The rupee depreciated by 34% at Lourenço Marques between 1882 and 1890.

75. FO 63/1127 O'Neill to Granville, 13 June 1882; BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892; SMA 528/C P. Berthoud to Mission Council 20 Dec., 1896; SMA 496/A P. Berthoud to Grandjean, 24 May 1897; FO 63/1336 Consul to FO, 20 Oct., 1897. By 1898, £1 : 7$400 to 8$200, AN - MNE. CCC. Lourenço Marques 1895-1901 vice consul to MNE, 23 April 1898.

76. AHU. Moç., 2a Rep., pasta 6. GLM to MSMU, 27 Sept., 1889. See also enclosed petition form Lourenço Marques municipal council, 13 Aug., 1889.

77. BPP 1890-91 Consular report no. 855 for 1890; BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892. See also Std. Bank 1/1/102 Lourenço Marques 1895-1900, Inspector's report, 26 July 1897.

not suffered one bankruptcy in 20 years and were "large purchasers" of drafts on London for remittance to Bombay.[78] Although traders were not obliged to declare the amounts of specie exported, at least £16 577 was sent from Lourenço Marques in 1885. Some 58% went to Bombay, 37% to London and 3% to Zanzibar. In 1890 a total of £12 704 in specie exports was declared at the customs house of which 81% went to "British possessions", 15% to Britain and 4% to "Portuguese possessions". In 1892 £170 000 was declared exported.[79]

The monopoly which Banyans came to exercise over local trade led to the exclusion of African and European itinerant traders[80] and gave rise to a strong body of racial feeling. The Governor of Lourenço Marques referred to the Banyans in 1881 as "a plague" of "bloodsuckers". To Freire de Andrade they were "one of the greatest plagues... of the East Coast."[81] Banyans were accused of exporting the capital needed for the development of Lourenço Marques for

> "The native returning to his homeland is immediately besieged by a horde of Moors and Banyans who seduce him by every means until he lets his money go."[82]

Following the defeat of Gungunyana, some 900 Banyan merchants were

---

78. Std. Bank 1/1/102. Lourenço Marques 1895-1900. Position and prospects of the branch and the Post, 12 Oct., 1895; Inspector's report, 26 July 1897. See also liabilities reports.

79. These figures are in no way complete and merely indicate the direction and flow of sterling exported from Lourenço Marques. AHU. Moç., Alfândega, packet 1382, 1885 exports; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 7, Alfândega de Lourenço Marques; BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892. See also BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879; BO 3, 28 July 1888; Estatistica das Alfândegas de Moçambique, 1884.

80. BO 32, 8 Aug., 1885; Std. Bank 1/1/102 Lourenço Marques 1895-1900 Inspector's report, 26 July 1887; H.A. Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 21.

81. BO 1882, p. 142, Report of GLM for 1882; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade report, 1891.

82. J.A.M. Serrano, "Explorações Portuguêses em Lourenço Marques e Inhambane", BSGL, 6, 1894, 436; Alfredo Freire de Andrade, "As minas de oiro do Transvaal e sua influência sobre Lourenço Marques"; Revista de Obras Publicas e Minas, 1898, 330-31.

described to have entered the interior

> "to suck the country dry, taking from it the gold the native brings from the Transvaal."[83]

New Consumer Patterns and the Emergence of Sterling as a Bridewealth Medium

Cloth and liquor were the two major consumer items increasingly sought after by the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. As large amounts of cheap, industrially-produced cloth were imported into the area women discarded locally-made cotton and bark textiles, which were time-consuming to produce, and adopted a form of dress resembling the Indian sari.[84] A British official was informed in Maputoland in 1887

> "That formerly they weaved garments out of the wild cotton found in the thorn country... now, however, they can obtain all the clothing they require by purchasing it wherever they go to work and at Delagoa Bay, they seldom or never go to the trouble of making their own which is, of course, inferior to that made by Europeans."[85]

In reply to a general circular sent from the Foreign Office in 1887 asking consular representatives to collect samples of hand-woven cloth in order to secure their duplication in Manchester, the British consul in Lourenço Marques stated that, although cloth had formerly been produced, "there are no clothes of native make in general use within my district which it would be of any value to send home with a view to their being matched by British manufacturers." Although cloth was still being produced in areas like the Lamwe Highlands it was "of a curious shape and texture (and was) difficult to obtain ... an industry that is now rapidly dying away before the advance of European trade."[86]

---

83. Gomes da Costa, Gaza 1897-98, 128.

84. Mauch, Journals, Aug., 1870, p. 67. See also Patricia Davison and Patrick Harries, "Cotton weaving in South-east Africa: its History and Technology" in Textiles of Africa (ed) Dale Idiens and K.G. Ponting (Bath, 1981).

85. BPP 1890, C.-6200 Saunders to Shepstone, 17 Nov., 1887.

86. FO 63/1188 O'Neill to FO, 25 Sept., 1886.

In contrast to males, who adopted the skin clothing of the northern Nguni-Gaza, women evolved their own distinctive style of dress. The following description of female attire in Khosen in 1894 was similar to that of most parts of the Delagoa Bay hinterland:

> "The women are dressed in cloths of bright colours and are much more covered than (in Switzerland). Several have full robes of many colours, formed by a piece of cloth attached to the belt and falling to the ankles. Another piece, attached around the neck, falls below the hips ... Many also have a piece of cloth across the shoulder."[87]

Specific cloth types seem to have been restricted to localized markets although dark blue calico was worn in most areas at times of mourning.[88] By the 1890s males frequently wore cotton cloth as an addition to their skin clothing.

The increased purchasing power of migrants returning from the Diamond Fields, the eastern Transvaal goldfields and Natal when combined with the favourable duties imposed in 1877 all resulted in a sharp rise in the importation of cloth and liquor.[89] This was encouraged by the Portuguese as increased consumer demands drove men onto the labour market and increased the amount of sterling circulating in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Much of this money then found its way into the hands of the Portuguese in the form of hut taxes, liquor licences and customs duties.[90] From 1880 to 1898 the Lourenço Marques customs revenue from liquor rose from 25 000$000

---

87. SMA 1760. Grandjean diary, 27 Jan., 1894. See also R. Robertson in The Net, May 1893, p. 70; Junod, "BaRonga", 115; ZGH. 796. 892/56 "Further Information regarding Maputoland, 31 August, 1896"; SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 24 Nov., 1896.

88. St V. Erskine to President RGS, 11 Dec., 1868, ms. in RGS; Cohen, "Erlautende Bemerkungen", 203; Junod, "Rikatla", 1 July 1891 in BMSAS, 98, 1891; Idem., "Lourenço Marques", 25 July 1894 in BMSAS, 7 Oct., 1894.

89. Import statistics were published in the Boletim Oficial. Cloth and liquor statistics are transcribed in Appendix 3. See also Junod, "BaRonga", 363; FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; GH 1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879.

90. BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892; Bovill, Natives Under the Transvaal Flag, 67; SMA 502/C Junod to Leresche, 16 Sept., 1890; SMA 536/A Borel to Grandjean, 23 April 1897; Junod, Life, I, 537-38.

to 167 000$000. The protectionist tariff of 1892 placed a heavy duty of $450 per litre on distilled liquor and thus protected the market for Portugal's lowest quality 'colonial wines' or "vinhos para pretos" which were taxed only $010 per litre. This resulted in a rise in the importation of colonial wines from a rough annual average of 50 000 litres in 1882-1890, to over 3 million litres annually in 1897-98.[91] This tariff structure also protected the numerous distilleries constructed in the 1890s to manufacture Zambezi and Natal sugar into liquor for the Transvaal market.[92]

Contemporary observers constantly remarked on the large number of canteens, and extensive trade in liquor, in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. In 1892 there were 147 canteens serving a population of 40 000 in the Crown Lands; by 1896 there were 82 licensed canteens, within a one-and-a-half kilometre radius of Lourenço Marques, serving a population of 5 000 to 6 000. This figure excluded unlicensed canteens and wine shops, which did not require liquor licences.[93] Canteens became important labour recruiting centres to which men were attracted by liquor and credit and from where they were taken to the mines in batches by recruiters.[94]

It has frequently been noted that people become locked into the world economy when former luxury imports become necessities and that this was an important factor in generating migrant labour. However it was not merely human nature that created a market for imported goods like cloth and liquor. The chiefs and numzane often stimulated a demand for these goods by dressing their wives in imported cloth and by using liquor as a libation and reward and

---

91. Mappas Estatisticas (1899) pp. vii ff; BPP 1892, Consular report no. 955 for 1891.

92. Liquor distilled in Mozambique avoided Transvaal duties. BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153, 1892; BPP 1896 Consular report no. 1904 for 1895; Std. Bank 1/1/102 Liabilities report, Oct., 1895; AN - MNE. CCC. A-25-7. Intèrêts Françaisesdansle Mozambique; LA 464 Consul to SS, 16 Nov., 1895.

93. SMA 350 P. Berthoud, "Rapport sur la baie de Delagoa, 1887"; P. Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 119-20, 236; SMA 497/B P. Berthoud, "État du Littoral", Sept., 1887; D. Doyle, "A Journey through Gazaland", Pro. RGS XIII, 1891, 114; FO 63/1317 Casement to FO, 4 Aug., 1896; Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 54; Junod, "BaRonga", 206, 363.

94. Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag, 67; Richardson, Crowded Hours: Lionel Cohen, 137.

incorporating it as an integral part of many social rituals.[95] Powerful chiefs were able to discourage or prohibit the sale of liquor to their followers but in most cases it was in their interests to encourage trade because of the numerous taxes they extracted from traders. Chief Magude of Khosen levied taxes in kind on traders and then resold the goods on his own account. He is also known to have demanded death duties of 40 pieces of cloth and a carafe of liquor from a deceased Banyan's estate.[96] It was common for traders to provide chiefs with licence fees, transit, ferry and shipping taxes and to extend to them considerable amounts of credit.[97]

The importance of new consumer demands as agents of "proletarianization" has been stressed in the preceding section. It has also been noted that the transformation of merchant activities from itinerant to retail trading led to the exclusion of compradore and sertanejo traders. But retail trading also had a considerable effect upon African commercial and production patterns.

Following the cattle epizootic of the early 1860s, the Portuguese encouraged the importation of beja marriage hoes by reducing their import tariff by an effective 25%.[98] But it was not until the French vegetable oil trading company of Fabre established a branch at Lourenço Marques that hoes, mainly of French origin, became a major import. From several thousand hoes imported annually from Portugal in the 1860s, the number of hoes brought into Lourenço Marques in 1874 reached 254 700 valued at 60 000$000.[99] By November 1874 the Governor of Lourenço Marques remarked that

---

95. Junod, Life, I, 148, 216; II, 382, 385, 390.

96. E. Creux, "Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo", BMSAS, 45, 1882, p. 40; SMA 1760, Grandjean Diary, 23 Feb., 1893; Junod, "Rikatla", BMSAS, 98, August 1891.

97. BPP 1887 Consular report no. 60 for 1885; SMA 497/B P. Berthoud to Leresche, 14 Nov., 1887; SSa 155 Ral358/95, Consular report 1894; ZGH 795 2131, Consul to Salisbury, 25 Jan., 1896; KCL Richter in von Wissel, p. 4. See also note 50.

98. Compare prices in BO 40, 5 Oct., 1861 ($460) with BO 42, 17 Oct., 1863 ($345).

99. BPP 1883 XLVIII C3533 Report of the Mozambique Tariff Commission, April 1877. See p 299 , figure 6.

> "the most considerable articles of kafir consumption in this area are hoes, but of a special kind; if they do not conform to this pattern they will not sell."[100]

But the following month the Governor reported that "a notable surplus" of hoes had accummulated in the customs house with the result that hoes had halved in value.[101] In October 1875 he wrote that

> "the merchants have suffered a great fall in the value of Landin (beja) hoes which used to constitute a large part of the import commerce."[102]

Nevertheless merchants continued to flood the market with industrially-produced hoes and about 220 000 were imported in 1876. These hoes were valued at 58 268$300 which was more than the combined value of the two other major imports, cloth and liquor.

The African population attempted to restrict beja hoes to the sphere of bridewealth circulation for a hoe brideprice "was considered a sacred deposit in the hands of the father, brother or tutor of the bride, that under no circumstances could they be used for agricultural purposes."[103] But Indian and European merchants were under no similar social compunction and increasingly used hoes to purchase agricultural and hunting produce and to pay guide and porterage fees.[104] Hoes rapidly lost their special-purpose value and, despite the opposition of the chiefs, brideprices spiralled from 5-10 hoes in the 1840s to well over 50 in the late 1870s.[105] This brideprice inflation was fanned by migrants who returned from the

---

100. BO 1, 2 Jan., 1875, Lourenço Marques district report for Nov., 1874.

101. BO 7, 13 Feb., 1875.

102. BO 50, 11 Dec., 1875, District report for Oct-Nov., 1875.

103. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., GG to MSMU, 8 Oct., 1886.

104. Fernandes das Neves, Hunting Expedition, 280; UNISA/JC "Litteratures - Coutumes", p. 27.

105. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877 District Report for 1876-77; Junod, BaRonga", 79; Life, I, 276-77; JSA file 74, evidence of Ndaba; Granjean, La Mission, 57.

plantations and mines of South Africa with wages which they used to procure hoes at Lourenço Marques.

As early as 1875 the Governor of the settlement noted that

> "This fall (in the value of hoes) is because the kaffirs have adopted the system of exchanging wives for gold instead of hoes."[106]

However hoes and gold were initially both acceptable for marriage purposes and the exclusion of hoes from the circuit of bridewealth was only completed in the early 1880s.[107] In 1881 the Director of the Lourenço Marques customs reported that

> "Hoes are not imported to-day as they no longer serve in the marriage of blacks. Marriages are to-day made with goods and money. In this district only money is used and hoes are only used for agriculture."[108]

The transformation of the major bridewealth medium from hoes to gold was hastened by the Portuguese who, despite the otherwise liberal nature of the tariff reforms of 1877, placed a tax of $072, which amounted to about 33% ad valorem, on each imported marriage hoe while exempting agricultural hoes from all duties. In 1884 the Governor-General of Mozambique wrote that, due to the emigration of labour to Natal, "the kaffirs of these (Lourenço Marques and Inhambane) regions prefer dowries in pounds as do any citizens of a civilized country."[109]

There were several reasons for the adoption of gold as a basic medium of bridewealth exchange. Sovereigns were more transportable than scores of hoes and they had a constant scarcity value. It was common for daughters to be married off as a hedge against starvation during a time of scarcity and money was, like cattle, easily

---

106. BO 50, 11 Dec., 1875 District report for Oct-Nov., 1875.

107. Castilho, O Districto de Lourenço Marques , 13; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 3, GG to MSMU, 8 Oct., 1886; JSA file 74, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza; evidence of Ndaba.

108. BO, 29 Aug., 1882, Lourenço Marques customs report for 1881.

109. AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 1, GG to MSMU, 28 April, 1884; BPP 1883 C3533 Report of the Mozambique tariff commission, 1877; BO 33, 16 Aug., 1884, portaría 199.

convertible into food.[110] Perhaps most importantly epizootics and tsetse inflated the value of cattle as a unit of consumption and consequently discouraged their employment as a means of exchange. The rise and fall of hoes as a bridewealth medium is well illustraded in figure 6 which traces the number of hoes imported into Lourenço Marques:

Figure 6

Hoe Imports into Lourenço Marques[111]

Year	1862	1863	1866-67	1874	1876	1882	1883
No.	1,109	15,263	7,500	254,700	219,624	0	0
Value	141$410	7 743$500	3 338$000	60 000$000	58 268$000	0	0

Year	1884	1885	1886	1890	1897	1898
No.	833	23	7,524	24,974	5,446	17,930
Value	20$000	5$500	1 274$050	4 053$000	755$900	2 223$800

The figures for hoe imports by sea from Natal are more complete and although only a small and more commercially sensitive part of the whole, give a good impression of the process taking place:

Figure 7

Hoe Exports from Durban to Lourenço Marques[112]

1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878-83	1884
500	3 824	2 156	13 028	51 268	51 710	686	2 800	nil	36

By the late 1870s hoes were being exported from Lourenço Marques to Durban[113] and were taken overland to Swaziland and Zululand as well as to the former production areas of the

---

110. JSA file 74, p. 38, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.

111. These figures are drawn from the Boletim oficial de Moçambique; AHU, Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 7, Alfândega de Lourenço Marques, 1890; Mappas Estatisticas (Lourenço Marques, 1899). These statistics are of an impressionistic rather than a real value.

112. Natal Blue Books, 1870-84, "Exports".

113. Ibid., "Imports". 1 073 in 1877, 1 250 in 1878, and 7 575 in 1880.

Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg districts.[114] The dependence of the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland on Indian and European merchants for their metal requirements was tightened as African mining and smelting in the Transvaal was prohibited by legislation and swamped by industrial imports.[115] Labour-intensive locally-produced salt was also largely replaced by purer imported salts.[116]

Although an important trade in flint or "trade" guns existed at Lourenço Marques, modern guns were rare and too expensive for the African market and those who sought them were obliged to find work in Kimberley.[117] Most of the guns imported through Delagoa Bay were obsolete military firearms which, although they cost 55s. to make, were remaindered for 2s in Europe. These guns were landed at Lourenço Marques for about 8s and then sold in the interior for as little as 10-11s during "bad times" but averaged at about 25-30s.[118] Lipperts and Dentzelman, a Dutch firm selling guns on the Diamondfields, established a branch at Lourenço Marques in the mid-1870s, where their agent "Hofumana" (Hoffman) was known to the Zulus as "the Portuguese leader". Hoffman boasted of selling 800 guns in one day and when the gun trade was prohibited in March 1878, he was left with 30 tons of gunpowder.[119] As with cloth and beads,

---

114. SS 919 R1634/84 Lddrst Lydenburg to SS., 10 Sept., 1883; H. Raddatz, "Das Kaffernland", 54; Natal Government Gazette, 58; ZGH 736.249, "Statement of Faku, a Tongaland induna", 20 March 1891.

115. African informants believe that metal production in the Transvaal was halted in order to prevent their ancestors from making arms and force them to purchase European imports. O.T., Nelson Mhlongo, chief Dzumeri's vilage, Letaba district; Thomas Mampeole, Modjadji's village, Lebowa; John Mabalal, Chief Thomo's area, Gazankulu; Joao Mahuleke, chief Xikunda's area, Mhinga district. European sources tend to support the "swamping" theory, cf. Krige, Rainqueen, 47; R. Wessman, The Bavenda of Spelonken (London, 1908) 28-29. However Adolf Schiel, the Zoutpansberg native commissioner prohibited mining, J.B. de Vaal, "Tin en Goudsoekers in die Noord-Transvaal", Brandwag, 28 June 1946; O.T., N.J. van Warmelo referring to an interview with chief Ngevekulu in 1940. See also Law 17, 24 Sept., 1895.

116. Junod, "BaRonga", 203; Natal Blue Books, "Exports".

117. Struthers, "Hunting journal", 96, 103; Webb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 63, evidence of Bikwayo. See also p. 88.

118. MNE 664 Duprat to MNE, 30 April 1879; GH 829 Purvis to Lt. Gov., 20 March 1878; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.

119. Webb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 63, evidence of Bikwayo; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.

guns required an aesthetic appearance that appealed to a very localized market. In 1875 Lipperts and Dentzelman declared that old Prussian flintlocks were no longer marketable and that the most popular guns were percussion types with large-bored, long black barrels and heavy wooden butts attached by a pin rather than a ring.[120] Guns were taken to Zululand and Natal by individuals, some of whom probably financed their journey to the plantations and Diamondfields in this manner.[121] Guns were also sold to the Zulu on credit for cattle which were then driven into Natal where they were sold for cash by "amatonga" traders.[122]

The prohibition on arms sales at Lourenço Marques lasted from March 1878 to July 1882 and was reimposed in January 1883 following complaints from the Transvaal government that the "rebel" chief Mapoch was obtaining guns and ammunition from the settlement.[123] Because virtually every hostile chiefdom in the northern and eastern Transvaal and Swaziland[124] was able to obtain arms through Lourenço Marques, the gun trade was temporarily prohibited on several other occasions.[125] Most of these guns were muzzle-loaders and flintlocks which were traded in the interior for produce and money. Until 1895 the importation of these "trade guns" was encouraged by low customs duties, amounting to half that levied on modern rifles, and by the

---

120. CSO 525.2461/75 Lipperts and Dentzelman to Firearms Board, Durban, 30 June 1875.

121. GH 1050 Case of Agnew vs van Gruning in Registrar of the Supreme Court to GH., 14 May 1875; NA. Umsinga Magistracy files, 1876-78, migistrate to Attorney gen., 26 Nov., 1877.

122. NA. Umsinga Magistracy files 1876-78, Annual report for 1877; FO 84/1539 vice consul, Lourenço Marques to O'Neill in O'Neill to FO, 10 Oct., 1879.

123. SS 816 R5166/82 ZAR diplomatic agent in Lourenço Marques to SS, 22 Sept., 1883; SS 1333 R571/87 Portuguese consul to SS, 24 Jan., 1887; BO 2, 2 Jan., 1887.

124. SN 1A Nelmapius to Lddrst. Lydenburg, 4 May 1879; SS 564 Ra4034/81 Vrede regter to Cmdt gen., 15 Sept., 1881; SS 1333 45/87 Albasini to Schoeman, 24 Dec., 1886; SS 1900 R3931/89 Haenert to SS, 29 April 1889; LA 463, consul to SS, 25 July 1894; Idem., 12 June 1894, 4 Aug., 1894; BMSAS 1890, 107; BMB, 1890, 21-22; Grimsehl, "Onluste in Modjadjiland", 222, 225.

125. BO 2, 2 Jan., 1887; BO 22, Dec., 1888, p. 137; BPP 1893-94 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.

exclusion of their owners from normal gun-licence requirements.[126] The trade in guns and ammunition constituted an important, but highly inconsistent, source of revenue for Lourenço Marques traders and the customs house.[127] Figure 8 provides some indication of the importance of the gun trade but must be treated with some caution as many guns were "smuggled" into the Delagoa Bay hinterland, especially via the Limpopo river mouth.

Figure 8

Gun and Ammunition Imports into Lourenço Marques[128]

1882	1883	1886	1887	1890	1891	1892
6,223$840	5,765$000	5,460$000	13,400$445	25,151$750	49,572$000	22,549$000

The trade in guns with the Transvaal chiefdoms eventually pushed the Boers into settling the border between the two countries in 1869. Before this date the Boers had continuously encroached upon the markets of the Lourenço Marques traders who complained bitterly:

> "What is the purpose of a port on the coast without a hinterland and without natives from whom come the produce of the land, who form the backbone of commerce."[129]

Following the ratification of the border settlement in 1875, the Governor of Lourenço Marques complained that Lourenço Marques traders were being arrested as "smugglers" in the Transvaal.[130] One

---

126. FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; SS 207.893 McKenzie to and Ryan report 22 April 1876; A. Aylward, The Transvaal To-Day, 366; SS 4681 R1579/95 Vrederechter, Geluk to Cmdt. Gen., 16 April 1894; FO Annual series, 1894, 45; BPP 1893-4 XCV Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.

127. On the detrimental effects of gun prohibitions on production, trade and customs revenues, ef. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879; Vasconcellos, "Mappas Estatisticas", 51; FO 84/1539 Thompson to O'Neill, in O'Neill to FO., 10 Oct., 1879; FO 63/1110 O'Neill to Sec. State, 17 July 1881.

128. AHU. Moç., Alfândega 1836-90, packet 1382; Estatisticas dos Alfândegas da Provincia de Moçambique; AHU. Moç., 2ª Rep., pasta 7, Alfândega de Lourenço Marques; BPP 1892 consular report no. 955 955; BPP 1893-4, consular report no 1153.

129. AHU. Moç., CG. pasta 19, Albasini to CG, 8 March 1860 in GG to MSMU, 4 May 1860; ABB, Albasini to sec. gen. province of Moz., 4 March 1860.

130. SS 203 R153/76 Gen. Manager Lourenço Marques and ZAR transport service to acting SP, 16 Jan., 1876. For the extent of the territory "lost" to Portugal by this treaty, compare the border on Petermann's map of 1870 with that on Jeppe's map of 1877. BPP 1879 c2220 map facing p. 358.

observer noted that,

> "on my way to Delagoa Bay via Phalaborwa ... almost every day I saw kaffirs and Banyans, the former as porters engaged by the latter, carrying guns or boxes filled with drink or gunpowder, and kaffir hoes, such that I myself saw ... a party of 100 of which each kaffir carried rum or 8 to 10 guns or 25 to 30 hoes."[131]

This trade caused a Zoutpansberg veldkornet to complain that the Spelonken was being

> "overrun with native traders from the Portuguese territory ... the lowveld is full of them. Of course none of these traders have any licences and consequently undersell the white traders here and defraud the government of import taxes and licence money ... the white traders here are complaining bitterly and in fact the trade is taken entirely out of their hands."[132]

Mozambican traders operating in the Transvaal were obliged, according to the 1875 Peace and Commerce treaty, to pay import duties and government licences and this was enforced by the British administration of 1877-81 which feared that "our traders are much disadvantaged by this (free trade) practice."[133]

In 1882 the newly-independent Transvaal government made provision for the establishment of border officials and, following the increase in transport riding and the smallpox epidemic of the following year, officials were entrusted in 1884 with patrolling the border and collecting import duties.[134] These measures aimed at restricting competition from Mozambican traders were paralleled by the passage of legislation in the Transvaal which discriminated against the wave of Asian traders who had entered the country after the first Anglo-Boer war. The "coolie" law number 3 of 1885 prohibited Asians from obtaining Transvaal citizenship or owning land and required that they purchase an expensive trading license. The Gold law (21 of 1896) prevented Asians on the goldfields from working outside of European service and demanded that they carry a

---

131. SS 919 R1634/84 "Verklaring van Louis Kaufman".

132. SS 263 R250/78 Grieve to Zoutpansberg Lddrst, 8 Jan., 1878.

133. SS 459 R4073/80 Lagdon annot. on Albasini to SNA, 8 Sept., 1880.

134. SS 919 R1634 Lddrst Lydenburg to SS., 16 Sept., 1883; Sanitary inspector, Lydenburg to Lddrst Lydenburg, 10 Oct., 1883; Volksraad besluit 146, 23 June 1884, 86; R2208/84 Gold commissioner to SS, 6 May 1884; Law 4, 1882.

monthly pass. The liquor law prohibited Asians from trading in that basic commodity. All these measures restricted the ability of Mozambican traders to operate competitively in the Transvaal and were forcefully, although unsuccessfully, resisted by the Portuguese.[135] Several Mozambican traders were arrested and at least one informant to-day remembers the trading licence system as the reason for the collapse of the trade, undertaken by Indians and Africans, between Mozambique and the Transvaal.[136]

The ending of trading and hunting, when combined with growing consumer needs and the insecurity of food production, help explain why men sought wage labour in south Africa. But these factors do not explain why the movement of labour onto the market was characterized by migrancy and temporary wage employment. In the final chapter it is argued that the origins of a migratory form of labour movement should not be sought in the emergence of a super-exploitative system devised by capital in alliance with the state, but rather in terms of the changing social condition of the people living in the rural areas.

---

135. SSA 384 Ra 2892/96 M.J. Farrelly, "Opinion of the Treaty with Portugal and the Coolie Laws", 29 May 1897. See also various enclosures in Ra 2892/96; MNE 709 consul to MNE, 17 Nov., 1896.

136. MNE 707, Consul to MNE, 19 Nov., 1883; Schlaefli, "Valdezia à Lourenço Marques", 150; A. Schiel, 23 Jahre Sturm und Sonnenschein in Südafrika (Leipzig, 1902), 263; O.T., Thomas Masuluke, 7 April 1979.

Chapter 9

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MIGRANT LABOUR

Kinship and the Structure of Production and Accumulation

In the nineteenth century kinship structured the social relations of production in the hinterland of Delagoa Bay. Real or putative kinship links expressed a social relationship linking members of the same productive unit. Exclusion from, or membership of, the kinship group determined a man's rights to labour, land, the resources of the clan commonage and established his position in the redistributive economy. At the political and judicial level, kinship structured the nature of material and political inheritance and gave a political definition to the clan as the dominant corporate group within the chiefdom. Kinship defined crime as an offence committed against the kin group,[1] it legitimated the positions of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen and importantly, allowed them to extract taxes and fines. At the ideological level, kinship determined social avoidances and deference, and defined prospective marriage partners.

Both the politico-judicial and ideological levels influenced kinship at the economic level. Thus inheritance increased a man's access to land, cattle and women, and this gave him the means to attract 'foreigners' as dependants who would be incorporated into the kin group. Similarly, respect for the elders was founded on their control of women, and women's productive and reproductive capacities, and of seeds, tools, knowledge and access to land and the ancestors. Respect as ideology reinforced the position of the elders in the production process. Thus kinship and ideology played a major role in structuring the form of production and accumulation in the nineteenth Delagoa Bay hinterland and for this reason people were able to invoke their ancestors as far back as the sixteenth generation.[2]

---

1. Junod, Life, II, 582.
2. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 6 Feb., 1890.

Differing marriage patterns for chiefs and commoners encouraged the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the chiefs in the Delagoa Bay hinterland and this facilitated their dominance of the chiefdom. As all marriages contracted by the heir to the chieftaincy before the death of his father were morganatic, a new chief was generally young on his accession and therefore had time to consolidate his power. While chiefs tended to form repetitive marriage alliances which centralized the circulation of goods and women between the royal families of different clans, commoners were prohibited from marrying the offspring of a common grandparent and, apart from preferential clan endogamy, their marriages lacked any recognized patterns.[3] The extensive or horizontal nature of commoner marriage alliances encouraged an egalitarian spread of women and goods between commoner families and restricted the clan from becoming stratified hierarchically into self-perpetuating tributary lineages. Corporate groups were formed by the chief's "placing" of his brothers, sons or father's brothers as sub-chiefs in the various districts under his control. But these "lineages" were generally dependent upon the patronage of the chief for the reproduction of their wealth and following, as it was common practice for the chief to displace existing sub-chiefs with supporters or "clients", generally drawn from his agnatic kin, on his accession to power. If a sub-chief accumulated sufficient followers to present a threat to the chief, the legal precedent existed for the latter to seize the property of the sub-chief and replace him with a more tractable "client".[4]

The power base of the chiefs was not confined to the royal family and appointed sub-chiefs, but extended to, and his authority depended upon, the support of the numzane, or homestead heads.[5] These men controlled the homestead as a productive unit consisting of the "houses" of married sons and married dependants. Junod referred to them as "gentlemen", "owners of cattle" who ranked "almost as petty chiefs" and as "headmen of the villages, the important men of the country."[6] The accession to power of a deceased chief's eldest son was far from automatic or ascribed and

---

3. Junod, Life, I, 234, 253, 369-70, 376-77. Marriage to women living in distant districts was discouraged due to the problem of retrieving their bride-prices. Ibid., II, 183.

4. Ibid., I 357-8, 413; Junod, "BaRonga", 387.

5. The degree of centralized authority exercised by the chief differed from one chiefdom to another. CF SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA 28 July 1871

6. Junod, Life, I, 328-9; II, 6, 46.

in many cases the numzane found legal precedent for the seizure of the chieftaincy by the heir's father's brother (the regent) and his house or by a brother of the heir who, as a district sub-chief, had accumulated a large and powerful following. The council of elders drawn from the numzane confirmed the legality of the chief's position and could overrule and, in extreme cases, depose and even execute a chief for misrule. The control exerted by the numzane over the chief was symbolized by their provision of the chief with his "great" wife.[7]

The numzane's support for the chief was ensured in several ways. The large number of marriage alliances entered into by the chief gave them access to the more powerful numzane as affines. It was also only the wealthy numzane who were able to marry a chief's sister or daughter, due to their high brideprices.[8] It was possible for a numzane, who had married a royal woman, to be placed by the chief as a district sub-chief.[9] Because of their relationship with the chiefs, the numzane benefitted from the chief's patronage - from the distribution of land and farming-out of cattle to the blessing of their first-fruits potions to the redistribution of taxes and the placing of numzane as sub-chiefs. The chief also decreed when a man, who had reached a sufficiently advanced age, was eligible to wear a wax headring.[10] But it was the common role of the chiefs and numzane, within the production process, that linked them as a group. They organised production through their control of labour, mediated with other elders over production strategies, decided when to plant and harvest and which new areas to cultivate, and interceded with the ancestors. It was their common relationship to the means of production, through their control of access to wives, land and tools, however, that determined their dominance.

The quality or amount of land that a young man received was dependent upon the generosity of the numzane, as was his access to the iron tools with which to work, and the cattle with which

---

7. Ibid., I, 376, 410-413.

8. Owen, "Description of Delagoa", May 1823 in RSEA, II, 479; Mission Romande, Chez Les Noirs (Neuchatel, 1894), 6; JSA file 74, p. 66, evidence of Majuba; Junod, Life, I, 283, 287.

9. Junod, Life, I, 416-17.

10. Ibid., I, 130-31, 295-403, 407, 409; II, 6-7; Junod, "BaRonga", 46.

to fertilize his lands.[11] By attracting dependants a wealthy man aspired to build a circular homestead consisting of up to thirty huts housing more than a hundred dependants.[12] However, the powers of patronage needed to attract such a following depended on a man's ability to marry. This was because labour was at a premium due to the labour intensive nature of production and because of the controls and restrictions of the kinship system which precluded the existence of an open wage-labour market. A bride provided a man with children who increased the size of his house and homestead in terms of access to labour and in terms of rights to cultivable land and pasture.[13] Thus marriage played a central role in the expansion of the homestead where, because of the patrilocality of marriage, the families of male children enlarged and enhanced the numzane's powers of patronage and consequently his political power and status. Female children secured the dependence of males on the homestead numzane as it was their brideprice that provided the means for a male dependant to marry. But marriages also provided young men with the means to segment their houses from the homestead. This was because the product of a wife's labour power and of her fertility increased her husband's ability, as a household head, to produce the surplus needed to attract his own following. Thus marriage constituted a major means of accumulation and wives were a synonym for wealth.[14] A numzane generally had two or three wives while powerful chiefs like Magoude of the Khosa and Ngwanasi of the Maputo had "several dozen" and fifty-eight wives respectively.[15] As one missionary expressed it,

---

11. Junod, Life, II, 7.

12. H.F. Fynn, "Delagoa Bay", in RSEA, II, 480; Cape Monitor, 16 July 1853; Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 26 June 1855; BPP 1890 C. 6200 Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887, 45; M. Morris, "Rjonga settlement patterns", Anthropology Quarterly, 45, 1972, 233.

13. Junod, Life, I, 126-29, 283, 288-89. For early twentieth century descriptions of lobola, see papers by Rosset, Guye, Benoit, Dieterlen and others in "L'eglise Chrétienne et la ccutume de lobola", August 1910. WUL Swiss Mission Records 21/1 Lobola.

14. ADM 1/2269 Osborne, "Description of the people of Delagoa Bay", 28 Sept., 1822; T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa, etc., I, 44-45; Junod, Life, I, 129, 210-214, 284, 288-89; II, 7; H.P. Junod, The Wisdom of the Thonga-Shangaan people (Pretoria, 1936), 121, 137, 145.

15. JSA file 74, p. 66, evidence of Majuba; Mission Romande, Chez les Noirs, 7; Junod, Life, I, 283.

> "Lobola is (the elders' bank). If they want to set aside some money, they invest it in a woman who will furnish them with children. These children once grown up, if they are girls will bring new dowries into the family and these dowries will buy more women and thus the family will become powerful. The possession of cattle is even subordinate to marriage."[16]

With the capitalist penetration of the nineteenth century it was the labour of children and dependants, and especially of wives, which determined the reproduction of the social formation. It was their labour that released males from domestic production and allowed them to take part in long-distance trade and hunting. As only males took part in these activities, they monopolised the luxury goods brought through Lourenço Marques, and the access of women to these goods was largely dependent upon their performing services for men. Thus, it was the ability of males to exploit female labour that allowed them to realise a profit from hunting and trading. That chiefs and numzane could tax trade and distribute the proceeds also proved an important element adding to their attraction of followers.

From the early eighteenth century, cattle as lobola (bride-wealth) were supplemented, and in hard times, even replaced by other goods such as lotus-shaped beja hoes, bronze and brass neck and armrings, goats and especially imported beads.[17] Before the epizootic of the early 1860s, cattle were the major medium of lobola, and for a marriage to be sanctioned they had to be transferred by the family of the bridegroom to that of the bride. However, because the area was largely cut off from other sources of cattle by a virulent tsetse-belt, access to cattle was restricted; they could only be acquired as lobola for a sister, on loan, by raiding or as inheritance. Both material and political inheritance were adelphic and consequently cattle and power passed from a father to his younger brothers to his eldest sons. The son

---

16. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, p. 272; Grandjean, La Mission, 79; H.P. Junod, The Wisdom, 121, 137, 145, 149.

17. Jakob de Bucquoi (1719) in RSEA, VI, 434; Jacob Francken (1757) in RSEA, VI, 495; Penwell (late eighteenth century) in RSEA, II, 460; Cape Monitor, 16 July 1853; JS 14, file 25, p. 26, evidence of Ndaba; Junod, Life, I, 275; African Museum, Johannesburg, Junod collection, (1) 5 sindane brass rings. See p. 281, note 21.

of a deceased headman could not inherit his father's goods or position until all his paternal uncles had died.[18] This form of inheritance meant that when men were of marriageable age, they had little chance of possessing cattle through inheritance and generally remained dependent on their father or father's brother for bridewealth until late in life.[19] Heirs were obliged to distribute part of their cattle inheritance only insofar as it consolidated the dependence of younger siblings, sons and male dependants upon them for wives. It was this dependence, and the access to the means of production that it determined, that maintained the cohesion of the homestead, the economic basis of the numzane's political power. The numzane were able to contract several marriages not only because of their monopoly of cattle bridewealth but also because of the levirate according to which men inherited the wives of their deceased elder brothers. Rights to the fertility of these widows were the most important inheritance left by a man to his heirs.[20]

The cattle monopoly held by the numzane was entrenched by the kinship system which regarded as incest unions between descendants of the same grandparents and favoured marriages contracted between clan members. Thus bridewealth circulated largely amongst numzane sharing a common patronymic and the social unions contracted in this way entrenched the power and political unity of the dominant clan within the chiefdom. The cadets or nandja,[21] because of their restricted access to cattle bridewealth, were dependent on the cattle monopolized by the numzane for their brideprices. But marriage did not mean automatic accession to the rank of numzane; a bridegroom remained dependent on his creditors until either he inherited a brideprice or a daughter reached a marriageable age and

---

18. Junod, Life, I, 211, 333.

19. Ibid., I, 278-79, 332-33.

20. Ibid., I, 202-11, 247, 262, 288-89, 509; Junod, "The fate of the widows amongst the BaRonga", SAJS, 1908. Widows would go to each of the younger brothers of the deceased husband and only thereafter to the deceased's eldest son and sister's son.

21. The term "cadet" is used as it implies a member of the family who is junior in status, generally, but not always the younger brothers. All children of the "great" house were senior to their siblings by other wives of their father. A nandja is a follower, subject or servant, Junod, Life, I, 6.

her lobola could be used to cancel her father's debt. It was the transfer of the lobola in its entirety which legalised the man's right to the children of his wife. Thus, right of filiation lay with the lobola, and if the wife's kin were to demand the entire brideprice and the husband were unable to pay, they had a legal right to reclaim their daughter and all the children of the marriage.[22] Even where, in the ideal instance, the full lobola was paid by the bridegroom's agnates,[23] the young man remained in a state of indebtedness to these konwana. Bridewealth debts were contracted with the konwana of different homesteads and with those of different houses within a single homestead. As shown in figure 9 , if a homestead head C furnished his son I by wife D with a brideprice acquired through the marriage of his daughter J by wife E, a debt was entered into between the two houses. Consequently when E's son K reached marriageable age, I could be forced to dissolve his marriage to H in order to repay his bridewealth debt. Similarly, if H was separated from I and C demanded the repayment of I's lobola, G was dependent on A and his other konwana to produce the brideprice. Failure to do so would lead to the retrieval of F's lobola by the dissolution of her marriage to G. F would then return to her father's homestead with her children L and M. Thus good relations

Figure 9

The Pattern of Bridewealth Indebtedness



22. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 12, 68; SMA 528/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 13 Jan., 1893; Junod, Life, I, 214-16, 241-2, 332, 493.

23. Junod, Life, I, 107, 118 but for the numerous exceptions to the rule, cf. Ibid., 134, 439.

between a man and his konwana were essential as a man was dependent on these numzane not only for the brideprice needed to procure a wife but also for the securing of his rights to his children.[24]

Bridewealth debts could be inherited from one generation to another.[25] As long as part of a man's brideprice remained outstanding or he remained indebted to his konwana, he was a legal minor, a de facto "cadet", dependent on the goodwill of the numzane. This explains the extreme respect for elders and the hierarchical relationship between elder and younger brothers, for patrimony passed through the elder brother, upon whom the younger was thus dependent for his lobola.[26] The numzane were prepared to supply a cadet's lobola, as brides increased the power and productive capacity of the homestead and family and widened social alliances. In turn, the expectation of receiving a brideprice, and the nature of its partial payment, secured the adherence of the cadet to the homestead. The homestead head was under an obligation to assist the cadet and if he failed to do so he could be deposed by his younger brothers and paternal uncles.[27] Thus marriage was a social rather than an individual act as it introduced and maintained the reciprocal obligations that constituted the economic basis of the clan.

The massive importation of industrially-produced hoes threatened the numzane's monopoly of bridewealth, because migrants returning from Natal were able to purchase hoes around Delagoa Bay at 2s each. The subsequent inflation of hoe brideprices absorbed most hoes into the prestige sphere of circulation and allowed the numzane to retain their monopoly. But in the long term this proved an impossible situation as, apart from the difficulties involved in transporting a brideprice weighing several hundred pounds, the ability of young men to purchase hoes rose in proportion to their increasing ability to find wage labour in South Africa. As sterling specie replaced hoes as the medium of lobola the ability of the numzane to monopolise bridewealth became increasingly contingent

---

24. Ibid., I, 243, 282.
25. Ibid., I, 439; Grandjean, La Mission, 80-81.
26. Junod, Life, I, 211, 226, 299, 236; Junod, "BaRonga", 79.
27. Junod, Life, I, 278-79, 332.

upon their ability to accumulate and control the circulation of sterling in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[28]

The introduction of a sterling brideprice was constantly opposed by the chiefs and numzane.[29] They wanted a return to a cattle bridewealth which they could control and which produced offspring and was not "eaten up" in the buying of consumer goods. There was, however, little alternative to sterling as cattle diseases and tsetse continued to plague the area; as late as 1890 the Ronga chiefdoms were reported to be practically without cattle.[30] In order to control the circulation of specie bridewealth the numzane had to control the major part of the "liquid capital" flowing into the Delagoa Bay hinterland in the form of migrants' wages. This they were largely able to achieve by taxing the increasingly monetized economy and by continually raising brideprices above the level of the returning migrants' wages. This prevented the "devaluation" of brides and the breakdown of the special-purpose nature of bridewealth exchange which effectively meant that the dependence of the cadets upon the numzane for their brideprices was maintained. Thus during the reign of chief Zihlala (1867-83), the Mafumo brideprice was fixed at £8 but even during his reign was pushed up to £10.10s by the numzane. The Mazwaya chief, Maphunga(ca. 1860-90) tried to limit to £15.10s the claims of numzane to brideprices of £20-30. Brideprices continued to rise and by the 1890s they stood at £15-20 and in the Lourenço Marques area, where there was a larger circulation of sterling, they could reach as high as £30.[31] The cost of a concubine in Khosen in the late 1880s was about £10 or about two-thirds that of a normal brideprice and remained relatively constant,

---

28. BO 50, 11 Dec., 1875; Junod, "BaRonga", 89; SMA 513/B Grandjean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; JSA file 25, p. 235; ZGH 796.892/92 Foxon report 31 Aug., 1896.

29. SMA 502/A P. Berthoud to Leresche 26 Feb., 1889; 1760 Grandjean diary, p. 232; 513/B Grandjean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; ZGH 796.892/96 Foxon report 31 Aug., 1896. See also Webb & Wright, James Stuart, II, 146, evidence of Mahungane.

30. Junod, "BaRonga", 199; Cohen "Erläuternde Bemerkungen", 286; ZGH 796.892/96 Foxon report; JSA file 74, p. 9; Mackenzie, The Net, 1881.

31. SMA 528/A Berthoud to Leresche, 23 Nov., 1893; SMA 1642/A "Confessions des Negres", 1896; WUL.A.170 Am. Zulu Mission, Pinkerton diary, Julu 1880; ZGH 708.2288 Saunders report; ZGH 796.892 Foxon report; BMSAS, 116, 1894, 143; Ibid., 122, 1895, 361; Castilho, Districto de Lourenço Marques, 13.

perhaps because of the large numbers of Chopi women enslaved by the Gaza and Khosa in the 1890s.[32]

The cadet's dependence upon the chiefs and numzane was also structured by the cosmology of a society which engendered the belief that the chiefs and numzane had access to the supernatural forces controlling the daily existence and prosperity of the people. As the chiefs and numzane were the direct descendants of the most powerful ancestors and could intercede with them, they were thought able to control rainfall, health, the fertility of women and of the soil and the outcome of wars.[33]

The real and believed ability of the elders to control daily existence by controlling access to the means of production acted as a mechanism of social control and determined the form of surplus extraction. Thus even where the cadets were tied to a means of production they were dependent upon the chiefs and numzane, who, through extra-economic means, could extort various prestations from the cadets. Official taxes were known as nhlengo and could consist of a basket of maize from each village and gathered wild plums (bukanye) for the great national feast. An irregular and voluntary form of taxation considered as "an act of civility" (or mashobo) was to send beer to the chief's homestead. To luba or hlenga was to pay a tax of fealty. Other official taxes consisted of the payment to the chief of the skins and joints of certain hunted animals, the grounded tusk of an elephant and the contents of a crocodile's stomach.[34] A tax was levied on communal fishing expeditions and on the use of fishing traps.[35] Chiefs used the cadets' labour to build and repair their huts and to clean their cattle kraals, public places and roads. Unremunerated labour was also used in porterage and hunting expeditions organized by the chiefs.[36] In Maputoland men who served in military regiments left their homesteads in order to cultivate the fields of wives whom the chief placed as his representatives in the various districts of the chiefdom.[37] It was expected that the chief's followers would

---

32. Cape Mercantile Advertizer, 16 July 1886; Harries, "Free and unfree labour", 322, notes 55 and 56.

33. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 68; Junod, Life, I, 395-404.

34. Junod, Life, I, 401-2, 405-7.

35. Ibid, II, 88.

36. Ibid., I, 331, 406-7.

37. Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 1898; Junod, Life, I, 406; ZGH 708 Saunders to SNA, 12 Nov., 1887.

provide his soldiers with food and shelter and pay the lobola of his great wife which by the 1890s could amount to £30 and 20 cattle; sub-chiefs paying £1 or a cow, headmen 10s and villages 2s.[38] Outsiders who were attached to the clan but were not recognised as members, paid a special tax when they kondza'ed to the chief. A sagwati was a present given especially on festive occasions and as a sign of homage.[39]

Chiefs and numzane were able to accumulate wealth and followers in various ways apart form taxation. The sagwati paid by the Maputo chief to his counterpart in Zululand had a strong element of reciprocity which strengthened the position of the royal families. Thus Chief Nozingile of the Maputo might collect 100-200 headloads of goods each year from his followers, which he then sent to Mpande. In return Nozingile would receive over 100 head of cattle which were then added to the royal herds.[40] It was common for cattle, pigs, hens and other livestock to be loaned out to a neighbour who, as recompense for looking after the animals, was given, for example, one of the litter.[41] Because of his extensive marriages a chief normally fathered numerous daughters for whom he procured inflated "royal" brideprices.[42] The goods confiscated from a man accused of witchcraft accrued to the chief while chiefs and numzane, who acted as magistrates, were allowed part of any fine extracted from a defendant.[43] The sale of slaves constituted a further form of accumulation for chiefs and numzane that peaked during periods of political uncertainty and continued, in a minor way, into the late 1880s. An indigenous form of slavery, that contributed to a hierarchical social stratification, was also practised in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Female prisoners of war called tinhloko (heads) were a source of profit to their captors

---

38. Ibid., I, 376. See also Webb & Wright, James Stuart, II, 150-51, evidence of Giba.

39. Sa Nogueira, O Dicionario.

40. Webb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 67-68; Ibid., III, 157.

41. Junod, Life, I, 440; II, 46.

42. Ibid., 416.

43. Up to 50% of these fines was kept by the chief. Junod, Life, I 97, 330-31, 407, 439, 441-45; II, 534.

who either married or sold them.[44] The pawning of followers and voluntary enslavement were also practised during periods of great insecurity.[45] Young men on inheriting the chieftaincy were able to enrich themselves, and entrench their power by confiscating the property of their political opponents.[46]

The material goods and labour power accumulated by a chief or numzane were eventually distributed to his followers as presents, food and drink in festivals and parties, military prctection, and access to brides. The cadets also benefitted from the exercise by the chiefs and numzane of social knowledge; of genealogies, legal precedents, religious observances and the structuring of cyclical time by rites of passage and festivals. As co-ordinators of most phases of the production process the chiefs and numzane gave cadets access to wives, sufficient labour, land, tools, fertilizer and the divine intercession needed to ensure a successful harvest. The prestige and power of the chiefs and numzane was measured in terms of the generosity of these "benefices".[47]

The relations between the dominant chiefs and numzane and the subordinate cadets were thus a complex interaction of patriarchal and filial bonds and mutual obligations and were very different from the simple wage relationship linking capitalist and worker. It was nonetheless a relationship of exploitation in the technical sense that wives, although they were passed down to the cadets, did not constitute part of the numzane's benefices. Until their husbands had fully honoured their brideprice debts, wives remained under the control of the numzane and the circulation of their brideprice cemented the social ties linking the numzane as

---

44. Cape Mercantile Advertizer, 16 July 1886; ZGH 699.252 Umbandeni to SNA, 19 Aug., 1886; Harries, "Free and unfree labour", 312-18, 322; FO 84/2224 Br. Cons. to FO, 4 April 1892; Junod, Life, I 450, 471. See also Skully, "Phalaborwa Oral Tradition", 330 and note 32, p. 314.

45. ADM 1/2269 Owen to Admiralty, 8 March 1824 and 19 June 1824, Owen to Admiralty 9 Oct., 1823; FO 97/303, Owen to GGM, 10 May 1825; W. Owen, Narrative, I, 270; Boteler, Narrative, II, 300-301; Webb & Wright, James Stuart, II, 143, evidence of Mahungane.

46. SMA 497/D P. Berthoud to Leresche, 4 Feb., 1888; SMA 497/E Berthoud to Leresche, 11 Oct., 1888; SPG. Mission Reports 1892. Bishop Carter's "Journey into Tongaland".

47. Junod, Life, I, 408-9; Grandjean, La Mission, 73.

a collectivity. Furthermore whereas the benefices passed down by the numzane were the product of their social and political dominance, the prestations given by the cadets were the product of their labour. This dominance was entrenched by the numzane's ability to structure labour time and to determine the size of the cadets' prestations. This ensured that the cadets, as direct producers, were dependent upon the numzane not only for access to the means of production but even for the redistribution of the product of their labour. The transfer of prestations and benefices, structured by the kinship system, ensured the reproduction of the relations of dominance and subordination that structured the chiefdom.

The dominance of chiefs and numzane was symbolised in various ways, such as the wearing of headrings and expensive skins, the hierarchical distribution of the joints of a slaughtered beast and the arrangement of households within the homestead.[48] The hierarhical structure of the social formation was particularly noticeable during first-fruits festivals when

> "The gods must be the first to enjoy the produce of a new year, then the chiefs, the sub-chiefs, the counsellors, the headmen, then the younger brothers in order of age."[49]

Outsiders who were attached to, but had not been incorporated into, the clan were prohibited from partaking in the first-fruit festivals, or from drinking milk, with members of the host clan.[50] Junod described a hierarchy in which the chief was

> "all powerful ... an autocrat with power over life and death. In every village the headman possesses similar power over his subjects and the elder brother reigns as a despot over the younger ... From the top to the bottom of the social ladder the strong dominate the weak and combine, in a powerful way, to assure the submission of the inferior."[51]

---

48. Junod, Life, I, 312, 329-30, 321.

49. Ibid., II, 404.

50. Ibid., I, 251, 396, 433.

51. Ibid., II, 224-5. The power of the chief was not always and everywhere the same, cf. note 5, p. 306.

A cadet excluded from his father's patrimony and dissatisfied with his position could always leave the homestead.[52] He would then generally move to his mother's brother (malume), as his closest consanguinial relative with property outside of his father's family, or kondza to a new chief and, in return for the customary prestations, be assured of the chief's benefices. But a sister's son had no claim to the patrimony of the malume and the nature of the kondza relationship was determined by the size and importance of the migrant's following; a single cadet would probably be given marginal land and, in terms of inheritance, would be beneath the youngest son of the most junior wife.[53] Thus in the Delagoa Bay hinterland segmentation was a measure of desperation rather than a mechanism for the resolution of conflict.

This indicates that although kinship laws can be traced to, and were rooted in, the production process, they also structured the social relations that emerged out of the existing form of production. But underlying the moral inducements to conform that were embodied in kinship ideology lay the threat of force. Deviants were threatened with accusations of witchcraft that could result in their execution or expulsion from the kin group and in the enslavement of their children.[54] But this was a drastic course of action as the numzane lost a dependant and the wrongdoer lost his rights to a secure means of subsistence. In the nineteenth century this often meant that he would be sold into slavery or be forcibly conscripted into the Portuguese army.[55]

Consciousness of exploitation is discernible in political segmentation and social avoidances; in folk stories, proverbs and songs which recognised the servile position of the poor and celebrated the triumph of the young and oppressed over the oppressor.[56] But this consciousness was never transformed into class conflict, for adelphic inheritance ensured that many cadets, as brothers of the deceased, eventually became numzane, even though at an advanced

---

52. Ibid., I, 331.

53. Ibid., I, 433; II, 6-8. If a man had no heirs his goods were inherited by his sister's son.

54. Ibid., II, 525, note 2; Cape Mercantile Advertizer, 16 July 1886.

55. Ibid; Junod, Life, I, 330-31, 387; II, 7. See also p. 182, note 124.

56. Ibid., II, 213, 221-4; H.P. Junod, The Wisdom, 75-77, 81.

age. This dissuaded them from segmenting and accounts for the large size of the homesteads found in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. As males, all cadets were separated from women by the sexual division of labour and, even within the homestead, married women were separated from unmarried women, childless women from mothers and junior wives from senior wives and widows; moreover, married women were of different status and, due to the patrilocality of marriage, of diverse origin.[57] The "oppressed" were further divided by inadequate communications, kinship divisions and disputes, struggles over brideprice debts, and by the local problems whose resolution was vital to daily existence. Thus in contrast to the chiefs and numzane, the exploited cadets and women exercized little solidarity. Nevertheless a structured opposition existed between the two groups. As will be shown in the following sections, labour emigration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland was strongly encouraged by, and in turn magnified, this opposition between dominant and subordinate groups.

Wage Labour and New Forms of Accumulation: the Social Pressures Encouraging a Migratory Form of Labour Movement

With the growth of migrant labour a major source of sterling for the chiefs and numzane emerged from the direct extortion of a part of the workers' wages on their return from South Africa. These "labour taxes" were levied by the chiefs and then distributed to the numzane or were levied individually by the numzane. This form of taxation was recognized in the area as a common practice and generally amounted to £1 to the chief and 2s to the numzane.[58] The taxes differed according to the chiefdom and the chief. Thus the Maputo chief Nozingile demanded an unspecified amount of 'specie', while his wife the queen regent who succeeded him, levied a tax of £1 on all returning migrants. Her son Ngwanasi who used the labour of his regiments to plant and weed his fields, levied a tax of

---

57. Ibid., I, 126, 229, 284; II, 441. A son inherited the fields of his mother and the property of a mother's brother (malume) without a male heir was held by his sister for her son. Thus sons were to some extent dependent on their mothers for their access to land. Ibid., I, 211.

58. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BPP., SA corres., C2220, no 66, 1878-9; FO 63/1316 Consul to FO, 14 Feb., 1896; UNISA/JC, "Littérature - coutumes"; ZGH 708.Z288 Saunders report; CMAR 1894, 34, 36.

£5-10 on all males who avoided military service by migrating to South Africa.[59] Added to this source of sterling income, by the late 1880s the chiefs and numzane levied various fines, prestations and taxes, previously paid in kind, in sterling specie. Some chiefs reportedly extorted half the Portuguese hut tax from villagers in return for hiding them from colonial tax collectors.[60] They were also able to accumulate sterling by demanding presents and capitation fees from labour recruiters wishing to operate in their areas and it was universally recognized that recruiters were unable to function without the co-operation of the chiefs.[61]

A further source of cash income came from the host of taxes levied on Banyan merchants who themselves were drawn by the migrants' sterling wages. With the money thus accumulated the chiefs and numzane perpetuated their control of the bridewealth system and maintained their dominance. But chiefs and numzane were not interested in the accumulation of sterling simply as a source of material wealth but rather as a means of social control. Cadets could be wealthier than numzane in material terms, but as long as the elders monopolized access to wives, they were able to dominate and exploit the cadets.[62] This meant that, despite the cadets' participation in migrant labour and their consequent access to an independent source of bridewealth, they remained dependent on, and open to continued exploitation by, the chiefs and numzane.

---

59. GH 1050 Supreme court case, Agnew v. Van Gruning, 14 May 1875; BO 5 May 1877; BO 45, 11 Nov., 1877; ZGH 708.Z288/87 Saunders report 17 Nov., 1887; FO 63/1316, Consul to FO, 14 Feb., 1896; Junod, "BaRonga", 141. See also Junod, Life, I, 407.

60. The old village tax of a basket of maize or millet was symbolically transformed into a ls tax. Junod, "BaRonga", 65, 140, 157; ZGH 736.Z249/91 Statement made by Faku, 20 March 1891; ZGH 739.441 Brüheim to Res. comm., 22 May 1891.

61. SNA 1/1/21 Clarence to SNA, 24 Arpil 1871; Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; SNA 1/1/25, J. Colenbrander to SNA, 27 March 1880; H.W.D. Longden, Red Buffalo (Cape Town, 1950), 46; CMAR, 1894, 36; SNA 1/1/24 Dunn to SNA 21 March 1874; GH 829 Elton to PI, 25 Oct., 1875; CSO 664. 4069/78 Circular to Magistrates; CSO 677. 2548/78 Bennett to PI, 9 July 1878; CSO 726.4993/79 Dunn to PI, 1 Nov., 1879; GH 1050 Shires to SNA, 7 April 1875; SMA 542/B Loze-Grandjean, 27 Nov., 1897; TLC., p. 47, ev. of F. Perry; FO 63/1449, Crowe to FO, 15 April 1901.

62. SMA 513/B Grandjean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, p. 232; Junod, Les Chants, 48; Idem., Life, I, 385.

The deleterious effect of migrant labour upon agricultural production has been treated in a formalistic way in Chapter 6. Although available statistics indicate otherwise, it seems likely that the ecological upsets of the 1880s-90s magnified the pressures on young men to emigrate temporarily as this ridded the homestead of a consumer of food during the hungry season. At a more substantive level it may be noted that migrant labour was unable to bring about a development of the productive forces or change the structure of the social formation for, while the export of labour depleted the productive forces, migrants' wages were invested in wives and in unproductive consumer goods like cloth and liquor. A major part of the migrants' sterling wages was transformed through marriage into productive and reproductive labour but much to the chagrin of local traders, was then encapsulated within the sphere of circulating bridewealth controlled by the numzane. As bridewealth was kept in trust in order to provide future generations with the means of acquiring wives, it could not be invested or "eaten" in the development of the productive forces. Hence when wages were "converted" into bridewealth they took on a social rather than a market value and much of the developmental potential embodied in wage earnings was neutralized.[63]

The shift in the medium of bridewealth from cattle to hoes and later to sterling, deepened the involvement of males in the market economy and increased their dependence on external trade and later on migrant labour. This increased the exploitation of cadets as it was the product of their labour power which was exchanged for the hoes and sterling needed to maintain the elders' monopoly of bridewealth. By the late 1880s Mozambican migrant workers suffered a double exploitation through the extortion of surplus value by their employers and through the extraction, by the chiefs and numzane, of bridewealth and prestations that amounted to the major part of the migrants' repatriated wages.

The increased exploitation of the cadets was however matched by their increasing ability to earn wages in South Africa. This presented those males, excluded temporarily or permanently from an inheritance or without access to a sister's brideprice, with a

---

63. Alfredo Andrade, "As minas de Ouro", 330-31; Ferrão, Circumscripçoes, 45.

source of income independent of the chiefs and numzane. The resultant social contradiction was manifested in several ways. A general decline in cadet respect for their elders[64] was paralleled by a refusal to wear headrings as they made porterage more difficult.[65] Other signs of the general social upheaval of the period were the rise in alcoholism, "witchcraft" and especially, in spirit possession.[66] By the end of the 19th century the division between junior and elder had become more marked,[67] fission from homesteads was more frequent[68] and women had reportedly become more independent of men.[69] In areas like Lourenço Marques preferential endogamous marriage patterns dissolved and widows were able to contract marriages with "foreign" men who, because they were unable to supply a brideprice, surrendered their rights of filiation to their wives' deceased husband's kin.[70] Women also sought an escape by joining mission stations which they soon came to dominate numerically.[71] The small numbers of men who joined the mission stations were inculcated with a belief in "the dignity of labour" as a means to salvation.[72] Numerous migrants returned home with Christian wives married in South Africa and others, converted in

---

64. Richardson, Lionel Cohen, 159-160; Junod, Life, I, 157; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 1889.

65. Junod, Life, I, 130-32.

66. JSA file 74, p. 67, evidence of Majuba; Webb & Wright, Stuart Archive, III, 287; Junod, Life, II, 206, 479-504, 613; Idem., "Les Baronga", 404-7; A.T. Bryant, Zulu Medicine and Medicine-men (Cape Town, 1970), 71-2.

67. See pp. 203, 206-209.

68. Junod, Life, I, 318. See also M. Morris, "Rjonga settlement patterns", Anthropology Quarterly, 45, 1972.

69. JSA., file 25, pp. 240, 260-61, evidence of Ndaba; file 74, p. 38, evidence of Mahungane.

70. Junod, Life, I, 213, 253, 509-10. See also Life, II, 187, 197.

71. At the Swiss mission stations in Nondwane and Lourenço Marques the ratio of males to females was respectively 85 : 556 and 19 : 53. SMA 1256/C Statistiques do 1890, Rikatla; R. Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 140-41.

72. SMA 467 Grandjean, 1890; SMA 517/B Junod to Renevier, 10 Oct., 1895; SMA 1128/F Grandjean to Portuguese ambassador, Berne, 7 Nov., 1896.

South Africa and educated in centres like Lovedale, King Williams Town and Port Elizabeth, established their own schools and missions in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.[73] Thus as men found security against a hostile environment in wage labour which was outside of the control of the elders, the system of reciprocity was threatened and with it, the position of the chiefs and numzane. To forestall the dissolution of their power the chiefs encouraged migrant labour and adapted existing forms of surplus extraction. Many cadets responded to their increased exploitation and the decline in local economic opportunities by emigrating permanently to the labour markets of south Africa.

While this emigration of Mozambicans contributed to the growth of South Africa's black proletariat, it depleted the following of the chiefs and numzane in Mozambique. In Maputoland permanent emigration to Natal reached such large proportions in the 1880s that the queen regent sent a message to the Natal government requesting that although she was

> "very much indebted to the Natal government for the licence granted to her subjects to enter, pass through or work in Natal without interference or being bound for three years ... however ... at the same time she would be very pleased to know that the said government made it compulsory for her subjects to return home after two or three years' service in Natal as many of them forsake their homes, wives and children and never return."[74]

The absence of a large number of males employed in South Africa, the rapid spread of venereal diseases causing female infertility and the probable increase of amenorrhea due to the ecological upsets of the late 1880s-90s, resulted in a fall in the overall birthrate.[75] This drop in the population of the area was bitterly decried by the chiefs and numzane in much the same way as

---

73. WUL. AB. 867 Aa5 Mackenzie to Archbishop, Cape Town, 21 Aug., 1889; SPG., Mission reports. Bishop Carter, "A Missionary Journey into Tongaland", 1892; BMSAS, 14 April 1894, 57; SPG., Charles Johnson, "Amatongaland", 1895, parts I and II; ZGH 796.234 Res. Commissioner to High Commissioner, 6 March 1896; FO 63/1316 Consul to FO 8 May 1896; Grandjean, La Mission, 177, 192-3.

74. ZGH 702.33/87, "Statement of Grantham and deputation from Zambile", 27 Jan., 1887. See also JSA, file 25, p. 260.

75. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "State of the coastal areas, 1887"; SMA 82/H Liengme, "Report for 1892"; Junod, Life, I, 203.

the "depopulation" thesis was later decried by the Portuguese in their negotiations with the Transvaal and South African governments.[76]

The loss of dependants was a serious blow to the chiefs and numzane because they were dependent on the labour power of the cadets for their social and political dominance. Their ability to attract followers through the accumulation and redistribution of goods was adversely affected which in turn diminished the productive potential of the homestead, lowered its defensive and offensive capabilities and threatened the security of the numzane in old age. The effect of this loss of male labour on existing social relations should be seen in conjunction with the general loss of revenue caused by shrinking hunting and trading frontiers and by the threat to the numzane's control over access to the means of production that was posed by alternative sources of bridewealth. By securing a part of the migrant's wage on his return home, the chiefs and numzane were largely able to maintain both control of bridewealth circulation and their dominant position in the redistributive economy. In short, the reproduction of the relations of dominance and subordination was dependent on a form of labour movement that ensured the repatriation of the worker and of his wage. But the control by chiefs and numzane of egress and ingress of Delagoa Bay labour was severely restricted by the nature of its movement.

Nineteenth century migrant labour was far more complex than the push-and-pull migration suggested by some writers for twentieth-century South Africa. In-migration preceded, accompanied and facilitated out-migration, which often took the shape of a stage-by-stage movement onto the labour market. Even in the well-paid areas, the men moved from one farm or mine to another so as to benefit from better pay and working conditions. During these moves it was easy for the worker to loosen his ties with his area of origin and join the Mozbieker, Shangaan and Amatonga communities or place himself under a farmer or chief, in South Africa. To move onto the non-contracted labour market was tantamount to "disappearing" in the eyes of plantation or mine owners.

---

76. SMA 513/B Grandjean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; SMA 1225 H. Berthoud, "Expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891"; E. Noronho, Lourenço Marques, 54-5; TA. GOV. 210 Confid. 33/06 Br. cons. gen., Lourenço Marques to Selborne, 27 July 1906; Cabral, Raças e Usos, p. 102.

There is evidence to suggest that the chiefs exercized some control over their followers in South Africa and that they were able to condition, to some extent, the willingness of their dependants to return home. Thus if war threatened a chiefdom, the chief refused to permit the emigration of any male followers of military age and recalled his people working in South Africa.[77] Just as the nature of the cadets' prestations changed with migrant labour, so too did the nature of the benefices passed down by the chiefs. The latter encouraged the cadets to maintain contact with their home areas by protecting their interests in various ways.

In a society where the term "recruiter" is synonymous with "swindler" and "perjurer"[78] the chiefs and numzane played an important role in controlling the operations of recruiters and colonial government agents. By encouraging or discouraging labour emigration, the chiefs and numzane ensured that the recruiters operating in their areas fulfilled the obligations they contracted with migrants. They encouraged competition between freelance and contracted labour recruiters, negotiated and advised on the terms of new labour-importation schemes and, by using the royal homestead as an information-gathering centre, they directed workers to the best-paid labour centres.[79] If a young wife did not return to her parents during her husband's emigration, generally because her lobola had already been paid, it was the duty of the chiefs and numzane to protect her and her children. This function came to be known as basopa, from the Afrikaans pasop (watch out) and ensured that the cadet's property was protected during his migration and that his family had enough land and labour to provide itself with food; it also prohibited any infidelity on the part of the wife.[80]

---

77. Natal Mercury, 24 June 1870; Ibid., 5 Sept., 1871. See also pp. 65, 87, 112-113.

78. Sa Nogueira, Diccionario (Ba-galantzana).

79. SNA 1/1/24 Dunn to SNA 21 March 1874; GH 1050, Shires to SNA, 7 May 1875; CSO 665. 4069/78, "Statement by Umango, messenger sent by Nozingili", 7 June 1875; I.I. 1/1 R496 Shires to SNA, 29 Aug., 1875; GH 829 Elton to PI., 25 Oct., 1875; ZGH 702.33/87 "Statement of Grantham and deputation from Zambile", 27 Jan., 1887; SS 3360.6608/92 Livingstone to SS., 14 June 1892; TLC., p. 47, evidence of Perry; CMAR 1898, p. 4.

80. Grandjean, La Mission, 199; Junod, Life, I, 330. See also Ibid., 440; ZGH 708. Z288 Saunders report to SNA 17 Nov., 1887.

The benefits of the redistributive economy encouraged workers to return home, as it provided them with land, labour and the social security needed to subsist outside the wage economy. The maintenance of a subsistence base in the rural areas provided the migrant with both a weapon to combat low wages on the labour market and with an insurance in old age. Thus Mozambicans were able to use desertion to force an improvement in wage rates and working conditions in Natal. Similarly when the Chamber of Mines tried to reduce African wages in 1890-91, thousands of Mozambicans withdrew their labour by returning home and in this way were successfully able to force a return to the old wage level. This rural supplement to an industrial wage markedly differentiated migrant workers from workers drawn from Europe who, being the product of a more developed process of primitive accumulation and proletarianization, had no other income save their wages. Consequently migrant labour emerged, at least partially, as a purposefully-developed mechanism employed by the worker to protect himself from the impoverishment, insecurity and alienation that stemmed from the excesses of proletarianization.

Several years before the imposition of Portuguese rule, the cosmology of the peoples of the Delagoa Bay hinterland had changed sufficiently to accommodate migrant labour as a normal part of attaining adulthood. Prohibitions on sexual intercourse during lactation had been a traditional form of birth control that could last up to three years, but with the growth of migrant labour men were encouraged to go to South Africa during this period of abstinence. Death on the mines and various aspects of the migrants' life were institutionalized and incorporated into the local cosmology through songs, stories and rituals. For many, migrant labour became a rite of passage that replaced entry into the age-regiments or the prestige associated with hunting and trading journeys.[81] Thus labour recruiters in the 1890s referred to migrant labour as "a form of initiation"[82] and as early as 1891 a missionary wrote of migrant labour as a tour de compagnonnage or itinerant apprenticeship performed at least once if not several

---

81. Junod, Life, I, 136; II, 188-9, 192, 355, 521.

82. Best and Williams in CMAR, 1894, p. 34; Junod, Life, I, 136, 340; II, 255, 393.

times by all young men in southern Mozambique.[83] After a period of service on the mines young men were treated with new respect as gayisa, those who have returned from the mines and are a source of wealth. Red-coats, smoking jackets, hats and trousers bought on the mines were the symbols of their new status. Men who remained at home and refused to work on the mines were denigrated as mparras, narrow-minded and ignorant provincials.[84] Because of the pressures emerging from within the society, migrant labourers in the nineteenth century were almost exclusively men in their teens and twenties.[85] But that it was not merely economic factors that drove these men onto the labour market, is evidenced by the presence amongst them of numerous chiefs' sons.[86]

A migratory form of labour was encouraged in various other ways. As the amount of bridewealth in circulation increased, men were able to marry at a younger age as they were no longer dependent on the receipt of a brideprice for a female relative.[87] Furthermore, young marriages were encouraged and, as the birthrate fell in the late 19th century, the marriage age dropped from the mid-twenties to 11-12 years old for girls and 12-13 for boys and there was a withholding of the premarital sexual favours known

---

83. SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud, "Rapport sur l'expedition". Elsewhere he referred to migrant labour as a "tour de France". See also Junod, Life, I, 147.

84. R. de Sa Nogueira, Dicionário; Cabral, Raças e Usos, 99, 182. During World War I followers of the Murimi millenarian movement used the word "gayisa" to mean rain, Junod, Life, II, 601.

85. II 1/5 1116/78 Col. Eng. to PI, 4 Dec., 1878; II 1/54 PI to Col. Sec., 28 April 1890; II 1/55 551/90 Depot surgeon to PI., 5 July 1890; CA IAC 8 to 12, 21.

86. WUL. AB 867 Aa5 Bishop Mackenzie to Archbishop Cape Town, 21 Aug., 1889; SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche, 7/9 Jan., 1890; SMA 485/B Junod to Leresche, 2 Sept., 1892; UNISA/JC., Junod, "Les Causes...".

87. JSA, file 74. Evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza. A wife married with a sister's lobola came to be considered higher in status than a wife procured with a brideprice earned on the labour market, A. Clerq, "The Marriage Laws of the Ronga Tribe", Bantu Studies, 12, 2, 1938, 96.

as gangisa.[88] Early marriage meant that young men were pushed into marriage before leaving for the mines, and the sexual gratification and security of family life acted as an important attraction for a worker who might be obliged to return home due to accident, disease or an unwillingness to accept a cut in wages. Younger marriages ensured the continued dependence of the cadets on the umuzane for a brideprice and probably helped offset the falling birthrate.

A consequence of the reduction in marriage age was that women played a fuller part in homestead production and became mothers at a much earlier age. Men's dependence on women to supply the subsistence needs of the family increased proportionately with their involvement in migrant labour and, in this way, much of the exploitation involved in homestead production was passed on to women. By increasing the burden placed on women in the production process, the umuzane increased the cadet's dependence on women to supplement their wage labour with the agricultural production needed to reproduce the family. This increased exploitation of women was an important factor conditioning the cadet's decision to return home with the brideprice necessary to complete his debt to the elders. For with an increasing rate of migrancy, the establishment and maintenance of the homestead came to rest almost entirely on its female members and it was the product of their labour and fertility that gave to the cadets the possibility of entry into the dominant umuzane grouping.

---

88. SMA 497/B P. Berthoud, "L'état du Littoral", Sept., 1887; JSA file 25, p. 260, evidence of Ndaba; p. 236 evidence of Mahungane; SMA 1642/A "Premières Confessions des Negres"; Robertson, July 1890 in Wheeler, Soldiers of the Cross, 113; Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 1898; Junod, Life, I, 99; TLC., p. 163, evidence of Cohen; ZGH 708. Z288/87 Saunders report, 17 Nov., 1887; ZGH 796.157 Foxon report, 31 Aug., 1876.

EPILOGUE

Nineteenth century migrant labour from Mozambique to south Africa was part of a global phenomenon; the product of the specific form of development that emerged in areas, on the periphery of the industrialized world, where capital was unable to break down existing non-capitalist forms of production or effect a transformation in their social relations. The historical development of an industrial labour force in these areas was consequently very different from Marx's classical model of a proletariat created by private ownership of land, single-heir inheritance, enclosures and overpopulation.[1] In 19th century southern Africa, industrialization was not synonymous with impoverishment. The inequitable spread of the benefits of industrialization must be traced not to an inherent link between migrant labour and underdevelopment but to the process of struggle - both between capital and labour and within the working class itself. The subjugation of the African working class was only secured by the emergence in the 20th century of an aggressive and interventionist state that was responsible for the implementation of a battery of racially discriminatory social and constitutional measures.

During the pre-colonial period the chiefs and numzane in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, through what was in effect an alliance with capital, played an important role in directing labour to and from the markets of southern Africa. But because their political position was dependent on the kinship system, with all its rights and obligations, they were constrained from supplying the market with the enormous supplies of cheap labour needed by the development of the Witwatersrand and the opening-up of the deep level mines. Colonialism was fettered by no such encumbrances and it was only the colonial state, increasingly powerful after the Portuguese victories of 1895-97, that was progressively able to free labour from its material possessions - and from the rights and obligations embodied in the social relations of the old order. Only the

---

1. Other early Marxists were fully aware of this distinction. Cf. Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York, 1968 edition), 361 ff.; V.I. Lenin, "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", Collected Works, vol. 3.

colonial state was able to use organized violence to propel workers onto the market for, unlike the chiefs and *numzane*, its only responsibility towards the workforce was to ensure the conditions of its physical reproduction. The colonial state was able to use the apparatus of government, army, police, prisons and chiefs working as government agents, together with the threat of forced labour and porterage, military conscription, compulsory cultivation, corporal punishment and imprisonment to coerce workers onto the market, while at the same time restricting Africans to reserves where their access to a means of production outside of wage labour was strictly limited. It was through the partial preservation of the old non-capitalist mode of production in these *regedorias* that the colonial state was able to compel the African homestead to bear much of the cost involved in the reproduction of the labour force.

The qualitative nature of migrant labour from the Delagoa Bay hinterland changed markedly after the Luso-Gaza wars of 1894-97. The colonial period was marked not so much by the increase in numbers of workers forced onto the market, but rather by their increased exploitation. In 1901 the Portuguese and the Milner government in the Transvaal transformed the labour decrees of 1897 into a temporary working agreement. According to this *modus vivendi* Portugal exchanged the labour power of its colonial subjects, at an extremely low rate of remuneration, for recruiting emoluments and especially, for rail, harbour and customs privileges that gave to Lourenço Marques a competitive edge in its rivalry with Durban and Cape Town.[2]

In February 1906 the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) of the Chamber of Mines, which had replaced the RNLA while in "exile" in Cape Town during the Anglo-Boer war, was given monopoly recruiting rights by the Portuguese in Mozambique. In that year 53 000 workers, amounting to just over 65 per cent of

---

2. The number of trucks passing from the Witwatersrand to Lourenço Marques was strictly tied to the number of Mozambicans employed on the Rand, a measure that effectively gave the Transvaal a monopoly of Mozambican labour. NA. SNA 1/4/10. C51/01. High Commissioner to gov., Natal, 23 Dec., 1901 and various enclosures. In 1902 emoluments amounted to £30 000 and it was estimated that workers would return to Mozambique with a minimum of £360 000. TA. GOV. 18. 441/02 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 2 June 1902; GOV. 41. 307/03 Gosselin to Lansdowne, 6 Feb., 1903.

the African labour force employed on mines affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, were of Mozambican origin. This monopsony pushed those mining companies that were independent of the Chamber into an alliance with anti-emigration settler interests in Mozambique.[3] This caused the British and Transvaal governments to intervene directly in the dispute and through their efforts the Robinson group agreed to join WNLA in January 1908. The following year the modus vivendi was made permanent by the signing of the Mozambique - South Africa convention. This was followed by the tightening of the pass laws and the introduction of a maximum average wage on the Witwatersrand mines. These measures were largely responsible for the sharp drop in real wages on the Rand after 1897 and it was only after World War II that African wages, in cash terms, rose for the first time above the £3.10s wage level of 1896.[4]

Pressure from the colonial state not only pushed down the wage level, it also increased the number of migrations undertaken by a worker. Pre-colonial labour migration was performed almost exclusively by men in their teens and twenties, but during the colonial period labour migration was commonly undertaken by men who had completed up to fifteen contracts and continued migrating in their thirties and forties.[5]

"Traditional" wage supplements through theft, trade and informal activities were also restricted by the marked increase in the control of labour during the 20th century. In Mozambique, poorly capitalized Portuguese colonialism needed its own source of cheap labour. Thus under colonialism the basic contradiction in

---

3. GOV. 210. 33/06 Cons-gen., Lourenço Marques to Selbourne, 27 June 1906; FO 367/19 minutes of Barrington and Grey, 14 Nov., 1906; FO 800/71 Grey to Soveral, 24 Nov., 1906.

4. Francis Wilson shows that in 1969, the final year of his survey, African real wages were lower than in 1889. Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 45-46, 53, 55, 141.

5. M. Binford, "Stalemate: a study of cultural dynamics", 86; F. Wilson, "International migration in southern Africa", International Migration Review, X, 4 (1976), 459; David Webster, "Migrant labour, social formations and the proletarianization of the Chopi of southern Mozambique", African Perspectives, 1 (1978), 171; O Mineiro Moçambicano, mimeo, Centre for African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 1976, 60 ff.; C.E. Fuller, "An ethnohistoric study of continuity and change in Gwambe culture", PhD. thesis, Northwestern University, 1955, pp. 148-9, 224.

the emigration of labour shifted from satisfying the needs of chiefs and numzane to satisfying the divergent needs of both Portuguese settler and metropolitan interest groups. To overcome this contradiction, the Portuguese colonial state enforced a migrant form of labour; a policy that was willingly supported by the South African state, whose mining capitalists were anxious for homestead production to subsidize their below-subsistence industrial wages, and whose administration was increasingly able, after the Anglo-Boer war, to enforce short-term labour contracts.

Appendix I

ETHNOGRAPHERS AND THE ETHNIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE DELAGOA BAY HINTERLAND

Early European travellers and later anthropologists and historians employed a variegated and confusing terminology when referring to the inhabitants of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The British usually called them "amatongas", a word that entered the English lagnuage as a borrowing from the Zulu who used it to refer to all the conquered peoples of the coastal areas north of Zululand.[1] It was used in a similar way by the Gaza Nguni in the Zambezi river valley and by the Maputo who, due to their close links with the Zulu, perjoratively referred to the senior branch of their clan, which constituted a separate chiefdom situated north of the Tembe river, as "amatongas".[2] The term was thus imbued with derogatory overtones and was consequently never used by the people to whom it was applied. Nevertheless, the Natal colonists, and later the Swiss mission, adopted the word as a genericism applied to all people living between the Zulu border and the Zambezi, regardless of their linguistic or cultural affiliations.

There are two hypotheses as to how the Nguni arrived at the term Tonga. The first is that a linguistic soundshift caused the Tsonga word Ronga, which denotes "easterners" to be pronounced "Tonga" in Zulu.[3] The second is that the original inhabitants of the east coast were called Tonga before the immigration into the area of various Nguni and Shona-speaking groups some time before the 16th

---

1. A.T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, 286-7; St. V. Erskine, 1869 ms in RGS, 45; ZGH 713.480 Martin to Havelock, 20 July 1880; C.M. Doke and B.W. Vilakazi, Zulu-English Dictionary (Johannesburg, 1972).

2. C. de B. Webb and J. Wright, The James Stuart Archive, vol II, 143; A. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, (London, 1976), p. XXIV, note 2.

3. H.A. Junod, Life of a South African Tribe, I, 15; Transvaal Native Affairs department, A Short History of the Native Tribes of the Transvaal (Pretoria, 1905), 59.

century.[4] The use of the word Tonga to define a linguistic group is thus the invention of European scholars and its refinement into terms like Thonga and Tsonga merely represent attempts by anthropologists and the Tsonga Language Committee in South Africa to expurgate the derogatory connotations from the term. However, the use of the word Tsonga or Tzonga, even as a linguistic classification, was criticized as early as 1891. According to Henri Berthoud, Tsonga was a geographically derived term meaning southerner which, in the Nkomati river bend area, was pronounced Djonga or Tjonga.[5] This explains why many Tsonga-speakers have today rejected the term as an ethnic classification.[6] To complicate matters further, the gi-Tonga language was called isi-Tsonga by people living to the west of Inhambane and Junod initially referred to speakers of this language as "the Tsongas of Inhambane".[7]

Various other generic terms have been applied to the Tsonga-speakers. The word mu-landi was used by the people of the Delagoa Bay area to designate all blacks irrespective of their origins. This term was then adopted by the Portuguese as "Landim" and was used variously to describe the black peoples in the neighbourhood of Lourenço Marques, blacks living south of the Save River, displaced Nguni groups, Shona speakers, Mozambican soldiers of African extraction serving in the Portuguese army and blacks in general.[8] The Portuguese did, however, distinguish between immigrant Nguni

---

4. Bryant, Olden Times, 83; JSA file 25, p. 260, evidence of Mahungane; J. Nunes, "Apontamentos sobre a tribu dos ba-Thonga", B. Soc. Estudos da Col. de Moç., 3, 1, 1932.

5. SMA 1255 H. Berthoud, "Rapport sur l'expedition a Magude"; Ibid., "Quelque remarques sur la famille des langues Bantou et sur la langue Tsonga en particulier", Xe Congress International des Orientalists, 1894.

6. Krige and Felgate, "An ecological study", 8.

7. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal", Addresses and Papers of the British South African Association for the Advancement of Science, 3, 1905, 224. See also ABM. ABC 15.4 vol. 12, Wilcox to Strong, 18 Aug., 1884.

8. C. Montez, "As Raças Indigenas de Moçambique", Moçambique, no. 23, 1940, 53-66; Nunes to GGM, 4 Oct., 1830 in F. Santana, Documentaçao II, 222; F.L. Barnard, A Three Year Cruise in the Mozambique Channel (London, 1848), 165, 261; Richard Thornton, The Zambezi Papers, 53-55, 57, 69; H.A. Junod, Grammaire Ronga (Lisbon, 1896), 4-5.

groups and indigenous peoples, whom they often generically entitled Vatua and Landim respectively.

In the Transvaal, early coastal traders were initially called Tcheke because they had discarded skins for cotton clothing.[9] But the 19th century waves of coastal immigrants were called either Gouamba (Gwamba) after a coastal chief, Koapa which was the north Sotho mutation of Gouamba, or Toka after his grandfather. People in the Phalaborwa area referred to eastern hunters and immigrants and hunters as Mabono. Although these were the ancestral names of chiefs belonging to merely one group of coastal people, and in the case of the Gouamba was a synonym for easterners, and despite and rejection of these terms as a form of address by most Tsonga speakers and later by the Swiss mission, the terms were adopted by many blacks and whites in the Transvaal to identify eastern immigrants.[10]

Because of the distinctive nasal cicatrization of some immigrant coastal peoples, early Boer settlers referred to many Tsonga refugees as Knobnoses. This has caused English and Afrikaans South African historians to use the work Knobnose and (ma)Gwamba interchangeably when referring to 19th century Tsonga-speakers.[11] Yet southern Tsonga-speaking immigrants did not tatoo themselves at all;[12] others had small knobs on the face or body while the "true knobnoses", Tsonga-speakers from north of the Limpopo, shared their prominent nasal cicatrization with other immigrant and coastal groups speaking dialects of languages as varied as Chopi, Shona and gi-Tonga.[13] Furthermore, as a means of cultural definition, this form

---

9. B.H. Dicke, "The first Trekkers to the northern Transvaal", S.A. Journal Sci., 23, 1926, 1012.

10. Grandjean, La Mission, 50, 58; Nachtigal, "Tagebuch", 2, I, 279; Skully, "Phalaborwa oral tradition", 329.

11. G.M. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795, vol. 4, 476; Eric Walker, A history of South Africa, 286; B.H. Dicke, "The first Voortrekkers"; Grimsehl, "Onluste in Modjadjiland, 1890-1894", SAAYB, II, 1955, 204, 211-215, 229; J. Mouton, "General Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis", SAAYB, 1957, 152, 156.

12. Junod, Life, I, 178-80; Nachtigal, "Tagebuch", 281; Henri Berthoud, notebook 6 (private ms). Stayt viewed Knobnoses as a branch of the Thonga (The Bavenda, 19). This is also implied in J.D. Krige, "Traditional origins and tribal relations of the Sothe of the Northern Transvaal", Bantu Studies, 11, 1937, 324.

13. A. Caldas Zavier, "O Inharrime e as Guerras Zavallos", Bol. Soc. Geogr. Lisboa, 1881, 482; A.M. Cardoas, "Expediçao as Terras do Muzilla em 1882" in Bol. Soc. Geogr. Lisboa, 3, 7, 1887, 179;

of scarification was rapidly disappearing by the 1880s.[14]

A further term used to identify the peoples of the Delagoa Bay hinterland was "Shangaan". This expression arose because the Gaza King Manukosi was known to his Tsonga-speaking followers as Shoshangane. Tsonga-speakers were consequently often designated "Shangaans", a term that was then applied to refugees entering the Transvaal from the Gaza empire. But in its correct usage, the term was only applicable to those people conquered by Manukosi and his descendants, who adopted, as distinct from the "amatonga", the material culture of the Gaza Nguni.[15] In present day South Africa, only the (Gaza) Nguni immigrants who entered the Transvaal after the Luso-Gaza war of 1897, are officially classified as Shangaan or Tshangana and are thus distinguished from those people classified as Tsonga.[16] Nevertheless the word Shangaan gained widespread currency on the diamond and later gold mines of South Africa as a synonym for East Coaster[17] and has been accepted coloquially as an all-embracing term used to refer to the Tsonga-speaking people of south-east Africa and, in a more general way, to all Mozambicans employed on the South African mines. The point is that during the 19th century, these terms were used in a generic and imprecise way to embrace diverse peoples and tribes with no common name and, as ethnographic terms, they are of very little value.

The term Thonga was given the seal of scientific approval by the Swiss mission which needed to codify a common language linking its linguistically related followers on the East Coast with those living

---

St. V. Erskine, "Journey to Umzila's South East Africa in 1871-1872", J. Royal Geogr. Soc., 45, 1875, 82, 85; Chapman, Travels in the Interior of South Africa (London, 1868) vol. II, 256-7.

14. SMA 503/C Junod to Leresche, 13 July 1889; Henri Berthoud notebook 6 (private ms); War Office, The Native Tribes of the Transvaal, 131; Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 17.

15. The term is thus somewhat synonymous with terms like Vatualizado and Mabuyandlela. A.A. Caldas Xavier, Reconhecimento do Limpopo (Lisbon, 1894), 138; Harries,"Slavery, social incorporation", 318, footnote 38.

16. Van Warmelo, Ethnographic Survey, 91.

17. CA/GLW 100 no. 442, Report of Native Labour Department for 1876; Cape Blue Book on Native Affairs, G.8.-83 Appendix; ABM. ABC 15.4 vol. 12, Richards to Smith, 25 May 1885.

as refugees in the Spelonken area of the Transvaal. The most influential of the Swiss mission work was that of H.A. Junod, who in the 1890s wrote three books on a linguistically related group of people living south of the Nkomati whom he identified as the Ronga.[18] In his propensity to classify people, Junod was trapped within the limitations of his age.

Nineteenth century rationalism and positivism had bequeathed a categorization of the myriad of new details emerging from the discoveries of the expanding industrialised world. Without the orderly structuring of detail, there could be no clarity and no understanding. This early rationale for classification was no doubt further entrenched by his entomological studies and especially by the influence of 19th century concepts of nationalism and the central role of language in the classification of national groups and characteristics. This is evident in Junod's strong criticisms of Dudley Kidd's The Essential Kaffir, a work published in London in 1904, which grouped all Africans together and failed to distinguish between them on linguistic or any other grounds. To Junod, Kidd's extreme generalisations, made on the basis of race alone, were confusing and unscientific. However, Junod, following the publication in 1898 of his first monograph on the Ronga, was heavily criticized by his mission for artificially dividing the "Ronga" peoples living around Delagoa Bay from the "Gouamba" living in the north-eastern Transvaal. As these people spoke related dialects and fell within the constituency of the Swiss mission, it was felt that a single language with a common grammar and orthography would reduce mission costs.

Henri Berthoud, a leading linguist and colleague of Junod's, was particularly critical of the latter's linguistic formulations. Berthoud had written an evangelical handbook and a reading primer in 1884 in the central Tsonga dialect, spoken in the area between the Nkomati and Limpopo rivers, which was the dialect used by most of the "Gwamba" refugees forming the mission's Spelonken congregration.[19] He was opposed to the adoption of a further grammar and orthography

---

18. For references to H.A. Junod's work and to the following paragraph, see P. Harries, "The anthropologist as historian and liberal: H.A Junod and the Thonga", Journal of Southern African Studies, 8, 1, 48-49.

19. Grandjean, La Mission, 101.

as, prophetically, he felt that as different literatures emerged, the rift between the southern and central Tsonga speakers would become concretized and would divide the followers of the mission.[20]

During the 19th century there were considerable differences between the various dialects spoken in southern Mozambique. According to Junod the dialects spoken by the clans around Lourenço Marques which claimed Nguni origin, constituted the "real Ronga" while according to Berthoud, they were a transition between the central dialects and the very different dialects spoken by the people living south of the Tembe river who for many years had been Zulu subjects. This linguistic division between the people living north and south of the Tembe river was a major reason why the Swiss mission restricted its activities to the area north of the river. The mission also encountered language problems when in the 1880s, using the central Tsonga dialect codified in the Spelonken, they started work amongst the southern Tsonga (Ronga) speakers. Because of the linguistic division they were initially rejected as "Karangas", i.e. as foreigners from the north.[21]

Berthoud was opposed to the contemporary European orthodoxy whereby political groups were delineated according to their languages. Consequently, he was particularly critical of the basis of Junod's linguistic groupings which were defined according to geographical rather than linguistic criteria; terms like Djonga meaning southerners, Ronga - easterners and Nwalungu - northerners. The terms applied to the Bila linguistic sub-group owed its origin to the word 'Bilene', the name give to a humus-rich soil type lacking flood-plain. Junod's Hlanganou linguistic sub-group corresponds with the people the traveller St. Vincent Erskine called Abahlengane, a term which means "those who pay taxes, are tributary". This designation probably arose because, when Erskine travelled through the Delagoa Bay hinterland, the Nwamba and Mabila chiefdoms of the area were tributary to the Swazi. Junod's final linguistic

---

20. Ilse Hone, "The History of the Development of Tsonga Orthography", (private ms., 1981), 20-22.

21. For the debate between Berthoud and Junod, see SMA 1255/B Berthoud, "Rapport sur l'expedition à Magude, 1885"; Ibid., "Rapport sur l'expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891"; Ibid., "Des langues Bantou"; SMA 1254/B Junod, "Étude comparative du shiGouamba et du shiRonga", March 1893; Junod, "Thonga, Gouamba, Djonga, Ronga", BMSAS, 114, 1894.

sub-group, the Hlengwe, was also delineated in a geographically subjective manner as the term was used by Delagoa Bay traders to refer to the people living to the north of the Limpopo, people who themselves rejected the term.[22] These terms were sometimes used as points of reference by outsiders wanting to identify the people of a specific geographical area or by rootless refugees wishing to establish a claim to an area of origin; they did not refer to groups with a common social organization or material culture. As Berthoud stated, "the Ronga do not form a specific tribe and their name is a geographical designation rather than an ethnographic or linguistic one."[23] Thus although a member of the Nkuna tribe living in the Transvaal might recognize himself as a Djonga, this did not imply any common identity with members of the Khosa tribe or any of the other independent chiefdoms living in the Djonga area between the Nkomati and Limpopo rivers. The debate between Junod and Berthoud ended with the latter's early death in 1904 and, within a few years, regional dialects and patois had been standardized into distinct Ronga and "Gwamba" grammars and orthographies.

Junod was aware of many of the problems involved in his tribal classification and he attempted to solve these in his later work in which he formulated and developed his concept of a Thonga tribe. As early as 1905 he ascribed the recognition of the Thonga as a tribe, largely to the work of the Swiss mission.[24] Seven years later in his two volume Life of a South African Tribe, he divided the tribe into the "northern clans" who spoke the "gwamba" or Thonga/Shangaan dialect and the Ronga who occupied the area south of the Nkomati. As the word Gwamba could not be applied to the coastal "northern clans", it was eventually replaced by the term Thonga-Shangaan. What is important here is that in Life of a South African Tribe, Junod reified these linguistic divisions by imbuing them with cultural traits that distinguished the Ronga, as a cultural group, from the Thonga-Shangaan "northern clans". Similarly, although Junod recognized that there was no feeling of national unity in the Thonga tribe as a whole, it was distinguishable from other tribes because

---

22. Harries, "The Anthropologist", 46-47.

23. SMA 1255/B Berthoud, "Rapport sur l'expedition".

24. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal".

of a common language and certain shared customs.[25]

Junod's classification of people into tribes was further reinforced by his interest in folklore, proverbs and folk songs. Contemporary folklorists were intricately involved in European nationalist movements, the roots of whose consciousness they sought, in opposition to the nationalism imposed from above by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, in the cultural expressions of those elements of the nation least influenced by cosmopolitan worldliness; the peasantry. Thus it was inevitable that, just as the stories collected by the brothers Grimm constituted an expression of German nationalism drawn from "the people", so too were the songs, tales and proverbs collected by Junod seen as an expression of a Ronga or a Thonga consciousness which, at the level of the tribe, was distinguishable from, for instance, that of the Zulu as manifested by Callaway's collection of Zulu folklore.[26]

---

25. Junod, Life, II, 356.

26. Junod, Les Chants et les Contes BaRonga; Life, II, 176-300.

Appendix II

THE MAJOR CHIEFDOMS IN THE DELAGOA BAY HINTERLAND AT THE TIME OF THE LUSO-GAZA WAR OF 1894-95

Chiefdom	Settlement	Chief	Military Strength	Population
Khosa	Nkomati river bend	Songele	c.8 000[1]	
Mabota	15 miles north of Lourenço Marques	Novatjonga	c.1 000	
Mafumo (Chixaxa)	Lourenço Marques area. Just west of Mabota	Nwamantibyana	over 2 000[2]	
Maputo	South of the Maputo-Pongola river	Ngwanasi	(22 regiments)[3] 20-22,000	
Matolla	Both banks of Umbeluzi river. Large surface area, thinly populated.	Sigaule	2,000 (9 regiments)	
Mazwaya	North of Mabota, on both sides of lower Nkomati to its mouth. Heavy population	Mahazulu	2 400[4]	10 500
Nwamba	Large surface area, scattered population	Nwangoundwana	850[5]	4 000

(Source: Reis, A Populaçao de Lourenço Marques, 81-82)

1. UNISA. Junod collection, "Les Causes de la Rebellion..."
2. Junod, Les Chants et les Contes Ronga, 60
3. BPP 1890 Saunders to Shepstone, Nov., 1887; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 9 Aug., 1871.
4. Junod estimated 4,000 to 6,000. Les Chants, 58.
5. Junod estimated 1,500 to 2,000. "Les Causes..."

Appendix III

CLOTH AND LIQUOR IMPORTS INTO LOURENÇO MARQUES

	Cloth	Liquor
1882	119 800$000	99 108$000
1883	155 219$000	92 185$000
1884	114 873$000	37 947$000
1885	57 952$000	35 843$000
1886	52 667$000	25 818$000
1887	164 584$000	95 319$000
1890	371 600$000	185 045$000
1897	374 260$000	521 480$000
1898	158 000$000	468 900$000

Sources:

Boletim de Oficial de Moçambique

AHU Moç., Alfândegas 1836-90, packets 1376 and 1382.

AHU Moç., 2ª Rep. pasta 7 Alfândega de Lourenço Marques, 1890.

Mappa Estatistica (Lourenço Marques, Alfândega, 1899).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is divided into:

I. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

1. Official

a. Arquivo Histórico e Ultramarino, Lisbon
b. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Lisbon
c. Consulado do Portugal no Cabo da Boa Esperanço, Cape Town
d. Consulado do Portugal, Pretoria
e. Public Records Office, London
f. East Sussex Record Office, Lewes
g. Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg
h. Ingwavuma Magistracy Records, Ingwavuma
i. Transvaal Archives, Pretoria
j. Cape Archives, Cape Town
k. Archives Nationales de France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris

2. Missionary and Business Records and Diaries

a. Swiss Mission, Lausanne
b. United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, London
c. Witwatersrand University Library, Johannesburg
d. University of South Africa Library, Pretoria
e. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
f. Wernher-Beit Group Archives, Johannesburg
g. Standard Bank Archives, Johannesburg
h. Chambre de Commerce, Marseilles

3. Unpublished Private Papers

a. Transvaal Archives
b. Witwatersrand University Library
c. Royal Geographical Society, London
d. Africana Museum, Johannesburg
e. Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban
f. Papers held by private individuals

II. PUBLISHED SOURCES

a. British Parliamentary Papers

b. South African Republic

c. Cape Parliamentary Papers

d. Natal Legislature

e. Mozambique, Customs Department

f. Periodicals and Newspapers

g. Documentary Material Subsequently Published

h. Selected Books

i. Selected Articles

III. UNPUBLISHED THESES AND PAPERS

IV. ORAL TRADITION

V. ADDENDUM

I. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

1. Official

a. Arquivo Histórico e Ultramarino (AHU), Lisbon

Moçambique. Correspondência de Governadors (Moç., CG) (Folders)
Pasta 17 (1860) to
Pasta 32 (1879-1881).

Moçambique. 1ª Repartiçao (Moç., 1ª Rep.)
Pasta 1 (1879-1882) to
Pasta 12 (1897)

Moçambique. 2ª Repartiçao (Moç., 2ª Rep.)
Pasta 1 (1884) to
Pasta 16 (1897-1898)

Moçambique. Alfândegas (Customs)
Pasta 1371
Pasta 1379
Pasta 1380
Pasta 1382
Pasta 1654

Moçambique. Diversos (Boxes)
Caixa 1
Caixa 2

b. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (MNE), Lisbon

Consulado de Portugal no Cabo da Boa Esperança, caixas 678-679.
Consulados de Portugal. Natal e Santa Helena, caixas 697-698.
Consulado de Portugal em Transvaal, caixas 707-710.
Consulado de Portugal em Londres, caixas 663-664.
Legação de Ingalterra em Portugal, caixas 433-435; codice 264.
Direçao dos Consulados e dos Negócios Commercias, maço 23.

c. Consulado de Portugal no Cabo da Boa Esperança (CPC), Cape Town

Codices (Copy books)
1. April 1878 to May 1879
2. May 1879 to February 1881

3. February 1881 to July 1882
4. August 1882 to September 1883
5. September 1883 to October 1886
6. October 1885 to August 1887
7. 1884-1895 (não oficial)
8. 1892-1895

Maços (Packets)

1. Documents (received from) Moçambique 1879 a 1906
2. Maço marked "Free State" (actually "Diversos" from various vice-consulates in South Africa). Scattered periods. Mainly 1913-1915.
3. Vários documentos referentes ao ano 1890.
4. Private Papers - Consulado de Portugal

d. Consulado de Portugal, Pretoria (CGP), Housed in the Portuguese Consulate-General, Johannesburg

1. Registers of correspondence with Direção dos Negócios Políticos e Diplomáticos (DNPD) to 2 Jan., 1892.
2. Registers of correspondence with various Portuguese authorities, 20 Oct., 1892.
3. Registers of correspondence with DNPD, 1894-1896.
4. Registers of correspondence with Direcao dos Consulados e dos Negocias Commerciais, Dec., 1892-May 1896.
5. Copy-book of despatches sent, Nov., 1895-July 1896.
6. Copy-book of despatches sent, Oct., 1895-June 1896.

e. Public Records Office (PRO), London

Admiralty. ADM 1.: 69; 70; 2269.
Foreign Office. FO 63.: 698; 1026; 1047; 1049; 1050; 1127; 1148; 1281; 1316; 1317; 1336.
Foreign Office. FO 84.: 1026; 1039; 1539; 1616; 1640; 1709; 1901; 1969; 2224.
Foreign Office. FO 97.: 303; 318.

f. East Sussex Record Office, Lewes

Shiffner MS. no. 3216.

g. Natal Archives (NA), Pietermaritzburg

Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA). Official Correspondence. 1: 7-10; 12-29; 36-38; 40-42; 45-49; 51-59; 64-71; 75-80; 86-88; 96; 106; 111; 291-2.

1/3. Magistrates Letters: 8-9; 12-13; 17; 21; 23; 26-29.

1/4. Confidential Papers: 3; 8.

1/6 Miscellaneous Correspondence: 2.

1/7 Reports, Messages and Passes: 7-9.

Indian Immigration (I.I.) Protector of Immigrants. 1: 1-6; 9-10; 13; 15-22; 24; 26; 34; 40; 44; 46-48; 50-65; 68; 71; 74-77; 80.

Colonial Secretary's Office (CSO). 507-510; 513-515; 517; 519; 521-522; 525; 527; 530; 532-33; 536; 643; 558-561; 566; 571; 584; 587; 598; 603; 606; 608; 614; 620; 632; 636; 643; 656; 665; 668; 677; 680; 682; 726; 729; 732; 736; 750; 784; 787; 801; 820; 823; 837; 840; 841; 855; 862; 872; 876; 883; 897; 915; 918; 920-922; 927; 930; 933; 935-937; 940; 943; 948-949; 954-955; 957-958; 963-967; 974; 977-978; 982; 989; 1019; 1029; 1082; 1171; 1194; 1198; 1202-1203; 1209; 1268; 1273; 1295; 1330; 1334; 1345; 1352; 1357; 1360; 2298; 2552; 2554-2557.

Government House (GH). 27-30; 33; 54-56; 59-60; 66-69; 601; 1049-1054; 1214; 1325.

Letters from British Consul, Lourenço Marques. 829-830; 833.

Letters from British Consul, Mozambique. 837; 838.

Letters from Governor-General, Mozambique. 845-846.

Letters from Foreign Governments, Zululand. 857.

Letters from Foreign Consuls, Portugal. 870.

Zululand Government House (ZGH). 699; 702; 705; 708; 712; 713; 716; 736; 786; 795; 796.

Zululand, Commissioner's Archives (ZA). 26; 27.

Resident Magistrate. Letterbook Umsinga, 1876-1878.

Surveyor-General's Office (SGO). III 1/2.

h. Ingwavuma Magistracy Records, Ingwavuma

District Record Book. Section 7-19, including
"History of the Crown Land - Ingwavuma District"
"Historical Record - Ingwavuma District Tribes".

District Record Book 38(c)

i. Transvaal Archives (TA), Pretoria

State Secretary (SS). Official Correspondence. 20; 21; 30; 37; 38-40; 42; 43; 45; 49; 51; 55-58; 60; 61; 65-67; 89; 96; 99; 100; 105; 106; 108-112; 116-118; 124; 133; 173; 174; 185; 186; 188; 193; 198; 203; 207; 263; 342; 459; 490; 564; 636; 657; 691; 698; 719; 732; 760; 788; 816; 869; 869; 872; 873; 919; 955; 991; 1036; 1147; 1200; 1240; 1254; 1318; 1333; 1439; 1603; 1900; 2273; 2440; 2467; 2651; 2623; 2722; 3045; 3365; 3409; 3924; 3925; 4133; 4261; 4681.

State Secretary, Foreign Affairs (SSa). 1; 5; 6; 36; 132; 144; 155; 166; 167; 168; 169; 176; 177; 215; 241; 258; 263; 264; 329; 330; 349; 384; 388; 450; 547; 568; 594; 595.

Secretary for Native Affairs (SN). 1; 1A; 2-4; 4A; 5; 173-4.

Leyds Archive (LA). 455-6; 459; 461-465; 656.

Governor's Office (Gov.). 18; 41; 210.

Deceased Estates. No 4294 (old) Joao Albasini; No 2256 (old) Bras Piedade Perreira.

j. Cape Archives (CA), Cape Town

Immigration Agent (IAC). 1-11; 21.

House of Assembly (HA), Unpublished annexures to Votes and Proceedings. 53; 108; 110; 154; 167.

k. Archives Nationales de France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (AN-MNE), Paris

CCC. Lourenço Marques Vice-Consul's Reports. 1895-1901.

2. Missionary and Business Records and Diaries

a. Swiss Mission Archives (SMA), Lausanne

82. Rapports et documents.
435. Lettres de G. Liengme 1891-92.
436. Lettres de G. Liengme 1893.
437. Lettres et Rapports de G. Liengme 1894.
438. Correspondence du Dr. G. Liengme 1895-96.
467. Journal d'Antioka, 1890. Grandjean.
483. Lettres de A. Grandjean 1890-1892, 1896.
484. Lettres de Paul Berthoud 1891-1892.
485. Lettres de H.A. Junod 1891-1892.
496/A. Lettres de M. Paul Berthoud 1897.
497. Lettres de Paul Berthoud 1888.
501/A. Lettres de M. Eberhardt 1897.
502. Lettres de MM. P. Berthoud, A. Grandjean and H. Junod 1889-90.
503. Lettres et Rapports de MM. Grandjean, Junod and Nhalamhlala 1889.
513. Lettres de M. Grandjean 1893-94.
514. Lettres de M. Grandjean 1895-96 (also incl. 1912).
515. Lettres de M. Numa Jacques 1895-1896.
516. Lettres de H.A. Junod, 1893-1894.
517. Lettres de H.A. Junod, 1895-1896.
519. Lettres de P. Loze 1893-1896.
528. Lettres de Paul Berthoud 1893-1894 et 1896.
536. Lettres de M. A. Borel 1897.
542. Lettres, recit et rapport de M. Paul Loze 1897-1898.
549/A. Lettres de Numa Jaques 1896-1897.
797. P.V. de la Conference du Littoral. Statistiques 1889-1892.
798. Conference du Littoral 1893-1894. Liengme lettres 1894 and 1899.
815. P.V. de la Conference du Littoral 1895-1899.
840. Memoire justicatif du Dr. G. Liengme 3 Jan., 1896.
850. Rapports 1888.
872. Lettres de Mlle. Jacot, M. Grandjean 1896-1911.
1254. Rapports 1893-1895.
1255. Rapports 1890-1895.
1256. Rapports 1885-1892.

1127. Affaires de 1890-1896. Guerre.

1128. Lettres autour des affaires Liengme-Junod 1896-1897.

1180. Dossier Wesleyan.

1190. Divers et lettres Privées de M. & Mme. Berthoud.

1642/A. Premières Confessions des Nègres qui se Convertissent a Lourenço Marques 1896.

1760. A. Granjean. Journal 1889-1890 et 1895.

2001. Ethnographic photos by G. Liengme.

2013. Ethnographic photos by G. Liengme.

b. United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (USPG), London

Mission Reports:

Bishop Carter, "A Missionary Journey into Tongaland", 1892.

Rev. Charles Johnson, "Journal of an Expedition into Tongaland", Aug.-Sept., 1895. Parts I and II.

Report of the Bishop of Lebombo on the State of East Coast Labourers at the Johannesburg Goldfields, January 1899.

c. Witwatersrand University Library, Johannesburg

A. 170. American Zulu Mission. "Our Lamented Pinkerton's Story". Diary of an expedition (July-Nov., 1880) from Durban up the East Coast.

A. 950. Archives of Tsonga Presbyterian Church: Swiss Mission in South Africa 1872-1950. 21/1 Lobolo; 24/1 Shilvane; 23/1 Valdezia 1888-1896; 23/2 Elim 1890-1896; 56/1 Native Affairs; 3 unsorted envelopes (1874-1879; 1882-1889; 1890-1899).

d. University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria

Diary (tagebuch) of A. Nachtigal, Band 2, vol I, 1879, pp. 274-284. "Beitrag zur Geschichte der Knopneuse".
Junod Collection, Original MSS and letters.

e. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Letters from Missions. ABC 15.4. Volume 12.

f. Archives of H. Eckstein and Co. (HE) of the Wernher-Beit Group. Held by Barlow-Rand, Johannesburg

H. Eckstein, Correspondence. 57; 62-63.
P. Fitzpatrick, Correspondence. 140; 141.
L. Phillips. 146; 149; 151.
G. Rouliot. 171; 172.
Taylor. 190; 192; 197.
Marquard. 205.
General and Technical Report, Oct., 1889 - Feb., 1894.

g. Standard Bank Archives (SBA), Johannesburg

1/1/102 Lourenço Marques 1895-1900.
1/1/103 Lydenburg 1878-1879.

h. Chambre de Commerce, Marseilles (CCM)

File 157, Compagnie de Navigation, Cyprien Fabre.

3. Unpublished Private Papers

a. Transvaal Archives (TA)

Albasini Letterbooks. Correspondência Official do Consulado Portuguez em a Republica Africana do Sul Transvaalsch. Volume 1, 14 April 1858-7 April 1862; Volume 2, 12 June 1862-8 June 1866; Volume 3, 8 June 1866-15 October 1872. (Portuguese original, Afrikaans translation available.)

A. 18. Dicke, B.H. "The Development of the Northern Transvaal: Historical Stepping Stones and Reminiscences". June 1925.

W. 179. Henry T. Glynn. "Game and Gold".

A. 180. Cape. Public Works Department. Typescript of letters despatched. General. (i) 2.8.1875 to 31.5.1879
(ii) 3.6.1879 to 3.12.1880
(iii) 3.12.1880 to 12.1.1882

A. 195. MSS regarding concessions (1891-1893) in Lourenço Marques of A. Erasmus, J. Winterbach and L.H. Rau.

A. 334. Copies of material in A.H.U. relating to Louis Trichardt. 1838-39; 1843-49.

A. 375. O. Forssman Collection.

A. 599. Van Wielligh Aanwins op ZAR - Mozambique grens en die Swaziland-Mozambique grens. Dagboek 1890.

A. 881. Mariano Luiz de Souza, "Herineringe van Lydenburg 1872".

A. 1092. W.H.J. Punt Versameling, "Herinnerings van C.J. Trichardt".

A. 1266. Braz Pereira Collection (Portuguese original):

(i) Correspondencia 1846-1883.
(ii) Financial Records 1869-1873.
(iii) Financial Records 1873-1878; 1873-1880.
(iv) Financial Records 1873-1880.
(v) Publications and Newspaper Cuttings (in English and Afrikaans.

A. 1140. Beelaerts van Blokland Collection. Includes Anon., "Verhaal van een Reis in Oost-Transvaal uit her jaar 1858"; "Handelsexpedities naar Port Natal en Delagoabaai in 1852".

A. 1255. Newspaper cuttings (1889-1890) found in the South African Chancellory in Lourenço Marques.

b. Witwatersrand University Library (WUL)

A. 55 f. James, R.T.N., "Reminiscences.
A. 74. Machado Papers.

c. Royal Geographical Society, London (RGS)

Rogier, Lt. E., "Notes on Owen's Expedition (1823)". (1833 MS)

Hilliard, C., "Notes on the Manucousi or river King George, S.-E. Africa". (1859 ms.)

St. V. Erskine, "To the Limpopo mouth and back on foot", 1868.
St. V. Erskine, "Journal of Mr. St. V. Erskine, Special Commissioner from the Natal Government to Umzila - King of Gaza, 1871 and 1872".
St. V. Erskine, Letters to Secretary, R.G.S. 27 Aug., 1868; 11 Dec., 1868.

d. Africana Museum, Johannesburg

Junod Collection 39/220-661. MSS. related to Individual Items.

Notes on Junod Collection.

e. Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban (KCL)

James Stuart Archive. Files 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 60, 70, 74.

St. Vincent Erskine Papers, including diaries, letters, miscellaneous notes.

Alexander Anderson Papers. Includes "A Sea Voyage to Delagoa Bay in 1868 for big game hunting", and "Gun running at Port Natal".

Davidson Papers, "Diary of a sugar/coffee planter near Umzinto, 1867-1870".

Letters of J. Ecroyd.

Fynn Papers.

L.C. von Wissel. "Reminiscences of trading days in Northern Zululand, 1895-1919".

f. Papers Held by Private Individuals

Robert Briggs Struthers. "The hunting journal of Robert Briggs Struthers in Zululand and Tongaland 1852-1856" (In possession of Mr. R. Butcher, Durban).

St. V. Erskine Papers (Mr. E. Erskine, Natal).

Account book of Manuel da Gama 1859-1863 (In possession of Mr V. da Gama, Kurulen).

Letters and Papers of Henri Berthoud (In possession of Mr. P. Cuenod, P.O. Elim Hospital).

II. PUBLISHED SOURCES

a. British Parliamentary Papers (BPP)

Accounts and Papers, Commercial Reports.

BPP LXXI, 1877, C.1662 Consular Report for Mozambique 1876.

BPP LXXIV, 1876, C.1421 Consular Report for Mozambique 1875.

BPP XC, 1881, C.2945 Consular Report for Mozambique 1880.

BPP LXXI, 1882, No. 45 Consular Report for Mozambique 1882.

BPP LXXXV, 1887, No. 60 Consular Report for Mozambique 1885.

BPP LXXVI, 1890, No. 742 Consular Report for Mozambique 1889.

BPP LXXXVII, 1890-1, No. 855 Consular Report for Mozambique 1890.

BPP LXXXIII, 1892, No. 955 Consular Report for Mozambique 1891.

BPP XCV, 1893-4, No. 1153 Consular Report for Lourenço Marques District 1892.

BPP XCV, 1893-4, No. 1312 Consular Report for Mozambique 1892.

BPP XCIX, 1895, No. 1463 Consular Report for Mozambique 1893.

BPP XCIX, 1895, No. 1537 Consular Report for Mozambique 1894.

BPP LXXXVIII, 1896, No. 1760 Consular Report for Mozambique 1895.

BPP XCII, 1897, No. 1904 Report for Consular District of Lourenço Marques 1896.

BPP 1878-9, C.2220 South Africa. Correspondence no. 66.

BPP XLVIII, 1883, C.3533 Correspondence with respect to tariffs in the Portuguese Possessions in Africa, 1877-1883.

BPP LXXV, 1883, C.3587 Report by Consul O'Neill on Agriculture and Labour in the Province of Mozambique.

BPP 1875, C.1361 Correspondence respecting claims of Her Majesty's Government to Delagoa Bay.

BPP 1875, C.1137 Report of the expedition sent to install Cetewayo as king of the Zulus.

BPP 1890, C-6200 Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Swaziland and Tongaland.

BPP 1892, C.6684 Correspondence respecting boundary questions in Zululand.

BPP 1895, C.7505 Correspondence relating to certain Native territories situated to the north-east of Zululand.

BPP 1895, C.7780 Further correspondence relating to certain Native territories situated to the norht-east of Zululand.

BPP 1895, C.7878 Further correspondence relating to certain Native territories situated to the north-east of Zululand.

BPP 1896 C.7920-19 Report on the Port and Railway of Lourenço Marques.

Laws of the Transvaal up to 1899. (H.M.S.O., London, 1903).

b. South African Republic

Notule van die Volksraad van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek. Vol. II (1851-1853) to VI (1866-1867) (ed.) J.H. Breytenbach.

South African Archival Records, Transvaal. Vols. 2-6.

Voortrekker Argiefstukke, (eds.) D.W. Kruger and H.S. Pretorius (Pretoria, 1937).

De Locale Wetten der Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek, 1849-1885. (Pretoria, 1887).

c. Cape Parliamentary Papers

Annexures to Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly:

1875 - A.3. (Special Session) on the MacMahon Award.
1876 - G.8. Report on Immigration and Labour Supply for 1875.
1877 - G.47. Report on Immigration and Labour Supply for 1876.
1880 - G.71. Report on Native immigration to the colony from extra-colonial territories, for the year 1879.
1881 - G.56. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1880.
1882 - G.64. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1881.
1883 - G.79. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1882.
1884 - G.58. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1883.
1885 - G.2. (Report of the) Immigration Agent, Cape Town, to the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works for 1884.
1879 - A.26. Report of the Select Committee on the Supply of the Labour Market.
1890 - A.12. Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question.
1892 - C.2. Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question.
1893 - G.3993 Cape of Good Hope Labour Commission.

d. Natal Legislature

Sessional Papers 1872, no. 12, "Report of the Select Committee into the introduction of native labourers from beyond the borders of the colony".

Sessional Papers 1874, no. 4, "Report of the Select Committee on the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the colony".

e. Mozambique, Customs Department

Estatistica das Alfândegas, 1884.
Estatistica das Alfândegas, 1899.

f. Periodicals and Newspapers

Bulletin de la Mission Suisse en Afrique du Sud. To 1900; 1910.

Bulletin de la Societé Neuchâteloise de Geographie.

Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa.

L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée. Monthly, Geneva. Numbers 1 (1879-1880) to 14 (1893).

Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports, 1889-1897.

Missionary Herald. Proceedings of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. 1880 to 1883.

Compte-rendu de la situation commerciale et industrielle de la circonscription de Marseilles. Annual. 1873-1897.

Boletim Oficial de Moçambique.

g. Documentary Material Subsequently Published

M. and Mme. Paul Berthoud, Lettres Missionaires, 1873-1879. (Lausanne, 1900).

Berthoud, Ruth, Du Transvaal à Lourenço Marques: lettres de Mme R. Berthoud - Junod. (Lausanne, 1904).

Bleek, W.H.I. The Natal Diaries 1855-1856. (ed.) O.H. Spohr. (Cape Town, 1965).

Theal, G.M. Records of South-east Africa. Vols. 1-9.

Webb, C. de B. and Wright, J. (eds.) James Stuart Archive. Vols. I-III.

Comissão Organizadora. Mouzinho: Governador de Lourenço Marques. (Lourenço Marques, 1956).

Santana, F. Documentação avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Vol. I (Lisbon, 1964); Vol. II (Lisbon, 1967).

h. Selected Books

Acutt, N.C.
1942 Bushveld. (Durban)

Amselle, J.-L. (ed.)
1976 Les Migrations Africaines. (Paris)

Anderson, P.
1974 Lineages of the Absolutist State. (London)

Andrada, Joaquim Carlos Paiva de
1885 Relatório de uma Viagem ás Terras dos Landins. (Lisbon)

Andrade, Onofre Lourenço de
1867 O Presídio de Lourenço Marques no periodo de 24 de Novembro de 1859 a 1 de Abril de 1865. (Lisbon)

Axelson, E.
1967 Portugal and the Scramble for Africa. (Johannesburg)

Azvedo, A.L.
1957 O Clima de Moçambique e a Agricultura. I, Lourenço Marques. (Lourenço Marques)

Baldwin, W.C.
1863 African Hunting from Natal to the Zambezi 1852-1860. (London)

Bannister, S.
1830 Humane Policy. (London)

Barnard, Lt. Frederick L.
1848 A Three Years' Cruise in the Mozambique Channel. (London, 1848; Reprinted 1969)

Bernhard, F.O.
1971 Karl Mauch: African Explorer. (Cape Town)

Berthoud, Paul
1896 Les Nègres Gouamba. (Lausanne)

Boteler, Thomas

1835 Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia Performed in His Majesty's Ships Leven and Barracouta, from 1821-1826. (London)

Botelho, S.X.

1835 Memoria Estatistica sobre os Dominios Portuguezes na Africa Oriental. (Lisbon)

Bovill, J.H.

1900 Natives under the Transvaal Flag. (London)

Braatvedt, H.P.

1949 Roaming Zululand with a Native Commissioner. (Pietermaritzburg)

Bronkhorst, J.G.S. in J.C. Chase (ed.)

1968 The Chase Papers. (Cape Town)

Broome, William

The Laws of Natal Vol. III 1879-1889.

Bryant, A.T.

1947 The Zulu People. (Pietermaritzburg)

Bulpin, T.V.

1967 The Ivory Trail. (Cape Town)

Burke, E. (ed.)

1969 Journal of Carl Mauch. 1869-1872. (Salisbury)

Cabral, Augusto

1910 Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indígenas do Districto de Inhambane. (Lourenço Marques)

Castilho, A.

1880 O Districto de Lourenço Marques no Presente e no Futuro. (Lisbon)

Chevalier, L.

1969 Classes Laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié de XIX^{e} siècle. (Paris)

Colenso, J.W.

1905 A Zulu-English Dictionary. (Pietermaritzburg)

Corvo, João de Andrade

1884 Estudos sobre as provinciais Ultramarinas. Vol II. (Lisbon)

Costello, Tom

1931 1874! The Exciting True Story of the Early Days on the Caledonian Gold Fields, Transvaal. (London)

Costa, Gomes de

1899 Gaza 1897-1898. (Lisbon)

Costa Leal, Fernando da

1943 Uma Viagem na África Austral do interior da República do Transvaal para o porto de Lourenço Marques (em 1870). (Lisbon)

Cuenod, R.

1967 Tsonga-English Dictionary. (Johannesburg)

Dehérain, H.

1905 L'Expansion des Boers au XIX^{e} Siecle. (Paris)

Delegorgue, A.

1847 Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe. (Paris)

Dicke, B.H.

1936 The Bush Speaks. (Pietermaritzburg)

Distant, W.L.

1892 A Naturalist in the Transvaal. (London)

Doke, C. and Vilakazi, B.W.

1972 Zulu-English Dictionary. (Johannesburg)

Drummond, W.H.

1875 The Large Game and Natural History of South and South-east Africa. (Edinburgh)

Duffy, J.

1967 A Question of Slavery. (Cambridge, Mass.)

Dunbar-Moodie, W.J.

1856 Ordinances, Proclamations etc. etc. etc. relating to the Colony of Natal 1835 to 1855. Vol I. (Pietermaritzburg)

Enes, Anotónio

1946 Moçambique: Relatório apresentado ao governo. (Lisbon)

Ferrão, Francisco (ed.)

1909 Circumscripçoẽs de Lourenço Marques: Respostas aos Quesitos Feitos Pelo Secretario dos Negocios Indígenas. (Lourenço Marques)

Fernandes das Neves, Diocletiano

1879 A Hunting Expedition to the Transvaal. (London)

Flygare, J.

1899 De Zoutpansberg en de Bavenda Natie. (Pretoria)

Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A.

1978 All that Glittered. (Oxford)

Fynn, H.F.

1950 The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn. (eds.) James Stuart and D. McK. Malcolm. (Pietermaritzburg)

Fuller, C.

1924 Tsetse in the Transvaal. 9-10th Reports of the Veterinary Education Association, South Africa, 1924.

Fuller, C. (ed.) Leo Fouche

1932 Louis Trigardt's Trek across the Drakensberg 1837-38. (Cape Town)

Gibson, J.Y.

1911 The Story of the Zulus. (London)

Gillmore, Parker

n.d. Through Gasaland and the Land of the Portuguese Aggression. (London)

Godelier, M.

1977 Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology. (London)

Grandjean, A.

1917 La Mission Romande. (Lausanne)

Guy, Jeff

1979 The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom. (London)

Henning, M.W.

1932 Animal Diseases in South Africa. (Pretoria)

Henry, J.A.

1963 The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank in South Africa. (London)

Hitchins, R.L. and Sweeney, G.W.

1900 Statutes of Natal 1845 to 1899. (Pietermaritzburg)

Hufton, O.

1974 The Poor of Eighteenth-century France 1750-1789. (Oxford)

Hvidt, K.

1975 Flight to America: the Social Background of 300 000 Danish Emigrants. (New York)

Isaacs, Nathaniel

1936/7 Travels and Adventures in Eastern Africa. (ed.) L. Hermann. (Cape Town)

Isnard, Emile

1927 Les Fabre. (Marseilles)

Jeppe F. and Kotzé, J.G.

1887 Local Wetten der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, 1849-1885. (Pretoria)

Johnson, R.E.

1979 Peasant and Proletarian: The Working Class of Moscow in the Late Nineteenth Century. (Leicester)

Joest, W.

1885 Um Afrika. (Cologne)

Jordão, Levy Maria

1870 Memoria Sobre Lourenço Marques (Delagoa Bay). (Lisbon)

Junod, H.-A.

1896 Grammaire et Manuel de Conversation Ronga. (Lausanne)

Junod, H.-A.

1897 Les Chants et les Contes des Ba-Ronga. (Lausanne)

Junod, H.-A.

1927 Life of a South African Tribe. 2 volumes. (London)

Junod, H.-A.

1925 Cinquante Ans Après. (Lausanne)

Katzenellenbogen, S.E.

1982 South Africa and Southern Mozambique. (Manchester)

Kay, G.

1975 Development and Underdevelopment: a Marxist Analysis. (London)

Kennedy, R.E.

1973 The Irish: Emigration, Marriage and Fertility. (Los Angeles)

Kirby, F.V.

1896 In Haunts of Wild Game. (London)

Kirby, P.

1955 Andrew Smith and Natal. (Cape Town)

Krüger, B.J.

1966 Die Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk in die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 1885-1899. (University of South Africa Communication)

Lacy, G.

1899 Pictures of Travel, Sport and Adventure. (London)

Leavens, D.H.

1939 Silver Money. (Indiana)

Lee, A.W.

1930 Charles Johnson of Zululand. (London)

LeRoux, T.H. (ed.)

1964 Die Dagboek van Louis Trigardt. (Pretoria)

Levy, N.

1982 The Foundations of the South African Cheap Labour System. (London)

Lobato, Alexandre (ed.)

1961 Quatro estudos e uma evocação para a história de Lourenço Marques. (Lisbon)

Longden, W.H.C.

1950 Red Buffalo: The Story of Will Longden. (Cape Town)

Mackenzie, A. (ed.)

1866 Mission Life among Zulu-Kafirs: Letters of Henrietta Robertson. (Cambridge, 1866 and 1875)

Malton, W.H.C.

1902 The Story of Lebombo. (London)

Mathers, E.P.

1887 The Goldfields Revisited. (Durban)

Meillassoux, C.

1977 Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux. (Paris)

Merensky, H.

1899 Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben in Transvaal. (Berlin)

Mesnier, Pedro Gastão

1882 Considerações acerca do tratado de Lourenço Marques. (Porto)

Mission Romande

1894? Chez les Nois. Glanures dans le champ de la Mission Romande. (Neuchatel)

Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Joaquim

1898 Providencias Publicadas Pelo Commissario Regio na Moçambique desde 1 Dezembro 1896 até 18 Novembro 1897. (Lisbon)

Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Joaquim

1899 Providencias Publicadas Pelo Commissario Regio na Provincia de Moçambique desde 23 Maio até 9 Julho 1898. (Lisbon)

Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Joaquim

1899 Moçambique 1896-1898. Volume II. (Lisbon)

Myburgh, A.L.

1949 The Tribes of the Barberton District. (Pretoria)

Newitt, M.

1981 Portugal in Africa: the Last Hundred Years. (London)

Nogueira, R. de sá

O dicionário Ronga-Português.

Noronha, Eduardo de

1895 O Districto de Lourenço Marques e a Africa do Sul. (Lisbon)

Noronha, Eduarde de

n.d. Augusto de Castilho. (Lisbon)

Owen, W.

1883 Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar: Performed in H.M. ships Leven and Barracouta. 2 Vols. (London)

Palgrave, K.C.
1977 Trees of Southern Africa. (Cape Town)

Phipson, Thomas
1968 Letters of a Natal Sheriff. (ed.) R.N. Currey. (Cape Town)

Pierrein, L.
1975 Industries Traditionelles du Port de Marseilles: Le Cycle de Sucres et des Oléagineux 1870-1950. (Marseilles)

Pillay, B.
1976 British Indians in the Transvaal. (London)

Pouillon, F. (ed.)
1976 L'Anthropologie Économique. (Paris)

Preller, G.S.
1911 Piet Retief, Lewensgeskiedenis van die Grote Voortrekker. (Pretoria)

Preston, A. (ed.)
1971 The South African Diaries of Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1875. (Cape Town)

Quintinha, J. and Toscano, F.
n.d. A Derrocada do Império Vátva e Mousinho d'Albuquerque.
1930? 2 Vols. (Lisbon)

Reis, C.S.
1973 A População de Lourenço Marques em 1894. (Lisbon)

Rey, P.-P.
1973 Les Alliances de Classes. (Paris)

Rey, P.-P. (ed.)
1976 Capitalisme Négrier. La Marche des Paysans vers le Prolétariat. (Paris)

Richardson, A.
1952 The Crowded Hours - The Story of Lionel Cohen. (London)

Rita-Ferreira, A.
1963 O Movimento Migratório de Trabalhadores entre Moçambique e a África do Sul. (Lisbon)

Rita-Ferreira, A.

1975 Povos de Moçambique: História e Cultura. (Lisbon)

Schiel, A.

1902 23 Jahre Sturm und Sonnenschein in Südafrika. (Leipzig)

Schoelcher, V.

1877 Restauration de la Traite des Noirs. (Paris)

Schumann, C.G.W.

1938 Structural Changes and Business Cycles in South Africa 1806-1936. (London)

Stevenson-Hamilton, J.

1929 The Low Veld: Its Wild Life and its People. (London)

Terray, E.

1972 Marxism and "Primitive" Societies. (New York)

Thomas, B.

1954 Migration and Economic Growth. A Study in Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy. (Cambridge)

Thompson, E.P.

1970 The Making of the English Working Class. (Harmondsworth)

Uys, C.J.

1933 In the Era of Shepstone. (Lovedale)

van der Horst, S.

1942 Native Labour in South Africa. (London)

van Warmelo, N.J.

1932 Contribution towards Venda History, Religion and Tribal Ritual. (Pretoria)

van Warmelo, N.J.

1935 A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa. (Pretoria)

van Warmelo, N.J.

1940 The Copper Miners of Musina. (Pretoria)

War Office

1905 The Native Tribes of the Transvaal. (London)

Ward, H.

1851 The Cape and the Kaffirs. (London)

Weiskel, T.

1980 French Colonial Rule and the Baule Peoples. (Oxford)

i. Selected Articles

Albasini, João and Meneses, Aveliuo Xavier
"Informações dadas os governader da baia de Lourenço Marques sobre e estado dos boers on antigos cólónos holandes de Cabo, e que constituem a Rep. da Afr. Aus. (1854)". Annaes do Conselho Ultramarinho, 1854-1858.

Albasini, João
"Das terra de Macaxule, em carta enviada as gov. gen. de Moçambique datada de 8/4/1868". Arquivo das Colonias, vol. 3, 1918. pp. 13-14.

Andrade, A.G. Aug. Freire de
"Explorações Portugueses em Lourenço Marques e Inhambane". (1891 trip). Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 5, 13, 1894.

Andrade, Alfredo Augusto Freire de
"As minas de oiro do Transvaal and sua influência sobre Lourenço Marques". Revista de Obras Publicas e Minas, 1898.

Andrade, Freire de
"Exploração Portuguêse en Lourenço Marques e Inhambane". BSGL, 13, 5, 1894.

Anon.
"The exploits of Reuben Benningfield". Natal Advertizer, 26.6.1925.

Anon.
"Le commerce de l'ivoire Africain." L'Afrique Explorée et Civilizée, VI, 1885.

Anon.
"Secheresse et famine au sud de l'Afrique" - Paris, 6 Fevrier 1863. Journal des Missions Evangèliques, 1863.

Assocation of Mines
Report, Executive Committee Assocation of Mines: 21 May 1896; 24 July 1896; 23 February 1897. Annual Report of the Association of Mines, 1896.

Beinart, W.
"Joyini inkomo: cattle advances and the origins of migrancy from Pondoland". JSAS, 5, 2, 1979.

Beinart, W.

"Production and the material basis of chieftainship: Pondoland, c.1830-1880". Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, (ed.) S. Marks and A. Atmore, (London, 1980).

Berg, E.J.

"Backward sloping supply functions in dual economies: the African case". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 1961.

Berthoud, H.

"Exploration de H. Berthoud entre le Spelonken et Lourenço Marques". L'Afr. Expl. et Civ., VII, 1886.

Berthoud, H.

"Quelque remarques sur la famille des langues Bantou et sur la langue Tzonga en particulier". Xe Congres International des Orientalists. Session de Genève 1894 (Leiden, 1896).

Berthoud, H.

"Deux Problèmes Hydrographiques du Pays de Gaza". BSNG, XV, 1904.

Berthoud, P. and Mabille

"Voyage de MM. Mabille et Berthoud". Journal dés Missions Évangéliques, 1873.

Berthoud, P.

"Lourenço Marques." BSNG, 1895.

Bickford-Smith, V.

"Dangerous Cape Town: Middle-class attitudes to poverty in Cape Town in the late 19th century". Cape Town History Conference, 1981.

Bovet, M.S.

"Voyage d'information de M.S. Bovet dans le district de Lydenburg, du 4 an 16 Octobre 1910". BMSAS, March 1911.

Burawoy, M.

"The functions and reproduction of migrant labour: comparative material from Southern Africa and the United States". American Journal of Sociology, 81, 5, 1976.

Caetano dos Santos, Pinto

"Viagem de Inhambane as terras de Manicusse en 1840". Arquivo dos Colónios, 1, 6, 1917.

Cardosa, Antonio Maria

"Expedição ás terras do Muzilla em 1882". Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 3, 7, 1887.

Carmonia, Ilda Belo

"Relações entre os Portugueses de Moçambique e os Boers". Moçambique 1950 ano 22 nos. 85 (pp. 33-59); 86 (pp. 37-66); 87 (pp. 27-38); 88 (pp. 27-49).

Castilho, Augusto de

"Acerca de Lourenço Marques." Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 1895.

Coetzee, C.G.

"Die Kompanjie se besetting van Delagoabaai", SAAYB, 1948, II.

Cohen, E.

"Erläuternde bemerkungen zu den routenkarte einer reise von Lydenburg nach den goldfeldern und von Lydenburg nach der Delagoa Bai im Östlichen Süd-Afrika". Zweiter Jahresbericht der Geographischen Gesellschaft in Hamburg, 1874-1875.

Cooper, F.

"Africa and the world economy". African Studies Review, XXIV, 2/3, 1981.

Coqui, J.

"Journey from Ohrigstadt to Delagoa Bay". Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 1859.

Creux, E.

"Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo ...à la baie Delagoa". BMSAS, 45, 1882.

Da Creuz, D.

"Agricultura & a emigração em Moçambique". Portugal em África, 1909.

Dias, Jaime

"Qual seria o status glossinico no territorio de Moçambique, ao sul do Rio Limpopo anterioremente à grande panzootia de peste bovine de 1896?". Bol. da Soc. de Estudos Moç. 1961, nol. 128, pp. 55-65 and map.

de Vaal, J.B.

"Die Onstaan van Ohrigstad". Volkstem, 12 July 1945.

de Vaal, J.B.

"Yster vir assegai se lem". Brandwag, 14 June 1946.

de Vaal, J.B.

"Die eerste mynwerkers van Messina". Brandwag, 21 June 1946.

de Vaal, J.B.

"Tin en goudsoekers in die Noord-Transvaal". Brandwag, 28 June 1946.

de Vaal, J.B.

"Wie was die eerste delwers van Soutpansberg?" Brandwag, 5 July 1946.

de Vaal, J.B.

"Schoemansdal - die verlate Voortrekkerdorp in die Zoutpansberg". Naweek, 10 July 1948.

Dicke, B.H.

"The first Voortrekkers to the Northern Transvaal". SAJS, XXIII, 1926.

Dicke, B.H.

"Potgieter, Trigardt & Pretorius searching for the van Rensburg trek". SAJS, XXIII, 1926.

Dicke, B.H.

"The northern Transvaal Voortrekkers." SAAYB, 1941, I.

Dicke, B.H.

"Tsetse". SAJS, 29, 1932.

Doyle, D.

"A journey through Gazaland". Pro. RGS., XIII, 1891.

Ebersohn, W.H.B.

"Avonturiers van die Lebombo". Huisgenoot, 18 July 1947.

Endemann, K.

"Mittheilungen über die Sotho-Neger". Zietschrift für Ethnologie, 6, 1874.

Erskine, St. V.

"Journey of exploration to the mouth of the River Limpopo". JRGS, 39, 1869.

Erskine, St. V.

"Journey to Umzila's, south-east Africa in 1871-1872". JRGS, 45, 1875.

Etherington, N.

"African economic experiments in colonial Natal, 1845-1880", African Economic History, no 6, 1978.

Etherington, N.

"Labour supply and the genesis of South African confederation in the 1870s". Journal of African History, 20, 2, 1979.

Etherington, N.

"Frederic Elton and the South African factor in the making of Britain's East African Empire". Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, IX, 3, 1981.

Fernandes das Neves, Diocletiano

"Noticia de uma Caçada em Inhambane". Annais do Conselho Ultramarinho, 1864.

Fernandes das Neves, Diocletiano

"Exploração do Rio Bembe". Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 3, 6, 1882.

Fernandes das Neves, Diocletiano

"Cinco cartas de Diocletiano Fernandes das Neves ao Governo de Lourenço Marques, 8 Junho 1879; 18 Janeiro 1882; 13 Junho 1882; 8 Julho 1882; 31 Julho 1882". Moçambique no 69, 1952.

Ferreira, Antonio Maria Duarte

"Relatorio de Serviço de Sande de Lourenço Marques, 1886". Archivos Medico-Coloniaes, 4, 1890.

Ferreira, A. Rita

"Os Africanos de Lourenço Marques." Memorias do Instituto de Investigação Científica de Moçambique, vol. 9, serie c, 1967/8.

Galvão, João Alexandre Lopes

"Portugeses e Boers". Bol. Geral das Colonias, 1937 ano. 13 no. 145.

Gautier

"Une excursion au nord de Transvaal". Globe, Avril 1884.

Godelier, M.

"Infrastructures, societies and history". Current Anthropology, 19, 4, 1978.

Gouveia, E.F.

"Relações com o Transvaal". Archivos das Colonias, 111, 1918.

Grandjean, A.

"La Mission Suisse à la Baie de Delagoa". Le Chrétien Evangélique, XL, 9, Sept., 1897.

Grandjean, A.

"L'Invasion des Zoulou dans le sud-est Africain: une page d'histoire inédite". BSNG, XI, 1899.

Grandjean, A.

"Le Bassin du Nkomati". BSNG, XII, 1900.

Guy, J.J.

"A note on firearms in the Zulu kingdom". JAH, XII, 4, 1971.

Guy, J.J.

"The destruction and reconstruction of Zulu society". Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness 1870-1930 (eds.) S. Marks and R. Rathbone (London, 1982).

Hair, P.

"Milho, meixoeira and other foodstuffs of the Sofala garrison, 1505-1525". Cahiers d'Études Africaines, XVII, 1977.

Harris, M.

"Labour migration among the Mozambique Thonga: cultural and political factors". Africa, 29, 1, 1959.

Hornby, H.E.

"Report on tsetsefly problems of Maputo". Anais do Instituto de Medicina Tropical, vol. 4, 1947.

Jeannert,

"Les Ma-Khoça". BSNG, 1895.

Jeeves, A.

"The control of migratory labour on the South African gold mines in the era of Kruger and Milner". JSAS, II, 1, 1975.

Jeppe, F.

"The Kaap Goldfields of the Transvaal". Pro. RGS, X, 1888.

Jeppe, F.

"Die feststellung der grenze zwischen der Südafrikanischen Republic (Transvaal) und den Portugiesischen besitzungen an der Südostküste von Afrika". Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, 1892.

Joest, W.

"Reise in Afrika im Jahre 1883". Zeitschr. für Ethnologie, 17, 1885.

Junod, H.

"Observations météorologiques faites a Rikatla". Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 10, 1, 1891.

Junod, H.-A.
"Les Baronga". Bull. Soc. Neuchat. Geogr., X, 1898.

Junod, H.-A.
"The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal". Addresses and Papers of the Br. S. Afr. Assoc. for the Adv. of Science, 3, 1905.

Junod, H.-A.
"Native customs in relation to small pox amongst the Ba-Ronga". SAJS, 1914.

Junod, H.-A.
"The condition of the natives of south-east Africa in the 16th century, according to the early Portuguese documents". S.A. Journal of Science, Feb., 1914.

Junod, H.P.
"Some notes of Tshopi origins". Bantu Studies, III, 1, 1927.

Junod, H.P.
"Notes on the ethnographic situation in PEA, south of the Zambezi". Bantu Studies, X, 1936.

Krige, J.D.
"Traditional origins and tribal relationships of the Sotho of the northern Transvaal". Bantu Studies, XI, 1937.

Liengme, G.
"Un potentat Africain: Goungounyane et son regne". BSNG, XIII, 1901.

Liesegang, G.
"Ngoni migrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi, 1821-1839". African Historical Studies, III, 3, 1970.

Liesegang, G.
"Dingane's attack on Lourenço Marques in 1833". JAH, X, 4, 1969.

Longle, A.
"De Inhambane a Lourenço Marques". Bol. Soc. Geogr. Lisboa, 6, 1, 1886.

Machado, J.J.

"Chemin de fer de Lourenço Marques a Pretoria". Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 2, 5, 1885.

Marks, S.

"The traditions of the Natal 'Nguni': a second look at the work of A.T. Bryant". L. Thompson (ed.), African Societies in Southern Africa (London, 1969).

Martins, L.A.F.

"João Albasini e a colonia de St. Luis - subsidos para a historia da Provincia de Moçambique, e das suas relações com o Transval". Pelo Império, no. 126, 1957.

Mashaba, R.

Letter dated 22 Oct., 1894. Work and Workers in the (Wesleyan) Mission Field, 1895.

Meillassoux, C.

"From reproduction to production". Economy and Society, 1, 1, 1972.

Meinhoff, C.

"Einwirkung der Beschäftigung auf die sprache bei den Bantustämmen Afrikas". Globus, 75, 23, 1899.

Montanha, Joaquin de Santa Rita

"Viagem de ida, estada e volta dos Hollandezes da Republica Hollandeza Africana". (1855-56). Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte nao of. 1857.

Naval Officer (Owen?)

"Remarks on Delagoa Bay". South African Quarterly Journal, no. 11, 1830.

Nelson, W.

"Some letters - extracts from the Masbro Advertiser from 19 May 1877". Africana Notes and News, vol. 20, no. 5, 1973.

Nelson, W.

"Some letters - adventures of a local traveller in South Africa". Part II, 1878. Africana Notes and News, vol. 20, no. 6, 1973.

Nogueira, R. de sa

"As linguas Bantas e o Português". Revista da Escola Superior Colonial, vol II, 1950-1951.

Noronha, Eduardo de

"Lourenço Marques e as suas relações com a África do Sul". Bol. Soc. Geogr. de Lisboa, 15, 2, 1896.

Nunes, Joaquim

"Apontamentos sobre a tribu dos ba-Thonga". Bol. da Soc. de Estudos da Col. de Moç., 3, 1, 1932.

Otto, J.C.

"Sekoekoeni en die handel in vuurwapens". Historiese Studies, V, 1944.

Peres, M.A.

"Preliminary investigations on the rainfall of Lourenço Marques". SAJS, XXVII, Nov., 1930.

Preller, G.S.

"Herinneringe van Karl Trichardt". Voortrekkermense II, (Cape Town, 1920).

Punt, W.

Die van Rensburgmoord". Volkstem, 23 Sept., 1939.

Raddatz, H.

"Das Kafernland des untern Olifant". Petrm. Geogr. Mitteilungen, 1886.

Rey, P.-P.

"Les formes de la décomposition des sociétés pré-capitalistes au Nord-Togo et le Mécanisme des migrations vers les zones de capitalisme agraire", L'Agriculture et le Capitalisme Africain. (ed.) S. Amin, (Paris, 1975).

Rita-Ferreira, A.

"Labour emigration among the Moçambique Thonga: comments on a study by Marvin Harris". Africa, 30, 2, 1960.

Schlaefli-Glardon, E.

"De Valdezia à Lourenço Marques, journal de voyage". BSNG, VII, 1893.

Seidel, H.

"Die Ba-Ronga an der Delagoa Baai". Globus, 74, 12, 1898.

Sequeira, Arnaldo de Melo

"Emigraçao para o Transvaal sob o ponto de vista demográfico". Bol. da Soc. de Estudos da Col. de Moçambique, ano 3, no. 13, 1934. pp. 119-125.

Serrano, J.A.M.

"Explorações Portugueses em Lourenço Marques e Inhambane". BSGL, 6, 1894.

Slater, H.

"Land, labour and capital in Natal: the Natal Land and Colonization Company, 1860-1948". JAH, XVI, 2, 1975.

Slater, H.

"The changing pattern of economic relationships in rural Natal, 1838-1914". Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa. (eds.) Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, (London, 1980).

Smith, A.

"The peoples of southern Mozambique: an historical survey". JAH, 14, 4, 1973.

Smith, A.

"The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni politics, 1750-1835". African Societies in Southern Africa. (ed.) L. Thompson, (London, 1969).

Stals, W.A.

"Die kwessie van Naturelle-eiendomsreg op grond in die Transvaal, 1838-1884". SAAYB, II, 1972.

Texeira, Custodio Jose Antonio

"Descripçâo dos Rios da Bahia de Lourenço Marques" (Sept., 1838). Argivo das Colónias, Vol. 11, 1918.

Thomas, E.

"Le Bokaha". BSNG, 1884.

Thompson, E.P.

"Time, work-discipline and industrial capitalism". Past and Present, 38, 1967.

Trapido, S.

"Landlords and tenants in a colonial economy: the Transvaal, 1880-1910". JSAS, V, 1, 1978.

Trapido, S.

"Reflections on land, office and wealth in the South African Republic, 1850-1900". Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa. (eds.) S. Marks and A. Atmore, (London, 1980).

van Rooyen, T.S.

"Die verhoudinge tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die geskiedenis van die Ocs-Transvaal tot 1882". SAAYB, I, 1951.

van Velsen, J.

"Labour migration as a positive factor in the continuity of Tonga tribal society". Economic Development and Cultural Change, 8, 1960.

Vasconcellos, Adolpho de Castro Neto de

"Dos mappos estatisticos com relação ao movimento commercial no districto de Lourenço Marques, durante o anno de 1884". Bol. da Soc. de Geog. Commercial do Porto, 1886.

Wangemann, D.

"Die erstarkung der Transvaal-Republiek im kampfe gegen die eingeborenen". Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, 11, 1884.

Webster, D.

"Migrant labour, social formations and the proletarianization of the Chopi of southern Mozambique". African Perspective, 1978/1.

Wheeler, D.L.

"Gungunyane the negotiator: a study in African diplomacy". JAH, IX, 4, 1968.

Wolpe, H.

"Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid". Economy and Society, 1, 4, 1972.

Xavier, A.A. Caldas

"O Inharrime e as guerras Zavallas". BSGL, 1881.

Xavier, A.A. Caldas

"Os territorios ao sul do Save e os Vatuas." BSGL, 13, 2, 1896.

III. UNPUBLISHED THESES AND PAPERS

Binford, M.

"Stalemate: a study of cultural dynamics". PhD. thesis, Michigan State University (1971).

Bonner, P.

"The rise, consolidation and disintegration of Dlamini power in Swaziland between 1820 and 1889". PhD. thesis, SOAS, University of London (1977).

Coetzee, C.G.

"Die stryd om Delagoabaai". PhD. thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1954).

Delius, P.

"The Pedi polity under Sekwate and Sekhukhune". PhD. thesis, SAOS, University of London (1980).

Etheredge, D.A.

"The early history of the Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, 1887-1897". MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand (1949).

Evers, T.M.

"Three Iron-age industry sites in the Eastern Transvaal Lowveld". MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand (1974).

Felgate, W.S.

"An ecological study of the Tembe-Thonga of Natal and Mozambique". Mimeo., Institute of Social Research, University of Natal/Durban.

Ferreira, O.J.O.

"Stephanus Schoeman in Transvaal". PhD. thesis, University of South Africa, (1977).

Hattingh, J.L.

"Die Trekke uit die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek en die Oranje-Vrystaat 1875-1895". PhD. thesis, University of Pretoria (1975).

Hedges, D.

"Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the 18th and early 19th centuries". PhD. thesis, University of London (1978).

Heydenrych, D.H.

"Natalse spoorwegbeleid en -konstruksie tot 1895". PhD. thesis, University of Stellenbosch (1981).

Hone, I.

"The history of the development of Tsonga orthography". Ms., University of South Africa, 1981.

Kemp, B.H.

"Johan William Colenbrander: a history of his times and the people and events with which he was associated, 1879-1896". PhD. thesis, University of Natal (1962).

Leisegang, G.

"Beiträge zur geschichte des reiches der Gaza Nguni im südlichen Moçambiek 1820-1895". PhD. thesis, University of Cologne (1967).

McGill, D.C.

"A history of the Transvaal 1853-1864". PhD. thesis, University of Cape Town (1943).

McNamara, J.K.

"Development of a recruitment infrastructure: labour migration routes to the Witwatersrand gold mines and compound accommodation 1889-1917". Paper delivered at the Witwatersrand History Workshop Dec.-Feb., 1978.

Monster, R.

"Die Industriële Kommissie van Ondersoek in 1897 en sy politieke betekenis". MA, Potchefstroom University (1966).

Naudé, P.

"Die geskiedenis van die Zoutpansberg 1836-1867". MA thesis, University of South Africa (1939).

Naudé, P.

"Boerdery in die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 1858-1899". PhD. thesis, University of South Africa (1954).

Purkiss, A.J.

"The politics, capital and labour of railway-building in the Cape Colony, 1870-1885". PhD. thesis, University of Oxford (1978).

Ross, H.B.

"The diffusion of the manioc plant from South America to Africa: an essay in ethonobotanical cultural history". PhD. thesis, Columbia University (1954).

Seedat, Z.K.

"The Zanzibaris in Durban - a social anthropological study of the Muslim descendants of African freed slaves living in the Indian area of Chatsworth". MA thesis, University of Natal, Durban (1973).

Skully, R.T.K.

"Phalaborwa oral tradition". PhD. thesis, State University of New York, Binghampton, (1978).

Smith, A.

"The struggle for control of southern Mozambique, 1720-1835". PhD. thesis, University of California-Los Angeles (1970).

van Tonder, B.S.C.

"Die verhouding tussen die Boere in die ZAR en die Portugese van Mosambiek tussen die jare 1836-1869". MA thesis, University of Pretoria (1952).

IV. ORAL TRADITION (OT)

Nqcapu and Lucas Siweya, 16.4.79.

Edmund Mabyalane, Kurulen, 17.2.81.

Thomas Masuluke, Mtiti, 7.4.79.

Headman Maswanganyi, 8.4.79.

Chief Chevane, Ribola, 14.4.79.

O.I. Miyen, Elim, 18.2.81.

V. ADDENDUM

II h. Selected Books

Bell, Rudolph M.

1979 Fate and Honour, Family and Village: Demographic and Cultural Change in Rural Italy since 1800. (Chicago)

Berthoud, H.

1888 La Mission Romande à la baie de Delagoa. (Lausanne)

Bundy, C.

1979 The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry.

Welsh, D.

1971 The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in Colonial Natal 1845-1910. (Cape Town)

W(ilkinson), E. and H.

1906 Soldiers of the Cross in Zululand. (London)

Wilson, D.M.

1901 Behind the Scenes in the Transvaal. (London)

Wilson, F.

1972 Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969. (Cambridge)

Xavier, A.A. Caldas

1894 Reconhecimento do Limpopo - Os Territórios au Sul do Save e os Vatuas. (Lisbon)

II i. Selected Articles

Delius, Peter

"Migrant labour and the Pedi, 1840-1880". S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds.) Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa. (London, 1980)

Harries, Patrick

"Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extraction; the nature of free and unfree labour in south-east Africa". JAH, 22, 1981.

Harries, Patrick

"The anthropologist as historian and liberal: H.A. Junod and the Thonga". JSAS, 8, 1, 1981.